A landmark case: Miranda v. Arizona - Essay Example

of the of the of the Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436 (1966) Miranda v Arizona emerged as a landmark case, in the context of a suspected person’s rights during custodial interrogations by the police. The ruling in this case, generated considerable nationwide debate on this subject. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff, Ernest Miranda, was suspected of rape and robbery. These crimes had taken place ten days prior to his arrest. The police went to his home and asked him to accompany them to the police station for inquiry. Miranda was unsure, as to whether he could refuse to accompany them. Consequently, he followed them to the police station where he was included in an identification parade, before the victim (Miranda Rights - A view Across the Pond). The victim did not specifically identify Miranda as her molester. She merely stated that Miranda looked akin to the attacker and that his features seemed to be similar to those of her attacker. The police officer intentionally deceived Miranda and stated that the victim had identified him as her attacker. Subsequently, Miranda was arrested and two police officers took him to an interrogation room. In that place Miranda confessed to having molested the victim. During this entire process, Miranda was at no point of time informed that he had a right to abstain from incriminating himself. In addition, he was not advised to seek the assistance of an attorney although he had the right to do so (Miranda Rights - A view Across the Pond). In order to justify their inequitable actions, the police stated that Miranda, as an ex-convict, was expected to be familiar with the process of interrogation. Moreover, the police submitted a written confession by Miranda; which had a disclaimer printed at the top that the suspect had been informed of his rights. The disclaimer also stated that the confession had been made voluntarily without any coercion. As such, the rights of the suspect were not printed on this paper (Miranda Rights - A view Across the Pond). Subsequently, the case came up before the Supreme Court, where a 5:4 majority held that the police had to follow certain basic procedures, as specified in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, in order to protect the rights of a suspect during custodial interrogations. The Court went on to declare that if these procedures were not followed, then the confessions would be inadmissible, even if they had been given voluntarily (Miranda Rights - A view Across the Pond). As such, in Miranda v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court established a code of conduct to be followed by the police during custodial interrogations of suspects. In this case, Miranda, the plaintiff sued the State of Arizona, claiming that the state’s police had obtained his confession without informing him of his right to have an attorney present during the interrogation. He also claimed that by doing so, the police had violated his rights as provided by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The judges, by a majority of 5:4 decided in favor of Miranda. This decision was a serious setback to the law enforcement agencies. However, subsequent case law limited the application of Miranda rules to some extent (Miranda v. Arizona.In Britannica Concise Encyclopedia). The following case law reveals that the higher courts do not admit evidence based on confessions obtained under duress. In the case of Brown v. Mississippi, three black suspects were repeatedly and severely beaten till they confessed to the killing of a white man. This incident occurred in jail, in the presence of law officers. A fourth suspect was lynched. The police threatened the suspects with dire consequences if they challenged their confession at a later date. The police presented these confessions as the sole evidence at the trial. The trial court held that the defendants were guilty and convicted them to death on the basis of their voluntary confessions. The case was brought before the Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the trial court. It held that state authorities could not rely on confessions, obtained through violence and savage beatings (Brown v. Mississippi). Similarly, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court held that defendants should not be interrogated for long hours. In this case, the police questioned the defendant continuously for thirty – six hours. Finally, the suspect, being unable to withstand this torture, had made a confession. The Supreme Court held that such confessions were not voluntary confessions (Ashcraft v. Tennessee). Moreover, in Leyra v. Denno, the police adopted a devious method to obtain a confession. The defendant, a patient with sinusitis, was suffering on account of his illness. He requested medical care, and the police provided a psychiatrist, who was a state employee. This psychiatrist counseled the defendant and convinced the suspect that making a confession was inevitable. The defendant was convinced and provided a confession, which was recorded by the police. The police attempted to project this confession as being voluntary; but the Supreme Court did not accept their contention and reversed the conviction imposed on the defendant by a trial court (Leyra v. Denno). The Sixth Amendment provides a right to the defendants to have an attorney present in all criminal prosecutions. However, the Supreme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois held that such right was not restricted only to