Marine Accidents and Incidences - Essay Example

Marine Accidents and Incidences Introduction Marine transport just like any other form of transport is punctuated with incidents such as accidents, and terrorist attacks among other mishaps. Marine incidents include capsizing, cargo handling failure, grounding, collision or contact, delays and fires among many other happenings. Maritime incidents do not only involve boats but also canoes, kayaks, open motorboats, cabin motorboats, cruise ships, tankers and other types of watercrafts. Maritime incidents may also occur during the offshore drilling of rigs and while participating in water sports. The most common maritime accidents include: capsizing of boats; sailors falling overboard; water skier mishaps; collisions involving maritime vessels with stationary or fixed objects; and collision of maritime vessels with one another (International Maritime Organization, 2008). Maritime accidents often lead to property damage, injury and death of those involved. Many marine transport incidents are either related to failure of the management or engineering faults. Main Causes of Marine Accidents and Incidences Accidents that involve marine vessels have been associated with various causes. According to Marine Accident Investigation Branch, there are various causes of maritime accidents leading to the classification of the accidents by incidents. One cause is machine failure like in the case of Stellar Voyager Accident which occurred in March, 2009. Another cause is fire or explosion like in the case of Maersk Newport which happened in November 2010. Yet another cause is flooding or foundering for like in the case of Abigail H which happened in November 2008 in Port of Heysham (Marine Accident Investigation Branch 2010). Other causes include weather damage; and hull defects. Generally, the major causes of marine accidents include: operators’ inattention; over-consumption of alcohol or drug abuse; bad weather conditions; excessive speed; equipment malfunction; and carelessness or recklessness of operators. It is also worth noting that many of the maritime accidents occur due to inexperience of those involved. The number of deaths caused by boats accidents have significantly increased over the past few years according to the Annual Recreational Boating Statistics Publication (2008, p56). The main reason behind this is that most of the victims of maritime accidents especially boat accidents are not equipped with life jackets with which to save themselves. Most maritime accidents are often linked to several causes as a matter of fact. For example, there might be bad weather but due to sailors’ negligence a preventable accident may happen. Such a case can be blamed partly on weather but the major part cause will be the sailors’ negligence. This is especially so since if not for the sailors’ delay in taking a specific measure, the accident would not occur. This paper will relate the incidents that will be discussed in the following sections to the most likely cause. The incidents to be discussed are Pacific Sun accident which occurred in July 2008 (cruiseresearch.org par 4), the Ever Elite accident that occurred in September, 2009 and Stena Voyage accident which occurred in January, 2009. The three incidents have been adequately investigated by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch pursuant to the International Marine organization code for the investigation of marine incidents and casualties. The investigations are usually aimed at unearthing the causes of the accidents and future prevention of such accidents. The investigations are also aimed at identifying the circumstances under which the accident occurred and to ascertainment the same (maib,gov, 2009). Analysis of Marine Incidents On the evening of July 30, 2008, the Pacific Sun cruise ship rolled heavily in strong winds and high seas on its return journey to Auckland in the Pacific Ocean. The accident happened about 200 miles NNE of North Cape, New Zealand. Of the over 1300 passengers on board, 77 were injured with seven maintaining major injuries according to Maritimeaccident (2009). There was substantial damage to the ship’s furnishings but no pollution of the environment was caused. The ship’s speed had increased during the day. At dusk, the master made attempts to reduce the speed of the ship. The vessel’s speed reduced to below the speed at which the only working stabilizer was effective. Approximately two hour later, the ship rolled heavily three times as the master was attempting to reduce motion by changing course. Most of the injuries inflicted on the passengers and crew was mainly due to falls and contact with loose objects and unsecured furnishings in the public rooms, rooms designated as passenger emergency muster stations being no exception. As a result of the accident, most of the public places were rendered dangerous forcing the master to order all the passengers back to their cabins to avoid further injuries from occurring (Taic, 2009). Investigations later revealed that had the furnishings and fittings of the ship been sufficiently secured to resist motion, the injuries would be significantly reduced (Maib, 2009). As result of the accident, the bridge teams have been provided with night vision glasses, training in the risks associated with heavy weather have been improved to the advantage of deck officers and there has been review of the securing arrangements for the vessel’s satellite communication equipment. Various recommendations have been made to Princess Cruises: review of the role of active stabilizers to ensure passenger