Personalisation of Social Care: Mentally Ill and Disabled - Essay Example

?Running Head: Personalisation of Social Care Identifying and Critically Examining Personalisation of Social Care: Challenges of Commissioning Mentally Ill and Disabled Service Users Name Course Title Name of Professor Date of Submission Introduction The framework of ‘personalisation’ has been successful in dominating the domain of social work in the UK in just a matter of time. It is claimed that this sudden gain of prominence is brought about mainly by its similarity with major concerns of New Labour discourses, such as accountability, individualisation, and risk transfer (Gardener, 2011). It is assumed that, as long as it ignores the prevalence of discrimination, inequality, and poverty, recognises the marketisation of community care and social work, stigmatises perception of vulnerability, and promotes indifference and apathy in social work (Meads, Meads & Pringle, 2001), the idea of personalisation should be critically challenged. This paper analyses one of the most questionable components of personalisation: the process of commissioning. This paper argues that the contemporary techniques of commissioning do not constantly result in favourable outcomes for service users, in particular, for the mentally ill and disabled. Commissioners, quite frequently, evaluate good outcomes against service practices and results rather than in relation to what has been accomplished and enhanced outcomes for service users (Seden, Matthews, McCormick & Morgan, 2010). A more holistic commissioning process for social care is the biggest challenge of personalisation. This paper discusses the definition, importance, and implication of personalisation to social work and community care. It primarily examines the extent of the progress of the personalisation initiative, emphasising and comparing the experiences with and perceptions of the mentally ill and the disabled of the effectiveness of personalisation agenda, specifically with regard to the issue of commissioning. Second, the paper analyses the concerns raised by the execution of personalised social work and community care, with an emphasis on commissioning as a potential basis of reform. A great deal of the discussion here puts emphasis on individual budgets as the most beneficial case of current commissioning procedures, even though with some consideration of the significance of other components of personalisation, such as building social capital. Because personalisation has been recognised as a new and revolutionary model of public service reform, it has drawn much attention, as well as criticism. This paper discusses personalisation in England since this is where personalisation has progressed significantly. This paper examines the problems confronting commissioners with regard to personalisation, reflecting on the divergence between policy and practice. This discussion is of great importance to scholars, managers, policymakers, and people engaged in developing quality social care, building the benefits and privileges, and challenges and risks confronting those responsible for improving personalised social care. Personalisation: Definition, Importance, and Implication to Social Care Personalisation implies perceiving social care services in a completely distinct way. This implies beginning with the individual as a person with a purpose, inclinations, and strengths, and placing emphasis on them in the course of recognising their needs and preferences on the way they are supported and assisted to live fully (Carr, 2010). It demands a major change in the way social care is perceived and planned so that all services, personnel, procedures, and systems are equipped to prioritise people (Needham, 2010). The usual service-oriented model has generally implied that individuals have not been given the appropriate assistance at the appropriate time and have been incapable of developing the type of assistance they require (Carr, 2010). Basically, personalisation concerns granting individuals much more control over the way they live their lives and does not merely concern granting personal budgets to individuals entitled to council subsidy (Duffy, Waters & Glasby, 2010). Personalisation implies fulfilling the goals and needs of entire communities to guarantee everyone receives appropriate support, counsel, and information to make well-informed choices about the assistance they require (Duffy et al., 2010). It denotes making sure that individuals have broader options in how their needs are addressed and are capable of receiving general services like health, education transportation, employment and housing, irrespective of age or disability (Carr, 2010). The programme of adult social care policy puts emphasis on the improvement of support personalisation. This has been continually asserted in major policy papers such as the one circulated in 2005 by the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit entitled Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People, and the one released in 2006 by the Community Services White Paper entitled Our Health, Our Care, Our Say, (Needham, 2010, 6) which introduced the programme of individual