Miranda versus Arizona: the Landmark Case - Essay Example

? Running Head: MIRANDA VERSUS ARIZONA Miranda versus Arizona: The Landmark Case that Transformed the U.S. Judicial System School Instructor Date Introduction The Miranda v. Arizona case facilitated the redefining of the due process of the U.S. constitutional law. Centered on the case was an indigent Mexican, Ernesto Miranda, who made and signed a written confession to crimes of kidnapping and rape in Arizona in 1963. During the custodial police interrogation, Miranda was not accorded his privilege of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution: the right against self-incrimination and the right to assistance of a legal counsel, respectively. The Arizona Supreme Court convicted and sentenced Miranda to 20-30 years imprisonment, based from his written confession. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court repealed the conviction and ordered the suppression of Miranda’s signed rape confession (Mason & Stephenson, 2007). The Court ruled that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination” (Warren, 1966) and the Sixth Amendment right to a legal counsel (Mason & Stephenson, 2007). This rule is what is now famously known as the ‘Miranda Warning.” This paper will discuss the Miranda v. Arizona Case; show how it violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution; and tackle how the 1966 U.S. Supreme Court’s Miranda decision transformed the American judicial system. Critical analysis by this author will likewise be given. Miranda versus Arizona In 1963, Ernesto Miranda, a young, destitute and uneducated migrant from Mexico, was arrested by the Arizona Police for crimes of kidnapping and rape. Miranda was questioned in the police interrogation room where he orally admitted committing the crimes, and signed a written confession, without full and effective warnings of constitutional rights: the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. Miranda also signed an acknowledgement that he was aware of his right against self-incrimination; that he had full understanding that any statement made by him may be used against him; and that he had voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. The written confession was used in the trial. He was convicted of kidnapping and rape crimes and sentenced to 20-30 years imprisonment for each crime by the Arizona Supreme Court (Baker, 1985). Miranda’s legal defense appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court and revealed reasonable doubt regarding the elements of the said committed crime: the rape victim was unable to show evidence of resistance to Miranda during the said sexual assault; it was questionable if Miranda had fully understood his legal rights and had indeed “voluntarily” waived them. His lawyer disputed that the written confession should not have been allowed in the trial since he was not afforded appropriate protection to his rights as mandated by the U.S Constitution and the U.S. court laws (Gribben, 2011). Two years after, the U. S. Supreme Court overturned the conviction and ordered the inadmissibility of the signed confession. The Court ruled that the defendant should be fully knowledgeable of his right to assistance of a legal counsel before or during the interrogation; aware of his right to remain silent; and reminded that any admitted statement may be used against him. The Court explained that police interrogation procedures are intimidating and could forcefully compel the individual to self-incrimination, especially without a defense lawyer present during the interrogation (Hendrie, 1997). Violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution The Fifth Amendment (right to self-incrimination) and the Sixth Amendment (right to the assistance of a defense counsel) are the legal privileges guaranteed to all individuals by the U.S. Constitution. Any confession made by an individual is inadmissible in court if it was obtained without the individual’s full awareness of the said constitutional rights. The Phoenix Police Department clearly violated these rights by not providing Miranda the procedural safeguards to effectively protect his right against obligatory self-implication to the crime. The Miranda versus Arizona case put the police under debate as to its role in the protection of the individual’s rights as certified by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. Several efforts had been made by the U.S. Supreme Court to tackle concerns on the violations of the 5th and 6th Amendments. The 1936 Brown v. Mississippi case had been ruled that the Fifth Amendment shall safeguard an individual’s right from obligatory confession; the 1936 Gideon v. Wainwright case held the Court’s decision of the accused individual’s right to an attorney and that if the said accused could not afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent him; the 1964 Escobedo v. Illinois case had been ruled that if the accused individual’s right to consult with an attorney has been denied, it will mean a violation of his Sixth Amendment right (Baker, 1985). Arguments on the Miranda Case The Miranda case was clearly a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The forewarnings of the privilege to remain silent should be fully explained to the suspect that anything said can and will be used against him in court, and the privilege to a legal counsel be given to the suspect, that if he could not afford it, he will be provided by the state. The Arizona Police failed to afford Miranda the required procedural safeguards to protect his rights under the