The Chernobyl Disaster - Essay Example

268083 The Chernobyl disaster The purpose of this report is to carefully examine the Chernobyl nuclear accident of 26th April 1986, as well as the lessons that can be drawn or learn from the world’s worst nuclear disaster thus far. In April 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear power station was situated within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which was at that point in time part of the Soviet Union. As will soon become clear from the evaluation presented below the whole way in which the erstwhile Soviet Union grossly mismanaged its ageing nuclear power station meant that the Chernobyl disaster was quite simply an accident waiting to happen. There were economic, technological and political factors alongside the almost complete lack of effective health and safety measures were highly evident causes of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Indeed despite its then status as a military superpower in the mid 1980s the Soviet Union had serious problems that the Chernobyl nuclear disaster amply demonstrated. By the mid 1980s the Stalinist era economic planning and one party political systems of the Soviet Union were beginning to show their age and their propensity for economic failure, administrative inefficiency, and declining political legitimacy. More ominously the Soviet Union’s outdated industries were a danger both to its own people, other countries, as well as the environment. The strain of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a renewed a nuclear arms race with the United States were not taken by the stagnant economy (White, 1990). The main economic and political institutions as well as it systems dated back to the infrastructure constructed by Stalin in the late1920s and the 1930s. The collectivisation of agriculture and industrialisation had been achieved at great human cost, with political obedience and loyalty to the Communists counting for more than efficiency or ability to do their jobs (James, 2003 p. 53). When such an approach was typical of the managers and the workers of nuclear power stations it was always a potential cause of accidents. The Soviet Union had suffered horrendous losses during the Second World War which were partially compensated by the gaining of satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the desire to prevent itself being invaded ever again (James, 2003 p. 301). Yet the onset of the Cold War meant that the Soviet Union took undue risk in both its civil and its military nuclear programmes in order to generate electricity and make atomic weapons as quickly as possible. Undue risks that ultimately led to the Chernobyl disaster (Gaddis, 2005, p.271). The attempts of Gorbachev to reform the Soviet Union would end in more than just the Chernobyl disaster due to the way in which the reforms were implemented. Gorbachev and his politburo colleagues regarded reform of the Soviet economy as their main priority. After all they reasoned that if they could not salvage the economy they would not be able to salvage the Soviet Union, as it would be too weak to continue as a superpower, and perhaps even as a state. The problem was that the great majority of industries completely disregarded health and safety procedures (Hobsbawm, 1994 p. 475). The nuclear disaster at Chernobyl showed up everything that was wrong with the planned economy within the Soviet Union, with targets contained in five year plans being more important than preventing accidents and substantial environmental damage (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.475). To a very large extent the vast majority of the factors, which contributed to the unprecedented nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in April 1986 were related to the faults within the crumbling economic system of the Soviet Union itself. Since the early years of the1980s the economy of the Soviet Union that had featured state – owned enterprises, which ranged in size from the smallest collectivised farms through to giant steelworks not to mention nuclear power stations. Power stations such as the one at Chernobyl that were widely considered in need of upgrade or replacement by Western nuclear experts (Gaddis, 2005 p. 274). The Chernobyl disaster was a direct consequence therefore of many years of neglect within the economic system of the Soviet Union taken as a whole. In the majority of the Soviet Union’s industrial units and power stations very little attention was paid to ensure that there were adequate health and safety measures in place and actually enforced through frequent inspections. This clearly did not happen in the Chernobyl nuclear power station, or indeed the rest of the power stations within the Soviet Union during the 1980s (James, 2003 p. 302). The Soviet Union’s nuclear power stations were supposedly meant to adhere to some rudimentary health and safety measures yet these standards were considerably lower than those in the West were. In the case of the Chernobyl power station in the run up to the disaster even these limited procedures and regulations were apparently ignored completely (Hobsbawm, 1994 p. 489). The Chernobyl disaster was certainly a nuclear accident that could have easily been avoided and it could also have been contained sooner than the Soviet authorities actually did in April 1986. The senior management at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was very slow to react to the initial reactor fire and the serious of a full-scale reactor meltdown, a slowness that actually turned a nuclear accident into a large-scale disaster (Hobsbawm, 1994 p.489). The early attempts at tackling the nuclear accident at Chernobyl were arguably hindered by the unwillingness of the Soviet officials within the