Is Vegetarianism a Demand of Morality - Coursework Example

Is Vegetarianism a Demand of Morality? Introduction Vegetarianism is an ancient and respectable doctrine. Many moral philosophers, including Peter Singer and Robert Nozick, have argued that vegetarianism is a matter of morality, and have advocated not eating meat on moral grounds (Martin, 1976). However, morality issues aside, there are many other reasons why some people choose to become vegetarians including health matters, scarcity of meat resources, food safety, environmental concerns, religious issues, and a dislike for meat, to name but a few (Brown, 2010; Hayes & Laudan, 2008). For this reason, it is evident that although some people may opt to become vegetarians out of moral grounds, not all vegetarians base their decisions on morality, and therefore, vegetarianism is not a demand of morality. This paper discusses this issue by presenting evidence that while there are moral grounds for becoming a vegetarian, vegetarianism is not necessarily a demand of morality. Reasons for vegetarianism As mentioned in the introduction, people may choose to eat a vegetarian diet for many different reasons. Hayes and Laudan (2008) group the reasons for vegetarianism into three categories: philosophical reasons, environmental reasons, and health reasons. Under philosophical reasons, Hayes and Laudan (2008) note that people who are vegetarian on ethical grounds do not believe (either personally or as part of the teachings of their religion) in the killing of an animal for food, or they may object to the ways in which animals are raised for food. For instance, vegetarians and vegans may be concerned with industrial farming conditions, or they may be against the killing of unwanted animals on free range farms. Additionally, Jains, Buddhists and many Hindus are vegetarian because of their belief in the principle of nonviolence, although some will consume meat if an animal has been slaughtered by other people. Jains will not even eat root vegetables, because the plants are killed rather than left to grow. As well, Seventh-Day Adventists believe that a vegetarian diet is more untainted and thus more spiritually desirable (Hayes & Laudan, 2008). Environmental reasons for vegetarianism are premised on the belief that vegetarian diets are a better choice for the environment (Hayes & Laudan, 2008). According to Hayes and Laudan (2008), vegetarians argue that animal farming is very land intensive and can result into environmental damage, particularly when sensitive areas such as rainforests are cleared to create more land for grazing. They may also point out that the land could be better utilised to grow grains instead of being used for rearing animals. This, they say, would yield more food per piece of land and could help to feed many hungry people across the world. As for health reasons, studies have indicated that people who restrict themselves to vegetarian diets tend to consume less saturated fats (which are found at the highest level in meat) and get higher amounts of beneficiary dietary fibre, and are less likely to suffer from high blood pressure and diabetes. Further, it is argued that vegetarians may be less susceptible to certain types of cancer (Hayes & Laudan, 2008). As well, some people are restricted to vegetarian diets because of a scarcity of meat and other animal products or because the items are too expensive (Brown, 2010). Where scarcity is not an issue, some people choose to become vegetarians for one or more of the reason mentioned above. Vegetarianism versus morality Moral philosophers including Peter Singer and Robert Nozick have urged people not to eat meat on the premise of morality (Martin, 1976). Such philosophers point out that people should not eat meat or animal products as a justification of their morality. This is referred to as moral vegetarianism. According to Martin (1976), moral vegetarianism is understood as the view that as a result of some moral principles, one ought not to eat some kinds of edible animals and some animal products. Along this line, there are two types of vegetarians: the lactovo variety who consider eating animal products such as eggs and milk not to be morally wrong; and the vegan variety, who regard eating animal products to be morally wrong (Martin, 1976). This twofold nature of vegetarians in itself raises questions about the connection between vegetarianism and the obligation to become a vegetarian. Judging from the nature of vegetarians as shown above, the moral obligation to be a vegetarian is debatable. According to DeGrazia (2009), most people, including ethicists and philosophers, are not vegetarians and apparently do not feel obligated to become vegetarians. As Martin (1976), argues, it is clear that to have any apparent validity, moral vegetarianism must be taken to mean that there is a prima facie duty, rather than absolute duty, not to eat meat or products derived from animals. The question is, would vegetarians rather die than opt to eat meat or animal products if they were presented with a situation where there was no non-animal food? Again, what would happen if such people ate meat or animal products (if not for health complications)? These two points amenable to discussion. But it is clear that the duty to be a vegetarian is a matter of personal decision, not a moral obligation. Moral vegetarians base their beliefs on respect for animals’ right to live. To such people, an animal’s life can be likened to a human being’s life, and thus, killing an animal for food is comparable to killing a human being for the same purpose. Strict vegetarians will therefore argue that “one ought never to kill any nonhuman animal unless it were right to kill a human being in the same circumstance” (Martin, 1976, p. 15). From this standpoint, if is not right to kill a human being for food, it is also not right to kill and consume a bird or any other animal. Vegetarians holding a moderate position will argue that it is prima facie wrong to kill an animal for consumption but that certain human rights, such as the right to life, can override this clear wrong. From this perspective, it would not be right to kill a human being but it would be justifiable to kill an animal. Additionally, vegetarians will argue that while it is justifiable to kill an animal in some cases, this is not allowable in cases where meat substitutes are available. In this scenario, it is not clear why some vegetarians would allow killing of animals and denounce it in different situations; or why some vegetarians are strict not to consume any animal products while others consume them. In the same perspective, it is not clear from vegetarians which animals it is morally wrong to eat. This point is particularly complicated since it is not easy to determine microorganisms and other animals that might be willing to be eaten. Additionally, it is not clear what vegetarians would say were there genetically engineered animals. Further, there is no clear definition of an animal product and moral distinction of an animal