Is Marx a moral philosopher - Essay Example

?Is Marx a Moral Philosopher? Communist Manifesto declares in clear terms: “communism abolishes…all religion and all morality, rather than constituting them on a new basis” (Marx & Engels, 1848). For many people, this stands as the very basis for the argument that Marxian philosophy has nothing to do with morality. However, a look into Marxian philosophy proves that it is strongly based on the concept of justice and morality. However, the mere fact is that Marx himself was not aware of the influence of the basic tenets of morality while developing his own philosophy, and this may be the reason that very little does he mention about morality; both in criticising capitalism and in promoting communism. As Cohen (1978, cited in Joshua, Cohan, 1982) rightly points it out; Marx was unaware of the element of morality in his philosophy. So, he failed to discuss morality. Thus, it becomes evident that morality is not at all explicit in Marxian philosophy. So, this work intends to analyze what implicit morality is inherent in Marxian philosophy. The first question addressed here is why Marx explicitly denied the applicability of morality in his philosophy. In order to understand the reason, one has to go back to the nineteenth century where, according to Marx and other critical philosophers, ‘exploitative economic arrangement’ was the major facet of the society. In that situation, morality and ethics were just false consciousness that was well-molded to fit into the exploitative regime of capitalism. So, it was necessary for him to declare that morality (as it existed in the capitalist society) does not deserve to be preserved. Instead, he declares that he would constitute morality on a new basis. Thus, it becomes evident that morality in Marxian philosophy can only be understood from the reasons he uses to declare capitalism as unjust and communism as just. As Rawls and Freeman, 2007, p. 320) describes, the very first argument put forward by Marx against capitalism is that it is based on the exploitation of the worker. In other words, he declares that capitalism is not an arena that offers mutual benefit but it involves systematic extraction of profit from one group (ibid). However, the trouble at this juncture is that Marx does not declare in clear terms that such an exchange is unjust. Instead, he declares that it is ‘by no means an injustice’ in his Capital (Marx, 1939l). In the words of Wood (1981, p.91), it is natural to see such an attitude from the part of Marx because he could not achieve a trans-epochal standpoint from where he could comment on the justice of that economic system. In other words, he was not free from the bounds of historical materialism. So, according to him, morality purely involved the stabilising of economic structure (ibid). However, a more rational explanation seems to appear from Husami (1978) who argues that it is possible to see that Marx thought capitalism unjust even in the absence of explicit words. It is pointed out by the scholar that for Marx, there are two sets of ideas; that of the ruling class and that of the non-ruling class. In a capitalist society, the ideas of the ruling class receive attention and approval. On the other hand, in a communist society, the ideas of the proletariat receive more attention. According to Marx, the latter is the right way (ibid); and capitalism is unjust. In addition, one can see the use of words like ‘embezzlement’, ‘robbery’ and ‘exploitation’ to explain capitalism. According to Cohen (1978, cited in Joshua, Cohan, 1982), these words are sufficient to reach the conclusion that for Marx, capitalism was unjust and hence against morality. Thus, the scholar points out that Marx, like many others, did not have adequate knowledge about his own mind. Thus, throughout the explicit response, he managed to avoid calling capitalism as ‘unjust’. In the words of Hampsher-Monk (1992, p. 487), the idea comes more than evident through the overall sense of the texts. At least, the analysis is sufficient to reach the conclusion that for Marx, capitalism involves poverty, overwork, lack of fulfillment and freedom (ibid). Then, the only question that needs to be answered is whether this conclusion is a moral one or an economic one. A rational answer is that the conclusion is a moral one. Thus, Marx’s criticism of capitalism is a moral one. Now, the next step is to analyse whether Marx thinks communism is the right way because it is just. A look into the Critique of the Gotha Programme (Marx, 1875) proves that communism is a society in which every person could contribute according to their ability and everyone could receive according to their requirements. Evidently, this is nothing more than a perfect theory of justice. Thus, if justice is ensuring everyone what they want and allowing everyone to contribute according to their