safety; review of the risk of injury from moving objects and furnishings and development of suitable means to secure such items during the heavy weather; development of a standard to secure furnishings and equipment in public rooms; and improvement of its instructions and guidance to include actions aimed at injury to personnel reduction. According to the investigation that was conducted, various factors contributed to the happening of the accident with fatigue of the crew members not being among them. The itinerary planning was a major contributor to the happening of the accident. P&O Australia, notes that the cruise ship required modifications especially during the winter season. However the cruise planning process failed to address this cruise as it had been completed on several occasions in the past. The starting and finishing of the cruise had two lengthy ocean passages that required to be made at between seventeen and eighteen knots. At the time of the accident, the pacific sun had nineteen knots maximum compared to twenty one required after each period in the dry dock. This gave little flexibility if any to the master in making up for lost time due to the impacts of bad weather or delay in departure. The schedule of the cruise placed the master in a difficult situation therefore forcing him to do everything possible to arrive at the turn around port on time or limiting the delay to a minimum. If there was proper itinerary planning, the master would have greater flexibility in achieving outward and return passages on schedule. The decisions on passage also contributed to the incident. If the master has decided to miss visit on the mystery island and instead progress directly to from port villa to Auckland, there was high likelihood that he would have passed before the occurrence of the forecast storm and arrived early. This would only negatively affect one cruise. However this decision to visit Mystery Island was understandable. According to the weather forecasts, the WRI advised the master to look for a route direct to Auckland and modify route and speeds as need be in the prevailing circumstances. However, it moved SE and converged on pacific sun’s route. The master altered course and speed as need be for a comfortable movement by placing the sea and swell on starboard quarter. However the master considered not heaving until it was just before sunset and on realizing that he would be unable to see the swell and sea in the ensuing darkness. Had he decided to heave to during the day, the depression would have passed to the south therefore encountering lesser winds and waves. By deciding to move parallel to the storm direction and heave to at sunset, he placed the ship in the area of worst sea conditions as one of the stabilizers was ineffective at slow speed. On thirtieth July it was dark and overcast night thus the master neither the OOW was able to identify sea and swell direction. Better lighting would have enabled them identify the best heading for the ship when hove to, to reduce rolling and in the timing of any course alterations in avoiding particularly large waves. With night vision glasses, the bridge team would have a better understanding of the conditions of the sea faced and maybe warned of the large waves approaching. In relation to the roll mechanism, lack of a steady build up to the 3 large roll angles experienced conflicts with normal parametric rolling behaviour. The large sea and swell combined with the second more northerly swell highly contributed to the heavy rolling of pacific sun. The pacific sun had only one working stabilizer thus ability to dampen of the ship was reduced and placing the remaining working stabilizer at a risky position of failing leaving the ship without any active stabilizers. It should be noted however that the malfunctioning port stabilizer indirectly contributed to the accident. However if there were two working stabilizers, this would have handled the rolling of the vessel throughout the cruise. The master was not aware that by reducing the speed of the vessel to less than ten knots it would impact the active stabilising affects making the stabilizers act as bilge keels. He was also not aware of the vessel’s parametric or synchronous rolling in particular conditions as no such training is given to the masters. As earlier explained the incident was caused by a combination of factors. It was the failure of the management to fix the stabilizers as it was earlier agreed. By deferring maintenance, it was clear that the vessel would have been left without working stabilizers during the winter season. The management also failed by not providing the OOW and master with night vision glasses which would have enabled the master to notice the storm that was coming (emsaeuropa, 2007). The management as a performance management practice would have trained the masters in issues regarding synchronous rolling which is usually not included in the syllabus of the master. Also the management can be blamed for itinerary planning which could have provided the master with greater flexibility. The onboard staff had also a role to play in the prevention of the inflicted injuries. Through the advice of the staff, the loose furnishings and objects would have been fixed. If the severity of the conditions had been anticipated, then there would be review of securing arrangements, postponement of arrival, passenger activity restriction and menus modifications aimed at reduction of the hazards present in the galleys during cooking. The vessels condition was poorly maintained which also contributed to the incident. Had the