Introduction to International Relations - Essay Example

? Introduction to International Relations (ADD (add tuto’r (add Introduction to International Relations A number of theories have been developed by scholars to explain state behavior. Some such important theories are classical realism, neo-realism, neo-classical realism, liberalism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism. The very basic principle of classical realism is that all states are looking for ways to increase their power and to decrease the power of their enemies. However, neo-realism accepts state reactions are not always based on the nature of the states, but based on the nature of the international system. Neo-classical realism is a combination of both classical and neo realism that accepts both system level and state level natures. Liberalism is a state level theory that believes in the goodness of society. It argues that states try to create peace and cooperation. The last theory is constructivism that claims that the reason behind a particular state behavior is the unique features of the state. Admittedly, in order to understand the America-Vietnam relation, a mere state level theory will be gravely insufficient. The best way to understand the U.S- Vietnam relation throughout the history is to analyze it in the light of a system level theory as the relation was, and is, largely shaped by the international power equations, not because of the special features existed in the nature of America or Vietnam. In addition, neither America nor Vietnam showed even the slightest hint of benevolence, thus proving the unsuitability of constructivism. Thus, the theory that can best explain the relation is neo-realism, and a little bit of force can make classical realism too fit for explaining the relations, though inadequate. The tenets of neo-realism Neo-realism is a system level theory and it does not take the individual character of states into consideration. According to neo-realism, the reactions of the states are the results of fluctuations in the international system. As there is no international government that controls the actions of governments, there is total anarchy in the international sphere that makes states always vulnerable to the atrocities by others. Thus, states are always in the effort to gain power in order to protect themselves. However, a rise in power and influence results in more rivalry and more unrest. In this international arena, states have no way other than either defending themselves or attacking their rivals first. A look into history will prove that the American-Vietnam relation was mainly the result of the power movements in the international sphere which was mainly bipolar in nature. The America-Vietnam Relation A look into history proves that the American-Vietnam relation can be better understood in the light of neo-realist perspective. The neo-realism, similar to classical realism, argues that all states try to amass power, and that while seeking to increase their own power, they seek to reduce the power of their enemies too. In addition, it is argued in the theory that such states consider other states with power as their enemies. When there is equality of power, peace exists as the players are equal in resources. According neo-realism, the nature of the international system gives birth to power struggles among nations. As Glenn, Howlett, and Poore (2004, 22) state, since there is no world government that controls the movements of national governments, there is total anarchy, and the governments do everything they can to remain secure; hence, when there is a perceived threat to their sovereignty, states either attack first hand or defend themselves using any possible means they have access to. Admittedly, a look into the America-Vietnam relations will prove that the American intervention in Vietnam was the result of the international power relations that existed at that time, and at that point of time, US had no other option other than the military action. Admittedly, the American interest in the Far East is as old as the National Security Council Report No. 68 (NSC 68) of 1950. Here, one should remember the fact that this highly confidential policy had its birth even before the Korean War. As Virden (2008, 82-83) points out, the document opined that in order to counter the Soviet Union’s military power that strengthened through the development of nuclear weapons, it is necessary for the US to raise its military and economic power; the report also pointed out that the US should be capable of helping those nations in Europe and around Japan which are threatened by the USSR aggression (NSC 68). Evidently, US prepared to face the challenge with increased military power. Here, one has to remember the fact that the issue here is international in scope as claimed by neo-realists. Thus, evidently, the US policy to be active in the Far East as a result of the NSC 68 recommendations is only a reaction to the international system that was predominantly bipolar. At this juncture, it seems useful to go back to the neo-realist claim that all power struggles are not a result of the nature of the states, but can be a function of the nature of the international system. A closer look into history will prove that US had no other option left in the international arena other than taking active role in Vietnam. To illustrate, France was considerably losing its position in the Far East, and eventually history witnessed France’s failure in the 1954 Dien Bien Phu conflict and the consequent withdrawal. The issue was compounded by the fact that Mao Tse-tung Communism came into power in China in 1949 followed by the claim that China and Russia are ‘foreign friends’. Admittedly, it was necessary for China to get united with like-minded Russia and its allies. Evidently, the international power relations and influences were changing dramatically. As Waltz points out, “states work harder to increase their own strength, or combine with others if they are falling behind” (Waltz, 2010, 126). The already alarmed US got another terrible blow when the USSR and China acknowledged the legitimacy of Ho Chi Minh government in Vietnam. It seemed that the whole Far East was coming under the hold of Communism. As France lost at Dien Bien Phu, the US had no other way other than sending American troops to Vietnam. At this point, there is one more thing that deserves attention, that is, Japan was in close proximity of China, and the US imperium was under constant threat from the growing Chinese power. In fact, as Organski (1968, 321-322) points out, China, with its vast boundaries and huge population, had the potential to become a world power. Admittedly, this situation made it necessary for the US to work to ensure its presence in the Far East. President Eisenhower’s speech of 1956 points out “There is no one in this room that needs a blueprint of how important it is to us that Japan stays outside the Iron Curtain. A nation of 90 million industrious and inventive