The Humes Theory of Knowledge - Essay Example

? For Hume, ‘cause’ is intimately connected to his theory of knowledge. Indeed, causes themselves, are in the ‘head’ – so to speak. To understand what Hume means by ‘cause’, is similarly to understand what he means by understanding, hence the importance of epistemology. Hume argues that our information concerning causal relations between ideas, do not emerge an intuitive analysis or “immediate experience”. Rather, he claims that our preconceived ideas, recalled through memory, inform and shape an immediate experience, and therefore interpretation: “The probabilities of causes are of several kinds; but are all deriv’d from the same origin, viz.the association of ideas to a present impression” [Hume 130]. However, such a theory needs some qualifications. For example, what is the process by which we decide which ideas are ‘causally related’? In other words, what are the cognitive components of the mind which Hume argues, go into related some ideas, but not others? The following will examine the relationship between inference and epistemology, demonstrate Hume'’ scepticism, and analyze Kant as a means of criticizing and overcoming Hume’s problem. Toward this, Hume argues that when we examine two distinct ideas, or in turn, two impressions which we might think are related, we supposedly find that we do not perceive any of the necessary, or ‘causal’ connections between these two ideas or impressions. Rather, Hume argues that what we do perceive, are only those ideas which are contiguous and successive. Hume writes: Without any farther ceremony, we call the one ‘cause’ and the other ‘effect’, and infer the existence of the one from that of the other. In all those instances, from which we learn the conjunction of particular causes and effects, both the causes have been perceiv’d by the senses, and are remember’d: But in all cases, wherein we reason concerning them, there is only perceiv’d or remember’d, and the other is supply’d by conformity to our past experience . . .This relation is their constant conjunction. Contiguity and succession are not sufficient to make us pronounce any two objects to be cause and effect, unless we perceive, that these two relations are preserv’d in several instances [Hume 87] Although a long passage, the preceding contains many of the core ideas surrounding Hume’s ‘model of the mind’, his notion of ‘causation’, and finally, the notion of ‘inference’ – that is, the opposite of a deductive or necessary form of reasoning. First, is the important notion of sense impression. Hume argues that the mind operates by ‘mirroring nature’ – to borrow a phrase from Richard Rorty [1979]. An impression of the external world, is akin to a photographic image, and to this end, he argues also that the more immediate an impression is, the more “lively” [Hume, 1995: 98]. In other words, past impressions are more vague. The second important aspect of his theory of causality, is the notion of ‘belief’ or ‘understanding’. In this regard, he argues that the relationship between one impression and another impression (e.g. representation), is a relationship that is founded on ‘belief’, and belief itself is formed out of custom and habit. He argues that habit and not the impressions themselves are what ‘conjoin’ the two, given that any careful consideration of the nominal nature of impressions, will yield the conclusion that two certain ‘frames’ are different than another. By contrast, he claims that notions such as “identity”, “time”, “place” and finally “cause”, are only “ideas” rather than anything which actually exists in nature and therefore understood or perceptible by the senses [Hume 73]. The classic example of two such impressions, are between ‘smoke’ and ‘fire’. Taken or understood as images, separately, that is, neither one of these resemble one-another. There is no reason, save for habit and experience, to relate one of these impressions with the next. Indeed, he argues that because of our “imagination”, we are capable of thinking of these impressions as distinct and separate from one-another – that is, as completely independent or in isolation from one-another. For example, if events can be imagined or considered to be ‘uncaused’, it is also possible or plausible that in reality they are uncaused. If this is a valid possibility, it follows that no valid demonstration can be made concerning the impossibility of uncaused events: “the separation, therefore, of the idea of a cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual separation of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no contradiction nor absurdity” [Hume 79-80]. Thus, causation or the assumption that every event has a cause, is an assumption that ‘begs the question’. Having outlined some of the central tenets regarding his criticism of the idea of causal necessity, some remarks should be made concerning how these actually come about in the mind. First, he argues that the components of our causal reasoning, are a rooted in a present impression of sense, or a memory. And, a memory is an imagined idea of a related event. That is, it is imagined, precisely because it is not known – as was argued above. For example, when we hear a certain noise, we might think of someone wringing the doorbell. Hume asks how and why do we infer from the given impression to its supposed cause? In this regard, if ‘reason’ is not capable of connected or inferring the two events, perhaps it is experience. We find that when a sequence of events is constaly repeated in our experience, and when these events are conjoined, we create ideas that are associated concerning them. In this regard, when we think of one experience of events, we will often think of another: “when the impression of one becomes present to us, we immediately form an idea of its usual attendeant; and consequently we may establish this as one part of the definition of an opinion or belief, that ‘tis an idea related to or associated with a present impression” [Hume 93]. There are a number of important considerations with respect to Hume’s argument, and in turn, ‘epistemology’ and ‘ontology’. First, his position reflects an epistemological scepticism in regard to necessity and causation – indeed, ‘reason’ itself. If all we know, is an extension of impressions, and these are conjoined out of habit, custom, belief, and ideas, and further, they can equally be doubted as accepted, then, there is no rational or a priori