What duties, if any, do we have to non-human animals - Essay Example

What duties, if any, do we have to non-human animals? This paper will address what duties, if any, do we have to non-human animals? The main point it will tackle is that raised by the moral philosopher Peter Singer who asks: ‘is it right, for example to think that it is morally quite legitimate to eat non-human animals?’1 In examining theories by Singer, McMahan, Warnock, Spira and Benson regarding the eating of non-human animals, consideration will also be given to the impact this may have on moral arguments regarding ‘duty’ in vivisection, and industries such as cosmetics, detergents and pharmaceuticals. Peter Singer believes chimpanzees and apes, should be granted ‘the right to life, to liberty and to protection from torture,’2 because they have autonomy like humans. Singer’s term ‘speciesists’ is used for people who ‘regard human beings as intrinsically more valuable than members of other species.’3 Singer purports to believe in equality between species, but Benson argues this is false ‘because of the relationships with other individuals which are inseparable from belonging to the same species.’4 Singer contradictiously suggests that chimps and apes have a greater level of consiousness, compared to other non-human animals. In an article and the book Ethics into Action, Singer discusses Henry Spira who campaigned to reduce animal suffering related to the Draize and LD50 tests. Spira’s advertising campaign was criticized for using a Beagle to gain an emotive response; it was suggested if a rodent appeared in the advert people would not have been so outraged. Spira pointed to the importance of ‘not how popular is an animal, but can it tell the difference between pain and pleasure?’5 Singer discusses Kant’s work and states that we ‘find moral worth only when duty is done for duty’s sake.’6 What is meant by this relates to the advertising, in that if people do their duty out of sympathy or shame, they wouldn’t be doing their duty for the sake of believing and feeling it to be true. Gary L. Francione criticises Peter Singer’s work, suggesting that whilst it contains an element of reform for animal-welfare, it ‘makes people feel better about animal uses, but does not actually achieve its proper aim of protecting animals.’7 Francione argues for full abolition of animal use, claiming that because animals are sentient beings this should enable them to have full moral and legal rights. Professor of Philosophy, Jeff McMahan, discusses animals raised in good conditions, then killed humanely, for human consumption and terms this ‘benign carnivorism.’8 McMahan states the main premise of benign carnivorism’s moral philosophical argument, is that it’s preferable animals live in a contented manner, with no suffering (up until their humane death), than to not have existed at all. Mary Warnock claims animals ‘should be used for the sake of human society,’9 she lists activities such as horse riding; sledging; the food and clothing they provide. This argument is favourable to those wishing to consume meat, though McMahan points out the illogical flaw that: ‘there are no individuals who never exist.’10 A comparative sense of ‘well-being’ is made between non-human animals and humans. Whilst non-human animals can appear to show emotion; other aspects of human life such as success, artistic endeavours, wisdom, meaningful connections to others, the ability to think rationally and appreciation of beauty aren’t always as easy to perceive in non-human animals. McMahan suggests that non-human animals lack a self-awareness for the future, claiming that they ‘do not…have desires or intentions or ambitions…that would be frustrated by death,’11 thus making it easier to justify killing them. McMahan’s argument makes interesting comparison to humans but his key premise throughout is that animals do not have the same rights as humans they have lesser rights; humans constantly place a higher value on human life. If non-human animals were seen to have a desire to live, it would be much harder for humans to eat them. Neither Singer, nor McMahan seem to explore the lack of ability to articulate in non-human animals, which would make for a key factor to express thought. Whilst never overtly stated by McMahan, it is implied that humans do have an alternative food-source; it is not necessary to kill animals in order to survive. McMahan carefully considers the time it takes for humans to consume meat, and the pleasure gained from that and states that it is unlikely this pleasure, ‘could outweigh all the good that an animal’s life might contain over several years.’12 He puts forward a compelling argument that animals derive pleasure from eating and other activities. This would seem to suggest a strong and convincing argument for the fact that humans have a duty to stop consuming non-human animals; the killing cannot be justified. If animals are no longer killed for food, this raises another key moral question concerning duty, essentially the duty of responsibility. Domesticated animals may be ill equipped with the skills to return to the wild. McMahon states: ‘to cause an individual to exist in a vulnerable and dependent condition is arguably to make oneself liable to certain duties of care.’13 The suggestion seems to be don’t raise non-human animals for meat in the first place. If you have done so, then stop immediately and assume the correct duty of care for the animal. Spira argues that eating animals also has a further detrimental impact, whilst, ‘six billion animals are being consumed for food’14 it would be impossible to stop animal testing for medical research; cosmetics and detergents etc because it’s illogical to allow animals to be killed for one cause, but not another. Benson points out that Singer and Spira’s suggestion that people should give up meat, but not any other products such as pharmaceuticals is ‘unbalanced.’15 In conclusion, the research above suggests that any arguments put forward for eating animals, do not stand up against moral philosophical debates; the arguments are weak and illogical. Harlan B. Miller makes a valid point when he suggests: ‘‘the ethical incoherence of our customary treatment of nonhumans has been demonstrated time and time again.’16 Whilst many people believe they have a moral duty to prevent animal cruelty and suffering; this seems to come with a disclaimer of: ‘providing it doesn’t impact adversely on humans.’ People have varying degrees of how much of a ‘duty’ they feel to non-human animals; Singer believes we have a duty to non-human animals with ‘self-awareness.’17 The level of consciousness plays a key factor in determining moral duties towards non-human animals, unfortunately, and returning to Singer, humans are still classed as a superior species. Francione argues for full abolition of non-human animal use, to fulfil our duty to animals who should have full moral and legal rights. Spira’s work was criticised for taking a accommodationist approach, but an overnight phenomenon of outright abolition is sometimes difficult to achieve. Spira believed in a duty to relieve suffering for non-human animals, and if this was achieved for initially a few, this had to be better than none. The agreed duty amongst all writers would be to minimize animal suffering, even amongst those who McMahon terms ‘benign carnivores.’ The majority consensus from the writers discussed, would suggest we have a moral duty to cease to consume meat. In the larger scheme we have a duty to cease breeding animals for meat, and that there is of course a duty of care for existing animals. The suggestion is that by ceasing to eat meat, this would also lessen the suffering of animals for other uses such as animal testing, as less argument could me made for it if this was the only reason for breeding animals, non-human animals would become on a more equal status to humans. Word Count – 1267. Works Cited BENSON, John. Duty and the Beast, Philosophy, 206 (53), Oct. 1978: 529-549. MCMAHAN, Jeff. Eating Animals the Nice Way, Daedalus 137, 2008: 66-76 PYNES, Christopher A. review of Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation by Gary L. Francione, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008, in The Quarterly Review of Biology, 3(84), Sept. 2009: 283. SINGER, Peter. A Companion to Ethics. London & New York, Wiley-Blackwell, 1993. SINGER, Peter. Rights and Wrongs in Nature: International Weekly Journal of Science, 437, Sept. 2005: 20-22. SINGER, Peter. Henry Spira’s Search for Common Ground on Animal Testing, in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 1999, 1 (8): 9-22. SINGER, Peter. Practical Ethics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. SPIRA, Henry. [interview], Newsletter of the Foundation for Biomedical Research, 1993, 10 (1): 4-5. WARNOCK, Mary. The Ethics of Being Beastly to Animals, in The Times (London: UK), January 24, 2001: 2. Read More