The Method of Winning the cold War - Essay Example

?The Winner of the Cold War Introduction And despite the many failings of the United s, there was no doubt that the world, for all its misery, was a better place than it would have been without American resistance to Joseph Stalin’s vision. Warren I. Cohen (1995, 261) When Ronald Reagan presidency ended and was asked what had been his supreme accomplishment, he responded, “People tell me that I won the Cold War” (Summy & Salla 1995, 19). At some point in the 1992 election George Bush declared a more theatrical triumph in the Cold War (Leffler & Westad 2010). Other affiliates of these regimes and several scholars have made identical claims, which are turning out to be, as emphasised by Ralph Summy & Michael Salla (1995) in their prelude, an ‘emergent orthodoxy’ (ibid, p. xv). The objective of this essay is to analyse the extent of the victory of the United State in the Cold War in the light of the logical essence of such claims. There are great difficulties contained in the modus operandi ‘winning the Cold War’ (Cohen 1995). The foremost is uncertainty about the extent of the claim, as the mentions of Reagan and Bush suggest, since victory in 1989 implied something distinct from victory in 1992, when the USSR had disintegrated and Gorbachev had been dethroned (Philips 2001). The next and interrelated difficulty is ambiguity about the real description of the Cold War. ‘Winning the Cold War’ is a very debatable principle since it can be understood as a moral excuse for all the defence and foreign policies of the Reagan administration—for instance, military involvement in Nicaragua during Reagan’s term, a tactic which foresaw perhaps combating and winning a major war and unparalleled budgets for peacetime military (Painter 1999). The concept of ‘winning’ also seems to justify the rules of aiming for military supremacy and arbitrations from strength, which may be catastrophic as shown. Did the United States Really Win the Cold War? Before attempting to evaluate the influence of the Reagan regime, it has to be explained first what was involved in the end of the Cold War, by determining the major components in the strategy of Gorbachev after 1985 and the unforeseen results of the course of internal and external reform. The policy reforms of Gorbachev occurred in four major domains; in each instance the policy acquired impetus and became more revolutionary commencing around 1987 (Geoffrey 2008). Primarily, the Soviet administration commenced after 1985 to reform features of its military strategy viewed as particularly hostile by the West, and at the same time to alter its method of arms control (Suri 2002). Gorbachev embarked on reassessing military principle, pioneering the notion of ‘reasonable sufficiency at the nuclear level’ (Juviler & Kimura 2009, 139) which indicates that ‘lower nuclear weapons levels would be required’ (ibid, 139) and advancing toward ‘defensive defence at the conventional level’ (Juviler & Kimura 2009, 140), in an effort to suppress the apprehensions of the West about surprise assault. The large-scale change in arms control strategy was recommended by the spectacular suggestions formed at the Reykavik summit convention in 1986 and agreed upon during the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) arbitrations, when the Soviet party suggested an extraordinary eagerness to agree on thorough on-site inspection and bigger reductions in its arsenal than those mandated of the United States (Lefler & Westad 2010). The address of Gorbachev at the 1988 United Nations, when he assured considerable unilateral cuts in Soviet arsenals and combatants in European Russia and East Germany, expressed the gravity of his determination to reduce armed forces (Juviler & Kimura 2009). Subsequently, Gorbachev indicated a reform in the ideological scope and proclaimed objectives of Soviet foreign policy, distancing from an idea of global class conflict toward a more broad-minded idea of peace and alliance. Propaganda about peace had contributed in Soviet policy beforehand, but Gorbachev placed a new emphasis on the essence of the United Nations and on ‘human values’ (Keohane, Nye, & Hoffman 1997). The Soviet Union escorted a new ideological approach with actual hints of a real policy reform, for instance, fulfilling its financial obligations to UN peacekeeping activities and collaborating with the International Atomic Energy Agency (Keohane et al. 1997). Next, Gorbachev embarked on removing Soviet political and military assistance from Marxist administrations in developing nations as a component of his thorough reassessment of foreign policy (Painter 1999). Cuban soldiers were removed from Angola and the regime was persuaded to conciliate with its domestic foes; Moscow persuaded Vietnam to pull out from Cambodia; and, largely critical, the Soviet Union consented to terminate its extended war in Afghanistan and withdrew all its combatants by 1989 (Geoffrey 2008). The last and most remarkable decision by Gorbachev was to modify Soviet policy toward the nations of East Europe (Phillips 2001). In his address in the UN in 1988 he declared that the Brezhnev