Recommendations on Air Safety - Essay Example

Recommendations On Air Safety Table of Content 0 Introduction 02 2.0 Executive Summary 02 3.0 Case ValuJet Flight 592 03 4.0 Case 2 Alaska Airline Flight 261 06 5.0 Recommendations 10 6.0 Conclusion 13 7.0 Appendix 13 1.0 Introduction Running an airline involves a lot of skill and imagination. Having said this, there is no doubt that the success of this high-fly business involves huge financial implications. Not all those who ventured into aviation have been successful. Any business startup requires strong financial backup, smart business acumen, and focus. Similarly, an airline startup requires sufficient capital, an eye for details, and focus. Many companies have had to bear the ignominy of an unceremonious closure to resource crunch. The success of an airline depends on is support staff and its aircrafts. Unless there is sufficient well-trained cabin and maintenance crew able to an airline, the risk of flying an aircraft is all the too high. New aircrafts too add to profits and reliability. All these cost money. Overworked staff has led to substandard work and at times grievous accidents. There is a need to take a closer look to evaluate the causes for such accidents. Human error can be attributed as the main cause for accidents. However, to substantiate the view that human error and mechanics lead to such catastrophes, this paper takes an in-depth look at two mishaps that occurred in the late 90s.We first take a look at the crash of a DC-9 ValuJet, flight 592 on May 11, 1996, with 110 passengers on board, and then a detailed investigation into the McDonnell Douglas MD-83 Alaska Airlines Flight 261 on January 31, 2000 carrying 83 passengers. In both these accidents there were no survivors. 2.0 Executive Summary This paper will involve a NTSB case study involving Alaska Airlines flight 281 that crashed off the California coast, in the 1990's and touch upon another accident that took place earlier in 1996. The idea of projecting these two cases is to focus on how and what led to the demise of these aircrafts and what can be done to overcome such occurrences in future. All this with an emphasis on the financial implications on such airlines will be studied. What are the possible courses of action for maintenance of existing aircrafts, smooth and efficient functioning of ground staff, and better and safer aircrafts These are prime reasons behind the success and failure of airliners around the world. No airlines can afford to risk of flying an aircraft not airworthy. How then can they manage their existing infrastructure to compete and growth in such volatile atmosphere Can an airline with just a handful of outdated and over flown aircrafts be able to make an impression in the industry Irrespective of these, no company can run efficiently without considering the cost v/s benefit factor. ValuJet is one such case wherein they were able to sustain operations despite competition. However, they paid the price for poor maintenance and overworked staff. As the Chief Executive Officer of FlyAir, I need to consider the implications of the NTSB report on air safety and evolve a plan to correct any such mistake taking place in my airlines. 3.0 Case 1 ValuJet Flight 592 A DC-9 belonging to ValuJet, flight 592 with 110 passengers on board crashed into the Everglades on May 11, 1996, killing all on board instantaneously. ValuJet was created in 1993 with just two aircrafts. Gradually they expanded their strength to add three different series of aircraft: the MD-80, the DC9-30 and the DC9-20. The airline has flights from Atlanta to Florida. When ValuJet began operations, many analysts felt that they would not be able to compete with the other major players in that sector. However, the airline bosses were able to convince themselves that they would not just compete with their rivals but also grab a portion of the dense market segment. The success for ValuJet came from low operation costs, and second hand aircrafts. They were buoyant by their unique ticketing system, no meals, and complete economy class flights. Their employees were also allowed a leisure dress code. The fairy tale ended when on May 11, 1996, a ValuJet flight, a DC-9, with a full complement of 110 people plummeted to the ground killing all on board. ValuJet had been the most successful startup company to date in the airline history. The focus shifted to five areas where the airlines may have bungled contributing to the accident: Airworthiness of the aircraft Ground maintenance practices Overworked staff Safety aspects of the airlines Cargo (Marc Wilson, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, Safety Concerns of Startup Airlines, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, Page 38, ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww2-1wilson.pdf). There are a few pointers that directly hint at the cause of the accident: First, the airplane was bought as seconds. To avoid investments in millions on new aircrafts, many airlines choose to buy and upgrade older fleets. Although critical parts can be replaced, aging airplanes can still pose safety threats. Secondly, there was a history of the plane being grounded for technical reasons. ValuJet has been a cause of concern for FAA and NTSB since its inception in 1993 (Holman, 1996). After a record of mishaps, ValuJet had been under the screw of FAA, which conducted a seven-day safety investigation. The aircraft that crashed on that fateful day in May had a series of technical problems before that accident. It was 27 years old, too old to be in active service as a passenger airline (Marc Wilson, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, Safety Concerns of Startup Airlines, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, Page 41, ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww2-1wilson.pdf). The contracting, or outsourcing as it is commonly called of aircraft maintenance is another area of risk. Many startup airlines contract with other companies to handle complex maintenance works. There can always be an element of miscommunication between the contractor and the airlines, resulting in operational hazards that are irreparable. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are compromised in the name of huge maintenance bills. The more established airlines follow their own set of standard operating procedures (Marc Wilson, Safety Concerns of Startup Airlines, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, Page 40, ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww2-1wilson.pdf). Cargo carried on board a flight is also a cause for concern. The capacity of the airplane must be considered and so too should the kind of cargo. External contractors are oblivious of safety rules. They are only interested in their own goals, even if it means at high risk. Mislabeled 'OXY Canisters, Empty', these were loaded in boxes into the cargo hold of flight 592. They are considered hazardous items when carried as cargo. This cargo is suspected to be a cause as the crew reported smoke and fire in the cabin and cockpit before it crashed (Marc Wilson, Safety Concerns of Startup Airlines, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, Page 42, ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww2-1wilson.pdf). The crew and support staff comes next, though not necessarily in this order of merit. Many startup airlines operate with limited staff to curb overheads. This affects the performance of its staff as they are likely to work overtime. Also proper training and experience counts in handling emergencies. Contracted training for personnel is a cause for concern. Many startup airlines go in for contracted training to overcome cost escalation, whereas, most established airlines conduct their own training. 4.0 Case 2 Alaska Airlines Flight 261 Alaska Airlines Flight 261, a McDonnell Douglas MD-83 with 83 passengers and crew on board crashed about 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, off California, on January 31, 2000. This is an Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-02/01. Washington, DC. Abstract This report discusses the safety issues that are subjected to intense speculation at the time of an accident. These include lubrication and inspection of the jackscrew assembly, extension of lubrication and end play check intervals, jackscrew assembly overhaul procedures, the design and certification of the MD-80 horizontal stabilizer trim control system, Alaska Airline's maintenance program, and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) oversight of Alaska Airlines (NTSB report, Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS About 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, California, January 31, 2000, www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/AAR0201.pdf). The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the accident was a loss of the ill-fated airplane's pitch control. This could have been caused from an in-flight failure of a horizontal stabilizer trim system jackscrew assembly's acme nut threads from excessive wear due to insufficient lubrication by Alaska Airline ground maintenance team. Alaska Airlines and FAA were named as parties contributing to the demise of Alaska Airline's flight 261 over Anacapa Island in January 2000. The report indicated that FAA officials had approved of Alaska Airlines extended end play checks that could have caused the acme nut threads to wear out causing the malfunction of the horizontal stabilizer trim system. The report continued saying that another cause for the accident was the absence on the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 of a fail-safe mechanism to prevent the catastrophic effects of total acme nut thread loss (NTSB report, Executive Summary, Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS About 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, California, January 31, 2000, Page xii www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/AAR0201.pdf). The horizontal stabilizer's jackscrew assembly includes an acme screw and nut, both of which have two threads. After the accident, severely worn and sheared remnants of the acme nut threads were recovered wrapped around the acme screw. The condition of the recovered acme nut thread remnants indicated that approximately 90 percent of the thread thickness had worn away before the remainder of the threads sheared off .212 In comparison, a jackscrew assembly with the maximum amount of wear permitted in service, as indicated by an end play measurement of 0.040 inch (that is, 0.030 to 0.037 inch of wear), would only have about 22 percent of the thread thickness worn away.213 (NTSB report, Cause of the Jam, Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS About 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, California, January 31, 2000, Page 129 www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/AAR0201.pdf). Of the 46 findings by the NTSB in its conclusion in the report, the following points to inefficiency and dereliction of duty by the staff of Alaska Airlines, and abetted by FAA to the extent of compromising on critical maintenance procedures. They are as follows: 1. The flight crew's decision to divert the flight to Los Angeles International Airport rather than continue to San Francisco International Airport, as originally planned was prudent and appropriate. However, Alaska Airlines dispatch personnel appear to have attempted to influence the flight crew to continue to San Francisco instead of diverting to Los Angeles International Airport. 2. The flight crew's use of the autopilot while the horizontal stabilizer was jammed was not appropriate. This was inappropriate and could have played a part in the crash. 3. Alaska Airlines extension of its lubrication interval for its McDonnell Douglas MD-80 horizontal stabilizer components and the FAA approval of these extensions increased the likelihood that a missed or inadequate lubrication would result in excessive wear of jackscrew assembly acme nut threads and, therefore, was a direct cause of the excessive wear and contributed to the Alaska Airlines flight 261 accident. 4 Alaska Airlines end play check interval extension should have been, but was not supported by adequate technical data to demonstrate that the extension would not present a potential hazard. 5 Until August 2000, Alaska Airlines used a fabricated restraining fixture that did not meet Boeing specifications. 