budgets. Personalisation was developed from Direct Payments pioneered in 1997 where in individuals who are entitled to social care can decide to get a cash amount as a replacement for services (Gardener, 2011). In spite of persistent attempts to promote take-up, and expansion of the policy to cover more groups of people within entitlement, expenses in direct payment comprise 1% of the expenditure of local governments on social care (Needham, 2010, 7). Individual Budgets (IBs), which combine an array of various funding sources to support self-sufficient living, is then introduced (Seden et al., 2010). The framework for IBs was mainly obtained from efforts initiated by In Control which established independent support for individuals with learning disabilities (Duffy et al., 2010). Therefore, given the need for self-directed support, critical consideration of commissioning for personalisation in social care is vital. Commissioning does not concern merely procurement duties. A holistic operational definition of commissioning is “the act of committing resources, particularly but not limited to the health and social care sectors, with the aim of improving health, reducing inequalities, and enhancing patient experience” (Sobanja, 2009, 1). All the countries in the UK are covered by this definition yet the procedures differ (ibid, p. 1). Commissioning is generally implemented in England. The 1990 NHS and Community Care Act witnessed the actualisation of Caring for People, a White Paper published in 1989 (Needham, 2010, 10). That paper recognised accurate need assessment and proper commissioning as the foundation of premium care. It had envisioned that commissioning would be related to assigned duty for budget management (Carr, 2010). However, actual practice has thus far failed to meet that expectation: commissioning processes are often intrusive, bureaucratic, and weak, deficient of decentralised budgets, inadequately reinforced by information systems, and poorly equipped to address the needs and demands of service users (Carr, 2010). Initially it was envisioned that commissioning would be suitable for individuals with varied needs or those who needed large availability of resource for their support. Nevertheless, as critics have stated, there has been an absence of delineation of commissioning arrangements, and rigorous commissioning frameworks are seldom (Fernandez et al., 2007). Instead, commissioning has become a manifestation of the process of gate-keeping where in social workers basically supervise accessibility of social care resources by ascertaining the qualification of people requiring support (National Mental Health Development Unit, 2009). Furthermore, there is a growing conflict discerned between the purposes of the role of commissioning as a gatekeeper and personalisation in social care. The current personalisation programme focuses on the responsibility of social workers in giving support, commissioning, and information. It may be assumed that these duties resemble more an ‘established’ paradigm of social work (Snoddon, 2010). Although there are some doubts about the consequences of building micro-commissioning and personalisation frameworks, there is a convincing assertion that this current setting will generate opportunities for the exercise of social work abilities (Snoddon, 2010) in helping individuals access and use social care advocacy in making their choice and gaining control of their lives. Personalisation is increasingly viewed as the foundation for supporting individuals in articulating their preferences of service provision with regard to the advantages or outcomes that it will give them. For a number of people this could be regaining dissipated abilities after a time in hospital; for others it could be sustaining self-sufficiency in non-institutional environments, whereas for some it could be expressing preferences and sustaining independence as they lose control over their lives because of heightened need for support (Carr, 2010). This has consequences for the function of commissioners and their understanding of the need and satisfaction of clients with regard to outcomes, in addition to the management of micro-commissioning and care planning. It has repercussions for the assessment of service monitoring and outcomes. As qualification standards have become stricter, and more individuals have bigger resources from property’s capital value and savings, there is an increasing group of individuals no longer capable of receiving social supports that might previously have been accessible to them (Spandler, 2004). This has results in enlarging population of people paying for their own social supports without any understanding or supervision by the local officials (Sines, Saunders & Forbes-Burford, 2009). Subjective proofs indicate that in several regions of the Southeast of England a substantial percentage of housing care beds for older people and some home care services are bought by self-funders (Carr, 2010). Although this has never been viewed as the duty of commissioners, ill-informed decisions by individuals at the time of acquisition can force them to use their own resources more rapidly than they may otherwise have done and