capability, one has to accept that communism is based on moral concepts. On the other hand, if someone claims that ensuring justice is to ensure proper resolution of disputes, communism again becomes the perfect society because there is no dispute in a communist society (Rawls & Freeman, 2007, p. 335). In order to understand this situation, one should look into the circumstances of justice as proposed by Hume. According to Hume (cited in Levi, 1984), if there is enormous material abundance that allows everyone to have what they wanted without invading the share of others, rules of justice will not be developed. Thus, in the communist society which offers material abundance, there is no need for institutions of justice. There is one more circumstance in which rules of justice would not be needed. This is the situation where all people share the complete fellow-feeling. In such situations too, there will not be the requirement for rules of justice. Now it becomes evident that this condition is totally fulfilled in the communist ideology. It seems that though his tenets are basically moral in nature, Marx did not want to commend communism on moral grounds. It is evident from his declaration that communism abolishes all religion and morality. However, the mere fact is that even though Marx declines to use morality as the basis, as Wolff (2002, p. 65) argues, a scholar cannot deny the existence of morality in Marxian philosophy. To illustrate, if morality is given the meaning of ensuring wellbeing of all, then communism as propounded by Marx is certainly moral in nature (ibid). Almost similar views are shared by Brenkert (1983, p. 65) in Marx’s ethics of freedom. It is pointed out by the scholar that the common notion is that Marx got out certain fixed ideas of his head, which are intended to make everyone happy and able to enjoy life. Also, what makes Marxism unique from all other social systems is its anti-ethical tendency; and this is so because there is not even a ‘single grain’ of ethical judgment other than an ethical postulate (ibid). Brenkert (1983) again goes back to the claim that Marx was the victim of historical materialism in which ethical laws only attempted to solve social antagonism through moral coercion rather than removal of the basic causes. Following the same method and slightly improving the same, Marx avoided criticizing the existing system and introduced a radically new idea which, instead of developing ethical principles to cope with the capitalist exploitation, sought to introduce an ideal society. Admittedly, those who believe Marx has no connection with morality claim that the language used by the moralists is far too different from the language used by Marx. However, it is claimed by Avineri (1970, p. 23) that there are no such words as moral words. The words like ‘good’, ‘right’ and ‘duty’ are not merely moral words. These words can be used for different purposes in different contexts; and in the same way, other words and expressions can take the place of these moral words (ibid). This situation goes true for Marx who did not use the traditional moral words of ‘justice’, ‘right’, and ‘duty’ and so on. Instead of these words, as Brenkert (1983) points out, one can see the use of vocabulary like ‘human’, ‘inhuman’, ‘exploitation’, ‘freedom’, ‘slavery’, ‘dependence’, ‘subjugation’, ‘imperfection’, ‘defect’, ‘brutalisation’, ‘venality’, ‘corruption’, ‘prostitution’, ‘money-relation’, ‘self-interest’, ‘despotism’, ‘suffering’, ‘impotent’, ‘involuntary’ and so on (p. 15). In fact, a look into morality proves that the words used by Marx are more concrete in nature, which can contain deeper concepts than words like ‘good’ and ‘right’ do. In addition, the words like ‘self-interest’, ‘suffering’, and ‘slavery’ can only be understood in the context of morality and justice. Thus, it becomes evident that the absence of the traditional moral vocabulary does not mean that Marx had evident antipathy towards morality and ethics. One can see that the allegation of the abandonment of traditional moral language is an irrational exaggeration. In fact, one can see Marx criticizing the ‘tainted morals’ and ‘evils’ of wages under capitalism. In addition is his claim that the ‘elimination of exchange value will help do away with the ‘evil’ of bourgeois society’. Thus, Marx claims that communism is a situation where “communist artisans associated with one another…the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies” (Marx, 1844). Thus, according to Marx, in a communist society, ‘the enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor’ vanishes, and labor becomes not only a means of life but the prime requirement of life (ibid). That means there will be all-round development of the individual along more abundant flow of cooperative wealth. Thus, as Buchanan, 1982, p. 78) observes, the allegation that Marx was not a