Ukraine to believe that it was actually a serious problem. The Soviet leadership in Moscow also attempted to keep the reactor fire at Chernobyl a secret from the rest of the world whilst belatedly shutting down the affected reactor and putting out the fire (Hobsbawm, 1994 p.475). The Chernobyl disaster was allowed to become a major incident, as there was a catastrophic failure of management to ensure that the reactor fire was prevented in the first place. That lack of fire safety precautions contributed to the unprecedented scale of the nuclear fallout from the fire at Chernobyl. The fire was only put out through the considerable bravery of the workers and fire fighters at Chernobyl, many of which died. In the end the reactor was encased in concrete whilst the rest of the power station continued to be used to generate electricity. On the 25 April 1986, just before a routine shutdown at the nuclear power station, the reactor crew at Chernobyl-4 began preparing for a test to determine how long turbines would spin and supply power following a loss of main electrical power supply. Similar tests had already been carried out at Chernobyl and other plants, despite the fact that these reactors were known to be very unstable at low power settings (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.475). A series of operator actions, including the disabling of automatic shutdown mechanisms, preceded the attempted test early on 26 April. As flow of coolant water diminished, power output increased. When the operator moved to shut down the reactor from its unstable condition arising from previous errors, a peculiarity of the design caused a dramatic power surge. The fuel elements ruptured and the resultant explosive force of steam lifted off the cover plate of the reactor, releasing fission products to the atmosphere. A second explosion threw out fragments of burning fuel and graphite from the core and allowed air to rush in, causing the graphite moderator to burst into flames (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). There has been some dispute among nuclear experts about the character of this second explosion. The graphite - there was over 1200 tonnes of it - burned for nine days, causing the main release of radioactivity into the environment (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Over all it was believed or estimated by Western nuclear experts that all of the xenon gas, about half of the iodine and caesium, and at least 5% of the remaining radioactive material was exposed. The whole of this radioactive material had originally been within the Chernobyl-4 reactor core (with its estimated 192 tonnes of fuel) and was released during the course of the accident. Most of the released material was deposited close by as dust and debris, but the lighter material was carried by wind over the Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and to some extent over Scandinavia and Europe. The main casualties of the Chernobyl disaster were among the fire - fighters, including those who attended the initial small fires on the roof of the generator turbine building. All these small blazes were rapidly put out in a few hours, but radiation doses on the first day were estimated to range up to 20,000 millisieverts (mSv), directly causing 28 deaths in the next four months and 19 subsequently (James, 2003 p. 402). The next task was cleaning up the radioactivity at the site so that the remaining three reactors could be restarted, and the damaged reactor shielded more permanently (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Roughly 200,000 people (nicknamed the "liquidators") from all over the Soviet Union was involved in the recovery and decontamination operations during 1986 and 1987. They received high doses of radiation, average around 100 millisieverts. Some 20,000 of them received about 250 mSv and a few received 500 mSv. Later, the number of liquidators swelled to over 600,000 but most of these received only low radiation doses. The highest doses were received by about 1000 emergency workers and on-site personnel during the first day of the accident (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Initial radiation exposure in contaminated areas was due to short-lived iodine-131; later caesium-137 was the main hazard. (Both are fission products dispersed from the reactor core, with half-lives of 8 days and 30 years respectively. 1.8 Ebq of I-131 & 0.085 Ebq of Cs-137 were released.) It was estimated that around five million people lived in areas contaminated (above 37 kBq/m2 Cs-137) and about 400,000 lived in more contaminated areas of strict control by authorities (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). During the course of the 2nd and 3rd of May 1986, around 45,000 residents were evacuated from within a 10-km radius of the Chernobyl nuclear power station, notably from the plant operators town of Pripyat. On 4 May, all those living within a 30 kilometre radius - a further 116 000 people from the more contaminated area - were evacuated and later relocated. About 1,000 of these have since returned unofficially to live within the contaminated zone. Most of those evacuated received radiation doses of less than 50 mSv, although a few received 100 mSv or more (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Despite the public rhetoric from the Gorbachev administration about making the Soviet Union less secretive many people at home and abroad believed that vital facts were been covered up about the cause as well as the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster. Whatever was said concerning glasnost was not borne out in reality as reliable information about the accident and resulting contamination was not available to affected people for at least two years following the