From Empiricism to Postmodernism - Essay Example

?Epistemology: From Empiricism to Postmodernism Submitted by: Introduction The nature of knowledge has evolved throughout history. During the modern period, that is “since the 17th century scientific revolution and the Enlightenment, we have assumed there is a single objective reality, and science and reason offer the most effective method of discovering it” (Greetham 2006, p.6). This was highlighted during two modern philosophical traditions, i.e. rationalism and empiricism. Rationalism, which began with Rene Descartes, claimed that knowledge stems from reason alone. However, by the time John Locke came into the scene, the nature of knowledge began to shift towards the empiricism. This was at its peak with the empiricist, David Hume. Contrary to rationalism, empiricism claims that knowledge stem from our experience alone. What we can know is that which we can perceive and experience through our senses. Nevertheless, despite the contrast between these two traditions, both characterized knowledge as something structured. It both aimed towards an objective truth, which serves as the foundation of all knowledge. However, by the end of the modern era, a new tradition stepped into the scene. This was called postmodernism. Postmodernism, on the other hand, serves as a critique of the modern project. While modernism emphasized on structure, postmodernism emphasized on de-structuralizing knowledge. “The new movement implies a shift from the signified to the signifier: and so there is a perpetual detour on the way to a truth that has lost any status or finality” (Sarup 1993, p.3). Postmodernism deconstructs foundational concepts such as causality, identity, truth and knowledge. Postmodernists attack the view that there is a single unified body of knowledge. Rather, knowledge, for postmodernists, is relative. There is no single truth so to speak but a multiplicity of truths. It argues that “the human subject does not have a unified consciousness but is structured by language” (Sarup 1993, p.3). In this paper, I shall focus on two philosophical traditions that have shaped the way by which we perceive reality, i.e. empiricism and postmodernism. I shall show how these two traditions differ in their epistemological approaches. In doing so, I shall argue that postmodernism does not serve to give us a clear picture of knowledge. Thus, if philosophy, in its epistemological concerns, aims to search for foundations of our knowledge, then so it seems that postmodernism contradicts the very nature of philosophy in its goal to achieve a reliable and foundational theory of knowledge. Therefore, although empiricism relied too much on observable facts, it nevertheless gave us a consistent theory of knowledge, as opposed to the postmodernist epistemological approach. Given the aforementioned background, I shall divide this paper into three main parts. The first part will discuss the empiricist tradition with regards to its epistemological approaches, while the second part will discuss the postmodernist approach. Here, I shall emphasize on the difference between the manner by which both traditions define the nature and acquisition of knowledge. Finally, the third part will be devoted to my analysis regarding the issue at hand. This will serve as my conclusion. In this final section, I shall give my argument on what I believe is the more consistent and reliable framework for epistemology. In doing so, I shall defend the empiricist view on epistemology as that which upholds rather then rejects the nature of philosophy. For, structure is a necessary factor in any theory of knowledge. Postmodernism deconstructs this structure of knowledge that philosophers, since the ancient period have developed. I shall argue that postmodernism dissolves the very nature of knowledge, and this nullifies the nature of philosophy itself. Postmodernism only serves as a critique to empiricism, but it does not suffice to create a reliable framework of a theory of knowledge, that is, of epistemology. Empiricism and Epistemology There are four key principles that empiricists are likely to believe: First, all knowledge, except purely logical relations, is based on experience: it is composed of matters of fact about evidence of the senses. Second, the evidence of our senses has primitive authenticity: that is, it can be trusted as the only reliable source of facts on which knowledge can be built… Third, empiricists tend to believe the mind is, as Locke describes it, a ‘tabula rasa’, a blank sheet, on which nature imprints itself accurately… And fourth, empiricists believe the only valid method of verification of the principles and theories we use to describle the external world is to subject them to empirical evidence. The truth of general factual statements can only be established through induction, even thought this can provide only probabilistic support (Greetham 2006 pp.103-104). Thus, for an empiricist, experience is the only authority in knowledge acquisition. Why is this so? Empiricists tend to believe that experience is one thing, which we cannot escape from. We receive data through sense perception whether we like it or not. They envision the mind to be like a mirror, which reflects reality as it should be, just like how we see it with our own eyes. And if reason attempts to come in the picture, it distort the image, like a fingerprint in a clean mirror. Thus, reason must be put aside when making judgments. Thus, the only valid approach or method that we should use, according to an empiricist, is verification through sense impression, i.e. through empirical modes of confirmation. Indeed, it is through a method called verificationism that empiricist’s claim to have knowledge of something meaningful. And this mode of verification is through one’s observation alone. During the early part of the 20th century, a revival of empiricism came to surface. This was called logical empiricism, or more commonly known as logical positivism. Like the empiricist tradition, logical positivists views knowledge from a general theory of language. This theory of language focused on two main themes, one of which is the verifiability theory of meaning. “Here is how the theory was often put: the meaning of a sentence consists in its method of verification…knowing the meaning of a sentence is knowing how to verify it” (Godfrey-Smith 2003, p.27). Thus, if we have no method to verify a sentence, then for the logical positivists, the sentence has no meaning, i.e. it