Fire-Safety in the Channel Tunnel - Case Study Example

The Channel Tunnel fire Customer Inserts His/Her Name Customer Inserts Grade Course Customer Inserts Tutor’s Name Insert Date Here (Day, Month, Year) Table of Contents: 1 Fire in a Channel Tunnel……………………………………….3-4 a. Cause of Fire…………………………………………………………5 2. Consequences and Lessons Learned a. Consequences of Fire………………………………………….5-8 b. Lessons Learned……………………………………………….8-9 3. If Fire strike cave in Preston………………………………….10-11 4. Conclusion……………………………………………………11-12 5. Reference List………………………………………………....13 Fire in A Channel Tunnel: It was 18th November 1996 when train laden with heavy good vehicles just made its way through the Channel Tunnel connected under the sea between France and England, suddenly caught fire. Considered to be eighth wonder of the world and a commendable engineering feat proved that no conventional designing and engineering moulds and safety measures could prevent eventuality and incident like that of a fire. The tunnel connected Pas de Calais, France with Folkestone, England whose design and construction was the coordinated efforts of whole Europe and United States. Before it started its operations on May 19, 1994, testing was done to ensure its safety including fire testing, but it turned out to be completely futile when the devastating fire hit the train damaging not only train but maximum part of the tunnel too. Security guards had spotted the fire even before the train was going to take on its journey but before the report could reach the driver, train had already entered the tunnel. Added to the problem was another train that was sent in when the fire was located. It proved to be a bad start. (Comeau & Wolf 1997: 60) Driver tried to take the train to the other side but the sudden fault forced the train to halt inside the tunnel. Soon fire exploded and flames spread everywhere but it took twenty minutes to save passengers and crew who were sent into the adjacent service tunnel. A locomotive, ten HGVs and approximately 1 km of tunnel infrastructure went into flames. This fire was the biggest ever challenge for the firemen who arrived on the scene from all over France, UK and Europe. Though they saved lives of passengers but were able to extinguish fire only after 14 hours. The French FLOR reached at the spot around 9:15 pm and took over the command, and rescued all the 34 passengers and crew and sent them towards the service tunnel. Fire spread over freight lorries towards rear of the train and within few minutes toxic smoke spread towards compartment containing 31 lorries. Temperature touched 1100 degrees C making wagons fused to the track. Passengers were caught in the thick smoke due to the impact of which many of them began to cough, choke and vomit, but the oxygen therapy provided by the French fireman reduced the severity of smoke inhalation problems. Many of them sustained minor injuries but were cured soon. Pressurized service tunnel served as a boon for the passengers as it saved their lives and also prevented heavy causalities. No firefighter suffered any injury despite of working in extremely hot and wet weather condition and having concrete continuously falling from above on them. Eight people suffered from smoke inhalation and had to be shifted from the service tunnel in ambulance especially used for Channel rescuers. Seriously injured passengers among whom were one driver, a pregnant woman and a driver were taken to the hospital by helicopter. Rest of the passengers was transported to Folkestone onboard. Cause of Fire No one came to know the real cause of fire but it was suspected that someone deliberately set the heavy goods vehicle on board, one of the shuttle wagons on fire much before train entered the tunnel. Experts had an uttered belief that fire was surely not caused by any mechanical or any system failure. (Kirkland 2002: Online) Safety experts and the Fire Brigade Union placed blame on design of the wagons carrying lorries for the fire. As compared to the trains that carry cars and small freight lorries, this train have semi-open wagons and no fire door between every four vehicles. Much before the accident took place, safety officials were skeptical about the risk and had warned about the impending fire, but Eurotunnel ignored their warning. In fact, fire union officials had also criticized car trains notifying the fact that this train could also catch fire due to the electric faults that could occur in the cars but if passengers travel separately, it could cause less danger but would increase their travel time. Consequences and Lessons Learned. Consequences of Fire Of the 50m of tunnel, only 0.4m thick tunnel lining got reduced to a minimum depth of 0.17m with the thinnest area being 0.02m. Investigations revealed the destruction of the concrete at a distance of more than 240m that extended 70m towards Britain and 170m towards France decreasing the depth of the linings towards 0.2 to 0.35m. Fire also destroyed many services including HV, LV cables, communication, lightening systems, traction and junction boxes at a length of 800m. Experts estimated replacement of 500m of track, 800m of catenary, 800m of refrigeration pipe