European Parliament as an independent actor in EU affairs - Essay Example

 European Parliament as an independent actor within EU affairs Introduction The European Parliament or EP is one of the keyinstitutions within the European Union (EU), which is a directly elected body and comprises of 766 members from 28 member states. Although the EP is not formally authorised to induct legislation, it has an important role in the EU’s budgeting and legislative processes, and coordinates closely with the Council of the European Union and European Commission (the other two key EU bodies) and is considered as one of the most dynamic legislatures worldwide (Farrell, 2007). The Parliament is also the second largest democratically elected parliament in the world (the first being the Indian parliament) with the largest electorate worldwide, wherein in 2009 records showed that there were nearly 375 million voters eligible for electing the EP members (Brand and Wielaard, 2009). While the European Parliament possesses legislative powers that the Commission and Council lack, unlike other national parliaments in Europe it cannot initiate legislations (European Parliament, Legislative powers, nd). Within the EU, the EP is considered as the ‘first institution’ by most of the treaties, and it has equal budgetary and legislative powers as that of the other body, Council of the European Union. It possesses equal jurisdiction over the EU budget, while the executive body, the European Commission, stands accountable in all functions to the European Parliament. The members of the European Parliament elect the President of the Commission and it has the right to accept or reject the Commission’s appointment, and can ask the Commission to resign as a whole. When it was first formed and until recently, the European Parliament was viewed as a body merely comprising of ‘multi-lingual’ voices. Its progress since its creation exemplifies the evolution of the EU structures that had initially formed and functioned without any distinct framework. This lack of a structural plan was evident when Tom Reid claimed that “nobody would have deliberately designed a government as complex and as redundant as the EU” (2004, 272). However, under current scenario, this has changed significantly and the EP is considered as one of the most powerful legislative bodies with regard to its budgetary and legislative powers. The Parliament has been given greater powers by various treaties, which came in through extensions in ordinary legislative procedures. In December 2009, the Lisbon Treaty came into force, which linked the Commission’s presidential election to that of the EP elections. At the same time, the Lisbon treaty also authorised the European Parliament with complete control over the EU budget, thus turning the legislative powers of the parliament in equal standing to that of the Council of the European Union (Europa, A Constitution for Europe, nd). Since the Lisbon Treaty, almost all decisions within the EU must be made with the permission of European Parliament (EP). Since the EP is the only body within the EU that is directly elected, it represents all citizens of the EU member states. However, despite its enhanced powers over the legislation and budgetary processes of the EU, a closer analysis reveals that the European Parliament lacks political freedom and it does not have an adequate access to the citizens, which must necessarily change to make it an independent actor within EU affairs. Discussion The enhanced role of the European parliament The European Parliament is the most democratic body within the EU, as the citizens of the EU directly elect its members. Various treaties, over the years, have granted greater powers to this institution in order to bring democracy within the EU. Owing to these changes, the EU has evolved from being a mere body for consultations to an important decision making body, as regards framing the EU laws and budget (under articles 14.1 and 16.1). Initially, the EP’s activities were limited to providing nonbinding viewpoints through consultation. It started gaining more power, in regard of influencing the EU legislation, through the cooperation procedure provided in the 1986 Single European Act. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 brought in the co-decision procedure that significantly increased EP’s power to affect EU’s legislative procedures in some arenas, especially the ones linked to the common domestic market of the EU (Europa, 2010). The Council of Ministers and the EP share powers of legislation and according to the co-decision procedure, both the EP and the Council must approve all Commission proposals for it to become a law; while using co-decision, the EP has the authority to change, remove or accept any proposed legislation. More power was accorded to the EP by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) that increased the scope of use of co-decision to various other policies such as social policies, environmental policies amongst many more. As the decisions making processes of the Council of Ministers are subject to an intricate system of majority voting instead of consensus, making way for a faster and more effective decision-making process, the Parliament’s power of co-decision is seen as a significant counterweight of a democratic nature, to the Council and the Commission. Further additions were made in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, which increases the responsibilities of the EP’s in the context of the EU’s legislative procedure (Eur-lex, 2007). It significantly increases the Parliament’s power of co-decision that encompasses 80 policy zones, including home affairs (police issues and matters of immigration), justice and agriculture. With this provision, the Lisbon Treaty grants EP the power that is equal to the Council of Ministers, in matters related to a majority of legislation passed by the EU. However, in some departments, such as, foreign policies, social security and tax, the EU member states still reserve their right to make decisions, and the co-decision procedure lacks jurisdiction over these departments. In the Lisbon Treaty the co-decision procedure is re-named to ordinary legislative procedure, however the term co-decision remains frequently in use. Furthermore, according to the consent procedure, the EP must approve or reject (by a simple yes or no) the addition of new member states and signing of treaties with any outside parties, as for example, in matters of trade and association agreements with non-EU