Why did President Lyndon Johnson decide to send combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 - Essay Example

?The Reasons behind the Pres. Johnson’s Decision to Send Troops to Vietnam After the successful revolution which saw the defeat of the French, Vietnam was divided into two countries. North Vietnam was established as a socialist country while South Vietnam was built following model of western democracies. Because it served as a buffer against the further spread of communism in the region, the West, especially the United States made serious efforts in supporting the South. However, South Vietnam’s government apparently failed in living up to the expectations of its people when it comes to uplifting them from poverty and landlessness. In the midst of worse economic disparities between the government bureaucrats and the majority of the people, the National Liberation Front or the Viet Cong began to advance an insurgency with ample support from the North. During the term of Pres. John F. Kennedy, the policy of the U.S. was still that of extreme caution. In treating the Vietnam issue, the Kennedy administration practiced the minimum requirement of the policy of containment, which is to provide logistical support and training to the South Vietnamese Army in order to make it capable in fighting the Viet Cong. By the time of his death, Kennedy had already sent more than 15,000 U.S. military advisors to Vietnam. Even with the presence of that many troops already in a foreign country, the demand for more continued to rise as South Vietnam’s security problems continued to grow worse. As Kennedy’s vice-president, Lyndon B. Johnson was automatically sworn in. Being the new president he also inherited many of the previous leadership’s problems, one of the biggest is the problem in Vietnam. However, even before he actually became president, Johnson was already a believer in the domino theory. Under the domino theory, it is seen that once a country turns communist, the nearby nations would also be heavily influenced by it until these too would experience communist infiltration and eventually revolutions. The series of communist revolutions in a certain region is called the domino effect. It was Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower who first came up with the concept of the domino effect. His most used example in proving the accuracy of such theory was the chain of insurgencies that was affecting Southeast Asia in the 1950s. Just like his predecessors, it was obvious that Johnson was very concerned with how one piece of the domino is about to fall, South Vietnam. It was the domino theory that inspired Kennedy to let the U.S. take an active role in South Vietnam by providing advisors and war materiel to the South Vietnamese Army. It was also this theory that would eventually prompt Johnson to send ground troops to the country. However, the orientation of the large numbers of U.S. troops sent to South Vietnam was not really to strike at the most potential source of support for the insurgency, which is the North. Although the ground troops were utilized to hit the local insurgents, the Viet Cong, they were instructed to take defensive posture against the North Vietnamese Army. This was apparently guided by a political and military response to the domino effect: containment. Containment is essentially defensive posture against the further spread of communism. For politicians who would not want to be labeled as too soft on the communists and who also do not wish to be considered as militarists or hawks, standing for policy of containment would seem to be the viable option. Pres. Johnson was an advocate of containment and this could be seen in the years immediately after he took over when Kennedy died. This policy, however, was constantly criticized by the political right in the U.S. as a sign of weakness, or of the unwillingness to venture into an escalated war that would achieve a quick and decisive victory against the enemy. Johnson defended his policy of containment well during the 1964 elections. His rival, Sen. Barry Goldwater often raised the issue of Vietnam just to portray him as a weak president at a time when the U.S. and the world are threatened by the spread of communism. Johnson, however, insists that taking a more proactive stance, such as actually rolling back the communists could lead into a nuclear holocaust. Directly launching offensive actions against the North could compel the Soviet Union and China to be involved openly in the conflict. At a time when his administration was focused on improving the social programs in the domestic front, being engaged in a war of bigger magnitude could be disastrous from Johnson’s point of view. Ironically, while it was the major reason why the North did not experience offensive actions from American ground troops it was also containment that prompted Pres. Johnson to send more ground troops into Vietnam. Before Kennedy died, an order was given out to the troops stationed in Vietnam to withdraw. This would have led to the return of about a thousand troops to the U.S. by the end of 1963. However, when Johnson took over, he came up with another order, NSAM # 273, which virtually stopped the pullout and gave the possibility of additional troops coming in (The White House 1963, 2). It must be pointed out though that while Johnson signified his intent to increase the number of American troops in South Vietnam, the orientation remains under the policy of containment. This means that the said troops would only be employed for defensive operations. From the military point of view, a defensive posture would naturally mean the involvement of more troops while allowing the enemy to be more fluid and to take the initiative. Ultimately, a defensive war is oftentimes a losing one but Johnson preferred to adhere to the policy of containment. Due to the defensive stance, the men on the battlefield and the officers have become wary of the outcome of the war. Since they were not suffering many losses from the offensive operations from the South Vietnamese Army, the Viet Cong could afford to strike targets which include American troops and military installations. With increasing casualties being suffered, the top U.S. military officers in Vietnam, headed by Gen. William Westmoreland pushed for the large-scale bombing of several targets within South Vietnam and in the North as well. Such actions are offensive in nature. These are pre-emptive strikes that aim to make the enemy no longer capable of launching attacks. However, Pres. Johnson opposes the concept as could be seen in the telegram he sent to the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam. In the message, he said that he has “never felt that this war will be won from the air, and it seems to (him) that what is much more needed and would be more effective is a larger and stronger use of Rangers and Special Forces and Marines, or other appropriate military strength on the ground and on the scene” (Office of the President 1964). Later, however, Johnson allowed the bombings to be made on North Vietnamese territory. This change of attitude may have been triggered by events that would lead Johnson to question his containment policy and that would also threaten his political ambitions. In 1964, the Republican Party had decided to field Barry Goldwater to run against Johnson in the coming presidential elections. Goldwater was one of the most vocal critics of the administration’s handling the Vietnam issue. Goldwater did not question American involvement in the domestic turmoil of