Parliament, Politics and Policy Making - Essay Example

1) Critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the law-making process in the House of Commons The enactment of legislation in the British House of Commons generally goes through several stages, with an Act of Parliament being initially proposed in the form of a Bill, which represents a draft version of the law proposed. The introduction of a Bill may be initiated either by HM Government (governmental Bill) or by individual MPs (private Bills), with the latter being somewhat disadvantaged in their deliberation by the insufficient allocation of time for Parliamentary debate (Keenan and Smith 53). The government Bills are customarily introduced in the House of Commons, with approved drafts going to the House of Lords and then to Monarch for the subsequent assent. While such a procedure creates necessary checks and balances system in order to prevent the possible implementation of hastily approved Bills, it still limits the powers of popularly elected MPs in favour of non-elected governmental bodies, The time limits on the readings of the Bills in one session represent a significant deficiency of the present system of lawmaking as well. As the sessions of Parliament are closed by the act of prorogation, each Bill that fails to be carried through all necessary legislative steps is considered lapsed, and its authors have to go through this very process of legislative enquiry anew (Keenan and Smith 53). This has a significant adverse effect on the tempo of lawmaking and obstructs the efforts of lawmakers. Nevertheless, the legislative procedure of British House of Commons has its own positive features as well. The system of readings used in the House of Commons allows for diligent and extensive scrutiny and examination of the proposed Bills, while the institution of the Second Reading Committee supports the legislative initiative of individual MPs by providing for sufficient time for debating the private Bills that would otherwise be delayed (Keenan and Smith 54). Nevertheless, the aforementioned problems of House of Commons lawmaking seem to outweigh its strengths. 2. (1) In what ways, if any, have Labour’s reforms to Parliament since 1997 improved its role as a policy influencer? The coming to power of ‘New Labour’ government in the United Kingdom in 1997 was followed by several major reforms of the legislative bodies. The modernisation agenda of Blaire’s government affected both Houses of the Parliament, leading to many changes in its procedural rules and other structural elements. One of most significant of these policy moves was a thorough reform of the House of Lords, which lost its traditional character of the representative body of hereditary aristocracy after the House of Lords Act of 1999 provided for abolition of all but 92 hereditary peerages (Strickland and Cracknell 3). The modernisation of the House of the Commons proceeded rather unevenly, being somewhat stalled and timid in 1997-2001 and increasing in pace after 2001 (Cowley 20). Under Richard Cook, the Labour Party’s Leader of the House of Commons in 2001-2003, such important reforms were undertaken as the provision for more even resources allocation to select committees, the introduction of more topical Parliamentary Questions, and establishment of payment system for heads of select committees, so that the latter might wield an influence comparable to that of the Ministers (Cowley and Stuart 29). The tenure of Jack Straw as the Leader of the House (after 2006) was marked by important changes in standing committees process, with the result that the powers of standing committees were broadened so that they might receive both oral and written evidence before scrutinising the Bills under consideration (Cowley 21). Nevertheless, the other reforms to Parliament introduced by New Labour had mostly detrimental effect on its standing. For instance, the introduction of automatic timetabling of legislation served to make each Bill going through pre-arranged sequence of the debates, which narrowed the chances of Opposition to scrutinise the actions of the Government (Cowley 22). Together with changes to parliamentary timetable effected under Cook, this had an effect of enabling the executive to pre-empt the critical moves by the Commons. All in all, Labour’s reforms proved to be rather contradictory and did not yield their promised results. 3. (1) What is significance of the relatively high levels of party cohesion at Westminster to the balance of power between the executive and legislature? After the reforms of the House of Commons in the second half of the 19th century and decline in the influence of the House of Lords after 1911, the importance of political parties’ discipline in the legislative process at Westminster became paramount. While the 1970s witnessed partial diminution of the power of party leaders in the Parliament (Depauw 130), modern Parliamentary process is still characterised by the dominance of party apparatuses over individual MPs. The existence of whips’ offices, with Chief Whips of the governing party being responsible to Prime Minister for the matters of guaranteeing the intra-party discipline and preventing the back-bench rebellions against the official policies, serves to cement party discipline and tie the parliamentary faction of the governing party to the executive, thus tilting the Parliamentary balance in favour of the latter. The Chief Whips of the ruling party receive the lucrative offices in the HM Treasury, further increasing their loyalty to the Cabinet. The refusal of the MPs to vote according to informal whips’ instruction may lead to the eventual expulsion from the party group, thus strengthening the party discipline and giving the executive additional means of controlling its parliamentary faction. 4.