The Imposition of Multilateral Economic Sanctions - Case Study Example

The Purposes of Economic Sanctions The imposition of multilateral economic sanctions against a sovereign nation is considered by many to be an appropriate tool to be used by the international community, largely through the United Nations, to bring about change in a nation’s sovereign policies when those policies are deemed contrary to the norms and best interest of the international community (Kaempfer, W. H., and Lowenberg, A. D., 1992:1). The United Nations acts on its authority to impose multilateral sanctions – meaning that the sanctions are voted on within the international community through a vote in the United Nations, as opposed to unilateral sanctions imposed by a country independent of the United Nations authority – under Chapter VII of its UN Charter (Cortright, D., and Lopez, G. A., 1995:20). While the imposition of sanctions against a nation has long been held a peaceful solution to the problems presented to the international community by a sovereign nation, they are indeed a serious step taken by the greater international (or imposing country)and are a “coercive” tool, and one that is relied upon as a deterrent to the use of force, but nonetheless is considered, too, to be the last resort prior to a potential use of force should the economic sanctions fail to achieve the desired policy changes (Cortright and Lopez, 1995:17). Imposing Multilateral Economic Sanctions At the international level, economic sanctions were first utilized by the United Nations against Rhodesia in 1966, to cause the white ruled nation to recognize the rights of its black majority population, and to correct human rights violations (The Washington Times, 2002:A01). Later, under the same kinds of circumstances, in 1977, economic sanctions were imposed against South Africa by the United Nations (Cortright and Lopez, 1995:5). However, both of these instances were in the first 45 years of the United Nations, when 647 resolutions were raised within the United Nations calling for the imposition of economic sanctions in the first case of Rhodesia, and then South Africa (Conroy, R. W., Cortright, D., Gibson-Dashti, J., et al, 2000:1). The use of economic sanctions in both cases proved sufficient enough that the UN, beginning in 1990, increased its use of economic sanctions passing 620 resolutions calling for the use of economic sanctions (Conroy, Cortright, Gibson-Dashti, et al, 2000:1). “At the conclusion of the Gulf War in April, 1991, the Council,” referring to the UN Security Council, the body within the UN responsible for initiating economic sanctions, “approved Resolution 687, which maintained economic sanctions over as a stick over the Iraqi government to ensure its compliance with the eight major provisions of the cease fire resolution. Within two years of passing Resolution 687, the Council imposed partial or comprehensive sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Libya, Liberia, Somalia, Khmer-Rouge controlled areas of Cambodia, Haiti, and the National Union for the total Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) faction in Angola (Conroy, Cortright, Gibson-Dashti, et al, 2000:1).” Thusly, the increased use of economic sanctions in the past decade is evidence both of the effectiveness of the tool, and as an alternative to military action against the country upon which sanctions have been imposed. However, it is during the past decade, too, that imposition of economic sanctions has coincided with the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian missions to those same countries (Conroy, Cortright, Gibson-Dashti, et al, 2001:1). So there is a noticeable change in the attitude towards the use of economic sanctions. Whereas in the first 45 years of the UN’s existence the sanctions were imposed for human rights violations and to improve those conditions in two countries, Rhodesia and South Africa, whose apartheid policies neglected its majority population, economic sanctions have begun to be utilized by the United Nations as a means to bring about change in the sovereign policies of the nations against which they are imposed for reasons other than human rights violations. Most notably, “. . . to reverse territorial aggression, restore democratically elected leaders, promote human rights, deter and punish terrorism, and promote disarmament (Conroy, Cortright, Gibson-Dashti, et al, 2001:2).” “Secretary-General Kofi Anan noted in his Africa report of 1998 that ‘sanctions, as preventative or punitive measures, have the potential to encourage political dialogue, while the application of rigorous economic or political sanctions can diminish the capacity of the protagonists to sustain a prolonged fight ((Conroy, Cortright, Gibson-Dashti, et al, 2001:2).” Unilateral Economic Sanctions In a detailed report of the Secretary-General containing responses to United Nations Resolution 54/200 of December 22, 1999, 13 nations called for an end to the use of unilateral economic sanctions as a tool employed by the United States and other nations against the sovereign