product from an animal part. In this regard, it is not easy to distinguish between vegan vegetarianism and lactovo vegetarianism (Martin, 1976). Further problems of moral vegetarianism Moral vegetarians have not presented any adverse consequences of eating meat or animal products apart from merely saying that is not moral. Even religious beliefs, which seemed to be basis of a moral obligation to vegetarianism, seem to be wavering. For instance, original Buddhism can be considered to have been the clearest religion on the sacredness of life. The doctrine of ahimsa in the religion required nonviolence to all sentient creatures, and vegetarianism was a fundamental application of this principle (Hill, 1996). However, according to Hill (1996), today a majority of Buddhists representing the Mahayana tradition in Korea, Mongolia, Japan and China do not require vegetarianism. Yet Hinduism, which today is one of the religions known for adherence to vegetarianism, was predicated upon animal sacrifice in the past. In Christianity, vegetarianism is not advocated except in a few sects such as Seventh Day Adventist – even though there is evidence in Exodus and Genesis that first Christians observed a vegetarian diet (Hill, 1996). It is therefore obvious that even religious beliefs, which would place a moral demand for vegetarianism, are slowly losing grip. Still on the same issue, Phelps (2004) argues that even in religion, vegetarianism is not proposed on moral or ethical grounds such as “you shouldn’t eat meat because it is wrong” but as a potentially powerful tool for people’s own spiritual development. According to Maurer (2002), even vegetarian organisations avoid the moral aspect as they convince people to become vegetarians. They avoid presenting the public with an ethical basis for rejecting meat. An ethical basis implies that adherence to prescribed rules (in this case not eating meat or animal products) is viewed as a duty and a moral obligation (Maurer, 2002). Vegetarian organisations thus often take a more exemplary approach (in which adherence is processual) by encouraging change for one’s own benefit. The most common approach involves a slow educational process, based first on health and gradually moving toward more openly ideological concerns about animal rights and the environment. Leaders of such organisations argue that since most people initially change their eating habits out of self-interest, promoting health benefits capture existing personal concerns. There is also a belief that people will initially resist dietary change and take on vegetarianism gradually. Hence, advocates of vegetarianism typically avoid strategies that directly challenge inherent meat-eating practices and beliefs, doing away with the vegetarian identity in favour of a strategy that embraces as positive any and all movement toward a vegetarian diet (Maurer, 2002). Finally, going to back to the issues of animal rights, Warren (2000) objects to moral vegetarianism, through what she calls moral extensionist objection. Animal welfare activists fight for animal rights by arguing that nonhuman animals need to be considered because of the similarity they share with humans in terms of life. But according to the moral extensionist objection, animals cannot equal humans as there is a moral pecking order with humans at the top and all forms of nature below. Since animal welfare arguments for a universal moral vegetarianism are based on such flawed moral extensionist premises, it is noted that animal welfarism fails as an environmental ethic and as grounds for a universal moral vegetarianism (Warren, 2000). Conclusion In summation, the discussion in this paper shows that although there may be moral grounds for people becoming vegetarians, becoming a vegetarian per se is not a compulsory requirement of morality. That is, people may have moral reasons for not eating meat or animal products, but they are not obligated to be vegetarians because of their morality. As well, there are many other reasons that may drive people to maintaining vegetarian lifestyles, including health concerns, issues about safety of meat and animal products, environmental issues, scarcity of meat resources, religious issues and a general dislike for meat or animal products. Notably, there is no evidence that all these reasons are driven by moral concerns of the individuals involved. Morality as concerns vegetarianism implies that animals’ lives can be likened to human lives, and as such, vegetarians ought not to eat some types of edible animals and animal products since doing so interferes with the lives of the animals involved. However, the fact that there are lactovo vegetarians who do not consider it morally wrong to eat animal products such as eggs and meat and vegans who deem it morally wrong to consume meat or all forms of animal products makes it difficult to determine the moral obligation of becoming a vegetarian. It means that one can choose to avoid all animal products and meat while others can shun meat and eat other animal products. But there is another challenge of differentiating between animal parts and animal products. Importantly, there are no defined implications of not eating meat or animal products, only that is morally wrong. As such, it is apparent that it is not wrong to eat meat or animal products and thus, vegetarians do not consume these products just because they prefer that kind of lifestyle. Therefore, since vegetarianism can also be a matter of choice for the reasons highlighted above, it is evident that the practice is not a demand of morality. References Brown, J. E. (2010). Nutrition Now (6th edition). New York: Cengage Learning. DeGrazia, D. (2009). “Vegetarianism from a very broad basis.” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 6: 143-165. Retrieved 14 March 2012, from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cts=1331717972683&ved=0CDMQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gwu.edu%2F~philosop%2Ffaculty%2Fdocuments%2FDeGraziaMoral.pdf&ei=YmZgT_z5L8KX8gPs5JG6Bw&usg=AFQjCNGoKPRgc7E9daBjIsuGZVpKWo54DQ&sig2=6nFHf_5b8AexJ6EvHLhUVw Hayes, D. & Laudan R. (2008). Food and Nutrition, Volume 7. London: Marshall Cavendish. Hill, J. L. (1996). The Case for Vegetarianism: Philosophy for a Small Planet. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Martin, M. (1976). “A critique of moral vegetarianism.” Reason Papers No. 3 (Fall 1976) 13-43. Retrieved 14 March 2012, from http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=4&cts=1331718505258&ved=0CD0QFjAD&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.reasonpapers.com%2Fpdf%2F03%2Frp_3_2.pdf&ei=ZWRgT6SiE4WZ8gOWkNGZBw&usg=AFQjCNHFEIcFSFoNpuXCmjhYv9Eym3_-JA&sig2=_IXbFPaBKl_J0rUu7KnBiw Maurer, D. (2002). Vegetarianism: Movement or Moment? New York: Temple University Press. Phelps, N. (2004). The Great Compassion: Buddhism and Animal Rights. New York: Lantern Books. Warren, K. (2000). Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What it is and Why it Matters. London: Rowman & Littlefield. Read More