turning into customers of the local government as their needs grow and their resources drain (Carr, 2010). It is ever more distinguished that local authorities should consider these individuals in their strategic planning. Due to the aforesaid difficulties and drawbacks of commissioning for personalisation in social care it becomes crucial to analyse and compare commissioning for two types of service users, the mentally ill and disabled in England. Commissioning for the Mentally Ill and Disabled in England A number of commissioning difficulties are arising as an outcome of the thrust for personalisation in social care. Commissioning will not be confined to individuals ‘with commissioning in their job title’ (Needham, 2010, 5), yet will be carried out by service users and personnel for the former, utilising a broader array of providers. Of the different ways wherein services can be personalised, focus here is on individual budgets. It is in relation to these budgets that established frameworks of service provision and commissioning are being critically questioned, and where the materialising practice foundation can signify major reforms to the larger welfare state (Needham, 2010). The processes and developments analysed here reveal the kinds of issues which services for the mentally ill and the disabled will eventually have to confront as they progress towards further personalisation. Although there are general rules for realising personalisation for all people seeking resources for social care, there are particular difficulties to the process of commissioning for mental health service users (National Mental Health Development Unit, 2009, para 4-5). First, mental health service users should be assisted to sustain greatest control and choice all the way through changes in their mental wellbeing, as much as necessary. This may include instruments like early prepared statements of their personal budgets as well as the implementation of a holistic technique by personnel (ibid, para 4). Second, mental health may not manifest as clearly in the application of personalised social care by the local government under the supervision of coordinated NHS Trusts. Further attempt may be required to make sure personnel are engaged in the local government’s staff training and development programmes on personalisation (National Mental Health Development Unit, 2009, para 5). Third, personnel have to aid equality of access to resources for social care and beneficial risk taking of mentally ill individuals; however, they have to carry this out frequently in the perspective of traditional organisational cultures and public anxiety. Managers should provide appropriate support and counsel in these situations, expressing their dedication to risk support and personalisation and making sure providers have certainty in systems of organisation risk management (ibid, para 5). Under managed care, some of the problems created by deinstitutionalization could be solved. For example, instead of leaving it up to people with a serious psychological problem, or their families, to find appropriate care, it would be the job of the primary provider to find this care and ensure that patients have access to it. The primary provider would also coordinate care offered by other providers, such as drug treatments, psychotherapy, and rehabilitation services. And the primary provider would ensure continuity of care, so that patients did not “fall through the cracks” (Rosenheck, 1999, 48). Thus theoretically, managed care could have tremendous benefits for people with long term, serious mental – health problems. For people with less severe psychological problems, the availability of mental health care through managed care systems and other private insurance systems has led to a tremendous increase in the number of people seeking psychotherapy and other types of mental health care. Unfortunately, however, mental health care is expensive (Rosenheck, 1999). This creates major financial disincentives for managed care companies to cover mental health carefully. Many managed care plans do not cover mental health service at all, and those health care plans that do often provide minimal coverage. For those who need hospitalization, insurance often pays for a very limited stay. For those who need outpatient care, insurance may pay for only a few sessions of psychotherapy (Kessler et al., 2001). They will also pay for drugs, but no psychotherapy. And then of course, may people do not have any kind of health insurance because they are not employed or their employer does not offer it. At the turn of the millennium, it is estimated that about 50 percent of people with serious psychological problems are not receiving stable mental health treatment (Kessler et al., 2001). Prevalent concerns about the difficulties faced by commissioning for personalisation underline the White Paper recommendations of the Coalition Government (Duffy et al., 2010). Definitely, commissioning for mental health remains weak in several domains, frequently with people assigned not having sufficient knowledge of mental health, or performing it merely as part of their duty, or being fairly incompetent (National Mental Health Development Unit, 