Chernobyl Disaster - Causes and Facts - Case Study Example

STUDENT NAME: STUDENT NUMBER: COURSE NAME: COURSE NUMBER: TOPIC: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER TUTOR NAME: DATE: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER INTRODUCTION On April 26, 1986 a nuclear catastrophe of immense proportions occurred at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) sending shockwaves across the whole world. The ChNPP is in Ukraine, near the northern state boundary with Belarus (Shestopalov and Gudzenko, 2002, p 1). The disaster is widely considered to be the greatest technologic tragedy of modern times connected to the peaceful use of nuclear power as opposed to its military use. The explosion happened at precisely 1:24 a. m (Moscow time) and was triggered after the elaboration of the emergency exploitation regime for the Nuclear Power Plant. The experiment’s objective to test electric equipment yet its probable effect on the nuclear reactor was not correctly examined nor taken into account (Shestopalov and Gudzenko, 2002, p 1). The result was a catastrophe whose ramifications have continued to be felt even over 23 years after it occurred. The following case study will thus analyze this disaster with regards to led up to the accident, the sequence of events, the main causes/ theories and the consequences of the accident so as to provide a comprehensive overview of this un fortunate incident. PART A: THE MAIN CAUSES AND THEORIES Much has been written about who or what was behind the Chernobyl disaster. Having occurred during the rule of a communist regime, politicization of the accident was common with many in the West seeking to capitalize on the accident to castigate the then Soviet government. However, whereas there indeed was a good measure of culpability on the part of the Soviet government, it also has to be admitted that accidents occur everywhere and an accident such as this can as well occur anywhere else. With this in mind, the following discussion will thus present a balanced analysis of the sequence of events leading up to the accident as well as the existing theories concerning the causes of the accident while evaluating whether they hold any merit. THE THEORIES: Human Error As Seen With The Sequence Of Events Leading Up To The Accident: Evidently, with regards to the immediate cause, the most obvious theory relates to the human error involved. According to Walker (2004, p. 237) the operating crew at the ChNPP were conducting a test on the safety system at unit 4. They took a chain of actions that caused destruction to the reactor. For the experiment, the emergency core cooling system was switched off by the crew who withdrew almost all the control rods. Several rods were removed to increase the output of power and consequently the crew lost control of the reactor (known by the Russian acronym of RBMK) triggering a series of hugely powerful explosions that tore the roof of the reactor building off and quickly set loose a massive inventory of radioactive elements into the atmosphere. The explosions also ignited strong fires within the reactor building that discharged further radiation to the outside and sparked off graphite blocks in the core. For a period of a few days about 100 to 200 million curies of radioactivity was released the building (Walker, 2004, p. 237). The human error can be seen in light of their non- methodical approach to experimental performance that saw them remove several rods and lose control of the reactor (Shestopalov and Gudzenko, 2002, p 1). If the crew had been more careful and ken in their duties, it is very possible that the explosion would not have been triggered in the first place. As such, they must be held to account to a great extent for the resultant accident. Faulty design: Nevertheless, while apportioning the blame to the operating crew is somewhat justified, the reality is that the accident would not have been so catastrophic had there been proper design of the reactor building. When a building is designed without sufficient safety provisions, it will inevitably fail when exposed to great amounts of stress. That was exactly what happened in the case of the Chernobyl reactor building which was not adequately designed to deal with a reactor explosion (Gerstein, 2008, p. 102). As Gerstein (2008, p. 101) explains, the reactor building was not well- equipped to cope with such a major explosion. The Soviets made use of a uranium- graphite reactor of the high power channel reactor (HPCR) type installed at the ChNPP and it had woefully bad design features. The reactor was a Soviet- specific design that had been custom-made during the ‘70s as an integral aspect of the nuclear weapons program of the USSR. It was designed to generate plutonium and to produce electric power. As part of its function as a weapons facility, the reactor needed numerous removals of its fuel rods through a crane on top of the 23 feet tall structure and this design was deemed as preventing it from being a conventional containment structure like those used by the West or other power generating facilities in the USSR. As a result, after the reactor was later transformed for civilian use, it did not have a crucial safety feature. At that time, there were no rules that prohibited the use of such an unprotected design. Further