Construction Technology in the Buncefield Incident - Case Study Example

Name Tutor Course Date Summary of the Buncefield Incident The Buncefield is an oil depot for both storage and transfer of oil. The depot is used by three companies namely Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited, United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Limited and West London Pipeline and Storage Limited. The Buncefield incidence was a blaze that occurred on 11th December 2005 at the storage terminal of the three companies. The owner of the depot was TOTAL UK limited and it was the fifth largest depot in UK with a capacity of sixty million gallons of fuel. On this day large amounts of vapour were noticed coming out from a pipe in the North West corner of the site constantly with loss of the contents from tanks through the pipes. This is where the largest explosion occurred. Loss occurred from one large and massive explosion and other smaller explosions. A large fire arose that attacked twenty one tanks that were on that site. An emergency response service by the police and fire service was immediately initiated that consisted of 180 fire fighters using seven hundred thousand litres of foam. The explosion led to a very wide spread damage covering almost two kilometres away from the site. The event was monitored by the British Geological Survey and it was calculated as 2.4 on the Richter scale. The suspected cause of the incident might have been a very strong fuel explosion (GB: Dept. of Work and Pensions 20). Many other homesteads in the surrounding were affected and hundreds of them got slight non-structural damages. Several businesses which employed a great number of people were destroyed and their premises which also employed several people were also seriously affected. The flying debris from the site also injured a number of people who were in the surrounding areas. However there were no people who were reported dead. Areas in the south England and beyond were covered by a dense black smoke from the fire. The fire lasted for three days where a lot of water and foam were spent in trying to put it off. At the end, around two thousand people were displaced and some motor ways that led to the site closed. Before the fire, the site had an inventory of thirty five million litres of oil in which a third of it was lost in the fire. The explosion was suspected to have been caused by an ignition of a cloud of vapour that had formed due to spillage of some tonnes of gasoline oil from a storage tank that had been overfilled. The over filling had resulted after failure of a supply vessel that was set to automatically close when the tanks are full. The vessel did not close and there was overfilling that resulted in spillage (Webster 32). After the incidence, environmental monitoring was carried out by agencies to reveal the effects of the incidence and the contaminants that were released to the environment. Compensation plans were however initiated immediately after the incident to resettle those who were displaced by the explosion and to compensate those whose property was damaged. Effects on the surrounding Environmental monitoring by the environmental agency reviewed several environmental contaminations that occurred during and after the Buncefield incident. The agency monitored the surface and ground water and found out that the waters had been contaminated by some of the products that were used during fire fighting, the leaking fuels and their products. This necessitated termination and cease of use of the existing boreholes before the incidence and construction of new ones in areas far from the site. This is because the products were dangerous and could bring harm when consumed by humans and animals. The agency however had to do a cleanup of the underground and the surface waters to remove the contaminants. Perfluoro octane sulphates, a type of chemical that is found in the fire fighting foam was also found to be a contaminant in the water. This is an environmental hazard that can cause health problems to both humans and animals (Institute of Chemical Engineers 610). Six months after the incident, the Perfluoro octane sulphates were also found in the water calling for treatment of the water sources. The contamination of the waters also affected the aquatic life greatly some of which the humans were depending on. Water contamination also resulted from some eight hundred litres of water which had been stored for fire fighting. This water leaked into river Colne which is a tributary of river Thames. This is the major water supply source of the people in the surrounding. This water therefore needs special treatment and disposal which poses an economic burden to the people (Gray 349). Contaminations on the land were also investigated where it was found that the surface layer was found to be contaminated with fuels and the products used in fire fighting. The pipes through which oil passed were fixed few meters beneath the ground and the leakages therefore caused contamination of the soils. Contaminants were however short lived and did not cause prolonged health problems. Off site damage also occurred and people living close and some distance from the site were affected by the incident. Some of their buildings were destroyed during the explosion leading to loss and displacement. People had to vacate from their areas of residence since the effects of the explosion threatened their stay in the area. Office blocks around t he area were also damaged. During the incident, there was heavy black smoke which led to air contamination at that time. Most people