Doctrine, stating the privilege of the Soviet Union to occupy Eastern Europe within the flag of socialist internationalism, had been discarded (Suri 2002). At some point in 1989 Solidarity made a compromise with the Polish United Workers’ party and adhered to the regime in August; a new multiparty elections and constitution in Hungary were declared in September (Suri 2002). In these two instances the deviation from the rule of the Communist Party was the outcome of an extended course of internal tension and the rise of strong party leaders, but reform was apparently permitted by the Soviet Union (Leffler & Westad 2010). Gorbachev tried to affect the more unruly administration of the German Democratic Republic (Geoffrey 2008). The Brezhnev Doctrine was officially abandoned by the Warsaw Pact when in the 1989 convention foreign ministers highlighted the right of each nation to be independent (Juviler & Kimura 2009). In spite of the recommendation of Gorbachev of large-scale reform in Eastern Europe, it is questionable if he expected, or aimed for, the disintegration of the coalition which took place after the revolutions in 1989 (Juviler & Kimura 2009). The concluding phase in the ending of the Cold War, the steady collapse of the USSR itself and the abandonment of the rule of the Communist party after the 1991 unsuccessful coup, was evidently a completely unintentional outcome of a reform course which had become wayward (Smith & Davis 2005). The administration of Reagan may have been actually accountable for the foremost three regions of policy reform which signified the ending of the Cold War (Summy & Salla 1995): ‘Gorbachev’s rethinking of military, ideological, and Third World goals and strategies’ (ibid, p. 24). There is no substantiation that the administration of Reagan attempted to provoke disintegration of the East European coalition, or even supported the opposition in East Europe, aside from enforcing regulations after the defeat of Solidarity (Phillips 2001). Oratorical emphasis on human rights, aimed just against socialist or communist nations, merely contributed in the deepening of the conflict with Moscow (Keohane et al. 1997). If the Bush administration is taken into account in the discussion, then it seems that, as expressed by Michael Mandelbaum, the greatest contribution of Bush to the historic episodes in 1989 in Eastern Europe was to lurk silently behind (Keohane et al. 1997). It is even less possible to argue that the administration of Reagan predicted or tried to accomplish the defeat of Communism in the Soviet Union, or the nation’s break up into autonomous nation-states (Painter 1999). The most prominent campaigner of putting demands on the economy of the Soviet Union, Richard Pipes, informed the European public in 1982 (Summy & Salla 1995): Now no responsible persons can have any illusions that it is in the power of the West to alter the Soviet system or to ‘bring the Soviet economy to its knees’. These are spurious objectives. What one can and ought to strive for is compelling the Soviet regime to bear the consequences of its own priorities (ibid, p. 25). The claims of Bush to have triumphed the Cold War cannot hence be justified by any major historical support that the administrations of Reagan and Bush were strongly influential in causing the demise of Soviet communism. However, the claim that Reagan actually affected policy reforms in the Soviet Union between 1985 and 1988 merits thorough re-evaluation. The Reagan’s Claim: The Force behind the Reform of Gorbachev One potential counterclaim against the idea that Reagan compelled reform upon the USSR is that the domestic programmes of Gorbachev and his matching reconstruction of external regulations originated entirely from domestic tensions. If that is the case, they had considerably insignificant connection to the White House. There is vivid substantiation that there was knowledge at the summit of the Soviet hierarchy in the 1980s that major reforms were required (Cohen 1995). Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, appealed in 1981 for the reconstruction of political and economic institutions, and the restructuring of military forces with the intention of guaranteeing better military success (Geoffrey 2008). His commentary in Kommunist in 1981 has been extensively mentioned by Western scholars (Smith & Davis 2005). It is hence questionable that only the extended stagnancy of the Brezhnev regime, and the ensuing poor health of Andropov and Chernenko (Cohen 1995), postponed reforms in internal policy. Gorbachev took over a policy and aimed to construct a global environment beneficial to his internal changes. Given the essence of the quarrel between superpowers in the Cold War, it does, yet, appear more likely that the United States had some actual influence. One explanation why it is possible that the administration of Reagan provoked Gorbachev’s re-evaluation of defence and foreign strategy is the timing (Summy & Salla 1995). The agenda of the Soviet administration after 1995 may be an immediate reaction to the preliminary Reagan regime (Summy & Salla 1995): Post hoc is not necessarily propter hoc, but there is a prima facie