people, tied in with Communist China…would pose a threat to US that would be very grave” (Etats-Unis, 1999, 424). Here, one thing becomes evident, the American sending of troops to Vietnam following the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1964, according to Rusk (1968, 255-257) was the result of the long term changing dynamics in an international system. Thus, one has to understand the fact that the US was one among the many players in the international system; USSR, China, and their allies, to mention but few. However, the following period witnessed a considerable shift in the US strategy as the international relations changed unexpectedly. First of all, the war budget made a hole in the US pocket, and hence, the sanity of the war became a matter of dispute in the domestic front. As Virden (2008, 128-140), points out, there was widespread criticism, and because of the civil unrest, the nation had no other way other than to think about a retreat, or a change in the equation. As a result, as Crockatt (1996, 241) points out, the diplomats in US prepared a list of priorities in American foreign policy towards Vietnam. It allocated 70% priority to avoid a humiliating defeat, and 20% to keep South Vietnam people free from China hands, and the remaining 10% to improve the life of the South Vietnam people. Though it wanted to withdraw, US had no other way other than continuing the battle, not for victory, but for strategy at that point of time. As Morgenthau (1965, 12) points out, America sent only a meager portion of its military power to Vietnam that was evidently not sufficient to win the battle. Admittedly, it was a change in the international power system that made it necessary for US to reach Vietnam. Fortunately for the US, the remaining period saw the international system shifting from a bipolar to tri-polar arrangement with the worsening Russia-China relations. This situation gave the US a much needed way out. At that juncture, there was evident lack of agreement between China and Russia. At this time, the American intellect brought out its time-tested strategy of divide and rule. It decided to strengthen South Vietnam and to withdraw its forces gradually. In addition, America renewed its strategic alliance with China, and history saw President Nixon visiting China n 1972. America got assurance from China that its bases in Northeast Asia would not be threatened. In addition, both the countries agreed that Russia was the main security concern for both the states. A review of the above discussed information proves that American activity in Vietnam was not totally isolated from the distribution of power in the international system. Thus, it becomes evident that only neo-realism could explain the relation between America and Vietnam till 1970s. Now, a look into the present day Vietnam proves that both Vietnam and America are moving according to the changing international relations. Now, while US realizes the need to keep its relations with Vietnam because of the need to ensure its presence in Asia, Vietnam finds it necessary to have links with America because of its worries about the escalating influence of China in Southeast Asia. Presently, Vietnam has good relations with both US and China. So, the tenet of classical realism that states are usually guided by the logic of the national interest, ranging from survival, security, power and relative capabilities become paramount. To illustrate, presently, Vietnam has diplomatic relations with 160 nations and bilateral trade agreement with 80 nations. In addition, Vietnam is the member of United Nations since 1977. As Mason (2010) argues, the continued interest of America in Vietnam as a way to handle China threat became evident when US helped Vietnam when there was China encroachment in the South China Sea. In this case, US was eager to have international talk to ensure China back out. In addition, one can see that Vietnam has changed many of its harsh Communist policies, thus justifying the classical realist view that national interest is paramount. For example, in 2005, Vietnam passed comprehensive religious freedom legislation. As Trang (July 2010) points out, Considering the situation that exists at present, Vietnam manages relations with both US and China, and US, in turn, ensures that its relations with Vietnam remains intact; and this is evident from the Bush visit to Vietnam and Triet visit to Washington. In addition are the various trade agreements that make US the largest export market of Vietnam. Over the years from 2001 to 2010, there was a ten fold increase in bilateral trade. Evidently, Vietnam will not risk opposing the US in the present situation. Though many of the historians prefer to claim that US intervention in Vietnam was an utter failure, the reality is that it was a huge success in political and economic terms. Presently, US enjoy reasonable relationship with China and without any risk of losing its influence on other Asian nations by ensuring China’s cooperation. Conclusion In total, US-Vietnam relation can be well understood only in the light of neo-realist and classical realist perspectives. Admittedly, both the players are moving according to the changing international power relations. Again, the neo-realist claim that nations tend to defend themselves by whatever means they can when there is a perceived threat to their sovereignty is justified seeing the still continuing and growing relationship between US and Vietnam. Their efforts to accommodate each other despite differences and doubts give additional proof for the interest. References Crockatt, Richard. 1996. The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991. London: Routledge. Etats-Unis. 1999. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower. US: Government Printing Office. Glenn, John, Howlett, Darryl and Poore, Stuart. 2004. Neorealism versus Strategic Culture. USA: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. NSC 68: United States objectives and programs for national security. National Security Council. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm. (27 Oct 2011). Mason, M. 2011. “U.S. Vietnam military relations: Former enemies now military mates”. Huff Post, Oct 28. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/09/us-vietnam-military-relat_n_675202.html. (28 Oct 2011). Morgenthau, Hans Joachim. 1970. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-70. US: Praeger. Organski, A. F. K. 1968. World Politics. US: Knopf. Rusk, Dean. 1968. “On Red China’s Nuclear Testing”. in Twenty Years of Crises: The Cold War Era. Ed. Kim, Yum Young. Prentice-Hall. Trang, T. 2010. “U.S-Vietnam relations are moving in the right direction”. Watching America, 15 July. http://watchingamerica.com/News/62082/u-s-vietnam-relations-are-moving-in-the-right-direction/. (27 Oct 2011). Virden, Jenel. 2008. Americans and the Wars of the Twentieth Century. UK: Palgrave Macmillan. Waltz, Kenneth, Neal. 2010. Theory of International Politics. New York: Waveland Press. Read More