The Contemporary Ethical Theory of Haidt - Report Example

Contemporary ethical theory of Haidt “Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual” Friedrich Nietzsche Introduction Haidt’s theoretical project is to undermine the domination of rationalist models in the research on moral judgment. For Haidt, there is no well established cause and effect relationship between moral judgment and moral reasoning. Moreover, Haidt concretely indicates that “moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached” (814). In Haidt’s paradigm, intuitions are primary in making human moral judgments; moral reasoning only does the labor of a lawyer, which provides justification for an already taken point of view. In other words, moral judgments are taken without a judge who could have weighed all considerations impartially. And, the only ones who are capable of making moral judgments based on moral reasoning are professional philosophers and such ilk. Needless to say, it is more than an elitistic argument as ordinary people too face many ethical challenges in their lives but attend them with considerable force of moral reasoning. The purpose the paper is to weigh the arguments of Haidt in favor of social intuitionism and counter-arguments by Pizarro and Bloom against each other to have better understandings of the ways moral judgment functions. Intuitions, Reasoning and Moral Judgments Haidt introduced and formulated the social intuitionist model as an alternative to the rationalist model of moral thought. He considers that intuitions as paramount in moral judgments as they are automatic affective reflexes. Moral reasoning is a chicken and egg question that attempts to find what determines moral judgments. Haidt argues that judgments are based on spontaneous intuitions while moral reasoning has only the role of justifying. In other words, moral reasoning is just the spokesperson of the moral judgments. Once an individual takes particular moral judgments, it would be justified by moral reasoning. On the other hand, for Pizarro and Bloom, the seemingly spontaneous intuitions are well shaped by prior reasoning. The model of social intuitionism offers a viable alternative to the prevailing rationalist models in moral judgment. Since it is social model, it cannot “deemphasizes the private reasoning done by individuals and emphasizes instead the importance of social and cultural influences” (Haidt, 814). More than moral reasoning, moral judgment takes place as a result of spontaneous intuition based evaluations. A moral judgment is often immediate and spontaneous; moral reasoning just follows it. It means after reaching at a moral judgment only, people look forward for moral reasons. Many of the laboratory researches have shown that human beings are actually governed by the forces of their unconscious when they pronounce moral judgments. Still, it is necessary to look at the role played by rational deliberations and the cognitive abilities in directing moral judgments. Moreover, people actually engage in moral reasoning while they confront ethical dilemmas. No moral judgments are taken all of a sudden and forever. The rationalist model, according to Haidt, portrays that “moral knowledge and moral judgment are reached primarily by a process of reasoning and reflection” (814). Here, moral emotion could play only a lesser role by adding some inputs to the process of moral reasoning. Simply speaking, the rationalist model assumes that every human being plays a role of judge while pronouncing is/her own moral judgments. Social intuitionism has many philosophical underpinnings as it is at the core philosophical thought. Haidt asserts that “[i]ntuitionism in philosophy refers to the view that there are moral truths and that when people grasp these truths they do so not by a process of ratiocination and reflection but rather by a process more akin to perception” (814). Here a person sees a thing and adopt a position without critically engaging with it. The so-called self-evident truths are the concrete expressions of moral intuitionism Moral intuitions play a decisive role on the making of moral judgments but, importantly, it is “a kind of cognition, but it is not a kind of reasoning” (817) Social intuitionist model is inherently multidisciplinary as it ‘easily links findings in social and developmental psychology to recent findings and theories in neuroscience, primatology, and anthropology” (830). The cognitive revolution has in many ways changed the scholarship on morality and moral judgments. As cognition is found to be an automatic reflex, moral judgments take place sans consciousness. It is because of this automatic nature of cognition involved in moral judgments, people usually are unable to conscientize their process of reaching a moral judgment. It is the particularities of our brain system which is able to quickly respond to complex situations make intuitions relevant in moral judgments. It challenges some of the misconceptions that emotions are not rational and reasoning is not reliable. Haidt argues that reasoned judgment and private reflection are the ways to moral reasoning, which is common only among the professional philosopher thanks tot heir training and experience. Haidt does take into account the fact that we do have many intuitions come into play when we come across a challenging situation. Intuitions might flow spontaneously; but they are not derived from a tabular rasa. The moral positions emerge in human beings as the result of lifelong learning and experiences. Social intuitionism also considers moral judgment as an interpersonal process. Moral reasoning affects moral intuitions mainly in two ways, argues Pizarro and Bloom, “by shaping the sorts of intuitions that occur and by controlling the situations that would elicit these intuitions” (195). While Haidt emphasizes the irrelevance of deliberate reasoning, Pizarro and Bloom look at the multiple ways through which moral judgment is affected by deliberate reasoning, even if its happens indirectly. Contrary to the after-the-fact justification role of moral reasoning in social intuitionism, Pizarro and Bloom proposes the moral judgments are relied on prior moral reasoning. The tension free moral decisions happen only in the artificial settings of laboratory. Pizarro and Bloom strongly suggest that “when one looks outside the laboratory, however, there is considerable evidence that people do struggle with moral issues, trying to determine the right thing to do” (195). It can be argued that cultural contexts considerably shape our moral judgments. But, there is no absolute cultural determinism with relations to morality as ‘there are innumerable instances in which people—not necessarily professional philosophers—take moral stands that put themselves very much at odds with members of their community. Examples include “righteous Gentiles” in Nazi Germany, children who insist on becoming vegetarians within nonvegetarian families, college professors who defend the abolition of tenure, and many pacifists during wartime” (195). Also, crucially, human beings come across many ethical concerns which never occurred in the lives of their ancestors collectively or individually. Also, no culture is as absolutist as we think them to be to settle all the moral questions a priori and once and forever. Cultures always keep many spaces open for its members in the present to deal with. Pizarro and Bloom suggest that “many moral issues are personal and have to be addressed by each individual in the course of his or her life: How much should I give to charity? What is the proper balance of work and family? What are my obligations to my friends? There are no “off-the-shelf” answers to these questions, no immediate gut reactions as to what is right and wrong” (195). The emotional judgements based on spontaneous intuitions could occur only in situations where the moral choices are relatively limited and fully open. For instance, it does not take much time to make your judgment on paedophilia. It is not same with the question of mercy killing. Although the social intuitionism theory has many advantages in defining moral judgments, it leaves out the fact that “immediate moral intuitions can be (and are) informed by conscious deliberation, and this deliberation plays a central role in our moral judgments” (195). Simply speaking, the processes of oral cognition are more complex than what it is considered as in social intuitionism. Conclusion Haidt considers moral judgments arise from fast intuitions which develop spontaneously. He undermines the role of conscious reflections of human beings on ethical and moral issues. For him, the role of moral reasoning is a posteriori, i.e. conscious deliberations come to play only after the actual moral judgments are made. In other worlds, conscious moral ruminations are for justifying moral judgments, not to produce moral judgments. However, Pizarro and Bloom challenges Haidt’s mechanical interpretation of moral judgment as deriving from spontaneous intuitions and they dialectically argue that, except in morally least complex situations, intuitions are not only less immediate but also well shaped by moral reasoning. They also reasonably challenge Haidt’s pessimism of ordinary people’s ability to engage in moral reasoning and choose their conscious ethical decisions. Works Cited Haidt, Jonathan. “The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment”, Psychological Review, Vol. 108, No. 4, (2001) pp. 814-834. Pizarro, David. A. and Bloom, Paul. “The intelligence of the moral intuitions: Comment on Haidt”, Psychological Review, Vol. 110, No. 1, (2003), pp. 193-196. Read More