suffered since breathing was a problem. However, the problem of air contamination did not last for a long time. The smoke also had the capacity to worsen the conditions of those who had respiratory diseases such as asthma. However, the evacuation of those affected saved some from the impact. There were small particles in the smoke which contained hydrocarbons which were irritating but had low toxicity levels. The incident left many people in search of medical care due to its health impacts. Other medical needs were due to the accidents that resulted at the moment of the explosion. A number of the emergency workers also suffered respiratory symptoms especially sore throats (Health Protection Agency GB 46). The employees of the damaged businesses also suffered loss of job before the damages were repaired. The debris that was coming out of the site during the explosion also left some people injured. Statistics collected from the incidence revealed that two hundred people were injured, two thousand people displaced, three hundred or more houses were damaged and six hundred businesses which offered employment to around sixteen thousand people were destroyed. People suffered psychologically due to the shock experienced after the explosion. There was a lot of anxiety caused and this led to panic in the local residents (Lombardo & Llewellyn, 234). Economic losses also occurred since there was loss of property and loss of employment for people. The renovation of damaged properties was also a financial burden to the owners. The company also suffered a great loss since the incidence costed the firm seventy million dollars. The company also had to set up a helpline fund for those who were affected by the incidence. Transport was also affected since the incidence occurred close to a motor way which was consequently closed. The terminal supplied thirty percent of the fuel in Heathrow Airport and after destruction by fire; the airport had to start rationing its fuel usage. Steps into redeveloping the site The damage caused by the explosion was very large such that any other developer who wishes to redevelop the place will have a heavy task. First, the developer will have to eliminate the contaminants which were left after the incident as well as winning the confidence of the community members. This would mean that the developer will have to stop further effects of the contaminants. For the contaminated waters, there will be need to treat the water as in the sewage treatment system to eliminate the products of fire fighting. This will be a very expensive process that will cost much for the redeveloper. Elimination of the fuel products from the waters requires use of fuel filters that will extract the fuel products from the water source. Treatment of underground water is however more difficult as compared to the surface water. This will require treatment in the aquifers which will be a more expensive process. The aquifers are the water bearing rocks in the underground. Treatment of the water in the aquifers will require elimination of all the present waters and allowing time for other cleaner waters to for. This is a very risky process as it might lead to a permanent water loss from the aquifer. Treating of the surface waters will require a recycling process that is fitted with fuel filters. An outlet will be created in the contaminated water body along which the fuel filters will be fitted to collect together the fuel products. The Perfluoro octane sulphates also found to be contaminating the water did not have a long lasting impacts and given time they would get finished from the water. Air contaminants were also found to be having a short term impacts and they disappeared after a period of six months. These would not be a major problem to the redeveloper. However, for a person to be allowed to set u residential or commercial property on the site, a confirmation from a risk assessor and the District Council must be obtained. Building and safety standards must also be imposed to ensure that there is no likelihood of future risks associated with the incident. The surroundings of site also should not be congested with buildings in case another explosion occurs (Davies 36). The soil that is contaminated with the fuels and hydrocarbons also need mitigation measures. The soils should be oxidised so as breakdown the carboxyl particles in the compounds. The soil sample is first taken to the laboratory for testing and experimentation on the oxidation process. This is a long and expensive process but cannot be avoided by anyone redeveloping such a site. The district council is however very strict on mitigation of contaminated land before it is developed. Redevelopment of the Buncefield site will however be very expensive but the redeveloper must treat the land first. Summary of the Key Findings Following the Official Investigation into the Event. Several groups continued investigating the incidence and released several progressive reports. The cause of the explosion was found to have resulted from failure of the protection system which was supposed to shut off once the storage tank is full. The system was supposed to automatically shut off once the tank is full to avoid overfilling. But at this time, the system failed and it continued pumping the oils until it was pouring down the sides of the tank and into the air. This led to formation of a rich mixture of air and fuel that collected in one of the outlets. After fifteen minutes, vapour form the fuel was seen flowing in all directions forming a vapour cloud thickened to a depth of about two meters. One hour later, the vapour