and signaling equipment having a length of 1500m. The major damage also occurred at the rear rake with eleven wagons and the rear locomotive got easily scrapped. Five pressure relief ducts with new doors and dampers were again refitted. The damage was done towards rear half with the front locomotive, amenity coach and front rake getting suffered from minor damage from heat and smoke and could be again used after cleaning and minor repairs. Eight trucks were also engulfed in the flames with the damage to the rear loader and locomotive. The tunnel was also damaged with the fire heat dislodging the concrete liner. Many of the engineering management system too were failed and engineers were also not able to completely monitor status of the cross passage doors to see how many of them were opened and how many of them were closed. Further investigations highlighted the fact that there were many system and procedural failures, which no body had ever anticipated. The most crucial lesson that was learned from this incident was the necessity of ventilation. It was felt that a plan to keep control of the ventilation should have been established and implemented at the quickest to reduce the incidence of fire. After the incident, ventilation system was incorporated to provide protection to the firefighters. Secondly rescue team and fire fighters also felt the need for strong communication systems, with the responders trying their level best to cooperate and coordinate the efforts by the latest communication systems. They had radio system, which had only five channels among which none was capable to send signals to fire ground operations. Further communication system also posed difficulty between the two command centers at both ends of the tunnel. Requisite quantity of water was also felt while fighting with the fire. While crews were able to stand in the fire area only for 8 to 10 minutes, more people were also felt required and provision was made to bring in more people on shuttles in the north running tunnel. After the incident, tunnel was closed for 15 days, while the passenger traffic on Eurostar trains began to operate on 4th December and again on 6th December, 1997, the Channel Tunnel Safety Authority gave authorization for the shuttling of buses, meanwhile ferries were being used as a substitute means of transport. The damage caused e expenditure of more than £200M to again reinstate the tunnel, (Flynn 2008: Online) naturally, the Eurotunnel had to bear maximum damage financially and now it had to negotiate with the banks for its 8.8 billion debt and estimated to be the second largest corporate loss ever in the United Kingdom according to the reports made by the Financial Times. (Clifford 1996: Online) The research fellow professor Gabriel Khoury, a leading expert on the concrete and safety of the tunnel said that he had written to Eurotunnel even before the fire engulfed the tunnel on the lining’s fire resistance process. He said that, “High strength concrete is usually of the order of C50/60 and is highly impermeable to corrosive agents. The concrete used in the Channel Tunnel was well in excess of C50/60. The concrete however was not designed to withstand intense heat loads and not be explosive.”(Flynn 2008: Online) Explaining further he said that strong concrete is vulnerable to spalling due to the intense heat if it is created by for e.g. hydrocarbon fires in tunnels that can reach to the extent of 1000 degrees C within a span of four minutes. In the tunnel also temperatures touched 1,100 degrees C with the fire burned for around seven hours causing structural damage to more than 500 m long tunnel. In this part, 50m of lining suffered severe spalling. He suggested that shortcomings in the Channel Tunnel lining’s concrete design could have been reduced by installation of the thermal barriers. These would have been acted as an extra layer of lining, which could have absorbed heat, and protected the precast concrete lining segments. (Flynn 2008: Online) Lessons Learned In February 1986, The Channel Tunnel Authority was set up by respective Governments under the Treaty of Canterbury with a main aim to provide advice and also necessary help to the Intergovernmental Commission on every issue related to safety of the Channel Tunnel Fixed Link. Soon after the incident, an enquiry was conducted by the Safety Authority to ascertain the exact cause of the incident and the events, completely investigate tunnel for its authenticity and security, fixed equipment and rolling stock, analyse the way incidents were handled and make recommendations but this inquiry did not ascertain the cause of the incident as it was being investigated by the French Judicial Inquiry. The report then came out with its recommendations, among which the most significant was withdrawing of the current “drive-through policy” which states that in case of any fire, the train should first try to escape from the tunnel so that fire could be controlled by the emergency sidings. Instead the company should adopt a new method adopting the policy of rectifying any possibility of failures of rolling stock or fixed equipment. Besides, Eurotunnel should conduct tests on all its