accident. This led to distrust and confusion about health effects (Hobsbawm, 1994, p.475). In the years following the accident a further 210 000 people were resettled into less contaminated areas, and the initial 30 km radius exclusion zone (2800 km2) was modified and extended to cover 4300 square kilometres in the now independent Ukraine (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). This resettlement was due to application of a criterion of 350 mSv projected lifetime radiation dose. However in reality radiation in most of the affected area (with the exception of half a square kilometre) fell rapidly so that average doses were less than 50% above normal background of 2.5 mSv/yr (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Several organisations have reported on the impacts of the Chernobyl disaster, but all have had problems assessing the significance of their observations because of the lack of reliable public health information prior to 1986. For instance during the course of 1989 the World Health Organisation (WHO) first raised concerns that local medical scientists had incorrectly attributed various biological and health effects to radiation exposure (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). There was a major International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigation into the Chernobyl disaster involving more than 200 nuclear energy experts from twenty - two countries published during 1991 were more substantial. In the absence of pre-1986 data it compared a control population with those exposed to radiation. Despite there being significant health disorders were evident in both control and exposed groups, but, at that stage, none was radiation related (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Subsequent studies in the Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were based on national registers of over one million people possibly affected by the radiation released after the Chernobyl disaster. Fourteen years after the Chernobyl disaster in 2000 the medical profession had diagnosed circa 4000 cases of thyroid cancer in children exposed to the fallout from the accident in 1986 (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Among these, nine deaths are attributed to radiation. However, the rapid increase in thyroid cancers detected suggests that some of it at least is an artefact of the screening process. Thyroid cancer is usually not fatal if diagnosed and treated early (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). The average radiation doses for the general population of the contaminated areas over 1986-2005 is estimated to be between 10 and 20 mSv, and the vast majority receive under 1 mSv/yr. These are lower than many natural levels. Some people have moved back into the exclusion zone. Such resettlement into these areas which remains contaminated, is actually perhaps surprisingly permitted. It is allowed for as long as annual radiation dose rate (largely obtained through food and drink) is projected to be below 15 mSv/yr. That level is actually only slightly less than the internationally accepted maximum occupational dose rate (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Though the Soviet authorities were anxious to contain the Chernobyl disaster they were not as anxious protect the people sorting out the mess upon the ground. As a consequence there is arguably very much an increased risk of leukaemia due to radiation exposure from Chernobyl may become evident in future among the higher-exposed liquidators. There is some evidence already of this and possibly solid cancers among the Soviet / Russian liquidators exposed too more than 150 mSv. Limited effect is expected within the general populations of contaminated areas that were not involved in putting out the nuclear reactor fire (White, 1990). There is currently no evidence nor any likelihood of an increase that can be directly attributed to the Chernobyl disaster in birth defects, severely adverse pregnancy outcomes, decreased fertility rates or any other radiation-induced disease. Such findings hold true for the general populations either inside the contaminated areas closet to Chernobyl or further afield (www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html). Therefore it has to be concluded that in fact the Chernobyl disaster was undoubtedly a direct consequence of many decades of significant and dangerous neglect within the moribund economic system of the Soviet Union taken as a whole. In the majority of ageing Soviet industry very little attention was actively paid to ensuring that there were adequate health and safety measures in place and actually enforced through frequent inspections of nuclear power stations. The Soviet Union’s nuclear power stations were supposedly meant to outwardly conform to some rudimentary health and safety measures as well as procedures yet these standards were considerably lower than those in the West were. In the Western World at least it should be easier to avert a nuclear accident upon the huge scale of the Chernobyl disaster. To put it very simply had the management of the Chernobyl nuclear power station had to fully comply with tougher plant safety procedures then 210 000 people might not have had to be resettled into less contaminated areas. Also the initial 30-km radius exclusion zone extended to large areas of the Ukraine. Bibliography Gaddis J L, (2005) The Cold War, Penguin, London Hobsbawm, E (1994) Age of Extremes, the Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Michael Joseph, London James H, (2003) Europe Reborn – A History, 1914 – 2000, Pearson Longman, Harlow White S, (1990) Gorbachev in power, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge www.world-nuclear.org/info/chernobyl/inf07.html Read More