Miranda vs. Arizona - Essay Example

Miranda vs. Arizona The landmark Supreme Court decision of Miranda vs. Arizona has been one of themost debated and widely discussed court cases in history. By the time any American reaches adulthood, they are familiar with the Miranda Rights from the steady stream of crime dramas on television. We know we have the right to remain silent and have a right to an attorney. Yet, the Miranda decision was far more reaching than the few principles that are read from a card. It reaches back into history to establish a precedent and presents ongoing dilemmas as it faces new challenges for the courts and law enforcement. Up until the time of the 1966 Miranda decision, police interrogations varied widely in manner and method. American law, based on English principles, had long accepted that coerced testimony or confessions were unreliable as evidence. This was the premise of the Fifth Amendment that made coerced and manipulated testimony inadmissible as trial evidence on constitutional grounds (Lively 292). Even though law enforcement eliminated the use of torture to elicit confessions, by the middle of the 20th century new questions about the ethics of more modern tactics arose. The court was faced with the problem of enforcing what was known as the 'totality of the circumstances' rule (Lively 293). It stated that the overall environment and climate that the confession was obtained in was what the courts were to consider when evaluating whether it was voluntary or not. Courts around the country had different standards and police had different methods. There was also the problem of the interrogations taking place in private and little was known about the methods being used behind closed doors. (Lively 299). In addition, the mandatory informing of the right to an attorney had only recently been established. The Miranda case was a decision that the court hoped would standardize the interpretation of the fifth amendment and reduce the number of appeals based on the general 'totality of circumstances' rule. The case involved a twenty three year old male, Ernesto Miranda, that had confessed to and had been convicted of rape. During his questioning he was never advised of his right to an attorney and it was unclear if he was ever advised of his right to remain silent or that anything he said would be admissible (Hall 553). At that point in history, the privilege against self-incrimination did not extend to police interrogations and under existing law his confession probably met the standard of 'totality of circumstance' and was considered voluntary (Hall 553). However, according to Hall, they did not meet the new standards that the court would put forth in this case (553). The court ruled that a person held for questioning has the (1) right to remain silent, (2) anything they say can be held against them, (3) they have the right to have an attorney present, (4) and the right to a public defender if they can not afford an attorney (Hall 554). This is the basis of the Miranda decision. The court also held that police needed to clearly advise the subjects of these rights and they needed to be clearly understood. If the suspect waived these rights, they must do so "voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently" (Lively 294). These rules were established to assure that suspects were afforded their constitutional rights under the 5th and 6th amendments. Supporters of the decision saw this as a move away from the strong arm and intimidating police tactics of the past. They applauded the ruling as a move towards fairness in an accusatorial system, enhancing the presumption of innocence, and preventing the cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners and suspects (Vile 400). It also set federal standards for the interrogation of suspects. Opponents to the ruling saw it as too limiting for law enforcement. In a harshly worded dissent, Justice John Harlan argued that it would bring about the end of the confession as a useful law enforcement technique. He stated in his opinion that, "The thrust of the new rule is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all" (Patrick 221). Senator Sam Ervin, a constitutional lawyer, made numerous attempts to limit the scope of the ruling (Vile 85). In the election of 1968, Richard Nixon ran on a platform that opposed the ruling and favored appointing justices that would undo it (Lively 295). In fact, over the years it has been diluted but has not substantially reduced the number of voluntary confessions as the opponents feared. The court has ruled that there can be exceptions made to the Miranda rules if there are exceptional circumstances. Public health and safety may preclude the adequate Mirandizing of a suspect. Inconsequential oversights by law enforcement may be overlooked. Though it has become more narrowed in definition over the years, and exceptions made, it remains true to its core reasoning (Lively 295). Its purpose remains to protect the suspect who may not have the mental or financial resources to protect themselves. Still, law enforcement often argues that the rules are too stringent and that confessed criminals are set free due to small technical errors (Philbin 582). They would prefer a modification that would allow voluntary confessions with out being subjected to the rigors of the Miranda rules. While some rulings have provided for a more flexible application of the Miranda rules, there have been cases where the court has tightened the rules up to prevent abuse. Rulings that allowed the application of the rules to be waived in exceptional circumstances were being exploited by law enforcement agencies around the country in what was known as a "two-tiered interrogation tactic" (Hoover 26). Officers would question the suspect without Mirandizing them. After they elicited a confession, they would then read them their rights and re-interrogate them. By this time the truth was on the table and the officers could elicit a statement made post Miranda. In Missouri vs. Seibert, a suspect was questioned using this tactic in regards to a murder case. The officer questioned her initially and got her to admit she knew that the crime would end with a boy's murder. He then advised her of her rights and re-questioned her. The court ruled that since the officer had purposely refrained from advising the suspect of her rights, it was inadmissible (Hoover 28). Any statements received after the inadmissible version were tainted by intimidation and could not be considered voluntary. The court ruled that this was a deliberate attempt to overturn the earlier ruling of the court by using an end run around it (Hoover 31). Other issues relating to Miranda have been brought to light throughout the life of the ruling. Age is an important factor that has been debated. Are young children able to understand their Miranda rights even if they say they do There is also the language of 'voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently'. The courts have not been able to define these standards sufficiently to satisfy every case. When a suspect voluntarily waives their rights, are they being coerced by their surroundings or misleading statements by the police Though the rules are simple and direct, there are still many gray areas to the Miranda ruling. In conclusion, the Miranda rules are an extension of the right to fairness and justice that our legal system is built upon. Torture, coercion, and intimidation have been shown to elicit unreliable testimony. The courts further have a duty to protect the citizens from unreasonable interrogation and police actions that may be cruel or inhumane. The Miranda ruling is a critical step in that direction. As our systems and techniques get more sophisticated, we can expect an ongoing debate and modifications to the Miranda rules. This is a sign of a healthy and active criminal justice system at work. Works Cited Hall, Kermit. The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States . New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Hoover, Lucy A. "The Supreme Court Brings an End to the 'End Run' Around Miranda." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (2005): 26-32. EBSCO. 12 Apr. 2007. Lively, Donald E. Landmark Supreme Court Cases : A Reference Guide . Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999. Patrick, John J. Supreme Court of the United States : A Student Companion. Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 2002. Philbin, Patrick F. "Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) Amicus Curiae." Supreme Court Debates (2000): 182+ . EBSCO. 12 Apr. 2007. Vile, John R. Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments, and Amending Issues, 1789-2002 . Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003. Read More