(1) Are the Departmental Select Committees efficient vehicles for the House of Commons to perform its scrutiny role? Or, are they useful means for the executive to occupy backbenchers who might otherwise be more effective? The Departmental Select Committees system was established in June 1979 for the purposes of increasing the ability of the House of Commons to scrutinise the expenditure, legislation and policies of the executive (Maer, Gay and Kelly 1). The control of the Select Committees over the Government’s actions is carried out with the help of such instruments as inquiries and publication of reports. Through inquiry procedure, the Departmental Select Committees may turn the attention of the Ministers to the respective governance issues, which might lead to the changes being made before the publication of the critical report by the inquiring committees, In addition, the Select Committees procedure may make the critical evaluation of rejected legislative proposals more likely, and the compilation of evidence by Committees encourages a more open discussion of policy options (Maer, Gay and Kelly 35). Therefore, the Selecting Committees’ continuing attention to the issues of governance makes the Executive aware of the desires of the Parliament and force the former to act upon them. Nevertheless, one more problem needs to be addressed in general evaluation of the Selecting Committees: the role of backbenchers. While it was argued that the Selecting Committees are characterised by disproportionate presence of backbenchers, it should be taken into account that it is these backbenchers who fulfil the important, but often neglected functions of guaranteeing the conduct of Parliamentary scrutiny, and, as the number of ministerial offices is understandably limited, the ambitious backbenchers are able to pursue their career in the Committees, using their talents for the benefits of the Parliament. 5. (1) What does the relatively poor coverage of Parliament by the media indicate in relation to its significance in the British political system? The relative lack of media interest for the internal dynamics of the United Kingdom Parliament may be taken as evidence of larger influence of the Executive in comparison with the Parliament, which plays its role in public perception of the latter. The strong dependence of Parliamentary majority on their party apparatuses and ultimately on the Executive makes the coverage of Parliamentary activities relatively secondary to that of the Government, and does not allow for the interest of media towards legislative institutions. In addition, it should be noted that the lack of openness and the continuing antiquated practices with regard to information dissemination at the Parliament also have an adverse effect on its attraction for the media. 6. (1) Assess the potential political impact of full democratisation of the House of Lords The introduction of complete electoral representation in the House of Lords and the replacement of appointed peers by representatives of regions and nations of the United Kingdom will have manifold political impact. First of all, the House of the Commons and the Government may be countered by the assertive upper house, as the latter may be more independent from party politics and might regard itself as representative of local interests, as opposed to parliamentary bickering of Westminster-centred parties. Secondly, the House of Lords might become a focal point for various local and regional political forces, including nationalist ones, which may tilt the balance in national politics in favour of the latter. Finally, the introduction of direct suffrage to the House of Lords would undermine the traditional foundations of British Monarchy by negating the principle of unelected authority comparable to that of the Monarch. 7. (1) What effect has multi-level governance had on Westminster since 1997? The increasing devolution of government functions to the local and regional authorities in the wake of appropriate reforms enacted by Blaire Government led to major fragmentation of the previous Westminster-centred model of political decision-making and the partial weakening of decisive role of the Parliament in policy making (Garnett and Lynch 211). Nonetheless, the powers of Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers remained relatively unscathed by the effects of multi-governance reforms, and the civil service system has remained mostly centrally operated, minimising the possible impact of drastic policy moves in the regions (Garnett and Lynch 210). Still, local parties and regional party groups of major national parties were able to use new devolved powers of the respective assemblies in order to oppose Westminster-driven political changes, thus undermining the Westminster Parliament-based political centralism in the United Kingdom (Garnett and Lynch 250). 8. (1) Evaluate the case for and against independent regulation of the standards and conduct of members of the Commons and Lords The regulation of standards of parliamentary conduct in the devolved assemblies by independent advisers became a standard practice after the 1997 devolution reform. Due to this fact, it may be pertinent to evaluate the validity of such practice in the House of Commons and House of Lords, the expenses scandal of 2007 being taken into account. Firstly, it should be noted that the introduction of external regulation of standards and conduct of the MPs and Lords would undoubtedly make the prospective culprits in their ranks less likely to breach the norms of parliamentary ethics. Nonetheless, it should be noted that external regulation is not a panacea, as it carries the risks of making the Houses dependent on the other bureaucratic authorities in dealing with breaches of ethics by their members, instead of creating its own structures and waging vigorous fight with all unethical practices. 