is meaningless. Take note that by verify, we mean its capacity to be tested in the empirical world. “Verificationism is a strong empiricist principle; experience is the only source of meaning, as well as the only source of knowledge” (Godfrey-Smith, 2003 p.27). Indeed, this approach has its own merits. The methods and approaches that science uses for instance are all empirical in nature. Science is based on empirical facts, that is, facts that are verifiable through observation. Another epistemological approach or method used by the empiricist tradition is logic. However, we should distinguish between two types of logic herein, i.e. deductive and inductive. In general “logic is the study of the methods and principles used to distinguish correct from incorrect reasoning” (Copi and Cohen 2009, p.4). Moreover, deductive logic “describes patterns of argument that transmit truth with certainty… inductive logic is a theory of arguments that provide support for their conclusions but do not give the kind of guarantee found in deductive logic” (Godfrey-Smith 2003, p.29). Scientific inquiry is said to be inductive. While empiricists value both deductive and inductive, an emphasis on the latter is made. Why? Primarily because although deductive logic gives knowledge, which is true and certain, it nevertheless does not say anything about reality, that is to say, these are empty truths. Thus, empiricists emphasize that although induction does not give us the kind of certainty that deductive logic does, it tells us about factual matters about the empirical world. Also, empiricists acknowledge the possibility of falling into error, “but that does not stop some claims in science from being supported by evidence. The logical positivists accepted and embraced the fact that error is always possible” (Godfrey-Smith 2003, p.29). Given the aforementioned overview on the empiricist tradition, we could say that this was how knowledge and the acquisition of knowledge was perceived and accepted during the modern period. Perhaps we could add one last point, which involves the individual ‘knower’. Herein, the individual was central to all epistemological investigations. The central figure and emphasis was on how an individual could be certain that his or her knowledge is clear and consistent. Reflection and reference to the self was always made when dealing with modern epistemological literature in philosophy. However, in the postmodern tradition, postmodernists aimed to dissolve the subject, and in effect, “it decentres consciousness” (Sarup 1993, p.2). In the next section, I shall discuss the epistemological character of postmodernism. Postmodernism and Epistemology In this day and age, we live in a world so dominated by the advances of science that we seldom have time to devote ourselves to matters, which are actually most essential to the evolution of human knowledge. This can be characterized by the rise of postmodernism, a major historical transition in human thought, wherein the world emerges into a kind of pluralistic civilization. This pluralism advocates the notion of ‘truth’ as something made rather than found,1 and thus leads to the view of knowledge as something socially constructed. In its engagement with knowledge comes language, for as a creation of human beings, language is inevitably bound up with culture. Herein, we see a defining moment in postmodern thought – the linguistic turn in philosophy. Such linguistic turn imparts to us its claim that ideas cannot be understood apart from the language systems that produced them. “Language games replace the global horizon of meaning; language constitutes reality, each language constructing specific aspects of reality in its own way.” Moreover, “It is argued that the human subject does not have a unified consciousness but is structured by language” (Sarup 1993, p.3). This postmodern emphasis on language has much to do with culture; for without culture there is no language. Postmodernism argues that our quest for knowledge is inevitably bound up with culture along with its socio-political structures. In effect, our claims about reality amount to mere social constructs, which are mainly determined by institutions of power and the demands of the people. We no longer ask questions in philosophy that are taken as ends-in-themselves but rather, as means-to-an-end, which defeats the very purpose of philosophy as that which is pursued without any utilitarian end. This concern takes place in the postmodern context, for herein, human beings fail to see the most essential structures of all things; the meaning behind our very own concrete lived experiences. What remains may be a form of nihilism wherein one no longer struggles to define oneself in search for genuine knowledge but rather, struggles to merely survive in search for power and satisfaction – a satisfaction, which never remains content. As a result, we are faced with the reification of knowledge in which the human subject is decentralized in so far as we are regarded merely as mediums for language and culture. There is a loss of ‘self’ insofar as there is a loss of consciousness. What remains is the person’s identification with his or her socially assigned typifications. In other words, the postmodern world, as reified, is a dehumanized world. Along with the dissolution of belief in foundations of true knowledge come the degradation of systems of thought. We no longer see the factors that distinguish philosophers from social scientists. The epistemological issues that philosophers deal with nowadays intersect so closely to the concerns of social scientists, that we fail to see the implications of such semantic relativism, which holds that incommensurability between different cultures and languages is inevitable, and which in turn becomes an anomaly in the quest of restoring meaning to the term ‘philosophy’. Given the postmodern frame of mind, one may ask “How can we now bring back meaning to philosophy in its quest for true knowledge? Postmodernism has offered us a fragmented way of thinking of one’s pursuit of knowledge that it has also given us thoughts about reality, thoughts which often occur in a rather utilitarian context along with social and cultural presuppositions, theories and beliefs, which embody the historical context of any given society, and which include the manner by which we relate to the world. This presents us with a problem for it seems that there can never be any given standard in validating our knowledge claims and their various