MOSOP: Survival through Resistance - Case Study Example

A Case Study of MOSOP: Survival through Resistance Details: al Affiliation: A Case Study of MOSOP: Survival through Resistance Introduction into MOSOP Approaches to Block Oil business in the Niger Delta, Nigeria The Nigeria’s Niger Delta has been a theater of the absurd characterizing a series of violent struggles. Since the late 1980s, the area has been an arena of mobilization and deadly protests from the ethnic minorities with peculiar demands against perceived predatory forces-the Nigerian government, the multinational oil companies and their local cohort surrogates. Weak and isolated, minority communities sought to internationalize their struggles in a political system largely dominated by three larger ethnic groups (Obi, 2000a, p. 67). Out of the cauldrons of minority protests rose The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) mounting sustained mass mobilizations through robust local and international support networks towards a worthy moral course-gaining economic control of resources mined in their ancestral homeland through political inclusion. The Movement organized the Ogoni people to demand “political autonomy” within their system effectively drawing the world’s attention through conflict with the Nigerian government, Shell Oil Company and a host of multinational corporations, all sourcing to benefit from the regions’ oil wealth. Indeed, since the 1990s, the movement’s dynamism in its tactical approaches drew international support with numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs)such as Human Rights Watch, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace coming to their aid in one way or another (Human Rights Watch 1993; Friends of the Earth-Netherlands 1993; Greenpeace International 1994). The movement’s activities were so intense pressuring the government to the brink prompting a three-year of harsh repression on the entire Niger Delta with the execution of MOSOP’s leader Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995 in a bid to smash dissenting voices domestically-an act that branded the system a pariah regime in the eyes of the international community (Obi, 2002, p. 30-41). As a matter of fact, the history of this particular movement has been punctuated with intrigues and turns with the principal aim of getting their government to lend them listening ears so as to deliver their grievances. This paper sets out to analyze the tactical activities of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) with due regard to its relations with multinational oil business companies operating in the Niger Delta. Summary Background of MOSOP Tactics and Its Evolution to the Present The history of man has been one characterized by occasional resurgence with distinct causal identities comprising of hyper nationalist beliefs, contentious religious principles, ethnical cleavage thinking, secessionist claims, and denial of fundamental inalienable human rights, environmental rights being at the epicenter in the recent times. The era after the Cold War markedly witnessed these identities antagonize each other for control of socio-political as well as economic scenes with events that occasionally tended to mount serious challenges to state authorities. Seemingly, Nigeria went through the test with near statehood collapse. The emergence of armed ethnic militias in Nigeria’s Niger Delta in the early 1990s was largely informed by marginalization of the minority communities, constituting social deprivation of fundamental, basic rights (Harper, 1996, p.42-47). The 21st century has seen indiscriminate use of lethal weapons giving way to conflagration of all sorts against the dysfunctional political structure of the state as well as oil multinationals’ policies infringing on the locals rights. Basically, these ethnic militias emerged with the sole purpose of challenging the poor choice of policies over environmental degradation emanating from oil extraction with little or no return at in certain instances (Onishi, 2000, par.2-4). Without shear contradiction, the oil related crises in the Niger Delta is the result of three principal protagonistic views of the locals against governmental inaction in full glare of multinationals rip-offs of the “host communities’ resources” (Hazen, 2009,p.281). The insensitivity concerns towards the state as the custodian of the peoples sovereignty has been the failed support to the plight of the oil-producing region regarding translation of the huge oil revenue into developmental courses in spite of the nation being one of the largest oil-producing nations among the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Instead, the oil wealth has enriched private pockets of individuals from the dominant ethnic communities sticky at the helm of state affairs. Indeed, since the discovery of the first Oil well in Bayelsa State, Oloibiri in 1956 by Shell, Niger Delta has been the largest contributor of Nigeria’s oil wealth. Since then, Nigerian economic prospects has been mono-commodity controlled economy dependent on the “black gold” with effective mining beginning in the 1970s. Noteworthy, nine against six oil producing states come from the Niger Delta and accounts for over 90 percent of the country’s annual income (Adeola, 2000b, p.213). In the middle of the crisis is Shell, which remains the principal producer of crude oil in the country. The company possesses over one hundred oil fields within the Niger Delta, putting it in effective control of approximately half of the total production, producing approximately one million barrels of oil daily (Obi, 2005, p. 3). Hitherto, the Ogoni people have been consistent in expressing their dissatisfaction with the mechanics and the consequential iniquities attributed to the impact of oil production on their ancestral homeland coupled with the national politics of exclusion alongside gross violations of human rights. Given that oil production in Nigeria is an exclusive legislative