Station Nightclub Fire - Case Study Example

Station Nightclub Fire Rhode Island, West Warwick February 20, 2003 of the of the Station Nightclub Fire On thenight of February 20, 2003 a fire engulfed the Station Nightclub located at 211 Cowesett Avenue in Rhode Island, West Warwick. It is regarded as one of the worst nightclub fires in U.S history, resulting in the loss of 100 lives and injuries to a further 200 people. The cause of the fire is blamed on pyrotechnics ignited by the tour manager of Great White, the keynote band for the evening after they began their performance. The results of the investigation indicated that the fire spread across the club via the polyurethane foam mounted on the wall to limit the sound from emanating outside the room. Billowing smoke limited vision and the use of just one exit route rather than the four doors available added to the confusion and loss of life. This paper aims at highlighting the events and causes of the fire, which will lead towards the analysis of the extent to which the codes were adhered at the time of the event, and the changes in the laws that were made subsequent to the fire. Introduction A sad and unforgettable event such as a fire usually results in loss of life and property that could have been avoided or prevented had one followed proper safety precautions in the first place. Adherence to the rules and due attention paid to the safety and security of the inhabitants of the structure in terms of escape routes, ventilation, communication and other safety features such as fire extinguishers and sprinkler systems can often prevent a fire from spreading as well as alert the relevant authorities in time. Obviously that did not happen at the Station Nightclub because as records show, the fire started at 11:07 pm and spread in five minutes due to the flammable nature of the polyurethane foam used to contain the sounds within the performance arena. In the ensuing panic, no one stopped to think and deaths and injuries resulted from the crowd stampeding to get out in a hurry. It was a sad event because adequate care and attention could have limited injuries and loss of life to much more manageable figures. History of the Station Nightclub The building that constitutes the Station Nightclub was first opened in 1949 when it constituted a combination of a restaurant, a tavern and a nightclub. However in 1972 a fire hit the structure after which it was kept closed until 1974. In 1974, the premises were reopened as a restaurant. However, an ownership change in 1985 again resulted in it being reestablished as a pub. The interiors and the roofs were made out of wood and the pub was divided into a bar and a club. The wall on the western side of the club constituted of a raised platform which was used by the bands to perform. The walls as well as the platform were insulated with polyurethane foam to control the volume of the music. At the time of the incident, there were 462 people in attendance following the local Fire Department’s clearance for a standing room of 404. There were four exits in the room, but in the panic which followed the fire only one of them was used by the crowd to exit. This was the main front door of the club through which most of them had entered. Although the people could see that the fireworks lit by Daniel Biechele, the tour manager had caused the entire stage to burn in seconds (Duval 2006), most erroneously assumed that it was part of the act and so did not react with alarm. They were then jolted to their senses that something was wrong when the fire alarm system went off. Background and Significance There were many other incidents similar to the Station Nightclub fire. In fact one had taken place just three days prior to this event at E2 nightclub in Chicago. History records that the Rhythm Club Fire of 1940, the Coconut Groove Boston Fire of 1942 and the Beverley Hills Supper Club South Gate Fire of 1977 are the three major nightclub fires that had occurred during this century (Duval 2006). However, these accidents also paved the way for different safety codes that were designed to protect the people. This paper will aim at analyzing the effectiveness of these codes at the same time discussing the extent to which these codes were followed in the construction of this night club. Furthermore, as a result of this incident that took away the lives of many people, new codes were conceived. Different suggestions and recommendations on how to prevent and negotiate fires will also be proposed by the end of this paper. Event The Station Nightclub fire of 2003 took place at a concert held on the evening of February 20. Records show that 462 people were in attendance and a performance to be given by Great White was the highlight of the evening. Instigation of the Fire In fact a video recording of the event was made by Brian Butler, a cameraman for a local TV station invited by part owner Jeffrey Derderian who was on hand making a report on nightclub safety (Listverse.com website, 2010).. He states that as some people noticed that the fire got out of hand almost immediately, they got up to leave. According to the timeline of the events specified by the NIST Investigation Department, the band took its place and lights were dimmed 11:07 PM. Soon after, four pyrotechnics present at the stage were ignited which started reaching the alcove near the drums. In a couple of seconds, the insulation foams started catching fire. Exactly after 11 seconds the band and the crowd realized that the fire is not an intentional part of the show (Grosshandler 2005). After 30 seconds, the band stopped playing and singer Jack Russell even remarked into the microphone that things did not look good. It was then that the crowd began to move out. Thankfully the fire alarm began to ring after 41 seconds removing all doubts of a planned act. It was not before 60 seconds after the ignition began that the emergency 911 number was reached. The scene after 90 seconds indicated that a black smoke had overwhelmed the club, and right after 100 seconds the main exit was blocked with the stampede trying to exit the premises. Unbelievably just five and a half minutes following the ignition of the pyrotechnics, the club was raging with fire. Cause of the Accident Soon after the incident, the site was visited by NIST representatives, other investigating agencies and forensic archeologists to give their insight on the causes of the accident. Their reports indicated that there were two main factors that led to the massive destruction and loss of live following the fire. For one, the interiors of the club presented a fire hazard as they were made of highly combustible materials. The wood used here was highly inflammable; this even led to an impediment in effective removal or escape of people as smoke was soaring in the club room acting as a deterrent to the crowd trying to exit the structure (Duval 2006). Secondly, the insulation