constitutional laws and rules of the state. Moreover, because there was no presence of an attorney during the questioning, it was doubtful that the confession was voluntary or merely extorted out of police coercion (Gribben, 2011). The police, however, acted rationally in their assumption that a man with Miranda’s criminal record should understand police procedures and is well-aware of his rights. The Arizona Court justly convicted and sentenced Miranda based on the state’s law (Gribben, 2011). The people’s respect and trust in the nation’s criminal justice system will be reinforced through the exercise of non-prejudicial rules: that rules will be fair to both the victims and suspects, that the general population is ensured of its safety when lawbreakers who voluntarily confess their crimes receive their due conviction, and that all truthful evidences presented in court should be admissible (Otis, 1999). In the National Review, Tucker (1985) wrote that the Miranda rule was indeed fundamental to safeguard the accused from being coerced or tortured into confession and it would be reasonably horrendous for an innocent man to be punished for a crime not committed. However, Tucker added, “In order to avoid this extreme injustice, it was argued, it might be necessary at first to let a few obviously guilty murderers, rapists, and robbers go free on 'technicalities,' while the police 'learned the ropes'” (Quoted in Tucker, 1985). Two decades after the Miranda case, the police never learned their lesson and still continue to commit the same errors. Likewise, the prosecuting panel still frequently disregard ‘forcefully extracted’ confessions and still often do not succeed in making convictions in protection of the defendant’s ‘constitutional rights’ (Tucker, 1985). Transforming the U.S. Justice The Miranda verdict was a different approach from the customary law in the police questioning procedures. Previous to the Miranda case, a confession would be held inadmissible only if it was verified to be extorted out of force, intimidation, or in exchange of a promise. In the Miranda versus Arizona case, the Supreme Court ascertained an assumption that a defendant’s proclamation obtained during custodial cross-examination without a waiver of the supposed Miranda warnings was held non-voluntary, and that any confession obtained in infringement of the defendant’s Miranda rights would invalidate the confession, even supposing that the statement was given out of the defendant’s freewill and not from forceful admission of guilt. The U.S. Supreme Court actually recognized in its verdict that Ernesto’s confession was not coerced by the Arizona Police; therefore his confession, if based on the traditional laws stated in the constitution, could not be rendered involuntary (Hendrie, 1997). The Miranda conditions would be valid simply while a suspect is both in custody and interrogation. Custody, under the Miranda rule, is an arrest or a denial of freedom comparable with an arrest; and interrogation is an intimidation used by the police for the extraction of self-implication statements from a typical suspect (Hendrie, 1997). “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (Warren, 1966). If the accused claims his right to remain silent, the examiner should respect the claim and discontinue the questioning, and if the accused asserts his right to a legal counsel, interrogation should stop. Communication may only be restarted when the accused reopens communique with the examiner (Hendrie, 1997). An individual’s constitutional rights are infringed when the suspect is not given his ‘Miranda rights’. The following is a ‘Miranda warning’ intended to envelop all bases that a detainee may encounter during police custody. A detainee may be requested to acknowledge and sign the following: “You have the right to remain silent and refuse to answer questions. Do you understand? Anything you do say may be used against you in a court of law. Do you understand? You have the right to consult an attorney before speaking to the police and to have an attorney present during questioning now or in the future. Do you understand? If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. Do you understand? If you decide to answer questions now without an attorney present you will still have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to an attorney. Do you understand? Knowing and understanding your rights as I have explained them to you, are you willing to answer my questions without an attorney present?” (Quoted in Mount, 2010). Subsequent to the Miranda warnings afforded to the detainee, he may then intentionally and wisely surrender these privileges and consent to respond to the examiner’s questions or make statements. However, unless and until such warnings and waiver are shown by the prosecution during the trial, no circumstantial evidence or confession from the interrogation can be used against the individual (Warren, 1966). Critical Analysis of the Miranda versus Arizona Case The country, in general, is faced with damaging consequences when the U.S. Supreme Court handed down the Miranda decision. The decision represented poor constitutional laws that would cripple police work and place distrust in the entire police force of the country. Moreover, the new set of rules is not intended to defend against police brutality or other obviously forbidden forms of oppression and threat. The police use coercive and compelling strategies; deny their acts in the court; and skillfully lie about supposedly given warnings and apparently consented waivers. The new rules, after the Miranda