the trial stage. The Court opined that there was scant benefit in providing legal assistance at the trial stage, when conviction was inevitable (Escobedo v. Illinois). The Miranda warning is to be given to a suspect, prior to the commencement of custodial questioning. In the absence of such questioning, the police are not required to give warning. As such, voluntary confessions obtained under such circumstances are admissible as evidence. As such, the US Supreme Court established explicit protections to suspects, during custodial interrogation, with its ruling in the Miranda case. Essentially, this ruling specified that a suspect was not to be deprived of freedom of action, while in police custody. Moreover, the accused were to be informed that they had a right to remain silent during interrogation. In addition, if the accused chose to talk, then they had to be informed that their statements could be used as incriminating evidence, in the court (Miranda v. Arizona). Furthermore, the Court established another right to the accused; namely, that the police have to inform the accused, prior to interrogation, that he has a right to consult an attorney. Additionally, the suspect is empowered to have an attorney present, during interrogation. If the accused is impoverished, then the court is required to provide an attorney to him. Under the Miranda rule, the interrogation has to end, whenever the suspect remains silent (Miranda v. Arizona). The police should not violate the Miranda rights of suspects. Statements obtained by violating these rights are inadmissible as evidence against suspects. Moreover, if the suspect, under interrogation, provides a statement, without consulting an attorney, then it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that the suspect had voluntarily forsaken his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona). However, the courts ruled that the Miranda rights should be applied in a limited manner, under certain circumstances. For instance, in Harris v New York, it was decided by the presiding judges that confessions obtained by the police, which breached the Miranda provisions, could be employed, in order to assist the jurors to decide, whether the statement made by the accused was veracious or false. The court also held that the right to have an attorney present was inapplicable to situations, wherein the police arranged face-to-face confrontations between the suspect and victim. However, such confrontation was to be arranged before the framing of charges (Harris v. New York). The Supreme Court permitted what constituted the first exception to the Miranda rule, in the year 1984. This exception was in respect of the rule requiring the police to inform the suspects of their rights before the initiation of interrogation. The Court allowed some leeway in the application of this rule. It held that the police need not strictly adhere to this rule under certain circumstances, which involved public safety. For instance, a police officer could question suspects about the location of weapons, prior to informing them about their rights (Grant). All the same, the Court relaxed the strict application of the Miranda rule to only that extent. It did not provide any exceptions to the other Miranda warnings; and reaffirmed that the other rules, like the right to remain silent, and the right to have an attorney would remain intact. The Miranda rules were deemed to apply to every custodial interrogation, irrespective of the seriousness of the alleged crime. Albeit, the police can question people about minor offences, without informing them about their rights; these rights have to be immediately informed to the suspect, subsequent to arrest (Grant). In the year 1984, the court permitted another exception, namely by allowing the use of illegally obtained confessions, as evidence in court, under certain circumstances. The Reagan administration supported the claim of public prosecutors, regarding the necessity to permit such relaxation, in opposition to some of the principal Warren Court rulings. The Supreme Court accepted some major exceptions to the exclusionary rule, which are set out below (Grant). First, the prosecution could employ illegally procured evidence that would have inevitably been obtained, regardless of the improper conduct of the police. Second, evidence obtained during a police search, could be utilized during trial, even if such evidence had been obtained on the basis of a warrant that subsequently proved to be defective. This engendered a good faith rule, which was of immense use in convicting criminals (Grant). These new initiatives of the Supreme Court proved to be very effective; and in the period from 1982 to 1983, no less than nine cases were decided on the basis of defense whose obtention had been challenged as being in violation of the US Constitution. The court declared that in eight of these cases, the search conducted or arrest made was lawful. However, in one of these cases, the court ruled that the police had infringed the rights of the suspect (Grant). In 1981, Warren E. Burger, the Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court severely restricted the circumstances under which the police could question a suspect before the arrival of the latter’s attorney. In 1983, the Burger Court rescinded a Californian law that allowed police to arbitrarily arrest any person, whom they suspected of having committed a crime, and who was unable to furnish satisfactory identification. The Court opined that this piece of legislation empowered police to a much greater extent than was