2009). Most practitioners remain under the classification of secondary care providers; hence provision of local service is controlled by local mental health trusts (Glasby, Littlechild & Campling, 2004). However, this is not to argue that there is a severe inadequacy of specialised mental health commissioners, yet it is an inconsistent trend across England (Needham, 2010). It is crucial that current supervision of commissioning for mental health services is considered. For instance, commissioners presently have rights over commissioning for personalisation, specifically, a structure for local government commissioners and the The Commissioning Friend for Mental Health Services (National Mental Health Development Unit, 2009). This second direction emphasises that recently the emphasis of commissioning has widened, expressing the necessity to perceive mental health as an absolute issue of population. This involves progressing to a more holistic perspective of service provision and via this model allowing service users to receive appropriate support (National Mental Health Development Unit, 2009, 6). Nevertheless, primary care is still incompetent in its treatment of mental health problems, with a large number of General Practitioners (GPs) revealing a lack of know-how in the field and a lot of individuals failing to receive quality care (Duffy et al., 2010). The basic weaknesses of commissioning for mental health services are reinforced by the following causes (House of Commons—Health Committee, 2010, para 9-10). First, inexperienced or incompetent mental health primary care workers; a large number of GPs have inadequate training or knowledge in mental health in spite a large amount of their time spent with mentally ill individuals (ibid, para 9). Second, in spite of current encouraging developments there is still insufficient accessibility of effectual treatments like exercise treatment and psychological treatments, and a heavy dependence on treatment with an extent of unsuitable prescribing (House of Commons--- Health Committee, 2010, para 9). Third, GPs are still the gatekeepers to a large number of mental health care, alongside extremely few chances for individuals to self-refer to social care services. Fourth are the inappropriately identified care alternatives via primary care services and expert services. And lastly, weak information systems are not connected to secondary care (House of Commons—Health Committee, 2010, para 9-10). Each of these causes should be handled if GP directed commissioning for mental health is to develop on the present condition with regard to commissioning. Two facts emerged about mental health: first, the most usual service procured was on-site counselling, which is currently recognised as a major area for improvement, as expressed by the persistent dedication of the Coalition Government to the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) agenda (House of Commons--- Health Committee, 2010); second was that services of commissioning for individuals with chronic and acute mental problem was extremely problematic or ineffective (ibid, para 12). Practice-based commissioning (PBC), currently, has concentrated on sectors where public Payment by Result taxes is present (Fernandez et al., 2007). This has successfully ruled out mental health service users where no taxes have yet been realised nationwide. GP-directed commissioning has the capability of improving the condition of individuals with common mental illnesses, like anxiety disorders and depression (House of Commons--- Health Committee, 2010). Primarily, if the agenda of IAPT is sustained, it will facilitate the emphasising of the connections between enduring physical health conditions and mental health, and make sure those mentally ill individuals’ physical health requirements are addressed more appropriately, resulting in an array of improved life consequences (ibid, para 13-14). Next, it could strengthen the implementation of evidence based, regulated interventions (Hakim & Pollard, 2011). Problems of commissioning are less apparent with regard to individuals with disability. Despite guaranteeing early outcomes, it is essential to acknowledge that the expansion and quite drastic compression of individual budgets for disabled service users have drawn considerable attention and commitment (Gardener, 2011). Similarly, others have argued that various advocates of individual budgets may be driven by quite distinct core philosophies. Such conflicts have perhaps been illustrated most compellingly by Pearson (2004) who has underlined the conflicts between the disability discourse and the social justice movement and the government’s market policies in earlier direct payment changes. Askheim (2003), similarly, claims that those evidently dedicated to the concept of ‘empowerment’ can advocate the notion either from a revolutionary civil rights framework, or from a market-based consumer standpoint. This is strengthened by Spandler’s (2004) argument that direct payments are an intricate union of the ideologies and needs of of New Labour, new right, and welfare user movement (ibid, p. 190), with an ability to obscure an array of core contradictions. Fernandez and