prerogative, the close ranks between the multinationals organizations and the government has given leeway to land use in the Niger Delta without due remittance of compensatory benefit to the locals, either health wise or in terms of returns on asset use (land) (Ikelegbe, 2001, p. 459). The ironical beneficial results of oil production not reaching the “actual owner” has been a misnomer of generations to date generating woes and suffering to oil-bearing communities. This is the gist that informed a decisional action of a people-the Ogoni community to combine forces by collectively agitating for a change of policy actions, hence the formation of The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The group has curved a niche in history conducting their activities in a confrontational manner against the government as well as the multinational oil corporations in search for justice in their motherland, now ecologically damaged against a backdrop international attention. MOSOP’s advocacy strategies through combined-effort lobbying and mobilization of environmental actors, within and abroad, as well as violent struggles have in the past pushed the Niger Delta problems to unsustainable levels beyond the scope of the state. Indeed, the disposition of MOSOP’s activities towards circumstantial evidence of mass neglect in the region tend to justify their modus operandi with plausible causes of their action including hostage taking-one of the many factors that served to internationalize the crisis in the Niger Delta. Whereas social consciousness had always been present in the region, the volatility that became attendant to the struggle against environmental degradation and social injustice in the 1990s was a child of circumstance (Adeola, 2000a, p. 691-94). Heroes were inadvertently made out of the struggle. Despite circumstantial evidence of shaky dictatorial military rules, MOSOP’s leadership kept the heat, stealing the limelight from regimes (Babangida and Abacha) held hostage by contradictory crises in the entire nation. How were these possible under such repressive governments with blood stains all over? Discernible Changes In MOSOP’s Tactics MOSOP’s tactical moves find its roots in the cultural history of the Ogoni people. In his analysis, Carr et al. (2001, p.150) notes that: “The grievances of the Ogoni people, like those of other communities in the Niger Delta, are long-standing, dating back to the British colonial era. They centre on the environmental damage done to their region by oil exploration and exploitation, their rights to a fair share of the oil revenue, and their oppression as a minority ethnic group by Nigeria’s ethnic majorities.” The above statement leaves no room for doubts that MOSOP was indeed founded on grounds of ecological grievances embedded in the politics of exclusion. In particular, winning back political control over oil-rich homeland has been key in the movement’s agenda. Douglas and Ola (1999, p.334) rightly concur that the expansion of MOSOP’s activities beyond minority rights for the Ogoni people includes resistance to ecological damage on their land. The Ogoni people are a cultural community found on the Niger Delta plains, east of Port Harcourt with a population of approximately 500,000. Spanning from the colonial era, the culture of the Ogoni people depicts a nurtured quest for self-determination. In the early 1900s, they strongly protested against their inclusion in the Opobo division. In 1947, they were granted their wish to have own Native Authority in then Rivers Province. Their struggle continued into the late 1950s making their voices count in a collective demand for a state for the minorities, eventually realized in 1967 with the creation of the Rivers State. Ogoniland was integrated into the oil economy after the discovery of oil in Bomu area in 1958. Subsequent concessions opened up the area to further oil exploration and exploitation in Korokoro, Bodo West, Yorla, Tai, Afam and Lubara Creek (Saro-Wiwa 1995, p.67). Over a period of 30 years, oil worth $30 billion had been extracted from Ogoniland, contributing about five per cent of National oil production in the year 1973(Obi, 2005). Indeed, Ogonis did support the government in 1967-70 civil wars in anticipation of reciprocation of oil benefits. However, this kind gesture was thrown up in smoke when the latter transferred the control of oil revenues to itself through legislation. The equation was further upset by a Land Use Decree (later legislated into an Act) vesting lands, occupied or not, under the control of the state. Accordingly, section 28.2 of decree revoked occupancy rights in favor of the public interest (Constitutional Rights Project (CRP) 1999, p.3-7). Meanwhile, “An ocean of crude oil had emerged, moving swiftly like a great river in flood, successfully swallowing up anything that comes its way. These include cassava farms, yams, palms, streams, animals…for miles on end. There is no pipe borne water, and yet the streams, the only source of drinking water [are] coated with oil (Saro-Wiwa, 1992, p. 58). In spite of the positive oil prospects, the locals had with nothing to show for their wealth except poverty, pollution and misery. Concessions granted without locals consent rendered farming and fishing no more. Worse still, ancestral shrines had to give way for industrial pipelines, yet no real employment and meaningful compensation were forth coming (Robinson 1996:32–46). With strong feelings of denied rights to oil proceeds by a government dominated by the three populous ethnic groups, MOSOP was born in 1991 to give voice to the Ogoni aspirations (Obi, 2001a, p. 69). Reaching out to one another in a concerted move aimed at contesting and blocking further marginalization, exploitation and pollution of the Ogoni oil-rich lands, the movement started out by delivering strong warning messages through the media informing the state-oil business alliance, and the top government of secessionist moves should their claims fall on ears. Essentially, their