desirable (Grant). In 1989, William Rehnquist of the Supreme Court, allowed enforcement authorities to confiscate the assets of a criminal defendant, which are to be paid as attorney’s fees. This decision was in response to Congressional enactment of legislation that allowed the seizure of assets belonging to organized crime and perpetrators of drug trafficking. The Rehnquist Court rejected the argument that such confiscations would affect the rights of defendants to due process of law (Grant). This Court also refused to countenance the argument that the defendant would no longer be able to obtain the services of an attorney of his choice. Furthermore, the Court by a majority of 5 to 4 ruled that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, did not disallow the execution of young people who had committed crimes, at the age of 16 or 17 years. The Court also decided that the Eighth Amendment proscription did not prohibit the execution of mentally retarded people. However, these decisions generated quite a bit of criticism (Grant). In Dickerson v United States, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional requirements set out in Miranda. It annulled a federal legislation, which had sought to dilute the gravity of police action that failed to make a suspect aware of the Miranda rights. This legislation, in effect, sought to render such omission as one of the several factors to be assessed by courts, whilst determining the validity of confessions. The Supreme Court, arrived at this decision by a majority of 7 to 2, and annulled this federal law (Dickerson v. United States). In Arizona v Fulimante, the Court by a 5 to 4 majority decided that confession obtained through coercive means does not automatically defeat the prosecution’s case. It also opined that the agony and mental suffering resulting from the criminal act, on the victims and their families, was to be given due cognizance by the court, while pronouncing sentence involving murder (Arizona v. Fulimante). In Harmelin v Michigan, the Court ruled by a majority of 5 to 4, that a state can enact legislation that would impose a life sentence without parole, on persons for a first drug offence. It also opined that such punishment would not infringe the Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments (Harmelin v. Michigan). Subsequently, the Supreme Court opined that the rules established in Miranda, were no longer to be deemed to be constitutional requirements. Their purpose was to prevent coercive measures being adopted by the police, to obtain confessions from persons in their custody. Effective law enforcement, which serves to safeguard society at large, must be encouraged. In addition, the police should be prevented from subjecting suspects to coercion that violates constitutionally provided rights. Therefore, it is imperative to find a suitable alternative to the Miranda rules; which do not provide a balance between these two major requirements (National Center For Policy Analysis ). Therefore, there is need to protect suspects against coercion, whilst permitting the police to adopt reasonable measures and procedures to obtain confessions from the suspects. For instance, it could be made mandatory to make video recordings of interrogations; which could be produced as evidence in the court. Furthermore, interrogations could be conducted in the presence of a magistrate (National Center For Policy Analysis ). Furthermore, the voluntariness approach can be adopted, while dealing with confessions. Under this approach, the courts may admit confessions that are obtained voluntarily, while rejecting confessions obtained under duress (National Center For Policy Analysis ). Thus, Miranda created an environment, in which the police were significantly restricted in their operations. The erstwhile freedom of the police has to be restored. In addition to the Miranda warnings, the court established additional requirements. For instance, the questioning police officer must inform the suspect of his rights, before starting the interrogation. After this, the police officer has to ask him, whether he agrees to forego or waive his legitimate rights. If the suspect refuses to do so, then the interrogation must end forthwith (National Center For Policy Analysis ).  The public safety exceptions in Miranda, permit police officers to interrogate suspects, without procuring a waiver of Miranda rights, if they have sufficient grounds to apprehend that such information would save a life, prevent serious injury or damage to property. In a manner that is analogous to the Fourth Amendment’s exigent circumstances rules, the public safety exception provided by Miranda covers situations where immediate action is of greater importance than strict adherence to police procedures (Miranda Exceptions). If the questioning of a suspect reduces or prevents a substantial threat to public safety or property, then there is no necessity to inform suspects of their Miranda rights. This is clearly in the best interests of society at large. Under such circumstances, it would be futile to permit the suspect to consult an attorney. As such, the provision of legal aid would ensure that the suspect would cease to participate in the interrogation process, thereby posing a major threat to society. In the adversarial system, obtaining in the US, a lawyer restricts his interest and involvement to protecting his client. The harm that may ensue to society is immaterial to the lawyer (Miranda Exceptions). Another exception to the Miranda rules is known as the undercover agent exception. Under this