Implementing Flight Operational Quality Assurance and Flight Data Monitoring Plans - Research Paper Example

The Implementation of Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) Plans and the Challenge of Effective Integration Course: Lecturer: Date: Contents Contents 2 Introduction 3 Definition and description of selected systems 3 Current safety status and philosophy on dealing with the systems 4 How the principles of system safety engineering apply to the system 5 Recommendations of how the systems could be improved 8 Comparison of the selected programs to other programs where system safety is applied 10 Conclusion 11 References 12 Introduction According to the U.S. International Air Travel Statistics (I-92 data) Program, in the last three decades, air travel has become the most preferred means of transportation taking place across different countries (Beck, Dellinger, & Oneil, 2007). This phenomenon can be attributed to several factors, including the high level of expansion in air transport facilities around the world. Enders (2008) saw the data with the number of air travels to increase in the future but feared that such issues as safety with air travels could negatively affect the rate of expected growth in international and local air travels. It is for this reason that such bodies as the International Civil Aviation Authority (ICAO) continue to enforce international policies that seek to minimise the number of air travel incidences and accidents. In its 2014 safety report, the ICAO recorded decrease in the number of accidents per one million departure from 3.2 in 2012 to 2.8 in 2013 (ICAO, 2014). This was against 2011 and 2010 rates of 4.2 each. This statistics shows that a lot of progress is being achieved in aviation safety. This research paper therefore seeks to investigate ways in which the implementation of two major flight safety systems namely the flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) and flight data monitoring (FDM) can aid in improving the safety status in air travel. This is done along the need to understanding the challenges that come with the effective integration of these and other flight safety systems. Definition and description of selected systems The FOQA and FDM systems are often thought of as being the same type of system and representing the same outcome. Klein and Militello (2011) however explained that even though these two may be very similar and used interchangeably, they are not the same and do not represent the same outcome. FDM can be said to be the parent safety system introduced by the Flight Safety Foundation and approved by the ICAO for practice for processing recorded data from routine flights. The overall aim of such processing of recorded data is to ensure that there is effective operational risk assessment for all aircrafts that are over 27 tonnes (Diehl, 2013). Out of the FDM, the FOQA was born very specifically by the US Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) which exempted itself from the ICAO’s mandatory requirement on January 1, 2005 for National Aviation Authorities (NAA) through the FDM (UK Health and Safety Executive, 2011). As a flight safety system, the FOQA acts as a voluntary program or guideline for capturing, analysing and visualising all forms of data generated by an aircraft in motion (Wasson, 2006). A major reason that FOQA and FDM systems have been considered synonymous particularly in the US is because as a member of the ICAO, international flights from the USA require compliance with FDM system to be implemented to gain access to international airports. It is therefore common to find aircrafts using the two systems simultaneously (Beck, Dellinger, & Oneil, 2007). Current safety status and philosophy on dealing with the systems There are different safety statuses and philosophies guiding the use and implementation of both the FDM and FOQA. As far as the FDM is concerned, the core philosophy on dealing with the system is to ensure that there is a universal safety consciousness among flight operators. For this reason, all airlines are expected to implement FDM programs under the ICAO Annex 6 mandate (Callantine & Crane, 2000). The philosophy behind the use of the FDM is regarded as a consciousness rather than action or practice based because even though NAAs are mandated by the ICAO to ensure that effective procedures are in place for the FDM system usage, the NAAs are not required to investigate specific events (Ericson, 2005). This means that the core philosophy for the FDM is to create and enforce flight awareness among aircraft operators. Verriére (2000) however opined that the consciousness created is an indirect means of enforcing the practical application of safety standards among the aircraft operators. In essence, even though specific events are not investigated by the NAAs under the FDM, the fact that effective procedures are monitored ensures that all possible factors that could lead to such specific adverse events that require investigations are detected by operators and done away with. But even if such specific events take place, the effective procedures required under the FDM system directs aircrafts on how and what to do deal with such events (Diehl, 2013). The FOQA functions on a relatively different philosophy as it cannot be regarded as being universal in nature. In the first place, the FOQA is not universal because its usage and implementation does not bind NAAs but the FAA alone. Secondly, the application of FOQA is such that it is not required for commercial operators even in the US, meaning that there is a highly restricted approach to the implementation of the FOQA. Billings (2007) explained that the current safety status of the FOQA can be considered as particularly subjective rather than objective. In the use of this system, much emphasis is placed on data that is generated by the pilot as the pilot goes about the movement of controls. By this means, what ought to be recorded and forwarded to higher authorities for action becomes highly subjected to the pilot’s discretion. Regardless of this, it will be appreciated that there are some new aircrafts that are beginning to appreciate and adopt the use of mechanically induced data recordings which are generated by systems in the aircrafts (UK Health and Safety Executive, 2011). This latter approach gives a better and more objective safety status to the aircrafts which can be used in effective decision