main satellite C communication system be stable, the officers would have communicated effectively with external organizations. The master is also to blame as he did not take the right decision for the good of the passengers and crew onboard. There are situations that require one to think first in order to save the lives of the onboard personnel. One such situation is where he opted for a stop over instead of making to the Auckland. On September 10, 2009 an able seaman from the United Kingdom registered container ship Ever Elite drowned after the lower section of the accommodation ladder standing on broke and fell into the water (Fishnewseu.com 2010 par. 1). This occurred in San Francisco Bay. The ship was approaching the terminal in Oakland, California at the occurrence of the accident. The seaman’s body was later spotted by an accompanying tug and was recovered onto a pilot launch (maib.gov.uk 2009 p. 1). The registered owner of Ever Elite is Aries Line shipping S.A whereas the manager is Evergreen Marine UK ltd. The port of registry is London in the United Kingdom. The accommodation ladder was set free after the hoist winch gearbox failed. The reason behind this is that the gearbox had been incorrectly reassembled and replaced by the vessel’s crew following maintenance. The factors that led to this incident included: lack of technical information; management system of onboard maintenance that was ineffective; and low level testing and maintenance requirements adapted for the hoist winch as it had not been regarded as lifting gear as per the national regulation definition. It was unnecessarily hazardous to rig the ladder when underway and a safe work system had not been developed. The seaman fell into the water and drowned as he was not wearing device meant for fall arrest and a lifejacket required for working over the side. There were also shortfalls in relation to safety measures identified during the investigation carried out to unveil the reason behind the incident. The cause of the death of the seaman was drowning with blunt force injuries. The seaman suffered blunt force on his head, chest, neck, abdomen, legs and back which resulted to broken right femur, abrasions, fractured ribs and multiple bruising. It is with no doubt that the port accommodation ladder was set free when the inner roller race of the intermediate taper roller bearing in the hoist winch gearbox failed. This resulted to the displacement of the shaft vertical bever gear and allowed for the disengagement of the spiral bever gear teeth in the lower chamber. The inner roller race failure was attributed to repeated high frequency effects with the outer tips of the teeth on the differential gear unit with the combination of the downward force generated by the wedging effect on the tapered rollers. The results of the investigation carried out indicated clearly that the vertical bever gear shaft had dropped by at least three millimeters prior to the ladder been set free. The heat marks on the worm in the upper chamber resulted from upper edges of teeth contact on the worm wheel. On the underside of the worm there were polishing marks which indicated that it had been rubbing against the intermediate bearing housing top. The marks on the body of the differential gear unit are an indication that it had been in vertical gear shaft contact. The rotational heating and polishing nature of the much of the damage caused is an indication that the shaft had been out position for duration of time prior to the occurrence of the accident. The burring on the pin is a further indication of the shaft been lower than designed resulting from interference between or misalignment of the shaft’s lock nut collar and the pin. This is as a result of the incorrect reassembly of the gear box during maintenance and was difficult to identify by external visual inspection. The negligence of the safety measures was highly contributed by the management. This so because the management had received recommendations that they consult an expert if they wanted to repair the vessel or buy new peripherals to replace the old one. The management received maintenance instructions from the manufacturers thus a clear indication that the manufacturer was very informed that the crew members would be able to handle the maintenance work. It was also the duty of the management to ensure that the seaman had safety devices and the fall arrest equipment. The safety belts available on the vessel were fall restraint not fall arrest devices. The fall restraint belts restrict one from reaching a point where he can fall but not safeguard his safety during a fall. The fall arrest devices are designed towards the minimization of the risk of injury to the wearer, maximize the chance of the rescue mission and suspend the victim in an upright position. The safety belts onboard were not capable of providing this. The management can also be blamed for not providing the appropriate personal floatation devices. The personal floatation devices can either be lifejackets or buoyancy aids (Ozanne-Smith, Oyebite, Peden & World Health Organization, 2008). The inflicted injuries caused the seaman to loose consciousness making it extremely difficult for him to stay afloat. The 75N buoyancy aid was of marginal benefit in such a situation. When selecting the appropriate personal floatation devices one should do it in relation to the task at hand (National Research Council (US) & Marine Board Committee on Fishing Vessel Safety, 1991). The personal floatation devices rarely require intervention for instance the auto inflate life jackets and self activating