Vietnam: How We Got There - Research Paper Example

Vietnam: How We Got There? Introduction In 1946, alliance between the Vietminh and France weakened, and all-out war erupted between them of the same year (Schulzinger 1997, 5). At first the United States only played the role of an onlooker. Washington continued its tradition of regarding Indochina as a particularly minor region. Formally the United States declared that the concern of Indochina’s future involved France, but eventually, top American officers started to pay more involved attention on Southeast Asia’s future (Gurtov 1967, 82). The increasing American interest on the triumph of France in its battle against the Vietminh overlapped with, and embodied a portion of, the growth of the Cold War. Europe stood for the original stadium of the Cold War, but occurrences in Asia contributed largely to the expansion of the rift between the Soviet Union and the United States (Neu 2005, 62). When President Harry Truman’s government resolved in 1946 that the Soviet Union intimidated the interests and security of the United States and its allies, Americans assumed as well that problems in one region were closely connected to issues and predicaments elsewhere (Schulzinger 1997, 8). While American officials recognized that the issues of the world are interrelated, they progressively created a global policy to control Soviet antagonism. Even though Southeast Asia did not turn out to be a main arena of interest for the United States in the period following 1945 politicians and planners in Washington eventually recognized the issues of the region as one part of the clash between East and West (Neu 2005, 47). This essay will argue that the United States involvement in the Vietnam War had been created by the commitment of Truman and Eisenhower. The Harry Truman Commitment: From 1950-53 Until now historians have devoted very little on the issue of Truman and U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Nguyen’s theory is that American involvement in the Vietnam War was strongly determined during the final years of the administration of Truman, not in the government of Eisenhower as numerous historians have asserted (Levantrosser 1986, 16). Eisenhower only carried on the policy of Truman’s administration. Similarly, Gaddis Smith held the Truman administration responsible for the American involvement in the Vietnam War in a 1973 commentary when he stated: “There are many candidates for the precise date the United States went to war in Indochina, May 8, 1950 is the best” (Levantrosser 1986, 17). Evidently, Smith is talking about the time that Truman initially declared that his government was providing financial support to the French to help them in their fight against the Viet Minh. This pledge of financial assistance is in agreement with the Truman Doctrine. It essentially confirmed that the United States would aid any sovereign nation or free people fight non-democratic ideology and outside or domestic conquest by another nation (Ferrell 2006, 38). Basically this implied that the United States would fight communist invasions in other nations. The growth of communism, by all measures, had been successfully hampered by the Truman Doctrine and containment and it was believed that these strategies would be successful wherever democratic nations were challenged by communist hostility (Watson, Devine & Wolz 2005, 75-76). That challenge came forward in a region called Indochina. By the 1890s, France had triumphantly occupied Indochina, namely, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos. During the Second World War Indochina was occupied by the Japanese Empire, as France was overpowered in that Southeast Asian region (Neu 2005, 3). France aimed to re-enforce colonial power over Indochina, especially over Vietnam, after the downfall of the Japanese Empire. The Vietnamese urgently initiated armed struggle against France and established a resistance party, the Vietminh (Ferrell 2006, 58). The United States was originally opposed to the idea of assisting French forces in reinstating colonial control. In the broad framework of the Cold War, alongside China’s adoption of communism, France was successful in persuading the United States that Vietminh opposition to invasion was motivated by communism and a component of the general Chinese and Soviet grand strategy to become superpowers (Edwards 2009, 454). America made a decision to assist France and provide them with martial support. Considering that the United States had created the containment policy to stop the expansion of communism and implemented the Truman Doctrine to aid sovereign nations oppose suppression by others, it became reasonable to entrust American military forces to South Vietnam’s defense. The Viet Cong and North Vietnam martially planning and behaving against South Vietnam’s administration were seen as counter to the Truman Doctrine and containment policy (Ferrell 2006, 60). The United States perceived this attack as a new effort to expand global communism by Communist China and the Soviet Union. The previous triumphs of the United States with the Truman Doctrine and containment policy rendered its military pledge to South Vietnam’s defense a rational decision given U.S. foreign policy as it had developed in the aftermath of WWII. II. The Eisenhower Presidency: The Major Turning Point Dwight Eisenhower, in the initial phase of his presidential term, sustained the policy of Truman of aiding the French; however, the most decisive moment in the US involvement in the Vietnam War took place after the 1954 Geneva Conference (Divine 1981, 54). The involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War, before 1954, had included providing financial and materials assistance to France (Neu 2005, 41). The administration of Eisenhower changed from a tactical