colleagues (2007) stated that the agenda is appealing all over the political sector since traditional critics can commend its market-oriented features, whereas for New Labour the agenda reverberates clearly with the wider push of the choice in the movement of public services. The agenda also appears to be quite appealing to service users who have open and readily available access to it (ibid, p. 99). Apparently, such contradictions may similarly result in role conflict for frontline staff working with the mentally ill and disabled service users as they struggle to aid receivers of individual budgets and direct payment, while simultaneously operating within financial limitations and within an arrangement that are not constantly as liberating as the original policy discourse may indicate (Glasby et al., 2004). However, unlike in mental health services, disabled service users experience difficulties in commissioning with regard to individual budgets and direct payments (Fernandez et al., 2007). As argued by Spandler (2004), after examining a number of issues, it appears apparent that neither a basic quest towards direct payments as a means to empower service users, nor a thoughtless response against them as only frugal consumerism is a sufficient reaction. Direct payments are indefinitely a ‘democratic’ or a ‘consumerist’ mode of social policy, yet in reality an illustration of the union of the two, a union that results in both opportunities and difficulties (ibid, p. 202). Likewise, as claimed by Sapey and Pearson (2004), direct payments exploit the premises of the free market and there can be a conflict between the individualistic nature of this model and the collectivist requirement of the accountability for welfare. Direct payments have to be viewed as a vital component of a collective framework of support or service delivery. Putting into effect direct payment arrangements give an opportunity to encourage self-sufficient living and accessibility of mainstream social and economic lifestyles, but may also become a hazard to collective accountability for welfare and idea of community care if it is understood within the paradigm of individualism. Performing the first one instead of the second is the main challenge (ibid, p. 65). The author wholly recognises that personalisation is a debated sector of policy and practice, and it is essential that the later perception of individual budgets is treated against this wider and more decisive setting. The government has recently initiated two remarkable attempts to build individual self-sufficiency by reassigning valuable resources to disabled service users, specifically, in 1988 by forming the Independent Living Fund (ILF) and afterwards via the implementation of direct payments in 1996 (Fernandez et al., 2007). Both these efforts at reassigning control from the state to disabled service users, in the author’s opinion, were thwarted by an inept implementation of conditionality. The local government and the ILF providing direct payments persistently limit the manner in which needed resources can be accessed by disabled service users (Duffy et al., 2010). Enforcing conditionality by limiting the access to resources evidently weakens individual autonomy, and hence contradicts the initial policy objectives that created these instruments (Duffy et al., 2010). Furthermore, this form of conditionality imposed on both mentally ill and disabled service users has the implication of slowing down improvement. A mentally ill or disabled service user receiving cash sum that can only be spent in definitely imposed ways is not likely to be capable of building support that appears quite distinct from what could otherwise be accessible from current service alternatives (Moullin, 2002). In substantiation thus far, this appears to function as a force to alter progressive judgment within the system. By delineating the connection between the state and service users with regard to the needs to be addressed and the goals to be realised, instead of service or processes, individual self-sufficiency is enhanced (Moullin, 2002). In practice, this implies that actions that were absurd for service users or personnel beforehand become more acceptable to the system and more probable for the people. Aside from the difficulties faced by commissioning for personalisation in terms of client-oriented processes and outcomes in mental health and transfer of direct payments and individual budgets to disabled service users, the concept of personalisation has to confront the issue of diversity in the UK. The next section will look at the performance of personalisation in terms of diversity management. Personalisation and Diversity The rules for commissioning recommend an evaluation of local needs that can be performed before commissioning. This is intended to create accurate knowledge or understanding of the kind of service needed by the local population, such as the Black minority ethnic group (Seden et al., 2010). The rules of commissioning propose that “issues of diversity are integrated from the start of the commissioning process as part of the initial needs assessment” (Snoddon, 2010, 37). Several Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) considered