making and for the promotion of aviation safety. How the principles of system safety engineering apply to the system Unlike traditional safety strategies where the emphasis on safety is on control of condition and causes of accident based scenarios, system safety emphasises on three major principles of practice, which are the identification of hazards, analysis of hazards and application of remedial control through the use of system-based approach (Ericson, 2005). This means that system safety seeks to minimise the reliance on probabilistic risk analysis by ensuring that there is a more tangible and evidence-based approach to safety. It is for this reason that system safety has been explained as a specialty within system engineering which combines the application of engineering and management principles to ensure the highly outcome with risk management. The two systems under discussion in this paper which are FDM and FOQA all have different ways in which they utilise and fulfil the three core principles and motifs for operating system safety. As system safety engineering is universally accepted as an approach for optimising safety through the use of system-based approaches, it is expected that any aviation safety system used in any part of the world will seek to align its police usage with the principles of system safety engineering. The reason for this assertion is that aviation safety practices comprise the use of scientific, technical and managerial skills to hazards which form the basis for system-based approach (Diehl, 2013). The first motif for system safety is the identification of hazards. This motif can be directly linked to the planning principles of system safety, which advocates that safety is planned through the use of integrated and comprehensive engineering efforts (Kossiakoff & Sweet, 2003). When planning for safety as a means of identifying hazards, there are two major issues that a typical system would consider. These are individual events and repeated events. Enders (2008) described the identification of repeated events as being easier with most safety systems because these systems monitor a statistically meaningful sample of flights. But because individual events such as aircraft stall are not predictable, much monitoring is required to detect their occurrence. Meanwhile, it is with the detection of individual and repeated events that some of the major differences between FDM and FOQA can be pointed to. For example in FOQA system, analysts use statistical trend information as the major source of information for the monitoring of flights for detailed understanding possible individual and repeated events (Flight Data Services, 2014). In the FDM system, similar statistical analyses are used. However, the major source of hazard identification based decision is from all flights even before any statistical summaries are rolled (Beck, Dellinger, & Oneil, 2007). This means that the FDM can be said to be generally comprehensive in its identification of hazards as the approach is more collective among all flights. The second motif for engaging in safety system is for the analysis of hazards. To effectively do this, the hazard analysis principle is expected to be seen and practiced in any given aviation safety system. To perform hazard analysis, it is strongly recommended that both hazard severity and likelihood of occurrence of hazard will be characterised (Smith, Furse & Gunther, 2005). Likewise, these two form the core elements of risk. In order to effectively characterise the elements of risk, Verriére (2000) noted that it is important to quantify historical data for particular hazards. From this perspective, it can be said that both systems under study rightly gives the guaranteed assurance of adequately being used for the analysis of hazard. This is due to the fact that both FDM and FOQA rely on statistical analysis which makes it possible for analysts to have access to quantify historical data for decision making. Having said this, the weakness with some forms of FOQA will be highlighted. It has already been stated that for some aircrafts, data is mainly pilot generated, meaning that if the pilot does not have a means of programming all historical events, the quantification of historical data will be negatively affected. Therefore, such historical data may either not be available or accurate. The final motif behind safety system is the application of remedial control, which basically involves the act of interventions either with the goal of minimising the impact of unavoidable risk or correcting the existence of an avoidable risk (Callantine & Crane, 2000). From this perspective, it can be said that both systems have major weakness for the application of remedial control. Alternatively, the systems fail to incorporate the task of applying any remedial controls. Rather, both systems focus on the analysis of data for decision making. By themselves therefore, the systems cannot generate any remedial controls or recommend any (Kossiakoff & Sweet, 2003). Having said this, the implicative nature of the systems can be appreciated. Principally, the systems function with the basis of behavioural approach where human interactions are incorporated to making them fully operational (Wasson, 2006). As a result of this, it is always expected that once the data analysis functions have been performed with the use of statistical trends, analysts will take over with the recommendation for any remedial control. After the recommendation for remedial control has been made, policy implementing stakeholders will then be expected to apply the remedial controls. Following these lengthy procedures, it would be admitted that the process of application of remedial control in both systems is extremely slow. Recommendations of how the systems could be improved Even though the current philosophies used in operating the two systems seek to protect passenger safety and enhance overall aviation safety, there are a number of ways in which the systems could be improved to make their purposes more revealing. One important recommendation that will be made with regards to the use of the two systems has to do with the need to ensuring effective integration of safety improvement initiatives into the FDM and FOQA. The reason for this recommendation is that safety improvement initiatives are generally regarded as third party aviation safety partners who are trusted the world over for their neutral