to that, the basic design of the reactor had four built-in risks most of which were not adequately understood by operating crew (Gerstein, 2008, p. 101). Clearly, the technical design aspect of the reactor was faulty. The fact that the government was so bent on a design that was different from others around the world points to their illogical desire to distance themselves fro the West even at the expense of their own safety. Politics should never have played a part in a sensitive issue such as this and the authorities are definitely at fault. Laxity and the Absence Of Basic Safety Systems: Aside from just mere human error and issues of technical design and operations, the prevailing belief that permeated through all Soviet nuclear energy facilities was that they were too safe for accidents to occur. To give emphasis to this incredibly naïve belief was the fact that the plant did not have radiation monitors, protective clothing or the other basic safety equipment that are standard safety precautions in the West. Further to that, there existed no backup strategies in place as part of the building’s design in the instance that a fire broke out (Gerstein, 2008, p. 100). This theory definitely holds water since the abject disregard for basic safety rules points to the laxity and overconfidence of the authorities and it is this overconfidence that played a major role in the accident. Poor Training: Another theory is that Soviet operators were not well educated in the basic risks that are intrinsic in the technology the operated and that they were inadequately trained in basic safety measures. Such omissions were rooted in the policies of the government department responsible for the facilities of the nuclear weapons program- the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. In the absence of an institutional acknowledgment of the risks involved, safety measures are less likely to be given the importance they deserve thereby opening the chance of an accident of such magnitude to occur. That said, blaming the decision- makers wholesale would be too simplistic and the reality is that the responsible decision- makers had many other priorities and their funds were limited. As Gerstein (2008, p. 103) aptly explains, the behaviour of these decision makers existed within a political culture and bureaucratic structure that reinforced and encouraged these policies. The policy level management did fully understand the risks of the RBMK reactor design particularly together with an inadequately trained and inexperienced workforce and this experience served as a major lesson to them. In summary, it is evident that human error, poor technical design, poor training and government laxity were all major causes that led to the disaster. However, all these factors generally point to one main cause- the absence of a safety culture in relation to nuclear power use within the former USSR. This lack of a safety culture was rampant within the entire NPP (the personnel, constructors and general leadership); the state control and administrative authorities; as well the legislative bodies (Shestopalov and Gudzenko, 2002, p 1). All these players were responsible for the Chernobyl accident. PART B: THE CONSEQUENCES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE A magnitude of this magnitude undoubtedly has major repercussions. The accident released vast amounts of noble gases as well as more explosive and dangerous radioactive elements such as strontium- 90, plutonium, cesium- 137 and iodine- 131. Approximately 20 % of the iodine- 131 in the reactor building (about 7 million curies) was released to the atmosphere. Measurable levels of radiation spread far away from the USSR into distant areas such as to the US, several areas in Europe, and amazingly even Japan. In European countries such as Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Austria and Poland, government officials were so concerned about the high radiation levels that they destroyed great amounts of crops, meat and milk. About 50,000 people living near the Chernobyl plant were exposed to radiation levels of 50 rads and more (Walker 2004, p. 239). With such levels, the effects were substantial and the following discussion will thus analyze the consequences of the disaster as well as the changes made t the industry following the accident and whether or not there were any lessons leaned from it. THE CONSEQUENCES Deaths: According to McKinney and Schoch (2003, p. 184), 31 people died during the first few months due to the release of radiation inclusive of the 12 fire-fighters lost their lives from radiation poisoning. Later reports of deaths were much higher and in excess of 4000 Ukrainians have died so far from radiation exposure after he clean up. Mental Health: It is widely considered that the impact on mental health was the greatest public health problem. Residents of the affected areas had various mental health issues such as lack of initiative; over- dependence on state help; negative self assessments of their health; and a general belief that they had a shortened life expectancy. Niggling misconceptions and myths concerning the threat of radiation caused among residents the development of "paralysing fatalism." These mental health problems were viewed by the government as the most serious and challenging (McKinney and Schoch, 2003, p. 184). Diseases/ Health Problems: Right after the accident, hundreds were diagnosed with radiation sickness (McKinney and Schoch, 2003, p. 184). 