9. (1) Critically examine the avenues open for the Parliamentary Opposition to hold Government to account for its action of inaction The Official Opposition in United Kingdom House of Commons has a variety of instrument, through which it may bring the Government to account for its action or inaction. The formation of official Parliamentary agenda is conducted jointly by the Chief Whip of the ruling party and its Opposition counterpart, so that the designation of legislative agenda is influenced by Opposition (Birch 135). The Parliamentary convention allows the Opposition to choose the subject for debate in 26 days of each Parliamentary session; it is also able to interrupt the planned programme of the Government by initiating the vote of censure in the midst of the proceedings, if the new Government policy is introduced (Birch 135). Questions to the Government are also used to convey to the Government the possible displeasure of the Opposition by its action. Nevertheless, the Official Opposition has no veto power in the Commons and generally refrains from obstructing the law-making process, which might make it less efficient in its opposing role than would be otherwise. 10. Critically analyse the relevance of MPs constituency work to their parliamentary role The MPs of modern British Parliament are universally elected in single-member constituencies since 1950 general election (Norton 705). Even though the relationship between MPs and their constituents are not formally defined, the constituents mainly expect their representatives to provide information to them on the parliamentary proceeding, to represent the interests of local constituencies in dealing with public officials, and to support the specific causes of his/her constituents in the Parliament (Norton 705). Such mode of representation allows MPs to play the role of intermediary between the constituents and the central authorities, and to connect the larger parliamentary issues to the local needs and concerns. At the same time, this system runs the risk of predominance of parochial interests and limited causes in national law-making process. 1. (2) Critically evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the legislative process in the Westminster Parliament Same as Question No. 1. (2) 2. (2) Examine the role of the Official Opposition in the House of Commons since 1997 The Official Opposition in the House of Commons under the New Labour government was at first weak and divided, as the loss of popularity of Conservative Party after Major Government’s unsuccessful record undermined its standing among the British public. William Hague’s indecisive leadership and political incoherence cost the Conservatives their defeat during the 2001 election and threw the party in turmoil (Jones, Kavanagh and Moran 834). The interfactional struggle that ensued ended in the election of Iain Duncan Smith (Leader of Official Opposition in 2001-2003), who was a firm supporter of euro-scepticism (Jones, Kavanagh and Moran 834), who was followed by Michael Howard (2003-2005), whose tenure as a Leader of Official Opposition was marked by his anti-Iraqi War position. The insufficient performance of Conservatives in 2005 general election caused Howard’s resignation, and David Cameron was elected as his successor. During the period of 2005-2010, Cameron pursued much less confrontational course to Blair, and then Brown’s Government than his predecessors did. Under his leadership, the Conservatives supported Blair’s educational reform in 2006 and moved closer to New Labour on social policy after 2006 (Jones, Kavanagh and Moran 834). The Conservative victory in 2010 election and the formation of Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition made Labour Party the Official Opposition. Under David Miliband, the party tries to reclaim its disillusioned working-class supporters, while avoiding verbal radicalism and still steering to the political centre. 3. Explain the relevance of MPs constituency work to their parliamentary role Same as Question No. 10. (1) 4. (2) What reforms might be made to improve Parliament’s standing with the British public? In order to become more accessible and popular among the British public, the Parliament should improve the standards of its members’ conduct by creating appropriate systems of both internal and external control and scrutiny. The radical reform of the House of Lords by turning it into fully elected institution will provide better opportunity for regions and local communities and reduce Westminster system party favouritism. The enactment of strict limits on the MPs spending and the elimination of party whips’ system, which creates the precondition for graft and favouritism, would also be necessary components of such reforms. Finally, the increase in scrutiny powers of the Parliament with respect to the Executive would increase the accountability and undermine bureaucratic secrecy. 5. (2) To what extent does the select committees system redress the imbalance of power between the executive and the legislature? Same as Question 4 (1) 6. (2) Critically evaluate arguments for and against a fully appointed House of Lords The arguments in favour of a fully appointed House of Lords may be summarised as follows. A fully appointed House would most closely resemble the existing House of Lords, with the remaining hereditary element removed, thus providing for a constitutional continuity. An appointed House could more easily be made representative both of sections of society (ethnic groups, sexes, etc.) and of the regions, with the necessary balance maintained by appointment decisions A fully appointed House could also provide a method for the inclusion of independent members and experts, as their expertise may not be taken into account in case of electoral process. It could continue to provide part-time members who could bring contemporary professional experience to bear on the duties of scrutiny. At the same time, a fully appointed House of Lords would be fundamentally undemocratic institutions, as the appointment of its members will be predicated on the political calculations of the Executive. In addition, the absence of elected members would undermine its legitimacy and make it out of touch with the mood of British society legislation. 