case that the Reagan administration forced the Soviet leadership to confront internal weaknesses and narrowed the options open to them. The Reagan administration, when it came to power, openly proclaimed it was altering the rules of the game with the Soviet Union after a decade of detente (ibid, p. 27). The policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union had been becoming increasingly uncompromising in the 1970s, in part because of domestic right-wing tensions and in part because of concerns over the Soviet threat, particularly after the occupation of Afghanistan (Juviler & Kimura 2009). However, there was a major modification in rhetoric and in arms control strategy under the administration of Reagan. It can hence be assumed that Reagan compelled a reassessment of the former Brezhnev policy, which merged the aim for military equality, embedded in arms control compromises, and of technological and economic assistance from the West by means of detente with an involved effort to expand Soviet influence in developing countries (Painter 1999). Brezhnev himself acknowledged in 1982 that the United States had “launched a political, economic and ideological offensive” (Painter 1999, 114) against the USSR and had initiated an “unprecedented arms race” (ibid, p. 114). Another questionable issue is precisely how the strategy of Reagan affected the Soviet Union. An assumption about the features of arms race would indicate that Moscow was probable to react to the rhetoric and military agenda of Reagan by becoming increasingly uncompromising and enlarging its own arsenal (Juviler & Kimura 2009); certainly, there was several proofs of this reaction, particularly in 1984 (ibid, p. 104). Thus the diplomacy of Gorbachev might require an explanation not as an outcome of the decisions of the White House, but regardless of them. A recognised effort to interpret and verify an accurate hypothesis has been carried out by Fred Chernoff. He studies the argument made by Dan Quayle and other scholars that the brisk development of the armed forces under Reagan provoked the Kremlin to react by enlarged military budget (Summy & Salla 1995). Consequently, the USSR, it is argued, experienced such major economic problems that it had to surrender the war and make significant arms control agreements. It is quite difficult to find trustworthy data on the military expenditures of the Soviet Union, but by making use of CIA approximations Chernoff shows that there is no believable support that the Soviet military spending boosted in response to the military budget of the United States (Summy & Salla 1995). There is a likely weaker idea that, while the leadership of the Soviet Union did not attempt to compete with the arms agenda of the Reagan administration, the alleged costs of extending the arms race by 1985 compelled a thorough re-assessment of Soviet defence and foreign policies (Juviler & Kimura 2009). Chernoff stresses this other development and admits that it has quite more possibility, while it opposes the principles of the ‘strong build-up’ (Cohen 1995, 63) idea that the Soviet Union would unavoidably react in military ways. This second idea is given by several scholars on Gorbachev. One account is provided by Allen Lynch (Summy & Salla 1995): Reagan’s more aggressive tack deeply unnerved the Kremlin and discredited the prevailing paradigm of Soviet-American relations among the political class at large. This proved to be necessary, though by no means sufficient, condition for the sea change in Gorbachev’s foreign policy (ibid, p. 27). He claims that the adequate requirement was the combination of Reagan’s growing tension with the weakening capacity of Soviet defence and foreign policies, which led to a barring of alternatives. If this idea is accurate, then it would mean that any government of the Soviet Union in 1985 would need to adhere to the policies of Gorbachev (Summy & Salla 1995). Lynch does actually argue that nearly all leaderships confronting the same external and internal problems would have adhered to the same policies. Given that these were factual, one may assume that there would be agreement, or at least quite major agreement, on the step to be taken. However, the facts given by Western scholars firmly indicate that there was not (Smith & Davis 2005). Gorbachev confronted resistance to his policies in the elites of the party and among segments of the military. He is revealed to have convened with the military leaders in 1985 and to have informed them that there would be rigid constraints on military spending (Geoffrey 2008). Defence Minister Sergei Sokolov, during 1985 and 1986, clearly demanded higher military budget (Phillips 2001). The absolute extremism of the foreign and arms control policies of Gorbachev did not become evident until he had been successful in overthrowing numerous of his biggest military enemies in 1987 (Phillips 2001). Definitely, any effort to make an argument that the demands of Reagan actually influenced the policies of Gorbachev fails, as shown by Chernoff and other scholars. Did the United States Really Win the Cold War? The intricacies of the actual process of decision making in the