initial messages were identity related with claims of power over their land being at the centre (Obi, 2001b, p.124). These messages were not catchy in the eyes of the international community. As a result, the movement metamorphicaly erupted and took on the environmental course- a course that no doubt heralded a listening atmosphere of pro-rights in the post-Cold War world. Under the theme of “Save the environment, Save the Ogoni People,” MOSOP found enough ground to “globalize” its struggles in the Niger Delta. In its activities, MOSOP adopted tactical, high-risk confrontational moves, deliberately targeting and disrupting Shell’s operations through protests that frequently turned deadly with the involvement of armed forces (Carr et al., 2001). In particular, MOSOP’s “high risk” strategies involved predicated rights mobilization of social power purposely geared towards complete blockage of oil extraction from Ogoniland until the underlying complaints were addressed. Given the strategic importance of the region to the larger Nigerian economy (contributing over 80 percent of the national revenue with over 90 percent of export earning pegged on the oil production), obviously, pressure on the government had to get elevated pursue dialogue, though this was short-lived. A raft of demands was kind of unbearable. In the list issued on 2 October 1990, the locals demands included, among other things, independent political control of Ogoni affairs, the rights to proceeds from oil resources for their development and a stop to further ecological degradation (Obi 2001a, p.121–123). Though debated, adopted, signed and delivered to the government by Ogoni society comprising of dialects at all levels after massive grassroots mobilization, the wait for response to the above demands was long. On 26 August 1991, one year after failed promises from the government, MOSOP’s leadership sent a stinging addendum to the federal government criticizing and calling for an expunction of clauses expropriation of Ogoni rights in the constitution (Obi, 2001a, p.124–125). Additionally, the addendum sought for restitution for the harm done to the locals health wise by flaring of gases, environmental impact of oil spillages (especially the air quality) and related problems caused by industrial oil extraction by Shell and their accomplices in the Nigerian government. Once again, it was business as usual with no real response from the military juntas. As MOSOP would realize, time was ripe to internationalize its concerns. Indeed, “The insertion of the Ogoni resistance into the global rights agenda, its success in waging one of the most sophisticated environmental rights struggles in the 1990s, was predicated not merely on the co-optation of the global rights discourse on the universalization of human rights and freedom, but also on a solid project of local popular empowerment and mass mobilization, under a conscious leadership” (Obi, 2001b, p.184). In its reenergized form, MOSOP co-opted several organizations such as the Federation of Women’s Associations (FOWA), the National Union of Ogoni Students (NUOS), the National Youth Council of Ogoni People (NYCOP), the Council of Ogoni Professionals (COP), the Ogoni Teachers Union (OTU) and the Council of Ogoni Traditional Rulers Association (COTRA), among other unions in renewed struggles forced the government to listen (Barikor-Wiwa, 1997:46; Obi, 2001a, p.76). Through idiomatic expressions of solidarity, unity and victory, MOSOP gained legitimacy as “a credible platform of voicing grievances of all as an umbrella” (Obi, 2001a, p.76). Riding under the massive support at home, MOSOP began networking abroad, initially extending hands to the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in the Netherlands in 1992. In the same year, the movement presented the Ogoni case before the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations-a case that showed in detain, if not an exaggeration, the circumstantial suffering and imminent extinction of a community as a result of environmental barrage orchestrated by a repressive Nigerian military government and its accomplices (Obi, 2001a; 2001b). MOSOP’s strategy of going global with elaborate accounts of ecological devastation and repression detailing fundamental human rights abuses shockingly and massively won international sympathy and support. On the sidelines, the news media coverage of its local and international lectures, publications, documentaries, letters, local and international lobbying propelled the movement to international fame. Notably, “MOSOP’s ‘complaints’ were well packaged for a global audience. Through effective networking mechanics, international non-governmental organizations advocating for human and environmental rights such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch Africa, Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, among others were informed appropriately and had a responsibility to respond” (Obi, 2001b, p.185). Apparently the inner circle of those in corridors of power was not prepared to let go. As the government became increasingly intolerant with MOSOP’s demands, the movement became even more ardent in its pursuit for justice. On 4 January 1993, the organization organized a peaceful rally against the state-oil alliance-a rally that marked a successful celebration of UN’s International day of the World’s Indigenous People attended by over 300,000 Ogoni people and other minority groups. Due to MOSOP’s resilience in its demands, the movement was even at more loggerheads with the state-oil alliance in months that followed. An alliance that preferred and fiercely defended the status quo, the state-oil alliance on the one hand, were hell bent on capitalist tendencies of wealth accumulation, and so they were prepared to utilize every penny to ensure no change in policies (Obi, 2000b, p.287–288). On 30 April 1993, a protest organized by MOSOP leadership against Willbros Oil Company activities (a company working on behalf of Shell) turned