assistance to a trial in nation-building during 1954 (Lomperis 1996, 320). The Vietnam War had become more and more detested and notorious in France by 1954 (Neu 2005, 43). The triumph of the Communist forces at Dienbienphu over the French forces stripped France of massive resources and energy. The withdrawal of France was made official in May 1954, at the Geneva Convention (Bowie & Immerman 1998, 22). Vietnam was momentarily partitioned, with Emperor Bao Dai over the south and Ho Chi Minh over the north. The Geneva Accords proclaimed that national elections will be held resulting in Vietnam’s reunification in 1956 (Schulzinger 1997, 88). Nevertheless, the involvement of the United States guaranteed that this ‘momentary split’ was to endure for more than two decades (Schulzinger 1997, 88). The Geneva Accords met refusal and defiance from the United States. John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State of Eisenhower, mobilized partners, particularly South-east Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Britain (Medhurst 1994, 38). As a challenge to the Geneva Accords, which had banned Vietnamese from joining foreign associations or to permit foreign forces in Vietnam, the signatories from SEATO concurred to safeguard South Vietnam (Sanders 2008, 50). The administration of Eisenhower supported Bao Dai in making Ngo Dinh Diem the prime minister, and afterwards continued to embark on state-building (Schulzinger 2006, 135). Dulles and Eisenhower built a new nation, once more as a challenge to the Geneva Accords and to what was recognized to be the resolve of the citizens of Vietnam (Lomperis 1996, 59). Eisenhower documented in his journals that he was aware of the fact that Ho Chi Minh would have garnered majority of the votes if there had been a true democratic elections in 1956 (Divine 1981, 147). The United States had supported a fake political formation, the nation of South Vietnam, in order to thwart an entirely Communist Vietnam (Divine 1981, 152). Eisenhower prepared to aid Diem in organizing South Vietnam after Geneva. He formed the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) and commissioned General ‘Lightning Joe’ Collins to speed up the mission (Sanders 2008, 50). The United States also pushed and aided Diem to overthrow Bao Dai. The withdrawal of France implied that Eisenhower could have abandoned the pledge of Truman in Vietnam. The latter had helped French forces, and France had exited (Neu 2005, 62). The integrity of the United States was not threatened, because it was France who had been defeated. Nevertheless, the exit of France from Vietnam was perceived by Dulles as a very good prospect for further US intervention (Schulzinger 2006, 29). Dulles stated, “We have a clean base there now, without the faint taint of colonialism” (Sanders 2008, 50). He declared Dienbienphu ‘a blessing in disguise’ (p. 50). When the regime of Eisenhower built South Vietnam, the pledge of Truman had not been restored but reconstructed, with a significantly higher extent of US accountability (Bowie & Immerman 1998, 71). The administration of Eisenhower and American scholars had considerable uncertainties about the headship of Diem. The then Vice President Richard Nixon believed that the people of South Vietnam do not possess the capacity to rule themselves (Schulzinger 2006, 155). Dulles even revealed that the United States helped Diem “because we knew of no one better” (Sanders 2008, 50). As stated by Dulles’s biographer, Townsend Hoopes, “magnificently ignorant of Vietnamese history and culture” (p. 50). Dulles continued taking for granted Vietnamese aspirations and the reputation of Ho Chi Minh, all for the disliked Diem, a professed Christian in a principally Buddhist society (Sanders 2008, 50). Dulles had stated in 1941 that “the great trouble with the world today is that there are too few Christians” (Sanders 2008, 51). In the tyrants of East Asia, such as Ngo Dinh Diem and Chiang Kai-shek, who were members of Christian organizations, the United States had discovered individuals with the potential of making Dulles’s ambition a reality (Medhurst 1994, 79). As claimed by Dulles, in any case the United States is protected by desirable collaborators and Jesus Christ Himself (Sanders 2008, 51). The administration of Eisenhower was greatly informed of the popularity of Ho Chi Minh. Nevertheless, Vietnam was not the critical issue, but its place as a possible domino in the Cold War. Eisenhower had claimed, in his speech in 1954, that if Communism successfully occupied Vietnam, other countries might follow (Bowie & Immerman 1998, 66). This is what he called the ‘domino theory’ (Divine 1981, 171). In spite of all the uncertainties, the administration of Eisenhower persisted with Diem. There were almost a thousand of US consultants assisting Diem and his military by the end of the term of Eisenhower (Sanders 2008, 51). The legacy of Eisenhower was strengthening and sustaining the anti-Communist sentiment, particularly in Indochina. When one takes into account the argument of the Cold war during the period, Eisenhower displayed extreme control in preventing US involvement during the Dienbienphu disorder. Remarkable management of his personnel and widespread political and military knowledge and experience led to granting the United States the most favorable solution possible (Medhurst 1994, 94). Nevertheless, his decisions after Geneva were inclined toward the unfavorable. The problem had fundamentally become an issue of state building and Eisenhower entirely placed his expectations on a Vietnamese head who was incapable of building any kind of extensive based support and was deficient of attributes needed to satisfy the mounting internal conflict (Schulzinger 2006, 26). Eisenhower was certain that new techniques could counteract the disintegrating condition, but