USSR bring in another group of issues which have to be cited about the theory that Reagan influenced the character of Gorbachev’s reaction. This theory is sensible only if it is believed there was a sound Reagan policy. There are several clear doubts which can arise about this idea. One counterargument is that no US government can actually aim for a strong strategy because of the incompatible demands of the Congress and pressure groups and especially due to the domestic bureaucratic conflict which goes before any formal policy actions (Cohen 1995). Where the head of the state assumes a dynamic role these difficulties can be lessened, but Reagan was known for his indifference towards details and ignorance of major concerns, for instance, nuclear tactics (Cohen 1995). However, it can be claimed that the general approach of Reagan’s tactics were evident enough. The objective was to strengthen the military might of the United States to acquire clear dominance over the USSR, to discard the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) approach towards arms control, and to destabilise the USSR by preventing its access to the economic or technological assistance of the West (Painter 1999). A basic difficulty in finding strength in the strategy of Reagan is the change in policy between his initial and subsequent regimes. Reagan, the foe of the so-called ‘evil empire’ (Summy & Salla 1995, 27), the advocate of the American armed forces, and the enemy of arms control, talked about at Reykjavik the likelihood of removing every nuclear weapon and start to negotiate critically on reducing the weaponry of the US (Summy & Salla 1995). It is not important at this point to address the issue of whether Reagan himself had a sensibly definite set of objectives. The main point is that the administration of Reagan was certainly not massive and was exposed to demands from the Congress and the general public. In 1985, when Gorbachev rose to power, he embarked on pointing out to the public that in spite of the treacherous military agenda of several extreme factions in the US, there were also other positive indications from the government (Phillips 2001). Gorbachev pursued the favourable effect of the peace movements in the West and claimed that Soviet peacekeeping may influence Western policy (Geoffrey 2008). While supporters of the ‘Reagan triumph’ (Summy & Salla 1995, 27) view a victorious Washington which had impressed its idea on domestic enemies and may possibly enforce it upon the Kremlin, the belief from Moscow was more unclear. Conclusions This paper has agreed with scholars who argue that the Soviet Union was coming close to a technological and economic decline by the 1980s, and that sustaining the strength of its military and global aspirations was critically straining its limited resources. This discussion, apparently, contributed to the analysis of the basis of the Reagan policy, but it was also the source of the new outlook of Gorbachev. It has also recognised that the strategy of the initial Reagan regime did enlarge demands on the Soviet leadership and hence inclined to promote a reassessment of the Brezhnev doctrine. This paper has, yet, refuted the idea that the Reagan strategy essentially resulted in Gorbachev’s restructuring of foreign and military policy, since the Soviet Union was left with no choice. Any similar idea is weak because there is a constant possibility of disagreeing understandings of power associations and constantly some opposition within administrations about policy makings. Furthermore, the character of politics means there is an opportunity for initiative, alternative, and the unforeseen. Lastly, this paper has refuted ideas that the arms strengthening of Reagan and his economic demands on the Soviet Union actually affected the feature of the policies of Gorbachev, for instance, the new arms control model of the Soviet Union. There is much proof that Gorbachev basically reassessed the military strategy of the Soviet Union and, in the INF situation, identified the intermediate-range weaponry as needless and inefficient. The rules for the thinking of Gorbachev were completely contradictory to those the initial administration of Reagan had promoted, and were actually not grasped by Gorbachev as mere surrender to dominant power. References BBC News (1999) World NATO’s Cold War roots [Online]. [Available at]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/325388.stm [Accessed: 3 February 2011] Cohen, W., (1995). The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 4, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945-1991. UK: Cambridge University Press. Geoffrey, R., (2008). Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953. Journal of Cold War Studies. 10 (3). p.179-181 Juviler, P. & Kimura, H., (2009). The Gorbachev Regime: Consolidation to Reform. Transaction Publishers. Keohane, R., Nye, J., Hoffmann, S., (1997). After the Cold War: international institutions and state strategies in Europe, 1989-1991. Harvard University Press. Leffler, M. & Westad O., (2010). The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume 1. 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