Vietnam: Why The Geneva Accords Failed To Sustain Peace In Indochina - Research Paper Example

Vietnam: Why The Geneva Accords Failed To Sustain Peace In Indochina A conference took place in Geneva, Switzerland (April 26-July 20, 1954) to attempt to find a way to unite Vietnam and restore peace in Indochina. Various countries such as the Soviet Union, United States, France, United Kingdom and China participated throughout the Geneva Convention and this is where the Geneva Accords were born. A declaration was produced by the conference on April 27, 1954 which agreed upon the stop of violence and the introduction of foreign involvement in Indochina’s internal affairs and supported the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Indochina (Anderson, 2005, 37). An international control commission which was to consist of India, Canada, and Poland was set to oversee the implementation of the Geneva accord although it was unable to ensure compliance. The agreement was among many countries including the United States which even though acknowledged the agreement existed, refused to sign it to avoid being legally bound to it. This agreement divided Vietnam into two, north and south.The northern zone was to be governed by the Viet Minh while the southern zone was to be governed by the state of Vietnam. The British chairman issued a “Conference Final Declaration” which stated that a “general election”was to be held by July 1956 so as to build a unified Vietnamese state. However, this document was not accepted by the delegates of both the united states and South Vietnam. This resulted in South Vietnam being viewed as an American puppet by many communist sympathizers while North Vietnam was viewed as a Communist International puppet. After the hostility ended, a large group of catholic North Vietnamese moved to the south during operation passage to freedom while others from the south moved to the north. Backed by the United States, the prime minister of Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem asserted his power in the south. His brother helped him rig the referendum which helped him gain 98% of the vote. However, Diem refused to hold the national elections citing that the state of Vietnam refused to sign the Geneva accords and went about trying to crush the communist opposition. Both sides violated the provisions of the accord by engaging in military buildups. The United States military advisors supported the army of the Vietnam republic while the guerilla activity in the south escalated. National Liberation Front popularly known as Vietcong was created by Ho Chi Minh due to failure of reunification (Anderson, 2005, 50). They were closely helped by the North Vietnamese army. This resulted in the Vietnam War. The Geneva accord failed to sustain peace in Indochina because it failed to give clear guidelines on how to solve the hostilities. It also splits the country into two parts; the southern part and the northern part which was backed by foreign countries that had no faith in the Geneva accord and had no intention of unifying the country into one. Why The United States Would Not Have Escalated The Military Conflict In The Vietnam War Should The November 1963 Assassination Of Jf Kennedy Not Taken Place President John F Kennedy was killed in Dealy Plaza on 22nd November 1963 at half past noon (Anderson, 2005, 21). Kennedy was assassinated due to his involvement with the Vietnam War, and the Federal Reserve Bank.President Kennedy sent McNamara and Taylor to Vietnam to gather intelligence that convinced him to withdraw the United States from Vietnam; but on 22nd November, 1963, the superpower group that wanted the war in Indochina to escalate overtook the United States government. This superpower group was planning President Kennedy’s murder as he was de-escalating America’s involvement in Southeast Asia. After President Kennedy’s assassination, the superpower made sure that America remained in Vietnam for a long time. Though nothing has been said about the forces behind the Vietnam War, it is a historical fact that the Catholic Church and the Vatican were involved. The war was hatched and plotted by the Vatican agents in a bid to turn Asia to Roman Catholic. Vatican in this case referring to the rulers and their order of Jesuits. The Vietnam War according to Avro Manhattan was fought because the Vatican wanted to take over Asia by first creating a power base in Southeast Asia. The Vatican played both sides. The south which was controlled by Diem who was a practicing Catholic and ruled with an iron fist by transforming the presidency into a catholic dictatorship which mercilessly crushed his political and religious opponents, and the north which was controlled by Ho Chi Minh who wanted a communist Vietnam. They made secret deals and advised Ho Chi Minh while controlling Diem. This leads to the bloodbath in Vietnam and the triumph of the Vatican. President Kennedy attempted to