positions on safety issues within the aviation industry (Verriére, 2000). For the goal of quality assurance to be successful, Billings (2007) noted that the role of third part quality assurance teams is very crucial. Hence, these third party quality assurance groups are often seen as having no direct interest with the outcomes of safety programmes. Because of this, they are able to deliver neutral and non-influenced judgments on the actual effectiveness of the systems. Already, safety improvement initiatives have worked with regulators, manufacturers, operators, and other stakeholders in the aviation industry. However, both the ICAO and FAA have failed to explicitly define the role that these safety partners have to play in the utilisation of the FMD and FOQA respectively. Because of this, credibility and objectivity with the systems have been often questioned (Kossiakoff & Sweet, 2003). Another important recommendation on how the systems can be improved is the need to be more proactive with the enforcement of safety standards. The Flight Data Services (2014) noted that the FDM system has an average flight monitoring and coverage level of 95% with the FOQA system recognising 100% coverage as desirable. This notwithstanding, there are instances where monitoring and coverage levels as low as 10% has been considered desirable under the FOQA (Flight Data Services, 2014). With such low levels of monitoring and coverage, the FAA certainly sends a very negative message to flight operators on the extent of liberty they have with the enactment and enforcement of FOQA programmes. As it has already been stated in the paper, both the FDM and FOQA have components of human interactions as they are behavioural in nature. Because of this, it is expected that there will be an external stimuli that attracts stakeholders to doing what is expected of them. One of the ways to attain this is through the recommendation to make enforcement a major issue. Until now, if the earlier motifs of system safety which are hazard identification and hazard analysis which can automatically be undertaken by the systems are not enforced, chances are that the latter parts of the system safety principle which is application of remedial control will be totally abandoned. Meanwhile, under system engineering, it is expected that there will be integration of all parts of the system life cycle to ensure effective outcomes (UK Health and Safety Executive, 2011). Comparison of the selected programs to other programs where system safety is applied Given the impact role that safety plays in aviation transportation, there continues to be new and emerging programs and systems which are all utilised with the goal of promoting safety. Other older programs and systems have continued to be evolved as a means of finding the most comprehensive approach to securing flight safety (Klein & Militello, 2011). One such program that has been used in addition to the FDM and FOQA is HAZOP, which stands for hazard and operability study. Like the other systems under review, the HAZOP also combines engineering and management principles, making is align perfectly with system safety (Enders, 2008). There are however differences in the philosophy and approach to using the HAZOP, which makes it worthwhile to integrate it with the FDM and FOQA. In the first place, functions based on the structured and systematic examination of planned and ongoing processes (Callantine & Crane, 2000). Due to the use of systematic examination of processes, the use of HAZOP is generally inductive in nature, meaning that experts using this system appreciate any collected form of data as a potential solution to achieving safety. As a result of this, a relatively equal level of attention is given to all data sources without undermining the potential of quality checks. Again, there is a very strong emphasis on the use experienced multi-disciplinary team known as the HAZOP team when using this program. Meanwhile, it has been recommended for both FDM and FOQA on the need to make it based on safety improvement initiatives. With the HAZOP, room is automatically created for such third party stakeholders because the team is always expected to be multi-disciplinary in nature (Billings, 2007). Conclusion There are several factors and conditions that have influenced the rate of increase in cross-border trips and journeys that are undertaken by people. Core among these factors and conditions include the expanding global business marketplace through globalisation, promotion of international cultural tourism, and increases in the number of international educational programmes (Smith, Furse, & Gunther, 2005). As people travel from one point to the other, especially through international journeys, it is important that the means of travel be given very critical attention. The paper has established that in order for the preference for air travel to be maintained for these cross-border journeys, it is important that the level of safety within the industry be improved. Based on the core findings from the paper, it can be concluded that an integrated flight safety system will be the best solution and answer to critical questions on flight safety. Furthermore, almost all forms of safety systems have their merits and challenges with implementation. By integrating the systems therefore, it is possible to focus and highlight on the strengths of each system, whiles complementing on the challenges of the systems with merits that the other provides. But even as the integrated systems are used, policy regulation must be taken very seriously to ensure that operators comply with standardised and recommended practices. References Beck, L. F., Dellinger, A. M., & Oneil, M. E. (2007). Motor vehicle crash injury rates by mode of travel, United States: Using exposure-based methods to quantify differences. American Journal of Epidemiology, 166(2), 212-218. Billings, C. (2007). Human-centered aviation automation. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Callantine, T., & Crane, B. (2000). Visualization of pilot-automation interaction, In K. Abbot, J. Speyer, and G. Boy, (Eds.), HCI-Aero 2000 International Conference on Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics. Toulouse: EURISCO, 87-92. Diehl, A. (2013). Air safety investigators: Using science to save lives-one crash at a time. New York: Xlibris Corporation. Enders, J. (2008). 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