members. Without the consent of the Parliament, the aforementioned agreements become ineffective. The EP also has the power to pass nonbinding resolutions, which are accountable to a simple majority. The Council of Ministers and the EP control the EU’s budgetary processes together, and the two bodies are responsible for appropriating annual budget of the EU. As from example, they make decisions on the funding amount to be allocated to education as against infrastructure development. However, the Council or the EP cannot decide the total amount allocated for the EU annual budget, since the figure is decided consensually by the EU member states, where a certain percentage of the Union’s total gross national income or GNI is fixed for the annual budget (Fact sheets on the European Union, 2013). Under the provisions made by the Lisbon Treaty, the Council and the Parliament together have combined power to appropriate the whole of the EU budget. Prior to the Lisbon treaty, the EP could decide on non-compulsory form of expenditures, as for example, development aid; while the Council had power over compulsory type of expenditures, as for example, funding related to international treaties and agriculture. The Lisbon Treaty removes the segregation of non-compulsory and compulsory expenditures. In the Lisbon treaty, it is significant that EP is granted greater control over the allocation of agricultural expenditure, which accounts for more than one-third of annual budget (Fact sheets on the European Union, 2013). Under circumstances where both the Council and the EP fail to approve to decide on a budget allocation, the Commission must present a new draft of the budget. In this context it can suggested that the EP’s power in regard to the annual budgetary process is more when compared to that of the Council, as the latter cannot pass a budget without approval from EP, but the EP has the power to pass a budget without the Council’s approval. However, most experts feel that in reality the EP can exercise this power only under unprecedented situations. While deciding the allocation of the annual budget of the EU, the Council and the EP must however comply with the annual expenditure limits made in the multi-annual economic framework that delineates the EU’s political priorities and limits maximum amounts for each spending and priority and category. As per the Lisbon Treaty, the Parliament must give its approval prior to the Council presenting its unanimous agreement on the multiannual economic framework. The EP also reviews the implementations as enforced by the European Commission in the previous annual budgets, via the discharge procedure. To close the annual budget books, the EP must vote to allow discharge, which is done after reviewing reports presented by the Court of Auditors and the Council’s recommendation on the issue (Fact sheets on the European Union, 2013). With the EP’s decision, the Commission is obliged to follow the observation and recommendations made by the former as regard budget implementation. Therefore, it is clear that the budgetary powers of the EP are significantly high, and it is greater than the powers granted to most national parliaments of the Union member states. The Parliament exercises an authority to supervise the activities of the European Commission and while it possesses a limited supervisory authority over the functions of the Council of Ministers. The EP oversees the EU policy management, has the authority to conduct public hearings and investigations, and has the power to submit written and oral queries to the Council and the Commission. The EP has a significant role in approving the appointment of the new Commission and in choosing its President after a span of five years. As per the provisions made in the Lisbon Treaty, the member states must arrive at a unanimous decision (during the European Council meeting) on the appointment of the Commission President, taking into consideration recent EP election results. Owing to this provision, it becomes possible for political groups with greater strengths within the EP to influence the appointment of the Commission President. Once a nominee has been fixed for the President’s post, he must be “elected” by the EP’s majority vote. It is generally surmised that this process of “election” is aimed largely at increasing public awareness on the EP elections and its role in Commission’s president selection. In reality, however the election procedure remains the same as was observed prior to the Lisbon treaty. It was observed during the 2004 and 2009 elections (prior to the Lisbon Treaty entering into force), the political group having the greatest influence within EP successfully installed a Commission President having the same political affinity. However, no political group in the EP has been in majority, so support from other political entities has always been necessary for approving the candidate’s nomination. Besides this, the EP also has the authority to reject or approve a new Commission (the whole group), but its jurisdiction does not include individual candidates. Furthermore, the EP may reject the entire Commission (not the Commissioners individually) by vote of censure. However, it is interesting to note that the EP has never used the vote of censure. In 1999, interestingly the Commission as a whole resigned, before the EP could opt for a formal vote of censure over charges of alleged corruption. Therefore, it is evident that while the EP has been granted enhanced powers, especially by the Lisbon treaty, it has not been able to make full use of the powers vested in it. The various roles of the EP clearly show that while it is independent institutionally, the EU is dependent to a certain extent on the Council (co-decision) and the government heads while taking decisions. Currently one of the major anomalies facing the EP is that with enhanced powers and dominance, other EU institutions at the same time have not garnered greater public interest. While, the European Parliament remains the most trusted amongst all European institutions (51% of the EU citizens have faith on the EP, in contrast to 47% that trust the Commission), the enhanced powers of the EP that places it as the Council’s co-legislator however reflects a decrease in voter interest (Schmitt, 2005). Therefore, despite new powers and enhanced influence as provided by the Lisbon Treaty, the EP still faces issues related to public perception. In November 2011, another poll conducted derived that while 45% of people interviewed from different