not only chaotic, but painful and deadly when soldiers opened fire on residents. On that very day, many residents were admitted with gunshot wounds leaving one man dead and a deepened sorrowful ordeal. In an attempt to silence them even more, MOSOP’s spokesperson-Ken Saro-Wiwa, was arrested and detained by security agents in June 1993. The state used more ad hoc tactics to divide MOSOP’s leadership. Wrangle emerged within its ranks pitting the moderates and the radical elements. On their part, militarily forces stepped up their game, instilling intimidation and a climate of fear in the entire region. Beatings and detention of MOSOP activists were widespread. State agents went an extra-mile planting misunderstandings between the Ogonis and their neighbors, a misunderstanding that led to loss of more lives across the divide. Given the trust that the community had invested in the movement, suspicions of some being traitors led to mob lynching of four chiefs on 24 May 1994. MOSOP”s leadership was held responsible for the incident. As such Ken Saro-Wiwa alongside nine others were arrested, charged for incitement resulting into murder and subsequently executed in November 10th 1995 in spite of worldwide outcry of a trial that fell short of judicial fairness (Douglas, & Ola, 1999, P.337). The death of Saro-Wiwa obviously left MOSOP deceased and fragmented. Further waves of repression against the Ogoni were even more unbearable forcing numerous activists into exile. Gaining ground became harder in the subsequent years with MOSOP’s remnants dispersed across Africa, Europe and North America. Nevertheless, the return of power in the hands of civilian elected governments since 1999, heralding an era of more democratic space brought some hope to MOSOP’s resurgence. Meanwhile, Shell temporarily withdrew its activities from Niger Delta. Conditions have since improved with more than 13 percent of oil revenue allocations going back to region (Obi, 2002). A ministry of environment was created to check into environmental concerns. In the ministry is the Department of Petroleum Resources to check into unorthodox oil extraction techniques. Even though the government has pulled up its socks a little, power relations between the government and oil multinational corporations on one hand and the Ogoni people on the other hand, remains skewed. Evidently, Saro-Wiwa charisma and ideals still lives on with forces at the grassroots remaining deeply committed to resistance towards more government yield-ups. Assessment of MOSOP’s Strategies towards Its Objectives Of all the socio-economic as well political problems in Nigeria, none equals the daunting and multi-layered crisis of the Niger Delta. The Niger Delta’s explosive crisis has attracted the involvement of international support, thanks to the tactical approaches employed by movements such MOSOP among other movements with the region’s interest at heart. MOSOP was the first social movement to mobilize the locals in the region to challenge ad hoc policies of both the government and multinationals in extraction of oil in the region. The pressure from this social movement largely accounts for change of policies of the two agents in the mid 1990s. The fundamental question that remains to be answered is how successful has its tactical activities been regarding the realization of privileges sought after so far? Effective campaigns championed by civil society movements need resources, media coverage, local and transnational support to pose a formidable challenge towards their courses. The harsh reality is that MOSOP had to get aligned to the resources caps from the global civil societies. It was clear to its leaders from the beginning that international support was only possible to movements with tangible goals and objectives with clear roadmap and the potential to win their cause. In a sense, MOSOP’s leadership was knowledgeable enough that international funding is based on strict cost to benefit analysis with only a few movements getting supported in the end. The movement therefore, prepared itself to champion a worthy course through elaborate, aggressive, effective and efficient strategies in order to gain transnational recognition and consequential backing. From the above preemptive preview, the case of MOSOP waging intense local and international campaign against Niger Delta environmental degradation couched in between denial of minority rights by the Nigerian state in conjunction with Shell Petroleum Company illustrates the hallmark of difficulties confronting environmental movements against their quest for effective inclusion politics in environmental management. Despite the re-verses suffered in the mid-1990s witnessing leadership wrangles, the movement served as a watershed for numerous environmental movements in the region in more ways than one. Just to mention, Chikoko Movement (CM) and Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) among other smaller groupings had their roots in MOSOP’s leadership. The origin of MOSOP underpins a people’s struggles for self-determination-explained more by the strategic location of the Niger Delta and political ecology of petroleum the world over. Conclusion and Recommendations to strengthening MOSOP Globalization is often seen as a double-edged sword for human rights. On one hand, new technologies and new international norms may be a boon for victims and activists, binding the world and making it harder for repressive regimes to act with impunity against their own citizens. On the other hand, the ideology of free trade and the spread of multinational corporations may infringe on labor rights, threaten the vulnerable environments, and destroy the local control. MOSOP has waged a worthwhile fight for justice not only for the Ogoni people but for all that reside within the entire region of Niger Delta. As it seems, the fight is yet over. Environmental issues are matters of survival not only in Nigeria but the world over. 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