Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics - Essay Example

Inserts His/her Inserts Inserts Grade (07, 03, Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics  In book VII(chapters 1-10) Aristotle explores the issue of mastery of feelings, and its relation to virtue. Mastery of feelings, or “continence” as Aristotle calls it (the Greek word is enkrates), can be defined as the ability of a person to resist his/her emotions when they conflict with reason. Even when a decision as to the rational course of conduct has been reached, many people experience certain counter-pressures, certain emotions that tend to induce them to violate the demands of reason. These emotions (pathos) are themselves beyond the control of reason, and stem from our “appetite” (which is the irrational part of human nature). Examples of such emotions can be lust, greed, anger, jealousy, hatred, joy, and-in some cases- even love. However a “continent” person is able to resist the pressure of such emotions. He is able to dutifully abide by the path that reason prescribes, even if in reality he has no desire for doing so. This dutiful adherence to goodness is not just applicable to cases where the ‘good’ course of action has been determined by a person’s own intellectual and rational faculties. It can also apply to cases where ‘good’ has been determined and prescribed by society. Dutiful, albeit passive and thoughtless, adherence to ethical norms can also be called “continence”. An “incontinent” person (the Greek word is akrates), on the other hand, is one who succumbs to the pressures of his desires and emotions and violates what in his own opinion is the demand of reason. The incontinent person lacks mastery of feelings. However, Aristotle maintained that “incontinence” is quite distinct from “evil”. The “evil” are those who believe that virtues (such as justice, temperance and truthfulness) are useless, and are not to be pursued at all. While the “incontinent” person fails to pursue ‘good’ out of a ‘weakness of will’, the evil do not even attempt to be virtuous. In other words the evil do not reach the conclusion that the virtuous course of action is rational; which seems, more or less, like a defect in their intelligence, or their rational faculties. He refers to the evil as kakos or as phaulos. It is important to note that even though the “incontinent” are removed from acting in a virtuous manner, they do acknowledge a duty of doing so. Hence, according to Aristotle, their situation is not hopeless (incontinence isn’t vicious). Here one might raise the concern that if the “incontinent” succumb to the inexorable counter-pressure of their desires and their emotions; then their actions are involuntary. And since, as the well known dictum suggests, ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, we can safely assume that the “incontinent” aren’t morally responsible for their seemingly reprehensible actions. However, Aristotle’s notion of “voluntary” (Book 3, Chapter 1) is entirely negative. An action is voluntary in two conditions. The first condition is the absence of any sort of ‘compulsion’ toward the performance of the action, and the second condition is the absence of ‘ignorance’ about the harmful consequences of the action. Note that ‘compulsion’ in used here only in the sense of being compelled by an external force (a force that lies outside the agent). And since desires and emotions lie within a person, therefore when an “incontinent” person succumbs to the pressure of his desires he can not be said to be acting involuntarily. It is clear that a person will act in ways that are ‘good’ if he is “continent”, and resists the irrational appetites that haunt him. However, according to Aristotle, the life of such a person is not virtuous. Aristotle believes that true ‘virtue’ and goodness are quite distinct from both continence and incontinence. In fact, Aristotle regards ‘continence’, ‘incontinence’ and ‘evil’ as the three defects from which a man can suffer. Aristotle believes that a truly virtuous person will not even be troubled by desires that might lead him astray. In contrast to both the continent and the incontinent person, the ‘good’ person does not even have irrational desires. He, therefore, does not feel the counter-pressure of irrational appetites. His mind is free of all conflicts. He lives in a state of ‘internal harmony’. Aristotle believed (under the influence of Plato) that this internal harmony is an essential component of the good life. Since the “continent” are devoid of harmony, their lives are not “good”. A virtuous person acts as he does because he is inspired by beauty and nobility (Aristotle uses the word Kalon). He also feels a strong aversion for ugliness and shamefulness (aischron). The additional element that a virtuous man has (and a continent man is devoid of) is a very high level of refinement of ‘Practical Reasoning’, as well as ‘Theoretical Reasoning’. Aristotle believe that in all the forms of desire and Pathos (such as anger), bad or hasty reasoning is implicit. Therefore with the refinement of reason one can avoid such irrational impulses altogether. Aristotle divided the Soul into two components: the Rational Soul, and the Irrational Soul. The irrational soul is further divided into the vegetative soul and the appetitive soul. A virtuous man has such a profound level of intellectual strength, and his rational faculties are so advanced, that the irrational part of his soul is completely subjugated to the rational part. In the case of a ‘continent’ person, his ‘passion’ rivals reason. Even though reason wins and gains a monopoly over action, it still has to face the nuisance of a domestic enemy. Therefore, the passions of a continent person limit the scope and development of his rational faculties. In the case of a virtuous person, Practical Reasoning ensures that his virtuous desires are also matched with correct thoughts. Practical reasoning, or Prudence (Phronesis) as Aristotle calls it, is what (a) determines the right course of action and (b) orients one’s desires towards it. It is a purely deliberative exercise, wherein an individual refers to standards such as happiness, utility, community welfare, humanitarianism, moral obligations, justice and Aristotle’s own equation of ‘good’ with the ‘mean’ between two extremes. The individual then comes to a decision about the right course of action. It is important to note that Aristotle believed that ethics can not be summed up in any amount of books. Rather, good is as good does. And it is through the application of Practical and Theoretical reasoning to each specific situation, that we arrive at what is good. Aristotle also believed that our Reason has a divine origin, and therefore a good life must partake in what is divine in us, while minimizing the influence of what is human. Even though the divine part of us is rather ‘small in bulk’, but it provides us with the means to live a good. Therefore, even though mastery of feelings can lead to a bare minimum amount of good, but the truly good life is about subjugating one’s desires to reason. Works Cited Page Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by Irwin, Terence. New York: Hackett Publishing Co, 2000. Print Read More