interpretations. And the issue on what can be claimed as knowledge involves the philosophical question of what is truth, and in turn, what philosophy is and should be. After some time, a number of postmodern philosophers criticized the linguistic turn of philosophy. One of the well-known postmodernist is Michel Foucault. Foucault “shifted from linguistic determination to the view that individuals are constituted by power relations, power being the ultimate principle of social reality” (Sarup 1993, p.73). Herein, Foucault claims that power produces reality insofar that it produces domains of certainty and truth. He emphasizes the relationship between power and knowledge, wherein the former creates the latter. Furthermore, he claims that “knowledge induces effects of power. It is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power” (Sarup 1993, p.74). Indeed, Foucault emphasizes the relationship between power and knowledge and focuses on knowledge in terms of how it is applied and used in disciplinary power. In his view, power is a necessary condition for knowledge construction and acquisition. Another main figure in postmodern thought is Jacques Derrida. Derrida also puts an emphasis on the linguistic turn of philosophy by providing a critique of language as the very foundation of our knowledge. This is emphasized in his analysis of the signified and signifier, i.e. the sign and the individual. He describes the distinction between these two concepts by characterizing it as a kind of endless question and answer process, such as when a child asks you a question, and you respond with an answer, then the child asks you about your answer, and then you give another answer, and so on and so forth. Hence, the answer keeps transforming into questions, and vise-versa, “and you never arrive at a final signified which is not a signifier in itself” (Sarup, 1993, p.33). Yet what does this all entail with regards to the method of postmodern epistemology? What Derrida wants us to understand, is that meaning and knowledge is never quite clear to us. We interpret signs and claim to know the meaning of the sign, when in fact, signs refer to what is absent, for meanings are absent. “Meaning is continually moving along the chain of signifiers, and we cannot be precise about its exact ‘location’ because it is never tied to one particular sign” (Sarup 1993, p.33). This implies that knowledge is a never-ending search for an absent meaning, which can never be captured fully as a unified whole. Conclusion: Philosophy and Epistemology If knowledge is inevitably bound with society’s social and cultural contexts, then culture itself has the capacity to communicate. If culture has the capacity to communicate, then for every given culture, there exists at least one theory of knowledge, which enables that society to relate to one another. Thus, if language is inevitably bound with society’s social and cultural context, then there exists at least one theory of knowledge, which enables society to relate to one another. This being the case, our knowledge continually asserts and acquires something about reality as we experience it. To speak about our concrete ‘lived experiences’ is to communicate both in the way we think and the way we live our life. To communicate both factors tells us of the possibility of formulating a foundational theory of knowledge by which we can subsume both meaning and structure, without having to dichotomize both as belonging to two separate schemes or epistemologies, incommensurable with one another. I find no problem in having to justify epistemic claims of knowledge, since given that we clarify our knowledge and the meaning it subsumes, then it seems that the problem vanishes. For, knowledge cannot be an ‘anything goes’ sort of attitude. “Knowledge is valuable. For it enables us to rely on our beliefs: on our own beliefs and on the beliefs of others. When seeking the truth about a matter, I appeal to the person who knows. For his opinions are reliably connected with the truth” (Scruton 2004, p.325). Postmodernism does not point to a single systematic theory of knowledge but rather; it designates various interpretations of our current culture. It is in this regard that postmodernism leads to the loss of belief in the objectivity of knowledge. We no longer have a single standard for gauging our knowledge within an objective paradigm of truth. What postmodernism gives us is a multiplicity of knowledge as relative to one culture to another. Thus, despite the postmodern deconstruction of foundational principles and concepts, I do believe that there remains a basic structure capable of serving as the very foundation of epistemology itself. I am not neglecting the fact that culture and other social factors play a big part in our acquisition knowledge, for I also do acknowledge that knowledge and socio-cultural factors are intermittently linked. But I do not take them as inter-dependent from one another. They are mutually exclusive. Hence, it has no necessary connection. So it can be said that knowledge exists apart from culture and its factors in play, and can serve as a foundation or basis for understanding reality. I do agree with the empiricists in their focus on the individual as the center of inquiry, and with knowledge itself as the pursuit of philosophy. Postmodernism only serves as a critique of empiricism. It does not suffice to stand as a framework for epistemological concerns of philosophy. Therefore, it must be set aside. References Copi, I. M. and Cohen, C., 2009. Introduction to logic. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall. Godfrey-Smith, P., 2003. Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Greetham, B., 2006. Philosophy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Richard R., 1981. Philosophy and the mirror of nature. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Sarup, M., 1993. An introductory guide to post-structuralism and postmodernism. Harlow: Pearson Education. Scruton, R., 2004. Modern philosophy: an introduction and survey. London: Pimlico. Steinar K., 1995. Themes of postmodernity. In W. T. Anderson, ed. 1995. The truth about the truth: de-confusing and re-constructing the postmodern world. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, pp.18-25. Berger, P. L. and Luckmann, T., 1995. The dehumanized world. In W. T. Anderson, ed. 1995. The truth about the truth: de-confusing and re-constructing the postmodern world. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, pp.36-39. Read More