coaches and locomotives, and rectify to ensure that the smoke may not spread. Further, company must ensure proper training of all their staff to increase their capabilities of meeting any emergency situations and hereby the training process of the Eurotunnel’s Rail Control Centre Operators’ also must be revised and improved. It should also make full review of the procedure being adopted by the Rail Control Centre with an aim to simplify the procedures and make them user-friendly and allotment of qualified personal and analysis of all the operations being carried out at the Rail Control Centre to make sure their efficacy and capability to effectively carry out their tasks. (Department Of The Environment, Transport And The Regions (National) 1997: Online) If fire strike cave in Preston? Let us examine case if fire strike cave in Preston. Preston is a small city of Lancashire situated at North West England along the northern banks the river Ribble. With a population of 131, 900, it is a very vibrant city. The city has a Miley tunnel that runs under the city center of Preston in Lancashire. It is very old tunnel with its history going back to 1836 with several modifications and extensions, but now the track of Longridge railway which passes through the Miley tunnel has become rusty and overgrown and the line which is passed enroute in Preston between the Blackpool road and Red Scar has now become a cycle and a footpath and it is planned to extend towards Grimsarhh. At Longridge, there is one portal towards a blocked off tunnel under the higher Road which leads towards Tootle Heights quarry, has been listed under the Grade II listed building but the station buildings located at Longridge and Ribbleton are still showing the signs of survival. It looks like a ghost tunnel with very few people would dare to enter it. This tunnel is also known as Maudland Bridge tunnel, with the two tunnels Deepdale one and Deepdale two now joined together by the reinforced concrete section. In the year 2003, the Preston City Link Canal Trust was formed having plans to open again the some parts of the Lancaster Canal towards new marina for them to be constructed at the former Maudland Bridge station. The plans were also on the anvil to open the Longridge line as far as Deepdale or Ribbleton with the line passing through viaduct over the new Marina. The stations and whole railway route have got rusted and in a very dilapidated condition but still it had withstood ravages of time. Fire can be caused in this whole tunnel and can damage the train if it passed through but these chances are very less and devastation would be of very minute degree as compared to the Channel tunnel between France and United Kingdom. The walls of the tunnel are made up of bricks and at several places its roof is made of iron rods, which has less chance to catch fire. Conclusion Development has made this world a better place to live in but slight human errors can cause extensive damage to not only life and property but also to the whole economy as well. It was nothing else then the human error that has caused damage to the tunnel considered to be the world’s eighth wonder. The tunnel was not only a great work of engineering but is a great economic beneficiary of not only one but two nations. Its devastation was the economic loss for both the nations. Though technologically advanced this Channel tunnel had more chances of getting caught with fire as compared to the dilapidated old Miley tunnel having fire resistant features. Modernization process is forcing companies and governments alike to adopt more to the most cost effective styles and designs but what they are ignoring are the fire resistance materials and structure that are more beneficial and more cost effective. It is very essential to adopt scientific approach for development and maintenance of tunnels giving more emphasis on security rather than cost factors. Reference List Bailey,C. Channel Tunnel Fire, France/UK. [Online] Available: http://www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/project/research/structures/strucfire/CaseStudy/HistoricFires/InfrastructuralFires/channelTunnel.htm [23 February 2009] Clifford, p. 1996. Profit Drive Causes Eurotunnel Disaster. [Online] Available: http://www.themilitant.com/1996/6046/6046_18.html [23 February 2009] Comeau, E. & Wolf, A. 1997. Fire in the Chunnel! NFPA Journal: 58-64. Department Of The Environment, Transport And The Regions (National). 1997. SAFETY AUTHORITY REPORT INTO CHANNEL TUNNEL FIRE PUBLISHED. [Online] Available: http://nds.coi.gov.uk/content/detail.asp?NewsAreaID=2&ReleaseID=4947 [23 February 2009] Flynn, S. 2008. Channel Tunnel concrete lining fire protection flawed, say experts. [Online] Available: http://www.nce.co.uk/news/transport/2008/09/channel_tunnel_concrete_lining_fire_protection_flawed_say_experts.html [23 February 2009] Kirkland, C.J. 2002. The fire in the Channel Tunnel. Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology, 17: 129-132. [Online] Available: http://www.ita-aites.org/cms/fileadmin/filemounts/ovion/doc/safety/sydney/OS12.PDF [23 February 2009 Kirkland, C. 1995. Engineering the Channel Tunnel. Chapman & Hall. Read More