lights retro reflective materials and whistles fitted on personal floatation devices. Had the seaman worn the right lifejacket, his chances of survival would be greatly increased. The seaman can also be blame for his death as when he noted the right safety precautions weren’t in place, then he would let go the job. Life is more significant than a job opportunity. The vessels condition also contributed to the injury and death of the seaman. Had the vessel parts been fixed correctly after maintenance then there would be no injuries. It is out of misalignment of the teeth that the accident occurred. The deficiencies identified in relation to the safety management, safety equipment, planned maintenance systems and emergency response raises a lot of concern in relation to the vessel’s operation. On January 28, 2009 an articulate road tanker crashed high speed service vessel Stena Voyager stern door after the ferry commenced crossing from Stranraer Scotland to Belfast Northern Ireland. The semi trailer of the vehicle rested on the vessel’s port water jet units while the tractor unit remained on the vehicle deck. The ferry quickly came to a halt as the crew made sure the vehicle was secure. The ferry returned to Stranraer but the passengers had to remain onboard for the better part of the night as the vehicle had prevented her berthing stern to the link span. The passengers were rescued using telescopic rescue platform by the fire service with the trailer been removed that evening by crane. No injuries were caused but the ferry’s stern door was lost overboard. The driver of the tanker can be held responsible in relation to the accident as he had not applied the vehicle’s parking brakes. The driver had also left it out of gear. The security arrangements applied were not in accordance to the securing manual of the vessel although there the rear wheels of the vehicle were chocked. The securing made on the vehicle was inadequate therefore failed to secure the vehicle rolling backwards when the stern trimmed the ferry as she accelerated. Of the ferry’s securing points and deck’s securing points to which the lashings were attached, none complied with the applicable national and international codes of practice. It was also noted that the lashing straps were of insufficient strength and tests carried out on the vessel revealed that the chocks could not have correctly positioned. The registered owner of Stena voyager is the Stena line limited with the port of registry been London. It is a high speed sea service cargo ferry operating along Belfast-Stranraer service. The ferry is a among the HSS 1500 class of high speed ferries introduced by Stena Line from 1996 onwards (Stenaline, 2010). The service speed is forty knots while it has 4x gas turbine driven waterjets. The incident occurred on 28 January 2009 at 2034hrs. According to the analysis carried out, the road tanker moved towards the stern door a few minutes after the ferry left berth at low speed with the likelihood that it was either held by the lashings or rested against the stern door. As the ferry increased accelerated, her trim angle increased relative to the stern. This resulted to a force acting on the vehicle that was adequate to cause the stern’s door to crush. The movement of the vehicle was a contributed by a number of factors: the parking brakes had not been applied; the vehicle was left out of gear; it was not lashed in accordance to national and international code of conduct; the wheel chocks were either positioned incorrectly or were not in position; and the trailer was not within a block stow as per the vessel’s procedures requirement. The cause of the accident can be blamed mainly on the driver and the vessel crew. If the driver had taken all the necessary precautions to secure the vehicle the accident would not have occurred. If the driver had not left the vehicle out of gear and had applied the parking brakes, the instilled notion by the acceleration of the ferry would not arise. It is the failure of the driver not to ensure that the vehicle was securely placed that the incident resulted. The ferry crew has the sole responsibility to ensure that all the passengers and cargo in the ferry was secure. Though the vehicle was under lashings, there should be a public address system to remind the drivers to securely place their vehicles in the ferry. It is through such systems that the driver of the trailer would have been reminded not to leave the vehicle out of gear. Through the public address systems the drivers would be informed of the fatal outcomes of not securing their vehicles. The lashings on the vehicle were not placed according to generally accepted code of practice. The rigging of the lashings should be in accordance with the regulations and instructions in the code of practice or Stena Voyager’s cargo securing manual. The lashings would have provided minimal security in case the vehicle rolled. This indicates negligence on the part of the crew members. The strength of the lashing equipment and points should be directly proportional to the weights of the vehicles being secured. The strength of the lashings used to secure the vehicle was as low as thirty five percent of the design strength therefore not adequate to secure the vehicle. This shows failure on the part of the management and the crew members not to provide adequate security measures to the cargo in the ferry. The chocks applied on the wheels of the vehicle were not sufficient enough to prevent the vehicle from a three degree incline. The crew members also failed in ensuring that all the security measures in the ferry were