another country. However, he considered the containment policy as defeatist and one that ultimately does more damage to the American interests in Southeast Asia. As one of the chief ‘hawks’ in the Republican Party, Goldwater was pushing for aggressive actions to be implemented against the main supporter of the South Vietnamese insurgency. Apparently, Johnson had to dispel the impression being projected by his political rival, that he was weak or even a coward. Surprisingly, a solution came forth less than a month after Goldwater was named as the Republican Party’s presidential bet. In August 1964, the USS Maddox reported that it was attacked by North Vietnamese naval vessels at the Gulf of Tonkin. The U.S. Navy actually reported that the attacks were done twice. With the weather conditions making visibility very poor, there were questions raised regarding the veracity of the report. Nevertheless, the Johnson administration took this as an act of aggression against the U.S., which warrants more offensive actions on the part of the U.S. military. The Johnson administration then moved for a joint resolution by the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate to be made allowing, a more direct and more massive military intervention in Vietnam. This time the troops sent would be utilized widely for combat operations and not just for defensive purposes. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave blanket authority to the president to employ the military in Vietnam without the need for seeking the approval of the Senate. The resolution states that “Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief; to take all necessary measures to repeal any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression” (U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate 1964). The Gulf of Tonkin incident, which was later exposed as highly questionable and which Johnson himself later admitted was based on falsities, became the pretext for Johnson to legally send more American soldiers to Vietnam. However, many historians and political analysts believe that the Gulf of Tonkin incident did not only escalate the Vietnam War. It had also managed to revitalize Pres. Johnson’s presidential campaign. When he was projected as a leader who was determined to protect American interests by admonishing the Congress to approve his proposal to send more troops to Vietnam, he actually deprived Goldwater of ammunition in the presidential campaign. As a president leading a country while at the same time functioning as a commander in chief during a time of war, Goldwater could no longer justify his criticism of Johnson as a weak leader. Goldwater could not even distinguish his potential leadership as the best alternative in combating the communist menace since Johnson now is actually on the warpath also. It is therefore very evident that the decision to send more troops to Vietnam also rescued his appeal as a politician. While the personal and political motivations of Pres. Johnson was apparent when he decided to send American troops to Vietnam in 1965, the actual conditions in the said country might have also provided convenient justifications. It must be pointed out though that such issues were actually domestic in nature but, nevertheless, the U.S. saw it necessary to intervene. Ever since South Vietnam was established as a free and sovereign nation, the series of governments that arose had proven to be inept, corrupt, and grossly unpopular. The power struggles among South Vietnamese politicians and their allies in the military had only made the crisis in the country more serious. It was, however, when Tran Van Huong became premier that the political crisis in the country really worsened. A Catholic, Tran Van Huong was accused of discrimination by the Buddhist religious leaders. Buddhists suffered repression from the South Vietnamese Army and the police during his premiership. In a country with a Buddhist majority, this could trigger wide discontent among the population. The U.S. was observing all the actions made by the Buddhist leadership. Reports were sent to the Pres. Johnson regarding the dissent being fomented among the people. However, one memo to Pres. Johnson’s special assistant for national security affairs stated that there are “no evidence to tie them to the Viet Cong or even to indicate that they sympathize with Viet Cong aims” (National Security Council 1964). Concrete steps could have been taken by the U.S. if they found out that the Buddhist hierarchy are being influenced or are building an alliance with the Viet Cong or any of its above-ground organizations. As the South Vietnamese government became increasingly isolated in the political arena, its army, the ARVN or the South Vietnamese Army had also incurred an increasing number of losses in the battlefield. The local army was not only poorly disciplined; it was also suffering very low morale. As a result of these glaring weaknesses, more and more ARVN units were being routed by the Viet Cong. At first, it was the Viet Cong’s creative application of guerilla warfare that inflicted the most damage. Later, however, tactics in conventional warfare were also employed by the Viet Cong against the ARVN, which resulted in heavier casualties on the part of the latter. Before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the U.S. military stationed in Vietnam could not fully participate in combat missions against the Viet Cong. They were tied to defensive roles. Because of this, the Viet Cong were able to gain tactical advantages. This situation in the battlefields was considered by Johnson as another compelling reason for reorienting the role of the U.S. military and for sending in more troops. It may be true that the worsening situation in South Vietnam was the reason why Pres. Johnson decided to send in American troops for combat. However, a review on his previous stand on the issue would expose the fact that he was not much interested in it. Pres. Johnson was more concerned with domestic problems and he was more determined to solve social welfare issues in his country than meddling with the national issues of others. Nevertheless, he was also wary of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia and he was also open to the possibility taking an active stance against it. But when confronted with what he considered as more compelling local issues, he tried to balance the priorities of his administration. In the end, however, the politician in him won. Knowing that sending American troops to Vietnam would prove to his rivals that he is a president with a strong political will, he did not hesitate change his previous stance to that of openly allowing the participation of the U.S. in a war that is not its own. Reference List National Security Council. 1964. Memorandum from Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bund). http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i/441_479.html (accessed April 20, 2011). Office of the President. 1964. Telegram from the President to the Ambassador in Vietnam (Taylor). http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i/441_479.html (accessed April 20, 2011). The White House. 1963. National Security Action Memorandum No.273. http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/viet16.htm (accessed April 20, 2011). U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. 1964. Tonkin Gulf Joint Resolution, Public Law 88-408. 88th Cong., 2d sess. http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=98&page=transcript (accessed April 20, 2011). Read More