their local district to be less racially diverse than others. Carrying out needs assessment was hence considered as needless (Snoddon, 2010). A difficulty with this model is that it has a tendency not to be rooted in a thorough assessment of the present local community (Seden et al., 2010). Several service users from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities might be neglected because of traditionally low access and contact levels to services, which conveys the idea that these groups of people are not present locally (Meads et al., 2001). Even in cases where there are comparatively few BME populations in specific vicinity, where choices on service-type are rooted mainly in the range of need identified against size of population, instead of the extent of need among local groups and people, it is probable that the requirements of a local community’s minority groups will be taken for granted (Gardener, 2011). The lack of a BME-directed evaluation resulted in majority of social support services not being personalised to cater to diverse racial/ethnic groups (Braye & Preston-Shoot, 1995). Generally, service providers stated an idea that the contemporary commissioning agreements for personalisation are not accurately designed to address BME populations’ needs (Hakim & Pollard, 2011). Some of these service providers elaborated their opinions (Hakim & Pollard, 2011, 5). First, due to the inadequate subsidy is it not constantly feasible to hire a practitioner to address various dialects or languages of the local area (ibid, p. 5). Second, the absence of qualification, and as a result resources, puts off services from completely taking part in BME neighbourhoods and catering to these requirements would necessitate a distinct project centre (Hakim & Pollard, 2011, 5). And third, a number of service providers had modest or no interaction with BME clients and believed that their community’s demographic did not need a service that is BME-oriented (ibid, p. 5). These explanations imply that services are incapable of addressing the needs diversity in their community. Similar to all person-oriented provision of support, in trying to address the needs of the service users, the personalisation agenda should pay attention to the distinct circumstances of diverse groups of people (Carr, 2010). Culture and ethnicity are central elements of individuals’ identity and can influence the manner they view and experience their lives. Personalisation has the potential to be a revolutionary programme for social support services. It is based on a power transfer and a radical perspective of the relationship between the state and individuals (Gardener, 2011). A social care manager articulated the goal that individual seeking support will be taken out from the ‘ghetto’ (Needham, 2010, 34) where in they have been located. This paper has presented an overview of the current personalisation programme, elaborating its implication to mentally ill and disabled service users, and major issues for commissioners in its execution. Conclusions A great deal of the discussion has put emphasis on social care. As personalisation progressed in mental health and disability care sectors, it will be influenced by the relationships between provider and commissioner that appear quite distinct from those in social care services. For instance, as shown in the above discussion, the relationships between provider and commissioner resembles a relationship between a dwarf and a giant, with major secondary providers eager to build up additional services, and commissioners possessing inadequate capacity to try innovative, minor programmes. As revealed in some studies, some mental health personnel believe that the commissioning groups merely do not have the initiative or the instrument to instigate change (Needham, 2010). This is a quite distinct approach from the marketisation of social care, and it is probable that mentally ill and/or disabled service users will require its own connections with providers and commissioners, as well as own problems. These problems will be specifically severe in services where mutual commissioning is anticipated, as the well-known challenging relationships between social and health care substantiates. A major problem which has to be dealt with as personalisation progresses is how to develop a balance between public interest, service user accountability, and service user choice and control (Duffy et al., 2010). Thus far this subject has been ignored, as personalisation of social support service users has concentrated quite subtly on placing utmost importance on service user control. Nevertheless, conflicts are coming out within social care. For instance, for mental health service users there could be a belief that individuals retreat to the labour market (Sines et al., 2009). These conflicts will become more intense as the guarantee of personalised care is offered to the homeless, ex-convicts, and the jobless (Carr, 2010). The level to which support is influenced by service user needs or by provisions enforced by government will be a critical concern if the agenda of personalisation is to wield an effect beyond social care. This argument refers