EU member states held a neutral viewpoint about the EP, nearly 26% people had a “negative” opinion, which is an increase of 9 % from a 2008 opinion poll (Hix and Noury, 2009). Some critics even claimed that though the EP is the only directly democratically elected institution of the EU, it lacks legitimacy of other European national parliaments. Thus, the EP not only lacks political independence (it is however an independent institution), it has failed to use effectively the powers vested in it, and lacks adequate public access even though it symbolises the EU citizens, being the only democratically elected body. The EP lacks political independence and adequate public access Since its creation, the EP has persistently gained power and it is capable of co-deciding the EU legislation, while possessing extensive powers to supervise the Commission, and to some extent, the Council of Ministers. Therefore, the EP embodies the presence of the citizens within processes of European legislation. Studies showed that in the past EP has often opposed EU and national level policies, which were against the interests of citizens. In 2011, it rejected allocation of financial aid (€2 million) to the European Commission expert groups, asking for greater transparency, and restraining the taking over by different lobbying groups (EPHA, 2012). Furthermore, it successfully blocked the ACTA agreement in 2012, a controversial treaty related to the enforcement of international property rights (RT, 2012). Therefore, there are evidences that the Parliament, in some instances, has genuinely made positive efforts to be more accountable towards the citizens that have voted it to power. There are no doubts that the EP is institutionally independent, as the Commission does not include Members of the European Parliament (MEP), and it does not depend on governmental majority. While institutional independence of the EP is a mere precondition, this gives a scope to create a stronger Parliament that would eventually assume complete control. However, for an effective control the EP must have adequate access to the mass media, which can be used for starting debates to garner public support, and in due course affect the legislative procedure. Until date, the MEPs have a minor role in public debates related to the EU policies, mainly due to lack of media attention. Two other major factors act as barriers in the independent functioning of the EP. First, the political union of the MEPs factions with national political entities makes it politically dependent; and secondly, a general lack of candidates that have widespread support from a majority of the EU member states for Parliamentary elections makes it less popular among the media and citizens. The presence of candidates with widespread support would help to free the EP from serving petty domestic interests, while at the same time it would also help to garner greater media access, especially during elections; or in other words, it would help in ‘Europeanising’ the EU elections. The former factor is also of significance, as owing to the political union, there are comes into existence political figures that focus only on interests at a national level, while the EP should in actual terms represent the whole of EU.  It contravenes the very institutional nature of the EP, and the MEPs work towards serving only national interests, which thwarts other policies that target EU as a whole. This was evident during the European Transport Networks (TEN-T) debates where a large number of the MEPs promoted only their national interests (EU, 2011). It may result in expending on a project that will probably not serve the European international transport system as a whole. With poor media support and strong political dependency, the result is a low voter turnout during the EP elections. It is necessary that the citizens first acknowledge the EP as a major player within European affairs, and only then, it will help to increase the voter turnout. Therefore, it is necessary that the EP reject the multi-annual economic framework, prepared ineffectively by various political heads at a national level, enforce major changes and use mass media to display the changes made in order to garner citizens’ support and attention. The budget issue that is co-decided by the EU and Council should be made public and more transparent, thus turning it more democratic. The German Federal Constitutional Court ruled on the Lisbon Treaty, that national parliaments are the main authority of democratic liability, while the EP failed to match the theory of electoral equality (Fischer-Lescano, Joerges, and Wonka, 2010). However, the ministers and heads of States that co-decide would lack liability in EU affairs, as they are completely dependent on governmental majority that are more interested in national issues. Since during national elections European issues have little significance, the MP’s tend to become biased, overlooking issues of European importance, thus defeating the very reason for which the EP was established and resulting in electorates losing faith in the EP (Kanter, 2012). Conclusion From the above review, it can be suggested that while the EP is institutionally an independent actor, functionally it is yet to become free. It is dependent on the Council and more importantly on the political parties at a national level, while lacking access to its own electorates. To become politically independent and to gain greater access to the citizens, the MEPs must initiate debates on policies that have relevance to EU issues, thus helping to europeanise the EP. However, it is still a long process and many changes are required before the EP gets political independence and the necessary media attention that would help to serve its democratic responsibilities to Europe as a whole. References Brand C., and Wielaard, R., 2009. Conservatives Gain in European Parliament Elections. Washington Post. Accessed 9th November 2013 from, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/07/AR2009060702402.html Clerck-Sachsse, J., and Kaczynski, P., May 2009. The European Parliament: More Powerful, Less Legitimate- An outlook for the 7th term. CEPS Working Document, No. 314, accessed 11th November 2013 from http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1846.pdf EPHA, 2012. MEPs unblock funds for Commission Expert Groups. Accessed 12th November 2013 from http://www.epha.org/a/5349 European Parliament, nd. Legislative powers- legislative initiative. 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