moral philosopher is often the result of analysing various isolated quotations instead of understanding the true sense of his entire philosophy. Secondly, the allegation that he did not use the traditional morality-linked words is the result of the inability to understand the presence of certain vocabulary that possesses even deeper moral values than the traditional words (ibid). In fact, there is one class of thought that argues that Marx has no morality because he has failed to introduce an ethics of duty. According to this group, morality is centrally concerned with duties and obligations a person has towards another. According to this ideology, morality is marked by the presence of certain principles like duty, obligation, guilt, justice, rights, and so on. When morality is viewed in the light of this concept alone, it becomes evident that Marx does not have a moral concept in his repertoire. However, there is another class of thought that claims that morality should be understood as linked to certain values, virtues, excellences, and a life of total wellbeing. This system is not about introducing rules, regulations, duties and obligations to follow, but about nurturing certain basic character traits which create such a society where rules of duties and obligations are no more required. In the opinion of Lukes (1985, p. 51), while the traditional moral view preached ‘kill not’, Marx went one step ahead and preached ‘hate not’. Thus, very evidently, Marx had morality in his philosophy. According to Peffer (p. 374), there are various reasons why Marx intentionally avoided the moral words of the time from his philosophy. First of all, the words were closely linked to, and highly appropriated by, the moralists of that time; and those moralists were all proponents of duty-bound and obligatory morality as against the concept of Marx (ibid). Thus, for Marx, the causes were more important than the effects. So, Marx rightly points out that money overturns and confounds all human and natural qualities. Marx wanted to go beyond the superficial and coercive concepts of duty and obligation into the realities of society which make people behave in a particular way. That is, for Marx, the morality is not different from the crucial areas of life, but a particular way of life where what one does will be well in accordance with the concepts of morality even without coercion from the principles of duty or obligation. In other words, when one leads a virtuous life, there is no need to develop rules of moral obligation. Thus, it becomes evident that the morality professed by Marx is far broader and deeper than the moral concepts of 19th century and even today. Thus, there arises the baseless allegation that Marxian philosophy does not contain morality. There comes a radically new proposition from Lukes, 1985, p. 112) that the morality as proposed by Marx is very similar to the moral concepts of ancient Greeks. To illustrate, the Greeks were more concerned about developing a kind of life that best suits human beings as against the narrow view of fulfilling moral duty. To illustrate, they sought the kind of activities that help a person flourish in life and looked for a moral life par excellence. Very similar was the approach of Marx too. Instead of blaming the existing system of morality, he thought about ways of making the lives of all happier. For example, he claims in his Capital (1:232) that laborers should be given adequate time to meet their intellectual and social requirements. Thus, obviously, what Marx considered as ethics is different from what many people consider as morality. Admittedly, philosophers like Plato and Aristotle have given a lot of stress on duty and obligation which are deeply linked to the Judaeo-Christian-bred view of humanity. The problem with this view is that it does not about how to change the existing system so that people get a favorable circumstance where morality is easily practiced. Instead, they introduce principles of duty and obligation which often turn coercive as the circumstances are not conducive. In sharp contradiction with this view, Marx ventured to develop an ideal situation where there is material abundance. The specialty of this ideal situation is that one contributes according to ones ability and gets according to ones requirements. In fact, the ethics of virtue as seen in Marxism and the ethics of duty are differently related to social change. To illustrate, ethics of duty deals with what one person owes to another person in the society and hence, it can be converted into legalised codes. That means, as already seen, such codes only result in minor changes in the existing capitalism. In other words, these codes will only act as controllers of troubles in order to strengthen capitalism. This makes it clear that ethics of duty is deeply linked to, and a product of, capitalism. In sharp