Multilateral Diplomacy: Its Greatest Success - Essay Example

Multilateral Diplomacy: Its Greatest Success The success of multilateral diplomacy requires a modicum of international cooperation and a commitment of willing states to take cooperative action. International cooperation, however, comes with many pitfalls and dilemmas. In an international system which many believe to be anarchical, it remains increasingly difficult for nation-states to envisage cooperative ventures. Indeed, survival being the prime motive of states, the distribution of gains from cooperation and the fear of becoming dependent on such cooperation drives states away from collaborative endeavors and structures (Waltz 1979: 106). However, since the 1970s, a school of thought (most commonly) known as neoliberal institutionalism has challenged this neorealist cynicism. The institutionalists perceive three principal challenges to international cooperation in conventional wisdom: the importance of states as the wielders of power in international politics, the structural constraints posed by anarchy in the international system and the unharmonious nature of cooperation in world politics (Keohane 1988: 87-89). Their response maintains that states are rational actors which persist in maximizing their potential (absolute) gains in the competitive anarchical environment through the vehicle of international cooperation (Lamy 2001: 213-214). Thus, we find that the possibility of success in multilateral diplomacy is backed by a strong theoretical tradition in international relations. This becomes important given that, for all intent and purposes, the United Nations (henceforth, UN) – the highest body for international cooperation – remained hostage to superpower politics throughout the Cold War (Ryan 2000: 30-50). Many believe, thus, that the greatest successes of multilateral diplomacy have come in the post-Cold War era, especially with the renewed vigor showed by the UN in peacekeeping operations. Indeed, in spite of failures in Rwanda and Cyprus, there were also a number of triumphs like in Bosnia and East Timor (Doyle & Sambanis 2006: 197-256). However, it is the opinion of this essay that the greatest success for multilateral diplomacy came not after 1991, but during the Cold War itself: it was the establishment of the nuclear non-proliferation regime which has been the most resounding triumph of international cooperation till date. The genesis of the call for nuclear non-proliferation goes back to the 1950s, with two distinct sources – firstly, the Republic of Ireland and secondly, the Non-aligned Movement – arguing for the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament. In fact, proposals for the control of nuclear energy at the UN had already seen the establishment of the UN Atomic Energy Commission in 1946. However, there remained severe differences of opinion between the United States (henceforth, US) and the Soviet Union (henceforth, USSR) over the US-proposed Baruch Plan aimed at facilitating the Energy Commissions activities. The suggestion was never implemented and, in 1949, the Soviets attained nuclear parity with the US, signaling the beginning of the Cold War and the era of nuclear deterrence. After a considerable debate between the superpowers, where the rhetoric went back and forth, the International Atomic Energy Association (henceforth, IAEA) was formed in 1957. It was unable, though, to curb the increase in the number of nuclear weapons deployed by the nuclear powers – which now included Great Britain – and led to the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community (henceforth, EURATOM) via which the US supplied nuclear fuel and materials to Western Europe. The early 1950s also saw activism on the part of the US to cut off trade in and transfers of fissile material between countries, and this remained an integral part of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” address to the UN General Assembly (1953). The idea was to restrict a massive nuclear buildup by the USSR, with the eventual plan to halt the production of all fissile materials, in order to limit the effects of the nuclear arms race in which the two superpowers were embroiled. By the late 1950s, this direction of US policy found stiff opposition in Soviet quarters, though the safeguards systems of both the IAEA and EURATOM had developed appreciably. In fact, by the early 1960s, the IAEA was overlooking the US’ bilateral transfers of nuclear technology to other states. At this point, a consideration of the political climate of the then contemporary world becomes prudent. By 1964, there were five nuclear weapon states (henceforth, NWS), comprising of Great Britain, France, and the People’s Republic of China, apart from the two superpowers. The spread of nuclear weapons, thus, made the conduct of international policy volatile for the great powers; in fact, by the 1960s, both the US and the USSR possessed enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times over (McNamara 1987: 154-55). Therefore, a consensus began to grow about reining in this unbridled nuclear buildup which otherwise threatened dire consequences for the world at large. Towards the end of the decade, however, there was a general thawing of relations between the two superpowers – generally known as détente – which paved the ground for a breakthrough in arresting nuclear proliferation. On the legal front, some progress had already been made. Firstly, the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 outlawed nuclear explosions on the Antarctic continent, delineating its use for only peaceful purposes. Secondly, the Partial (or Limited) Test Ban Treaty of 1963 prohibited nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. These were followed in 1967 by the Outer Space and the Seabed Arms Control Treaties. While the former prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons in the Earth’s orbit, on the moon, or any other “celestial body,” the latter proscribes the placement of nuclear weapons beyond 12 miles from the coastline. Thus, by the mid- to late-1960s, an international