Risk Management Occurred by the Natural Disasters - Essay Example

Risk Management Cycle Introduction Disasters have a way of impacting greatly into our lives. These disasters often cause millions of dollars worthof damages in property and industries, and often cause an invaluable loss in human lives. The degree or amount of preparation that goes into each disaster often eventually determines the property and human lives lost in such disaster. The process of managing disasters is complicated and is based on a variety of factors. This paper shall discuss the disaster management surrounding Typhoon Parma which hit the Philippines last October 2009. It shall assess the disaster based on the different stages of the risk management cycle, explaining what was right and what was wrong during the management of the disaster. It shall also provide key elements of risk management strategy aimed at ensuring more effective risk management in the future. Discussion Normal State The Philippines was just recovering from the devastating effects of Typhoon Ketsana on its islands when barely a week after, another storm warning was issued by their weather monitoring agencies (Associated Press, 2009). Consequently, the situation in the Philippines was far from normal before Typhoon Parma struck the islands. However, the projected path of the typhoon was not the same track as Typhoon Ketsana. Instead, the typhoon had its first landfall in the northernmost provinces of the Philippines on October 3, 2009 (Associated Press, 2009). It pummelled said provinces for two days before veering off the islands only to backtrack into the same islands and lingering, remaining almost stationary for 2 days over the South China Sea before heading for Vietnam (Associated Press, 2009). Its backtracking was largely a product of its interaction with Typhoon Melor which was headed towards Japan. Said interaction pulled Typhoon Parma back into the Philippines and causing more damage on its second landfall (Associated Press, 2009). The typhoon caused the death of 374 people, displaced about 100,000 individuals, damaging about 23,000 homes, and millions of dollars of losses in agriculture (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). Preparedness From October 1-3, 2009, in preparing for the typhoon, the Disaster Coordinating Council of the Philippines initiated a pre-emptive evacuation of about 45,000 people expected to be affected by the typhoon. This evacuation covered 15 provinces in Regions I, II, III, IV-A, V and the National Capital Region with families evacuated to host families and 117 evacuation centres (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009, p. 1). Local reports also indicate that their national government ordered the clearing of debris from the previous typhoon which hit the country. This clearing was made to prepare and prevent possible flooding; landfills in some of the provinces were opened in order to receive the debris to be cleared. The evacuation centres were also stocked up with food and other necessary items; relief goods were distributed to the areas which were expected to be hit by the typhoon (Philstar, 2009). The National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) also reported that “residents in low-lying areas and near mountain slopes under signal no. 2 and signal no. 1 [were] advised to take all the necessary precautionary measures against possible flashfloods and landslides” (2009, p. 1). The NDCC also authorized the release of 8,000 sacks of rice to the regions which were expected to be hit by the typhoon. The NDCC continued disseminating weather bulletins and gale warning advisories to the areas expected to be hit; their communication medium included SMS (text messages), facsimile, internet warnings to the different local disaster coordinating councils (NDCC, 2009, p. 2). Their police, military, rescue units, emergency rescue units, and similar manpower resources were also prepositioned in areas which were expected to be affected by the typhoon. Their social services agencies also doubled their efforts and mobilized their volunteers in order to prepare food packs and ready them for distribution to the provinces affected. Their health agencies were also ordered to preposition medicine and medical supplies in all regions affected (NDCC, 2009, p. 2). The regional and provincial government offices were also advised to identify and prepare high ground areas which were safe evacuation centres for evacuees. Government officials in areas in the path of the typhoon were advised to closely monitor the weather warnings and to prepare for possible changes in plans and precautionary measures as and when they were necessary (NDCC, 2009, p. 20). Operators of dams were also advised to assess their levels and spilling levels for possible release of waters in preparation for increased rainfall. The preparations made above were actually adequate preparations for the typhoon. What the Philippine government officials and residents were not prepared for was the second landfall of the typhoon. In fact, reports reveal that on its first landfall, the typhoon caused 2 deaths and damaged the farming and agricultural provinces in the northernmost parts of the Philippines (Guardian.uk, 2009). Such damage was relatively minimal as compared to the damage that the second landfall brought to the area. The second landfall worsened the damage it previously brought to the vast tracts of agricultural lands in the Northern provinces. Because of its interaction with Typhoon Melor, it also remained almost stationary in the Northern provinces for almost two days before leaving the country. On its second landfall, it dumped more rain into the affected provinces, filling the dams to capacity and consequently leading to the flooding of many low-lying provinces and loosening soil on mountain slopes (Environment News Service, 2009). Massive flooding of many farms and towns damaged infrastructure and crops. Landslides also damaged many properties, displacing families, and causing the deaths of 374 residents (La Vina & Agsaoay-Sano, 2009). The major damage wrought on by the typhoon was the flooding in the low-lying areas and the landslides in the more mountainous areas of the northernmost provinces of the Philippines (Ellao, 2009). Flooding was primarily due to the water released from their major dams; their dams released water at the height of the typhoon. The water could not be accommodated by their spillways and rivers, and hence overflowed to the farms and towns (Jamoralin, 2009). There was also insufficient warning given to the local government officials by those who were managing the dam as to the time and the amount of water to be released from the dams (Ubac, 2009). As regards the landslides, years of deforestation exposed mountain slopes to the elements, causing the soil to loosen and water to easily seep into the soil. Moreover, inadequate rainwater drainage and spillway systems were not set up in the areas hit by the landslides. It is also important to note that pollution caused the blockage of drainage systems – exacerbating the effects of flooding (Inkana, 2009). Based on a 2005 report, an area in Northern Philippines was already declared unsafe and at risk for landslides, however residents still refused to leave the