238 workers were diagnosed with acute radiation syndrome (Walker 2004, p. 237). In the long-term, cases of thyroid cancer grew very fast among children and in the Gomel region of Belarus where there had usually been 1 or 2 cases of thyroid cancer at most among children annually, 38 cases were discovered in 1991 alone. Overall, around 1800 cases of thyroid cancer among children were diagnosed in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine from 1990 to 1999. Fortunately, the rate of thyroid cancer among children decreased after 1995 but cases among teenagers more than doubled from 1996 to 2001. In addition to thyroid cancer, recent studies years have revealed that the children of parents who experienced radiation exposure particularly the ones who cleaned up the rector following the disaster showed high levels of genetic mutations (Walker, 2004, p. 239). Further to these illnesses, the selective abortion of male foetuses was experienced. About months following the accident, there was a noticeable drop in birth rates in several European nations due to the increase in miscarriages (Nicolopoulou-Stamati et.al, 2006, p. 9). These miscarriages were as a direct result of the radiation. Evacuations and Dislocation: More than 100,000 residents living within 30 km)of Chernobyl were forcibly evacuated and around 130,000 residents were resettled permanently due to contamination of their water supplies, homes, forests and fields (Walker 2004, p. 237). Food Contamination: Food was also affected and in Germany, Scandinavia and the UK, animals and crops were contaminated by radiation and subsequently declared not suitable for human consumption. In Lapland, for instance, reindeer was confirmed to be unfit for human consumption because of radiation. In Corsica, due to the consumption of local contaminated cheeses and various dairy products, children were discovered to have great quantities of radioactive iodine- 131 within their thyroid glands. In Italy, tonnes of vegetables were rendered unusable. Generally, more than a hundred million Europeans had to undergo voluntary or mandatory food restrictions for the next few years (McKinney and Schoch, 2003, p. 184). Financial Costs: The financial costs totalled over $13 billion four years following the accident (McKinney and Schoch, 2003, p. 184). The financial costs accounted for over 20 % of the state budget. In 1995, state expenditure decreased to about 10 % due to the unpopularity in the face of unemployment, poor housing conditions in the new settlements and the general lack of opportunities (Marples 1999, p. 27). All in all, the Chernobyl disaster resulted in deaths, illness, dislocation and property damage. CHANGES MADE IN THE INDUSTRY AFTER THE ACCIDENT Following the accident, several improvements have been made with regards to human protection and nuclear installations. Radiation and nuclear safety has been improved greatly in relation to international standards, processes, technology and to a variety of components, systems and the fuel characteristics of RBMK reactors. According to Taniguchi (2006, p. 2) they include: • The positive power coefficient that had been a contributing factor was eliminated. In addition, the shutdown systems were enhanced to get rid of initial local positive reactivity addition. • There has been the development of assistance measures and guidance to enhance the Design Basis Accident criteria for pipe breaks and overpressure protection and to assist operators to maintain the proper safety margins. • As part of the IAEA’s Programme on the Safety of WWER and RBMK Nuclear Power Plants, the International community has assisted in enhancing the safety of WWER and RBMK plants by improving reactor pressure vessels and also in areas of in-service inspection methods. • Improvements in operational safety such as the modernization of control systems and instrumentation to give operators more easily comprehensible information; to enhance the human aspects of man/machine interface; and to improve the use of probabilistic risk analyses a tool that was previously not used much (Taniguchi, 2006, p. 2) . LIST OF LESSONS LEARNT Lessons learnt from the mistakes of the Chernobyl disaster include: 1. The necessity for strict adherence to international safety standards in construction, design and operation of reactors. 2. The importance of strict adherence to the fundamental safety principles for nuclear power plants as well as the necessity of continuous safety analysis and early upgrading of operating nuclear power plants 3. There need to set up and support a high-level national emergency response system during man-made disasters. 4. The danger of failing to bring nuclear power under public control 5. The importance of scientific co-operation in dealing with such an accident and in researching on preventative measures. In short, no country is an island. 6. Adequate funding of national scientific research programmes is very necessary to create a comprehensive scientific research strategy. 7. Adequate medical training in case of a disaster. During the Chernobyl accident, the medical services were ill- equipped and found it hard to cope with the medical complications that arose. 