foam that was used to insulate the sound was also easily inflammable. The foam was made out of polyurethane which is generally used as a packing material. The report indicated that the foam cost just $575 while good quality fire deterrent foam would have cost a maximum of $1550 (McGrevy 2008). As this quality of foam caught fire readily, it was the main cause for the expansion of the fire throughout the room. Overcrowding was also another of the factors that caused the high loss of life and injuries (Duval 2006). Results and Losses The immediate fallout of the incident was a death toll of 96 people which increased to 100 within the next 70 days of the accident. Out of the 462 people attending the event, 100 people lost their lives and 200 of them were severely injured. A case was filed against the owners of the club, brothers Jeffrey and Michael Derderian along with Great White’s tour manager Daniel Biechele who was managing the event, who was charged with manslaughter. The trial began in 2006 and while Biechele pleaded guilty, the Derderian brothers indicated a no contest that was supposed to reduce their sentencing (Duval 2006). While Daniel was sentenced to 15 years in prison, Jeffrey was also sentenced to 15 years and Michael to 10. Daniel has been released for good behavior on 19 March 2008. He showed true remorse for his actions and most families of victims have even pardoned him for his unfortunate involvement in the affair. Analysis of the Fire Codes Old Codes Subject before the Accident and its Shortcomings during the Accident At the time of the construction of the night club the BOCA (Buildings Officials and Codes Administration) Code was applicable which treated clubs as separate entities with separate codes being applied to these building being utilized for nightclubs. According to the IBC 602.5, the building should have undergone Type VB construction; however the structure was constructed out of unsafe wood. According to the IBC Table 600, the building should be fire resistant only when there is a distance higher than 10 feet between exterior walls and the property line (Grosshandler 2005). Station Nightclub had a distance lower than this so there was no need of fire resistance. The height allowed under the IBC Table 500 to club buildings was up to 6000 ft high, this wall of station club was however only 4484m tall. However the IBC code requires a sprinkler protection with the structure, which was not complied during the construction of the company. The IBC Chapter 8 requires a thorough testing of the interiors for being fire resistant, however the interiors of the Station Club didn`t follow these codes and was highly combustible. The smoke and fire scales determined by the IBC codes were also not met. NPFA 5000 Codes requires a rigorous testing for plastic codes, which the plastic codes used under this structure did not follow. NPFA 5000n also requires an automatic sprinkler installation for an accommodation higher than 300 whereas this building didn`t have any kind of sprinkler system at all. It was also recorded that in a mock re-enactment of the same event, the NIST has demonstrated that the installation of a sprinkler system would have played a role in dousing the fire as well as giving time to people to get out through more escape routes. The same code also requires a fire alarm to be connected with a local fire extinguishing company (Grosshandler 2005). Though the club had a manual fire alarm located in the main hall and pool tables, it wasn`t connected with local stations. The exits however complied with almost all the exit codes specified by the NPFA. Thus we can conclude that if the model codes for 2003 had been followed by the building owners and the managers, the fire could have been controlled quite easily. Change in the Codes Major investigations being held in Massachusetts by the board of Rhode Island and other members paved way for a change in the scope of the codes to prevent further incidents. The NPFA 101 and the NPFA 5000 approved in 2006 specifies that a maximum exit load of two thirds of the capacity of the exit passage would be allowed for nightclubs. Under the “life security code” and “the building construction and safety code”, now for a festival seating arrangement with occupancy higher than 100 people to take place, the crowd managers would have to place automatic sprinklers in the building and ensure that proper exit routes are available (Duval 2006). The minimum exit capacity would now have to be 117%. Conclusion The new codes and laws incorporated following this incident were in fact the need of the time to prevent any more accidents from taking place. Following this tragedy, a lot of further recommendations have been made by different committees to ensure that the safety and security codes are being implemented. The local authorities should make sure that the codes are being implemented. Also, proper crowd managers and exit managers are needed who should be hired and approved by local authorities before being placed at such sites. The people who wish to attend these night parties should also be given special training regarding these areas. For example they could be shown exit routes through lighting before the performance and told exactly what to do in case of a fire or any other mishap. According to the recommendations made by the NIST, any night clubs not having a proper sprinkler system should be banned for using pyrotechnics under that area. Portable fire extinguishers should also be present at the disposal of a specialized task force to handle the job in case of any accident. We can conclude by stating that the design of an effective code system is very crucial to prevent any such accidents. However, until and unless these codes are being applied effectively they are of no use. Consequently, studying human behavior is very important to add value to the codes and it should be ensured that people are aware of the rules and regulations, and proper action is being taken against those who don`t follow them. References Duval, R. F., National Fire Protection Association & NFPA Fire Investigations Dept. (2006). NFPA case study: Nightclub fires. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, Fire Investigations Department. McGrevy, C. D. (2008). The Station Night Club Fire that occurred 20 Feb 03 in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Cincinnati, Ohio: University of Cincinnati. Grosshandler, W. L., Bryner, N. P., Madrzykowski, D., Kuntz, K., United States., Building and Fire Research Laboratory (U.S.)., & National Construction Safety Team Act (U.S.). (2005). Report of the Technical Investigation of the Station Nightclub Fire. Gaithersburg, Md: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology. The Listverse.com website (08 March 2010). Top 10 Modern Nightclub Fires. Accessed on 10 April 2012 at http://listverse.com/2010/03/08/top-10-modern-night-club-fires/ Read More