stop the war but was met with the wrath of the Jesuits of the papacy. A day after Kennedy was killed, CIA director John McCone went to the state house to transact the signing of a national security memorandum 278 which reversed Kennedy’s decision to de-escalate the Vietnam War (Anderson, 2005, 71). This gave the CIA carte Blanche to go ahead with a full-scale war in the Far East. It also created a new source of narcotics for the mafia’s market worldwide. The drugs would make the Jesuits billions of dollars in international trade as long as the war continued. They had been involved in the drug trade in the Far East for four centuries and did not want to lose the opportunity regardless of the number of lives to be lost in the war. The Jesuits wanted to maintain their control of the drug market and when President Kennedy stood in their way, they had him executed because they wanted the war to continue. Even though a roman catholic, John F Kennedy refused to be a Jesuit puppet, he put the welfare of the people of the United States first and that lead to his downfall. Had President Kennedy not been killed in November 1963, the United States would not have escalated the military conflict in Vietnam. The report of McNamara-Taylor mission to South Vietnam contained the essence of the decisions he had to make which was to get Americans out of Vietnam (Anderson, 2005, 80). This would have avoided the bloodbath where millions of lives were lost. Why The Johnson Administration, Which Seemed To Have Been Devoted To Domestic Problems, Decided To Go To War In Vietnam In 1964-1968 Following the assassination of President John F Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson inherited the white house. This left him little choice but to implement several unrealized initiatives by his predecessor particularly in the civil rights and economic policy fields. Just like president Kennedy, President Johnson was equally committed to winning the war against the communist insurgency in Vietnam. President Johnson vowed not to lose the war; he encouraged his advisers to work harder at helping South Vietnam prosecute the counterinsurgency.Johnson relied on figures like secretary of state dean rusk, secretary of defense Robert S. McNamara and national security adviser McGeorge Bundy, all of whom had been with President John Kennedy since the outset of that administration. Johnson told his national security team that he needed them more than Kennedy did. That need was realized because the counterinsurgency was deteriorating. Raids by Vietcong-the local communists-had picked up in intensity and occurrence following Diem’s ouster, and earlier assumptions about progress in the war were ill founded. Pentagon officials-both civilian and military- rejected earlier statistical evidence that pointed to mounting troubles against the Vietcong. As the new president, Johnson’s first impulse was to shift the war into high gear. He met with his top civilian advisers in Vietnam and told them to forget the reforms that Kennedy had stressed-that are the economic, political and social reforms-and concentrate on winning the military conflict. The administration started implementing a number of tactics within the first week of Johnson’s presidency hoping to apply more pressure on the communists.Those measures-which included aggressive propaganda and sabotage against North Vietnam-were unable to force a change in Hanoi or to stabilize the Saigon’s political scene. In January 1964, Washington was pleased when general khan overthrew the ruling junta to prevent Diem’s successors from neutralizing South Vietnam. Nevertheless, Washington was dissatisfied with the counterinsurgency progress. The secretary of Defense McNamara was sent on a fact finding mission in Vietnam in March 1964 (Anderson, 2005, 101). His report however was not a good one as it pointed to an increase in communist success and the deterioration in the morale of South Vietnamese. McNamara thus suggested economic support for South Vietnam and a more vigorous United States military program and President Johnson endorsed the recommendation. Having decided to shift the war in high gear, the Johnson government recognized that congressional approval would be required for direct military action, especially in an election year. Following the August 1964, 2 and 4 episodes, the Johnson administration sought a congressional decree authorizing retaliation against North Vietnam after its attack on American ships in international waters. The decree was passed almost unanimouslyon7th august by Congress and was signed 3 days later into law. It was officially known as the Southeast Asia Resolution but was also known as the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. This law gave a broad mandate to the Johnson administration to escalate U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. A few days before the vote, communist guerrillas attacked the U.S air base at