7. (2) Has Britain’s Membership of the European Union effectively undermined any notion of genuine parliamentary sovereignty? The membership of the United Kingdom in the European structures might be regarded as certain limitation of absolute sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, which leads the mainly Conservative Euro-sceptics to bemoan the loss of parliamentary sovereignty brought about by the EU membership. The acceptance of primacy of EU law over the Parliament’s decisions does indeed constitute the limitation of legislative powers of Parliament, while the European Human Rights Act of 1998 provides for the right of judiciary to challenge Parliament’s decisions that might run counter to the Act, thus limiting Parliament’s internal law-making powers (Jones 83). Nevertheless, it would be premature to argue that British Parliament lost its sovereignty as the result of Britain’s membership in the EU. Any laws adopted in accordance with the EU principles may be repealed in case of Britain’s withdrawal from the Union, while the Parliament retains the right to restore to itself the powers ceded to the EU (Jones 84). It is rather the implausibility of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU at the time that makes such scenario unlikely. 8. (2) Are pressure groups a threat to the representative role of Members of Parliament? The presence of voluntary associations and pressure groups in national law-making undoubtedly affects the legislative process and influences the position of individual MPs on the issues these groups strive to promote (Budge, Kay and Newton 287-288). Nevertheless, the influence of pressure groups on the MPs cannot be regarded as an infringement upon the latter’s representative role. Firstly, many of these groups come from the constituencies of the MPs and are thus merely an example of constituents’ lobbying for the decision they find useful. Secondly, pressure groups generally align with the ideologies that correspond to those of the MPs in question, thus not interfering with their political allegiance. Finally, pressure groups’ activities generally use the methods of advice and information when dealing with the MPs, not a coercion (Budge, Kay and Newton 284), and thus cannot be regarded as direct influences on his/her policies. 9. (2) In what ways, if any, have Labour’s reforms to Parliament since 1997 improved scrutiny of the executive? See Question 2. (1) 10. (2) Examine the case for and against reform of the electoral system for the House of Commons The problem of electoral reform for the House of Commons stems from alleged imbalance between the popular vote for the parties represented in the House and their share of MPs, which derives from First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system of elections in single-member constituencies. The proponents of alternative system of MPs’ election, such as Alternative Vote (AV) system, claim that FPTP voting results in imbalanced representation of political parties, which has adverse impact on the political community. In their judgment, the introduction of AV or fully proportional system (PR) would eliminate the discrepancies between popular vote and representation and provide for the overcoming of present two-party-dominated system. The supporters of FPTP, both in Conservative and Labour Parties, maintain that the abolition of FPTP would lead to the undermining of connection between an MP and his/her constituency, severing the ties between the Parliament and its constituents. In addition, they claim that introduction of PR or AV would allow minor, ‘extremist’, political parties to influence national politics, from which they are currently excluded by FPTP. They also maintain that the lack of absolute majority that would be the frequent case under PR/AV, would weaken the national government and lead to greater number of coalitions and general political instability. 11. (2) “All Parliamentary politics is ultimately a trade-off between the interests of Government, Opposition and Back-Benchers”. Explain and Discuss. While the Parliamentary politics is customarily viewed as revolving against the two-side struggle between the Government and Official Opposition, it should be noted that back-benchers of major Parliamentary factions play rather important role in the balance of power in the House of Commons. By dissenting against their party, sufficiently large numbers of back-benchers may drastically change the direction of legislative process and endanger the prospects of Government and/or Opposition in pushing for its legislative agenda. The revolt of back-benchers may be caused either by ideological or single-issue problems, but nevertheless the factor of defections or even abstaining from the vote might cost the Government that would ignore its back-benchers the great bulk of its majority, as John Major discovered. Therefore the control over back-benchers, if necessary, through concessions to them is an important part of successful Parliamentary policies. Works Cited Birch, A.H. 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Kavanagh, D., and Moran, M. Politics UK. 6th ed. Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2007. Print. Keenan, D.J. and Smith, K. Smith & Keenan's Law for Business. 3rd ed. Harlow, Essex: Pearson Education, 2006. Print. Maer, L., Gay, O. and Kelly, R. “The Departmental Select Committee System.” House of Commons. Research Paper 09/55, 15 Jun. 2009. Web. 16 May 2011. Norton, P. “The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP.” Parliamentary Affairs 47(4): 705-720. Print. Strickland, P. and Cracknell, R. “House of Lords Reform: Developments since 1997.” House of Commons. Research Paper 01/77, 24 Oct. 2001. Web. 16 May 2011. Read More