They may also point out that the land could be better utilised to grow grains instead of being used for rearing animals. This, they say, would yield more food per piece of land and could help to feed many hungry people across the world. As for health reasons, studies have indicated that people who restrict themselves to vegetarian diets tend to consume less saturated fats (which are found at the highest level in meat) and get higher amounts of beneficiary dietary fibre, and are less likely to suffer from high blood pressure and diabetes.

Further, it is argued that vegetarians may be less susceptible to certain types of cancer (Hayes & Laudan, 2008). As well, some people are restricted to vegetarian diets because of a scarcity of meat and other animal products or because the items are too expensive (Brown, 2010). Where scarcity is not an issue, some people choose to become vegetarians for one or more of the reason mentioned above. Vegetarianism versus morality Moral philosophers including Peter Singer and Robert Nozick have urged people not to eat meat on the premise of morality (Martin, 1976).

Such philosophers point out that people should not eat meat or animal products as a justification of their morality. This is referred to as moral vegetarianism. According to Martin (1976), moral vegetarianism is understood as the view that as a result of some moral principles, one ought not to eat some kinds of edible animals and some animal products. Along this line, there are two types of vegetarians: the lactovo variety who consider eating animal products such as eggs and milk not to be morally wrong; and the vegan variety, who regard eating animal products to be morally wrong (Martin, 1976).

This twofold nature of vegetarians in itself raises questions about the connection between vegetarianism and the obligation to become a vegetarian. Judging from the nature of vegetarians as shown above, the moral obligation to be a vegetarian is debatable. According to DeGrazia (2009), most people, including ethicists and philosophers, are not vegetarians and apparently do not feel obligated to become vegetarians. As Martin (1976), argues, it is clear that to have any apparent validity, moral vegetarianism must be taken to mean that there is a prima facie duty, rather than absolute duty, not to eat meat or products derived from animals.

The question is, would vegetarians rather die than opt to eat meat or animal products if they were presented with a situation where there was no non-animal food? Again, what would happen if such people ate meat or animal products (if not for health complications)? These two points amenable to discussion. But it is clear that the duty to be a vegetarian is a matter of personal decision, not a moral obligation. Moral vegetarians base their beliefs on respect for animals’ right to live. To such people, an animal’s life can be likened to a human being’s life, and thus, killing an animal for food is comparable to killing a human being for the same purpose.

Strict vegetarians will therefore argue that “one ought never to kill any nonhuman animal unless it were right to kill a human being in the same circumstance” (Martin, 1976, p. 15). From this standpoint, if is not right to kill a human being for food, it is also not right to kill and consume a bird or any other animal. Vegetarians holding a moderate position will argue that it is prima facie wrong to kill an animal for consumption but that certain human rights, such as the right to life, can override this clear wrong.

From this perspective, it would not be right to kill a human being but it would be justifiable to kill an animal. Additionally, vegetarians will argue that while it is justifiable to kill an animal in some cases, this is not allowable in cases where meat substitutes are available. In this scenario, it is not clear why some vegetarians would allow killing of animals and denounce it in different situations; or why some vegetarians are strict not to consume any animal products while others consume them.

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