had spread to most of the areas surrounding the site. At this time, one big explosion occurred which was later followed by several other smaller explosions causing fire all over the site (Kletz 427). Investigation on the arrangement and movement of the oil through various pipelines was also done that revealed that the lines moved fuel in different consignments that were separated by a boundary of mixed products. The operators kept watch of the entrance point of the oil lines from where the fuels were separated into their respective tanks. The investigators of the plant also found that the system lacked several facilities that could have enabled earlier detection of the fault. Firstly, there was no electronic way of monitoring the system and the pipelines that could have enabled identification of an arising problem along the system. The electronic monitoring would have enabled the detection of the failure to shut off the filling system. The investigating team also found that the plant did not have alarms to summon the staff of the impending danger. The plant also lacked a device to detect the presence of flammable vapours in the environment. If the vapours could have been detected, the explosion could have been prevented. The fire fighters had to be sourced from outside the plant in order to save the burning facilities. According to the recommendations by the health and safety committee, any plant that is operating with flammable substances ought to have a well equipped fire fighting system in case of an emergency fire outbreak (GB Fire Rescue Service 96). Investigations also found out that the plant’s fire pump house that was used to provide cooling water in the Buncefield site was located adjacent to the outlet from which the explosion began. This was identified as a possible source of one of the blast offs on the highly flammable vapour that had formed. The explosion however damaged the pump house which could have provided water to the fire fighters during the task. This made the task of fire fighting to be slow and hence the large extent of the damage. The investigation also found that overfilling a tank with a flammable fuel is very likely to cause an intensive explosion than a tank that is leaking form a below level. The design of the tanks was also found to have encouraged formation of vapour, and especially where there was no close monitoring of the filling system. The walls surrounding the plant were also found to be inadequate in protecting against the spread of the vapour into the areas surrounding the site. Adequate walls could have contained the vapour within the site and ignition could have not resulted. After the incidence, the environmental agency did monitoring to investigate on the effects of the explosion to the surrounding from which there was found some substantial contaminants in the environment. Contaminants were found in the surface and underground waters which was defined to be a health risk to both human and animal lives. Contaminants were also found in the air around the site which later disappeared after a few days. This was from the vapour that appeared as a dark cloud in the air. Other contaminants were found in the soil but in very low levels. The findings revealed minimal impacts on the public health. However, the Buncefield incidence showed a great need for prompt training of the responders of such incidences such as the police and the fire and rescue services and also the general public (Judy 109) . After several investigations on the incidence, recommendations were made to guide other similar plants into protection against such an incidence. Recommendations were given by the government of UK to guide on the construction of an oil deport. The recommendations majored on installation of immediate emergency response means in case of such incidents. Strict inspection on construction of the plants was also implemented in all other areas operating with flammable liquids. The government recommended that the Buncefield incident to be taken as a lesson by all other premises in the country to avoid further losses. The health and safety board is also doing strict inspection on such premises to ensure there is no potential for occurrence of such an explosion. Works Cited Institute of Chemical Engineers (GB). Hazards XX: Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Harnessing Knowledge-Challenging Complacency. Rugby: IChemE Publishers, 2008. Great Britain: Department for Work and Pensions. The Buncefield Investigation: The Government and Competent Authority's Response. London: The Stationery Office publishers.2008. Davies Alex. Workplace Law Handbook 2009. Cambridge: Workplace Law Group publishers. Webster Helen. Dispersion modelling studies of the Buncefield Oil Depot incident. Freeport: Met Office. 2006. Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service . Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service's review of the fire response. London: The stationery Office publishers, 2006. Health Protection Agency (Great Britain), The public health impact of the Buncefield Oil Depot fire. Porton: Health Protection Agency, 2006. Judy Orme et al. Public Health for the 21st Century. New York: McGraw-Hill International, 2007. Gray John. Water Contamination Emergencies: Collective Responsibility. London: Royal Society of Chemistry, 2009. Kletz Trevor. Went Wrong? Case Histories of Process Plant Disasters and How They Could Have Been Avoided. London: r Butterworth-Heinemann. 2009. Lombardo Joseph & Llewellyn Buckeridge. Disease surveillance: a public health informatics approach. Sandbury: Weiss Field. 2007. Read More