case, may contradict all pressures, to intimidate the anxious and uninformed suspect, and eventually to put off any confession at all. Likewise, in a police-dominated interrogation room, a suspect may naturally feel pressured into admission of guilt, and the police may take advantage of the suspect’s obvious weakness and ignorance. While the Miranda rule intends to balance unimportant pressures and shortcomings inherent to any police procedural questioning, it fails to serve the importance of fair practice in the prevention of deliberate oppression because the rule does not require restraint of police domination. It simply reduces the intrinsic coercive and unjust tactics of some police. The general population will not be served as the Constitution, which all Americans highly consider as their ultimate protection in this democratic country, weakens. With this, we could expect a significant decrease in the number of truthful confessions and fair convictions. A forewarning that the suspect may remain silent, that any statement may be used against him in court, that he could consult a lawyer or be provided with one if he could not afford it, and the requirement of the suspect’s waiver of his privileges, may simply put an end to the interrogation. The Miranda decision caused impairment to the American law enforcement. We, Americans, believe that some crimes are insolvable without confessions and that sufficient testimonial statements are crucial in crime prevention and control. The U.S. Court, on the other hand, is risking the majority’s welfare through the imposition of the Miranda rule. The social price of crime is excessively enormous and experimentally risky in exchange for the Miranda rule. The oral and written signed confessions obtained from Ernesto Miranda during the police interrogation, without any hint or mark of coercion, are now held inadmissible under the present Court’s rule. In the common view, it is quite surprising that a country as democratic as the United States of America and a Constitution which is supposedly a citizen’s protection of rights, could produce this outcome: that justice is evasive for a victim of a wicked and disturbing crime no matter how clear and truthful evidences are gathered and presented and regardless of the efficient implementation of police procedures rendered. All these are to be sacrificed to the Court’s notion of ‘justice’ which may not be shared by the thinking majority. Conclusion The Miranda decision by the Warren Court transformed almost the entire American legal society. It put forth a significant and permanent influence over American law. Prior to Miranda, our judicial system operated under a diverse set of suppositions. A knowledgeable citizen may be aware of the constitutional right of protection against self-incrimination, but not many realized that this protection may extend outside the courtroom. Majority of the white, mid-level Americans presumed that an individual was almost certainly guilty when he was brought under police custody and that questioning by the police could and should continue privately even without the presence of a defense counsel, until such time when the suspect voluntarily confessed to the crime. This system continued for four decades. It was customary and normal for the police to hide the fact that the suspect’s confession would be used for his incrimination to the crime. The police generally advocated this principle (Stuart, 2004). This changed when a young, uneducated, poor Hispanic man was arrested for crimes of kidnapping and sexual assault which he immediately and willingly admitted to. Miranda received a conviction not based on physical evidence or eyewitness testimony, but because he had implicated himself to the crime without being aware of his right against self-incrimination and his right to an attorney. Today, under the Miranda rule, any statement made by an individual under custodial police interrogation is inadmissible in court unless proper procedural protection of the individual’s Fifth (right against self-incrimination) and Sixth (right to assistance of a legal counsel) Amendments were given. The decision of the Court is valid only to questionings that took place when the suspect was under police custody. References Baker, L. (1983). Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics. New York: Atheneum. Gribben, M. (2011). Miranda vs. Arizona: The Crime that Changed American Justice. Turner Broadcasting System. Retrieved 7 April 2011 from: http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/not_guilty/miranda/5.html Hendrie, E. M. (March 1997). Beyond Miranda. FBI Publications Law Enforcement Bulletin. Retrieved 7 April 2011 from: http://www2.fbi.gov/publications/leb/1997/mar976.htm  Mason, A. T. & Stephenson, D. G. (2007). American Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases, 15/E. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Mount, S. (2010). The Miranda Warning. U.S. Constitution Online. Retrieved 7 April 2011 from: http://www.usconstitution.net/miranda.html Otis, W. G. (24 November 1999). Miranda: Morals and Marbles. The Washington Post. A23. Stuart, G. L. (2004). Miranda: The Story of America's Right to Remain Silent. Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press. Tucker, W. (18 October 1985). True Confessions: The Long Road Back from Miranda. National Review, 28. Warren, E. (1966). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. Supreme Court 436. McGraw-Hill Companies. Retrieved 7 April 2011 from: http://www.glencoe.com/sec/socialstudies/btt/celebratingfreedom/pdfs/314.pdf Read More