Bien Hoa destroying more than twenty five aircrafts killing four Americans and wounding many others. Johnson opted not to respond immediately. He formed a task force to deliberate the best form of action (Cookman, 1998, 51). They finally came up with a plan that envisioned a series of measures, of gradually escalating military intensity, which American forces would apply to improve morale in Saigon, attack the Vietcong in South Vietnam, and pressure Hanoi into halting its aid of the communist insurgency. The Johnson administration sent a large troop to Vietnam to evacuate and protect the Americans to prevent them from being killed. Johnson justified the large number of military involvement citing the need for the United States to intervene to stop the blood bath and to see a freely elected noncommunist government in power. How And Why The Washington’s Policy Of “Vietnamization” Lead To The End Of The Vietnam War President Johnson handed office to President Nixon in 1969.Upon taking office,President Nixon began withdrawing American troops from Vietnam; by august, twenty five thousand troops came home, and eighty thousand came home by the end of 1969 (Anderson, 2005, 111). A policy of “Vietnamization” was instituted by Nixon whereby Vietnamese soldiers were better equipped and trained to defend their nation. The component of Vietnamization was to strengthen the South Vietnamese armed forces in leadership and combat skills,numbers, equipment and the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. United States and third country ground troops turned ground combat responsibility to the Republic of Vietnam Army in the transition to full Vietnamization. United States continued with the combat service support and combat support while the Vietnam army improved in local security and small operations. The first large operation with the ARVN - Army of the Republic of Vietnam-ground forces was operation Lam Son 719, in February 1971 (Calley 1971, 10). This operation still had U.S. artillery support, intelligence and helicopters. Although with the help of extensive United States air support, the ARVN did much better against the 1972 Eastertide invasion. The problem of the Republic of Vietnams Air Force is that even for a specific maximum effort air offensive, it never operated under central control. South Vietnamese never developed deep battlefield air interdiction because their aircrafts were always controlled by regional corps commanders. On December 1972, Nixon ordered a bombing at an unprecedented level of intensity when the north refused to return to the negotiations, operation LINEBACKER II. This was at the grand strategic and strategic levels, attacking North Vietnams ability to import supplies, its internal transportation and logistics, command and control, and integrated air defense system. A peace agreement was signed within a month since the operation started. On twenty seventh January 1973, peace accords were finally signed in Paris. Prisoners of war were repatriated and United States troops began to withdraw immediately although U.S. supplies and limited advice could continue. The north did not remove its forces from the south rather committed additional forces in a conventional invasion. The north recovered quickly from the damage that was caused by the 1972 bombing ordered by Nixon and remained committed to destroy its rival. Saigon was seized on 30th April 1975 when North Vietnam launched a new conventional invasion. American combat were only involved when the operation FREQUENT WIND was launched. This operation was launched to evacuate 5600 senior Vietnamese government and military officials,Americans and employees of the United States (Anderson, 2005, 97). The 9th marine under the tactical command of Alfred Gray, Jr entered Saigon to evacuate the last Americans from the American embassy to ships of the 7th fleet. Among the last civilians to leave was ambassador graham martin. Vietnam was finally unified under communist rule. The South Vietnamese who had fought against the north were purged from Le Duan’s government. Over a million people were imprisoned setting off a humanitarian disaster and a mass exodus. Most South Vietnamese became refugees. Out of a population of around eight million, the Khmer Rouge executed over two million Cambodians in the killing fields under the leadership of pol pot. Tens of thousands of Hmong tribesmen were slaughtered by the Pathet Lao.The United States military took over a decade to recover some of its internal turmoil and breakdown in discipline. Southeast Asia in the end did not become a monolithic communist bloc. Works Cited Anderson, David. The Vietnam War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. Print. Calley, William L. (as told to John Sack), Lieutenant Calley: His Own Story. New York: Viking, 1971. Cookman, Claude ed., Facing My Lai: Moving Beyond the Massacre. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Read More