area (Carino, 2009). All these factors, when taken together, add up to inadequate preparation on the part of the people and the government officials in preparing for the disaster. Emergency Response The search and rescue operations conducted at the height of the typhoon to the flooded areas were inadequate. The search and rescue teams did not have enough motorboats to rescue residents trapped in their homes, on their roofs, and even on treetops (ABS-CBN News, 2009). They also lacked modern equipment to carry out rescue operations on areas buried by landslides. The efforts of the rescue teams were also hampered by road blockage from landslides and by high flood waters in many of the flooded towns (Inquirer.com, 2009). It was difficult to establish logistical routes during the typhoon when the roads were not passable to traffic and when only a limited number of helicopters were available to the rescuers (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009). There were coordination problems during the emergency response because the dam operators who were supposed to inform the local officials about the release of water failed to do so (Ubac, 2009). Consequently, many residents were trapped in their homes and floodwaters rose to alarming levels in a very short period of time. Failure of coordination in some of the mountain slope areas was also actually due to lack of cooperation of residents living in high risk areas who did not want to be relocated to the evacuation centres. Assistance to the residents and areas affected were made available through the different local government officials, private agencies, and international organizations (UN). After the typhoon a needs assessment team composed of representatives from the UN, the WFP, the UNICEF, WHO, IOM, UNFPA, and the Philippine NDCC was deployed to the northernmost provinces of the Philippines (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009, p. 1). The assessment team was able to establish the health needs of the people in the evacuation centres, with top morbidity causes including acute respiratory infections, skin infection, diarrhoea, fever, leptospirosis, and pneumonia. Most of these diseases are water-borne diseases and easily transmissible to other people. Based on such assessment, the local government units and the private agencies were able to immediately make provision for portalets and for diarrheal kits to be distributed to the evacuation centres (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009, p. 1). The assessment and ongoing management efforts were however hampered by continued flooding, slow receding floodwaters, destroyed bridges and roads. Consequently, adequate health assessment was limited by such problems. The response to disaster was also hampered by limited access to fresh, clean water for sanitation and hygiene, within and outside the evacuation centres. It is apparent however that the efforts to provide the affected citizens with what they needed were largely curtailed by limited resources on the part of government officials (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009, p. 1). Inadequate resources limited the movements and the search and rescue activities of the emergency response teams. Most of the resources of the response teams were also limited because of the recent typhoon that ravaged the country not more than a week after Typhoon Parma hit the country. In order to supplement food supplies, the national government coordinated with the international agencies in order to secure and deliver rice and other food necessities to the affected areas (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2009, p. 1). Rescue operations for bodies buried under landslides, for clearing of roads, for distribution of relief goods, and for draining of floodwaters were carried out in the days, and weeks after the typhoon by the local government agencies with the assistance of the military, the police, private agencies, volunteers, and international agencies (Hake, 2009). However, as was previously mentioned, said operations were hampered by limited road access; and some areas could only be accessed through helicopters. However, there were only a limited number of helicopters available to the rescue units. Assistance in this department was provided by the US army through their Chinooks (Hake, 2009). Other private agencies made their helicopters available, however, with a wide area to cover and with many goods and services to deliver, these helicopters were still not sufficient to effectively manage the disaster. Limited experience on the part of rescue teams was also seen. Inexperienced and ill-equipped rescue workers were often faced with monumental challenges that eventually increased the risk to their lives and the lives of the people they were actually rescuing (Aysan & Geleta, 2009, p. 8). Recovery The recovery period from the disaster is still ongoing in the affected provinces in the Philippines. The efforts which were however started include road rehabilitation, importation of food supplies, establishment of permanent and alternative relocation areas for displaced families, and similar livelihood assistance measures for areas affected. Road rehabilitation was prioritized because only when the roads would be cleared would the needs of the people be delivered (Aben, 2009). Roads were cleared and major highways were made passable to traffic within weeks after the typhoon. Displaced families eventually returned to their homes or were reassigned to relocation centres. Permanent relocation however has still to be provided for many families displaced by landslides (La Vina & Agsaoay-Sano, 2009). A major barrier in the recovery process in this region is the limited funding. Even with assistance from the government and from international organizations, damages in livelihood and rehabilitation still amount to millions of dollars (La Vina & Agsaoay-Sano, 2009). In fact the Philippine NDCC estimated the damage brought by the typhoon to 1.96 Philippine pesos and damages from the previous typhoon to be at 8.33 pesos; this represents 0.2% of their GDP (Padilla, 2009). Unofficial reports from the landslide and flooded areas also reveal that the damage is actually higher than the NDCC estimate. The amount estimated above cannot be completely financed and replaced by the government and by international agencies. Policy makers in the Philippines have yet to lay out firm and functional disaster and rehabilitation management for these disasters. Currently, “statements from Malacanang and Congress echo the same flawed fiscal policies that have been saddling the people long before Ondoy and Pepeng hit the country” (Padilla, 2009). The recovery plan being implemented in the Philippines has not been geared towards preparing for future typhoons. Flood monitoring systems have yet to be set up in the low lying provinces prone to flooding. Reforestation measures have also not been aggressively pursued by the government in landslide-prone areas. Dikes have been repaired, but not reinforced or increased in height. Disaster management training has not been implemented on emergency response teams. The current recovery process is actually not being kept in line with disaster management. 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