policies of developing nations (1999:2). However, it was Cuba’s response that focused almost entirely on the long-standing economic sanctions in place against that country by the United States since 1964. In its response to the UN Resolution 54/200, Cuba denounced the United States as using economic sanctions to gain political and economic control over sovereign nations. “To cite only one example,” the response reads, “in the period between 1993 and 1996, 61 laws and executive orders authorizing unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy and purposes were adopted by the United States Government. Thirty-five countries, comprising 2.3 billion persons, representing 42 percent of the world’s population were affected (1999:2-3).” Cuba’s response does not go into detail as to why the United States Government might pursue a course of economic sanctions in these instances, but makes general references as to the United States’ attempt to manipulate the policies of sovereign nations (1999:2-3). Cuba’s response does not address the sanctioned nation’s human rights or other national or US interest that might be threatened by the sovereign nation’s policies, only that the economic hardships endured by the people of those nations often contribute to increased deaths in the populations of the affected countries because those governments no longer have access to food, medical, and other resources that come directly from the United States or the other world markets that in a spirit of cooperation with the United States follow suit in adhering to the sanctions imposed by the United States against these sovereign nations. Nor does the response mention that “During détente in the 1980s, sanctions were relaxed, permitting Cuba to purchase goods from U.S. companies via third countries. In 1992, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, sanctions were tightened so that even U.S. produced medicines were effectively prohibited (Garfield, R., 2002:1).” The idea was that sanctions had worked to bring down Communism in Russia, and, thusly, should serve to cause Cuba to follow suit. Today, as Castro’s health is reported throughout the free world press as failing him, and the political future of the island just off the coast of Florida remains uncertain, it less likely that the United States will relax its economic sanctions against Cuba in an effort to ensure that Castro’s successor will a democratic government, brining about an end to Communist rule in Cuba. It would, of course, be a great success for the United States – any administration – if Cuba were to follow the same course as Russia, and put aside its Communist rule in favor of a democratically elected government. However, that time is yet to be realized, and in the interim Cuba has accused the United States of using economic sanctions as a form of terrorism against the island nation, and of genocide as a result of the loss of life in the ranks of the civilian population due to hunger, poor medical services, and lack of humanitarian services that would otherwise be accessible to the nation if sanctions were not in place (United Nations, 1999, p. 3-4). The Method Behind the Sanctions “Sanctions are characterized by the interruption of communications, diplomacy, and, or, economic relations (Losman, 1979). Economic sanctions have become an increasingly common tool since the end of the Cold War (Cortright, et al, 1998) (Garfield, R., 2002:1).” Recent programs have been structured around the use of economic sanctions at the multilateral level, as with the UN administered food-for-oil program, which gave Iraq access to certain humanitarian goods in 1995 in exchange for oil (Social Education, Vol 66:1). However, U.S. companies were precluded from participating in the program, though many of them found ways around the sanctions and did business with Iraq through other nations. The program, as it turns out, was poorly administered by the United Nations, and the result was documented events of corruption, and Iraq, in actuality, suffered very little under the economic sanctions because of the corruption associated with administering the program, and because companies found ways around the sanctions by going through other nations (Timmerman, 2004:1). Still, what this program and the subsequent corruption associated with it did was add a new dimension to the more commonly recognized three facets of use associated with the use of economic sanctions (Conroy, D., etal, 2000:1), and that new facet or dimension is special interest, or self-interest, by way of corruption associated with the use economic sanctions. At this point, where the sanctions have become the tool of self-interest through corruption, it is time to rethink the employment of sanctions as a tool, or to provide oversight that prevents such high level corruption (it involved high ranking heads of state and even the Secretary-General) (Timmerman, 2004:1). There have been allegations, too, in recent years that economic sanctions, as alleged by Cuba against the United States, is less a tool and more of a weapon, silent though deadly (Garfield, R., 2002:1). While the UN has, by way of Chapter VII, given itself the right to employ economic sanctions, there is debate over the fact that the sanctions impact not just a sitting sovereign government, but the civilian population of the nation against which the sanctions are imposed. Civilians have, since the beginning of time and “civil warfare,” been protected by rules of engagement and rules of conduct – although history has shown those rules to have often times been broken, neglected, or set aside; they were in place to create some measure of conscience and, presumably, social justice to which the civilian population could turn to in the face of violations (Garfield, R., 2002:1). There are no such rules of conduct or engagement when employing economic sanctions; indeed, those hit hardest by the employment of economic sanctions are the civilians (Garfield, R., 2002:1). The idea being that a sitting government will either not allow the body of its population to suffer the plethora of social and human maladies that arise out of economic sanctions; or, to the extent that a government (like Cuba) would endure that to happen, that the population would cease to tolerate the government and bring about change internally. Unfortunately, the latter has not been the end result, usually because of severe conditions that would keep the civilian population from achieving the resources in conjunction with good health to carry out such an effort. “Sanctions, if they came under the laws of warfare, would involve a careful process of selecting targets, taking precautions to avoid civilian deaths, and examining the relative strategic merits of a chosen approach relative to the probable civilian harm (Walzer, 1997). If sanctions came under the rules of war, sanctioning powers would have an enormous financial burden associated with the food and medicine they would have to purchase to meet their obligations and provide for captive enemy populations and their families. If sanctions came under the principle of distinction between military and civilian targets, many goods useful to the military but essential to civilians could not be sanctioned an the ‘silent deadly’ weapon would lose much of its bite (Garfield, R., 2002:1).” Proponents of multilateral economic sanctions argue that it’s an inexpensive way to bring rogue states into compliance with multilateral interests in the realm of humanitarian, political, armament and other dimensions in which the state would otherwise pose a threat to either its own population or neighboring countries. However, the social aspect of the sanctions are rendered moot in the face of documented public health issues arising out of those countries where sanctions have been in place for any significant periods of time, such as in Cuba, Iraq, Haiti and the Sudan (Garfield, R., 2002:1). Yet the use of sanctions meets with the support of people in other nations since it does not involve the use of military force or result in the loss of lives of soldiers who might otherwise be deployed to those rogue countries to quell the threat represented by those nations; as was the case of Iraq when it invaded Kuwait (Garfield, R., 2002: 1). For this reason, it can be presumed that people will opt for the continued use of economic sanctions, although will look for greater oversight to prevent the abuse of programs like food-for-oil, and will even look to correct the repercussions employing such sanctions might have on civilian populations as regards the health and nutrition of those populations. List of References Cortright, D. (1995). 1 Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations. In Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, Cortright, D. & Lopez, G. A. (Eds.) (pp. 3-14). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59438946 Cortright, D. & Lopez, G. A. (Eds.). (1995). Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=59438959 Cortright, D., Lopez, G. A., Conroy, R. W., Dashti-Gibson, J., & Wagler, J. (2000). The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990's. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105950670 Documents Prove U.N. Oil Corruption; the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program Was Marred by Bribery and Shady Deals Involving Top Officials and Cronies of World Leaders Such as French President Jacques Chirac. (2004, April 27). Insight on the News 22. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002650585 Garfield, R. (2002). Economic Sanctions, Humanitarianism and Conflict after the Cold War. Social Justice, 29(3), 94+. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000640810 Kaempfer, W. H., & Lowenberg, A. D. (1992). International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=101106328 Spotlight on Iraq. (2002). Social Education, 66(7), 412+. Retrieved January 10, 2007, from Questia database: http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5000659248 Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries, 2001 October 15, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly, Agenda Item 95 (a). Read More