exception, the police can conceal the identity of the person who casually questions suspects. The underlying reasoning for this exception is that a suspect who is unaware of the identity of the person querying him, will not be under any stress; and there will be no coercion involved (Miranda Exceptions). This was cogently illustrated in Illinois v. Perkins, where the US Supreme Court opined that engaging undercover agents for questioning or conversing with suspects does not breach the Miranda rights. Such interrogations do not present a police induced atmosphere and the suspects would be under no compulsion to speak. In such situations, the suspects in custody would speak frankly about the information that he has. He will communicate with the undercover agent, under the assumption that he is also a suspect in custody (Miranda Exceptions). The courts allow illegally obtained confession of the defendant in the trial process, if the defendant testifies on his own. This is done in order to establish perjury by the defendant. Moreover, the defendant’s silence at the time of interrogation is construed as guilt, if he subsequently argues on his own behalf in the trial (Stevens). Another exception is provided by what is termed as a purged taint. Under this exception, the confession obtained from a suspect after unlawful arrest by the police is rendered valid and admissible. This exception applies to instances involving multiple questionings by the police at different points of time, and also when the suspect confesses of his own volition. In these cases, the suspect’s confession, in the absence of any external pressure, redeems the police action of its illegality (Stevens). In Wong Sun v United States, the Supreme Court held that self – incriminatory oral statements made by a defendant that had been obtained subsequent to his illegal arrest, were inadmissible. In this case, the suspect subsequently, returned to the police station, of his own accord and furnished a confession. This happened several days after his release. The Court held that this voluntary confession could be admitted as evidence (Wong Sun v. United States). During the course of the interrogation, if the suspect refuses to be questioned, the questioning is to be discontinued. Moreover, the suspect can withdraw the waiver of his rights, at any time during the interrogation; or he can request for an attorney. This would bring the proceedings to an immediate halt, and the police are precluded from even suggesting that the suspect could review his decision (National Center For Policy Analysis ). The Miranda case is a landmark case in US law. The decision of the Supreme Court in this case generated considerable criticism from the government. Even US presidents from Richard Nixon to Ronald Reagan were critical of this decision. There had been several attempts to rescind it, which proved to be futile (Biskupic and Witt). The Supreme Court had intended to protect the poor and the ignorant; and it brought into force, the practice of reading out to the defendant, his rights before commencing interrogation. Gradually, this practice evolved into the legal standard in every police station across the US. This procedure has become popular as the Miranda Warnings (Biskupic and Witt). The objective of the Miranda Warnings is to provide certain rights to suspects, being subjected to interrogation in police custody. However, the courts have permitted certain exceptions to these rights. As such, the law enforcement authorities should implement a well designed interrogation policy, so that the suspect’s rights are not undermined, whilst at the same time the requirements of justice are satisfied. It is the responsibility of society to safeguard the rights of a suspect who is innocent. The fundamental tenet of any legislation is that a person is to be deemed to be innocent, until and unless proved guilty. As such, every person should have adequate rights to safeguard himself from police excesses, while in the latter’s custody. The government has thought it fit to enact draconian laws. Such laws have been ostensibly enacted to control terrorism; however, there seems to be considerable abuse of the powers bestowed upon the enforcement agencies, by these measures. Consequently, the Miranda Warnings are essential for today’s society. Works Cited Arizona v. Fulimante. No. lll S. Ct. 1246, 1265. 1991. Ashcraft v. Tennessee. No. 322 US 143. 1944. Biskupic, Joan and Elder Witt. "Congressional Quarterlys Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court." Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1997. Brown v. Mississippi. No. 297 US 278. 1936. Dickerson v. United States. No. 530 U.S. 428. 2000. Escobedo v. Illinois. No. 378 US 478. 1964 . Grant, Alan R. The American Political Process. Routledge, 2004, Pp.153 – 154. Harmelin v. Michigan. No. 501 U.S. 957. 1991. Harris v. New York. No. 401 U.S. 222. 1971. Leyra v. Denno. No. 347 US 556. 1954. Miranda Exceptions. 2005. 8 February 2009 . "Miranda Rights - A view Across the Pond." Criminal Law and Justice Weekly (2004, P168): Issue 34, JPN 647. Miranda v. Arizona. No. 384 U.S. 436. 1966. Miranda v. Arizona.In Britannica Concise Encyclopedia. 2006. 6 February 2009 . National Center For Policy Analysis . Handcuffing the Cops: Mirandas Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement. August 1998. 8 February 2009 . Stevens, Mark. Miranda Law: A Guide to the Privilege against Self - Incrimination. 25 June 2003. 9 February 2009 . Wong Sun v. United States. No. 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 1963. Read More