launched merely shallow reforms. Eisenhower, in a summary of US policy concerning Indochina, informed congress representatives (Nashel 2005, 96): The United States is the central key, the core of democracy, economically, militarily, and spiritually… We are establishing international outposts where people can develop their strength to defend themselves… We are trying with these programs to build up for the United States a position in the world of freedom of action (p. 96). Eisenhower’s grand economic assistance agendas fell short in offering any appropriate solutions to the issue and merely reinforced US involvement, while weakening the integrity of Diem. Eventually, Eisenhower had prevented the United States from completely participating in the war, but had failed to initiate peace (Schulzinger 1997, 107). Rather, he failed to provide his successors clear-cut resolutions and wide-ranging alternatives that would in the end result in the misfortune of the United States in Vietnam. Conclusions Vietnams continued to be, until the 1954 Geneva Accords, the answer to the unity of the entire French empire. Apparently, the Geneva Accords openly documented the crush of France’s attempt to stop the push of Vietnamese nationalism (Neu 2005, 52). As a result, for France, Vietnam instantly mislaid its value as a sign of the reliability of the colonial empire of France and its capability of limiting the thrusts of nationalism. Occurrences in that empire quickly seemed to confirm the ten-pin premise as imperialistic ten-pins in North Africa eventually started to weaken and shudder (Schulzinger 2006, 163). It was not just twist of fate that only a few months after the Geneva Accords, pro-autonomy leaders in the most valuable territory of France, Algeria, let loose a large-scale military movement for self-government (Morgan 2010, 92). French forces focused in South Vietnam were at this point critically required to challenge the emerging anti-colonial movement in North Africa (Schulzinger 2006, 165). With the exit of French forces, France was stripped of the ability to meet one of the most important conditions of the Geneva Accords, namely, to carry out the civil organization in South Vietnam, until internationally administered elections for reunification were conducted (Lomperis 1996, 83). The opportunity was now accessible to the United States to assume political authority in the south, to disregard the pledged election, and independently embark on forming an anti-communist and self-governing state (Bowie & Immerman 1998, 16). Via this substitute administration, the regime of Eisenhower expected it would be capable of attaining success against the communist state of Ho Chi Minh founded in the south (Bowie & Immerman 1998, 23). Hence, even though Truman had pledged to assist in thwarting Communism in Vietnam via France, Dulles and Eisenhower tried to attain this objective directly, deliberately sidestepping France. Apparently, one can assume that the strengthening involvement of the United States under Eisenhower was not in general fated, because there were other potential directions that the defeat of France and the conditions of the Geneva Accords brought about. Nevertheless, provided with the political attitudes and interventionist tendencies of Dulles and Eisenhower, the heritage of a defined, openly endorsed anticommunist sentiment in Vietnam that Truman had created rendered it quite doubtful that the new presidency would head off from that point. Factually, the Eurocentric concerns that had initially pulled the administration of Truman into Vietnam were not relevant anymore, but the serious implications of the policy lingered (Ferrell 2006, 9). Definitely it had a large-scale physical and political effect on Vietnam, and it had placed the United States in definite resistance to the dominant nationalism in Vietnam. Moreover, in the belief of a large number of American people it had instituted Vietnam as an important vanguard in the fight against the aggressive expansionism of China and USSR, encouraging them, effectively, to acknowledge the establishment of an anticommunist effort and institution there (Schulszinger 2006, 61). With the administration of Truman having quite initiated the effort, it was on the brink of certainty that Dulles and Eisenhower would involve the US in Vietnam and quite probable that they would complement the initial major intervention of Truman with another one that would strengthen and establish its involvement. References Bowie, Robert & Richard Immerman. Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Brocheux, Pierre. 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East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1994. Morgan, Ted. Valley of Death: the tragedy at Dien Bien Phu that led America in the Vietnam War. New York: Random House, 2010. Nashel, Jonathan. Edward Lansdale’s Cold War. University of Massachusetts Press, 2005. Neu, Charles. America’s Lost War: Vietnam 1945-1975. Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2005. Peters, Gerhard; Woolley, John T. The Presidency A to Z. Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2008. Sanders, Viv. “Turning Points in the Vietnam War: Viv Sanders Takes Issue with Some All Too Common Assumptions.” History Review 61 (2008): 50+ Schulzinger, Robert. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Schulsinger, Robert. A Time for Peace: The Legacy of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Sheehan, Niel. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Modern Library, 2009. Watson, Cynthia Ann. U.S. National Security: A reference handbook. Santa Barbara California: ABC-CLIO, 2002. Watson, Robert, Michael Devine, & Robert Wolz. The National Security Legacy of Harry S. Truman. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University, 2005.   Read More