movement had already emerged to restrict the scope of nuclear weapons testing and deployment. In this changing political and legal climate, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (henceforth, NPT) was opened for signature in 1968. This Treaty forms the very platform of the contemporary non-proliferation regime, and is touted as one of the most successful treaties in the history of the United Nations. Till date, 187 Parties (i.e. nation-states) have signed the treaty, with the notable exceptions being India, Israel, and Pakistan; North Korea was a one-time signatory, but withdrew in 2003. The NPT was built on a tripartite framework of prevention, peaceful nuclear energy and disarmament. It was sought to prevent the creation of more NWS in Europe, to serve as the basis for a global nuclear energy industry, and to control the burgeoning arms race between the US and the USSR, leading to nuclear disarmament (Bellany 1985: 1-2). As part of the NPT’s provisions, a transfer of nuclear energy technology would follow from the NWS to the non-NWS signatories to the Treaty, on the promise that the latter forsake any ongoing or future plans of developing nuclear programs. While India understood this as the employment of a double standard – perhaps owing more to its precarious geopolitical situation at the time than anything else – the trade-off seemed suitable and practicable for an overwhelming number of Parties to the NPT. The NPT was followed by the establishment of other multilateral forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (henceforth, NSG) in 1974 and the Missile Technology Control Regime (henceforth, MTCR) in 1987, which took the initiative of tightening the existing non-proliferation framework. While the NSG seeks to control the export (and re-transfer) of non-weapons specific nuclear technology which could be diverted military purposes and weapons development – as shown by India’s ‘peaceful nuclear explosions’ of 1974 – the MTCR remains a voluntary organization that specifically tries to prevent the proliferation of unmanned delivery systems. Moreover, the formation of several Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (henceforth, NWFZ) has contributed to the robustness of the non-proliferation regime. This expanded the notion of prohibition of nuclear arms development and deployment over specified geographical areas. The NWFZ include Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967), the South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985), the Association of South-East Asian Nations bloc (Bangkok Treaty, 1995), Africa (Pelindaba Treaty, 1996), Central Asia (NWFZ formed in 2006), and Mongolia, the only single-country NWFZ. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 187 was another feather in the cap of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, though it was a bilateral agreement between the US and the USSR. The treaty terminated a whole class of nuclear ballistic missiles of a specific category – ranging from 500 to 5,500 km. – and reinforced the bilateral agreements between the superpowers since 1972. The non-proliferation regime did (and indeed, still does) face its share of problems. For instance, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, proposed in 1994, failed to take off, following staunch opposition from India, and later the US Senate. Moreover, the emergence of India and Pakistan in 1998 as two new NWS – and in all probability, Israel as well – along with North Korea’s stubborn resistance have combined to pose a crisis of legitimacy for the regime (Behrens 2006: 12-16). The non-proliferation environment itself has undergone changes since the end of the Cold War and the decreasing importance of the nuclear threat. Now, the greatest threat to the non-proliferation regime comes in the form of transfers of nuclear materials and technology to non-state actors, and the menace of catastrophic terrorism. However, we must remember that “…the legal regime, however inflexible and outdated it may appear, offers an essential foundation for nuclear anti-proliferation policies: a normative and legal framework to legitimize national and international action against proliferators as well as provide incentives for non-proliferation” (Simpson 2004: 6). India has evolved as a responsible nuclear power, while Israel has maintained exemplary resilience even in a highly fragile environment. Till date, no terrorist organization has been known to acquire nuclear weapons. But, we must remember the circumstances in which the non-proliferation regime came into being, to understand the gravity of its success. At a time when the UN Security Council was literally rendered toothless by superpower rivalry, the US and the USSR were able to come together to address a problem which threatened the very existence of the world. For this reason, the nuclear non-proliferation regime remains the greatest success of multilateral diplomacy in the 20th century. List of References Behrens, C. E. (2006) CRS Issue Brief for Congress: Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service/Library of Congress. Bellany, I. (1985) The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. London: Frank Cass. Doyle, M. & Sambanis, N. (2006) Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Eisenhower, D. D. (1953) Atoms for Peace Address. Available from [2 October 2008] Keohane, R. O. (1988) ‘International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?’ Foreign Policy (110) 82-96. Lamy, S. (2001) ‘Contemporary Mainstream Approaches: Neo-realism and Neo-Liberalism.’ In The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Ed. by Baylis, J. & Smith, S. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 205-224. McNamara, R. S. (1987) Blundering into Disaster. London: Bloomsbury. Ryan, S. L. (2000) The United Nations and International Politics. New York: St. Martins Press. Simpson, J. (2004) ‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Back to the Future?’ Disarmament Forum, 1, 5-16. Waltz, K. N. (1979) The Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Read More