to wider concerns in the personalisation programme, regarding the extent of the mitigation or broadening of gaps between service users that personalised services can incur. Execution is still quite insufficient to provide a definite picture, and the great range of practice hampers standardisation. There have been claims that service users with ready access to services will be more self-assured in taking advantage of the gains of personalisation (Gardener, 2011). The author believes that the improved implementation of personal budgets may promote increased access to of ‘additional’ services from the own resources of service users, which could have an unfavourable effect on equality. Nevertheless, better transparency in relation to individual budgets has the capacity to improve equality (Needham, 2010), helping to guarantee that individuals with similar needs receive the same amount of resources. The concerns discussed here are fluctuating, making it uncertain to envision the direction of personalisation, even though the major risk appears revolve around the pace of transport rather than the future with all individuals engaged in making social care services more personalised. Several components of the upcoming programme are expected (Gardener, 2011): interest in non-state approaches towards long-standing problems of the welfare state, changes in the demography, and unreasonable reductions in budget. Personalisation is not a completely favourable solution; it does not provide direct advantages, in spite of the more optimistic views of it. Choices and trade-offs are inevitable. A great deal of the features of personalisation, just like with any large-scale policy reform, is still challenged, as local commissioners, service users, personnel, providers, and managers cope with the uncertainties of the programme. This paper has discussed current policy and practice in the mental health and disability sectors to determine the major problems and ambiguities for commissioners, in order for those claims to continue on an enlightened way. In a policy setting inundated with theories of best practice, it expresses the chaotic interaction between a policy agenda and the actual experience of the people directly involved and influenced by it. References Askheim, O.P. (2003). “Empowerment as guidance for professional social work: an act of balancing on a slack rope.” European Journal of Social Work, pp. 229–40. Braye, S. & Preston-Shoot, M. (1995). Empowering Practice in Social Care. Philadelphia: Open University Press. Carr, S. (2010). “Personalisation: A Rough Guide.” Adult Services Report, pp. 1-67. Duffy, S., Waters, J. & Glasby, J. (2010). “Personalisation and adult social care: future options for the reform of public services.” The Policy Press, pp. 493-506. Fernandez, J.L. et al (2007). “Direct payments in England: factors linked to variations in local provision.” Journal of Social Policy, pp. 97–121. Gardener, A. (2011). Personalisation in Social Work. UK: Learning Matters Limited. Glasby, J, Littlechild, R. & Campling, J. (2004). The Health and Social Care Divide: Experiences of Older People. Bristol, England: Policy Press. Hakim, R. & Pollard, T. (2011). “Independent Mental Health Advocacy.” Mental Health Alliance, pp. 2-7. House of Commons—Health Committee (2010). Written Evidence from the Mental Health Foundation, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmhealth/513/513vw93.htm. Kessler, R.C., Berglund, P.A., Bruce, M.L., Koch, J.R., et al. (2001). “The prevalence and correlates of untreated serious mental illness.” Health Service Research , 36, 987 – 1007. Meads, G., Meads, T. & Pringle, M. (2001). Trust in Experience: Transferable Learning for Primary Care Trusts. UK: Radcliffe Publishing Ltd. Moullin, M. (2002). Delivering Excellence in Health and Social Care: Quality, Excellence, and Performance Measurement. Philadelphia: Open University Press. National Mental Health Development Unit (2009). “The Commissioning Friend for Mental Health Services.” Commissioning Support for London, pp. 1-10. Needham, C. (2010). “Commissioning for Personalisation: From the Fringes to the Mainstream.” Public Management and Policy Association, pp. 1-34. Pearson, C. (2004). “Keeping the cash under control: what’s the problem with direct payments in Scotland?” Disability and Society, pp. 3–14. Rosenheck, R.A. (1999). “Principles for priority setting in mental health services and their implications for the least well off.” Psychiatric Services, 50, 653 – 658. Sapey, B. and Pearson, J. (2004). “Do disabled people need social workers?” Social Work and Social Sciences Review, pp. 52–70. Seden, J., Matthews, S., McCormick, M. & Morgan, A. (2010). Professional Development in Social Work: Complex Issues in Practice. UK: Routledge. Sines, D., Saunders, M. & Forbes-Burford, J. (2009). Community Health Care Nursing. London: Wiley-Blackwell. Snoddon, J. (2010). Case Management of Long Term Conditions: Principles and Practice for Nurses. UK: Wiley-Blackwell. Sobanja, M. (2009). “What is World Class Commissioning?” The NHS and HTA, pp. 1-3. Spandler, H. (2004). “Friend or foe? Towards a critical assessment of direct payments”, Critical Social Policy, pp. 187–209. Read More