knowledge. In this regard, the ‘necessity’ inherent in mathematics itself, would fall into epistemological uncertainty. Similarly with ontology. If ‘necessity’ is an extension of habit and custom, what can be said necessarily in regard to the outside world? If all external events cannot be known with absolute certainty, the external world is therefore typified by ‘uncertainty’. The following will present a challenge to Hume from Kant – a secondary source, so to speak. It is an argument which concludes that ‘apriori’ is possible, and it concerns the necessity of knowing all external objects in time, and in space. Thus, the focus of the following is ‘epistemology’ rather than ‘ontology’, however, the importance of both areas will be re-capitulated in relation to Hume and Kant in the conclusion. Human knowledge, Kant argued, is dependent on notions which are not empirical in origin. Instead, what Kant posits as `human understanding' cannot be refuted by experience. It will be shown later that although such formalist notions are irrefutable by `experience' that they are still not the whole of the experience of consciousness which is a criticism that will be pursued when the issue of representation is raised, that is, what Hume referred as ‘sense impressions’. The harmony that Kant's system creates between the senses and understanding is what is claimed to constitute a Copernican Revolution in epistemology [Kant XXXIII]. The distinction between sensibility and understanding is marked by a difference between passivity and activity. Kant writes: "We call sensibility the receptivity of our soul, or its power of receiving representations whenever it is in any wise affected while the understanding, on the contrary, is with us the power of producing representations, or the spontaneity of knowledge."[Kant 44]. By this, Kant is arguing that although ones senses are always at work, it is not necessary that one is focused upon what is a sensible given. For example, unquestionably my senses of touch are at work as I sit in this chair, but the senses themselves do not stand in any intentional relation with the chair. Instead, it is a matter of my thinking about the chair, and by interaction with it, which distinguishes a move from passivity to activity, or which marks a distinction between sensibility and understanding. In the `Transcendental Aesthetic', from the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant pursues what can be considered as transcendentally true with regard to such sensuous intuition. That is, if the chair, for example, as a phenomenon represents the "matter", what then is the "form" of this sensation as represented in the understanding which is what can be maintained necessarily, or apriori about the perception of phenomena. As stated in the lecture notes: “If an idea is something "conceived"--which it must be because the words he wrote were not images of perceptions; they were formed from ideas that did not come from perceptions--then why can we not conceive of other things?” The foundation of apriori sensibility is then argued to be the apriori categories of space and time. His reasoning is that because all objects of sensible perception are necessarily located in space and time, then the continuum of knowledge is therefore in a relation of dependence to it. Objects can change and variegate over a period of time, for example in colour, shape, size, etc., but they cannot as objects for thought be deprived in our understanding of space and time, and also remain perceptible. Space, Kant argues, is both apriori and sensuous in character. It is apriori, as opposed to a posteriori, because our immediate awareness of appearances, or of things outside of ourselves, cannot separate within this awareness, space from external reality: "It is impossible to imagine that there should be no space, though one might well imagine that there should be space without objects to fill it."[Kant 24] That is, any experience of something external, is an experience which is conditioned by space because the notion of externality itself presupposes that which is external and is "in a different part of space from where I am." [Kant 23] Thus, what might be predicated of something external, would constitute a posteriori knowledge, but, that an object is external is presupposed in its being external and therefore apriori. Further, space, according to Kant is not sensuous knowledge as an intellectual form, in that it is a universal predicate-- there is no intellectual distinction that can be made between particular and universal space. By intellectual, it is meant that I can, for example, state that a particular collie belongs to the universal category of dogs, but I could not claim that there are parts of space that belong to the universal notion of space, because the parts of space are in themselves spaces. Kant argues, therefore, that space is a "pure intuition", given that "we can imagine one space only and if we speak of many spaces, we meant parts of only one and the same space."[Kant 24] What follows from Kant's `intuition' is an expansion on the notion that there are apriori conditions that precede human knowledge in relation to sense experience and that knowledge then is the product of human understanding applied to sense experience. The `understanding' organizes the content of our experience according to its own rules, and these rules themselves, such as the confines of space and time, necessarily originate outside of sense experience, thereby allowing this very experience to be categorized. In sum, this paper has examined athe notion of ‘causality’ and ‘necessity’ with respect to Hume and Kant. It has been argued that Hume’s argument constitutes a position that reflects ‘epistemological scepticism’ regarding ‘necessity’. In short, Hume argues that these are the result of habit and belief, rather than empirical or sensible evidence-data. Further, it was shown how Kant’s notion of the transcendental aesthetic represents a means of overcoming this obstacle – that is, it reconciles the notions of empirical with rational truths. Works Cited: Hume, David. (1985). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kant, Immanuel. (1966). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Max Muller. New York: Anchor. Course or Lecture Notes. A Critique of Hume's Theory of Knowledge Using the thought of Immanuel Kant. Hume’s Epistemological Skepticism As Resolved in the Philosophy of Kant. Read More