8. Effective emergency services should be developed for a timely response to a disaster like this since during Chernobyl, the response was inadequate and not fast enough (Atsuo, 1997). In a nutshell, whereas the Chernobyl accident catalyzed improvements, there is still a likelihood that a similar even with re-occur especially since more countries such as Iran are experimenting with nuclear power. PART C: ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A DISASTER HAPPENING IN PRESTON As compared to how Chernobyl was handled, the chances of Preston effectively handling such a nuclear disaster are largely more favourable. With a proper transport and infrastructural network consisting of very comprehensive bus network, the emergency services would find it relatively easy to reach the affected people and evacuate them immediately after the explosion occurred. In addition, the well run emergency services are well- suited to handle a disaster of such magnitude. And with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 in force, Preston would be well- prepared to coordinate the much- needed response effort. Nevertheless, the congestion in Preston of people and businesses/ buildings is concerning. In terms of trade and industry, Preston is an important centre for the British defence aerospace industry with the military headquarters of BAE Systems located in Warton. The financial sector is prominent within the city and a vast selection of insurance firms, consultancies and law firms having their bases here. There are several other businesses such as café’s and restaurants. As such, a disaster would be catastrophic and would affect s man businesses. Apart from the sheer loss of life and exposure to radiation- related illnesses, it would undoubtedly cause a lot of financial loss since all these businesses would be faced with contamination. Having recently attained city status, Preston has been experiencing several building developments and this may serve as a challenge during disaster response efforts. The building congestion may make it harder to get to the different apartments and homes in time. This obstacle will effectively serve to hamper the rescue efforts. The Westinghouse Electric Company Springfield’s nuclear processing plant is located to the west of the City boundary and this proximity to the bustling city means that in case of an explosion, several city residents will be exposed to radiation. In the case of Chernobyl, the surrounding areas were quite populated as is the case in Preston. This would mean that hundreds of thousands of residents would be forced to evacuate their homes. In addition, the surrounding cities and towns would likewise be adversely affected by the radiation causing a countrywide problem. A factor that may hamper rescue efforts is the lack of cohesion and racial unity particularly in the North–West which is one of the poorest areas in the country. The lack of a sense of community and the propensity for hate crimes may make it difficult for the community to come together during a disaster to help one another. This should actively be remedied through civic education efforts to bring the community together. CONCLUSIONS The Chernobyl disaster is the worst man- made disaster of modern times. A variety of factors such as human errors and poor design among others were all responsible for it leading to catastrophic consequences. However, the disaster has provided us with various lessons that we can learn from so that another similar nuclear accident can be prevented in future in any part of the world be it Preston or anyplace else. This will help a great in ensuring that the world remains a safe place to live in; both now and for future generations. REFERENCES Atsuo, Akanuma. 1997. Lessons learned from the Chernobyl accident. 2. The Initial Medical Activities at the Accident. National Institute of Radiological Sciences Vol 117: 60- 69 Gerstein, Marc et.al. 2008. Flirting with Disaster: Why Accidents Are Rarely Accidental. New York: Sterling Publishing  Marples, David R. 1999. Belarus: a denationalized nation. Amsterdam: Harwood academic Publishers McKinney, Michael L and Schoch, Robert M. 2003. Environmental science: systems and Solutions. Ontario: Jones and Bartlett Publishers Nicolopoulou-Stamati, P et.al. 2006. Congenital diseases and the environment. Dordrecht: Springer Publishers Shestopalov, V and Gudzenko, V. 2002. Chernobyl disaster and groundwater. India: A. A Balkema Publishers The Chernobyl Forum. 2006. Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. IAEA. Retrieved 20th January, 2010 from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf Walker, J. Samuel. 2004. Three Mile Island: A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. California: University California Press. Taniguchi, Tomihiro. 2006. Improvement of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Initiated By the Chernobyl Accident. IAEA. Retrieved 20th January, 2010 from http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/coordination/DDG_statements/Chernobyl_DDG_speech.pdf The Chernobyl Forum. 2006. Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. IAEA. Retrieved 20th January, 2010 from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Chernobyl/chernobyl.pdf Read More