6 At the time of the flight 261 accident, the Alaska Airlines maintenance program had widespread systemic deficiencies. The above report and statistics pointed to a blatant violation of safety rules and regulations by Alaska Airlines. The accident could have been averted had the airlines followed the safety standards. The finding also pointed to the inefficiency of its support staff to make prudent and effective decisions in emergencies. Lack of training and technical, systemic deficiencies were found to be widespread among the airline staff. This was compounded by the fact that FAA officials had also abetted the airline staff from conducting frequent lubrications, resulting in jamming of the horizontal stabilizer trim system (NTSB report, Conclusions, Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS About 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, California, January 31, 2000, Page 178-180, www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/AAR0201.pdf). 5.0 Recommendations The loss of precious life is irreparable. The accidents cited above are definitely attributed to human error. In my opinion as the CEO of FlyAir, irrespective of the financial implications to run my airline, I would recommend adding more amenities that fulfill human safety and comfort as a prerogative. It is imperative that all staffs, whether on ground or in air are given the best of training. Such training will enhance decision making maneuvers at critical moments, thereby allowing the plane to react to commands. Ground maintenance staff must be trained to attend to deficiencies and error that can occur from frequent flying. Airplanes on ground are liabilities and this makes most startup airlines to keep them in the air. Constant overhauling is required to keep the life and mechanics of the aircraft in good conditions. The life of a passenger airline is between 22 -24 years. A new plane costs almost $35,000,000. A second hand airplane comes cheap at $2,000,000. However, this plane would have run the full distance of its life by the time it came up for sale and would need to be retrofitted to get clearance and become airworthiness. Frequent repairs and changes to parts will only add to the operational cost. Besides, once these planes are grounded for repairs, they eat into finances (Marc Wilson, Discussion, Safety Concerns of Startup Airlines, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, Page 39, ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww2-1wilson.pdf). . It is important to ensure that maintenance facilities authorized to overhaul these assemblies possess the proper qualifications, equipment, and documentation. As seen in the case of Alaska Airlines, maintenance should be entrusted to well qualified and authorized personnel. It is advisable to have a well-trained and full-fledged overhauling plant of your own. In the long run, they will serve the company better than short-term arrangements with outsourcing. Training of the crew is paramount to the success of an airline. It is they who ultimately decide the fate of the airline. Sufficient rest and training should be imparted. Some airlines keep their airplanes in the air for long period of time, ignoring basic needs of their crew. This can have catastrophic repercussions on operations. There is the need to give every crew member sufficient rest for enhanced performance. It is these people on whom thousands of others depend. Finally, considering the financial implications on an old and outgrown airplane and a new aircraft, the figures are quite explicit. Though the initial investment shows unrealistic comparisons, the fact that these planes can serve an airline for many years without repair and grounding is an asset to the company. The second-hand aircrafts would have flown for most part of its life and would be near the completion of its service. They are cheap and will fly for a few years without repairs. However, they are at risk at all times. They will be frequently grounded for annual and quarterly overhauls and will eat into profits by way of spares. Accidents are also not ruled out as immediate possibility. In this context, the image and reputation of the company takes a beating and business will come to a near standstill. This is perhaps the worst that a company can see. Proper maintenance will only help keep the aging fleet in shape, but this too needs a lot of money. Overall, despite the high initial investment, an airline that buys new airplanes, trains their crew and support staff efficiently, and creates a service hanger of their own, will be most profited. This can be done by analyzing the cash flow for hours flown by each aircraft over a period of time, the time lost for repairs and modifications, and fuel efficiency. Well trained staff will only add to this efficiency thereby creating a niche for itself in aviation circles. . 6.0 Conclusion It is quite tragic to see human error leading to loss of innocent life. The accidents recorded above were a case of human error. These problems could have been overcome had there been more involvement of the support staff. Lack of training and equipment led to outsourcing of contracts. Miscommunication, lack of coordination, and outsourcing of maintenance had led to disasters of Alaska Airlines and ValuJet. Many startup companies buy burnt-out airplanes at throw away prices. They do so at the expense of human life. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are compromised in the name of huge maintenance bills. It is advisable to introduce new airplanes for longer operational benefits. They are more fuel-efficient, less prone to maintenance, and are long lasting, serving for years without grounding. 7.0 Appendix Marc Wilson, University of Maryland Eastern Shore, Safety Concerns of Startup Airlines, Journal of Air Transportation Worldwide, Vol.2, No.1, 1997, Page 38, ntl.bts.gov/data/letter_am/jatww2-1wilson.pdf NTSB report, Loss of Control and Impact with Pacific Ocean Alaska Airlines Flight 261, McDonnell Douglas MD-83, N963AS About 2.7 Miles North of Anacapa Island, California, January 31, 2000, www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2002/AAR0201.pdf Read More