contrast, the ethics of virtue is a radically new way of finding such ways of life which enable people to flourish. However, the judgments based on this concept cannot be easily translated into law as they are in sharp contradiction with capitalism. That means adopting the ethics of virtue requires a total altering of the existing social structure. Thus it becomes evident that the ethics of virtue as seen in Marxian philosophy required revolution; not evolution. In fact, there were various reasons that made Marx look for alternative ways of social system. In the nineteenth century, the society was marked by alienation as he has noted. The workers were alienated from the product of their work, from the process of production, and from their own essential nature as human beings. As a young man, he adopted the motto that ‘nothing humane is alien to me’ and soon reached the conclusion that the class that can liberate the society is the proletariat. Puffer (1990) argues that Marx was heavily influenced by the Feuerbach view that ‘the essence of man is contained only in the community and unity of man with man’. Following this class of thought, Marx opined that ‘the essential human nature lies in true community of man’; and moving ahead of Feuerbach, Marx made the realisation that the proletariat lives in ‘disastrous isolation from this essential nature’ (ibid). While Feuerbach did not resort to looking for better alternatives, Marx made the complaint in his Theses on Feuerbach (1845) that philosophers have only tried to interpret the existing world situation in various different ways. Instead of suggesting ways to change the same, philosophers have only called for people to change it. After declaring that the working class is alienated from the basic human nature, Marx tried to dig deep into the basic reasons behind the antagonistic nature of modern society. Thus, he reached the conclusion that a society that is divided into social classes could not enhance human freedom. At that point, in order to point out the importance of removing class distinctions and enhancing harmony, Marx relied on the Greek philosophy which maintained that humans are fundamentally social beings. It also held that in order for humans to express their human essence properly, it is necessary to live in harmony. It is this understanding that made Marx claim that unlike other animals, humans produce universally as an act of exhibiting volition. From the above discussion, it becomes evident that Marx was not against morality but was against the traditional moral concepts and words. In other words, he was against the morality of duty. This is so because he was of the opinion that the ethics of duty itself was the product of capitalism and it only acted as a tool to strengthen capitalism. This is so because the ethical principles of duty were aimed to make people come into terms with the issues they faced in the capitalist and class-divided society. Those Judaeo-Christian- bred principles did not resort to look into and remove the basic social situations which resulted in such a social situation where the proletariat was in total isolation which even denied their basic human needs of social life. In contradiction with the ethics of duty, Marx wanted to introduce ethics of virtue that called for the creation of such a social circumstance where the coercive concepts of duty and obligation are no more required. Marx envisioned such a society where everyone contributes according to ones ability and gets according to ones needs. In such a society, people get adequate time to fulfill their social needs. In such a society where there is material abundance and the feeling of shared responsibility, humans will no longer require the ethics of duty. This might be the reason why Marx did not use the usual words which are used in moral scholarship. Instead of them, he adopted such words that are suitable for ethics of virtue and are wider and deeper in their coverage. In total, Marxian philosophy is moral in nature but in a way different from the Judaeo-Christian concept of moral duty. References Buchanan, A.E. 1982. Marx and justice: the radical critique of liberalism. London: Taylor & Francis. Brenkert, G.G. 1983. Marx’s ethics of freedom. London: Routledge & Kogen Paul Inc. Cohen, J. 1982. Review of G. A Cohen. Karl Marx’s theory of history. Journal of Philosophy, 79, pp. 253-273. Carl Marx. 1875. Critique of the Gotha Programme. Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume Three, pp. 13-30. [online] Available at: [Accessed 15 March 2012]. Carver, T. 1982. Marx’s social theory. NY: Oxford University Press. Carl Marx’s Capital. 1939. [online] Available at: [Accessed 15 March 2012]. Carl Marx. 1845. Theses on Feuerbach. [online] Available at: [Accessed 15 March 2012]. Husami, Z. 1978. Marx on distributive justice. 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