maintained. The deck crews’ cargo securing practices were not subjected to routine scrutiny by the onboard officers. If they would have been subjected to scrutiny, the crew members would have taken the prerequisite steps in ensuring all the security measures were put in place before the ferry started its journey. From the three incidents, it is clear that it is the obligation of every party involved in maritime travel to ensure security measures are put in place to secure the maritime vessels and the passengers. The management has to collaborate well with crew members so as to be well informed of the condition of the vessels. The crew members have to collaborate effectively with the passengers to ensure that they are well secured. Without this collaboration and cooperation, there will be recurrent maritime incidents which may result to death of many people, damage to vessels and loss of maritime business. Conclusion According to recent research involving maritime incidents in the United States of America, United Kingdom, Australia and Canada, most of the incidents are caused by human error (Barnett, nd). A majority of seventy percent of the recorded incidents caused by human error, situation awareness and assessment predominate as the contributory factors to the accidents (ABS, 2004). It was by lack of situation assessment and awareness by the master and the crew members that the pacific sun incident occurred. It clear that if the crew members of Stena Voyager had assessed the situation of the trailer, then it the trailer would have been properly secured in prevention of the accident. Various proposals have been put forward aimed at maritime incidents reduction. There has also been legislation enactment directed at curbing maritime incidents. I am to elaborate and discuss on the particular proposals put forward for the above mentioned cases studies and any other relevant suggestion that will see to the reduction of the maritime incidents. Some of the suggestions are workable while others are difficult in implementation. The pro and cons of the various proposals will be discussed into detail to estimate on the viability of the proposals. The management of the various companies should engage their workers in ongoing training. The training should be in accordance with the company’s codes of practice and performance management practices. The training should be aimed at increasing the knowledge of the master as well as crew members about the operation of the various parts of the sea vessels. The crew members should be kept up to date with the maritime technology. They should also be well informed about the precautions to undertake in case an incident occurs. These steps should be aimed towards reassuring the passengers of their safety and subsequent evacuation. It is apparent that the crew members play a major role in any maritime journey. They are the people acting as a bridge between the management and the passengers. Without proper information relayed to them, disasters may arise fatal to all the parties involved. It is with proper training that the crew members and the master will be able to properly assess and estimate a situation and therefore take the most favorable decision in relation to the environments. The training should also focus on climatic conditions and the effects thereof. In most of the cases the master is not well aware of the various maintenance procedure carried out on the vessel. The company policies should be aimed at ensuring that masters and crew members are well aware of the condition of the vessel they are traveling in. This is especially so to help in guiding them on the best and viable action to take in case of emergencies. Had the master known that one of the stabilizers was not working, may be he would not change route at such a risky environment putting the people onboard at risk. In order to reduce the occurrence of accidents mainly caused by vehicles on ferries, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency that there be coordinate programme of inspections of roadside or dockside freight vehicles presenting for shipment at the united kingdom ports. The inspection will be aiming at identifying vehicles that do not comply with IMO and MCA ferry securing arrangements guidelines. There will be instigated actions against the owners of such therefore reducing incidents in ferry operations. There should be actions taken to increase levels of awareness and compliance to ferry safety guidelines. If the necessary actions and recommendations are taken, there will be significant reduction of maritime incidents. The sea and oceans will be a safe place to transport cargo and passengers in. However the international community should not fail to recognize the threat posed by pirates in the high seas. If the necessary precautions are not taken, then incidents will be arising from pirates’ operations therefore not achieving what all along we have dreamt of. References ABS (2004), ABS Review and Analysis of Accident Databases: 1991-2002 Data American Bureau of Shipping Technician Report: SAHF 2003-5.1 March 2004. Barnett M.L, Risk management training: The development of simulator based scenarios from the analysis of recent maritime accidents viewed on 3rd August 2010 from http://www.solent.ac.uk/mhfr/resources/Risk%20Management%20Training.pdf Chircop A. E., Gold E., Kindred H. M.(2003), Maritime Law(illustrated), Irwin Law, Toronto. P. 32. Cruiseresearch.org, Marine Accident Reports: 1979 – 2009 viewed on 2nd August 2010, http://www.cruiseresearch.org/MAR.html Emsa.europa.eu (2008), Damage to ship viewed on 2nd August 2010 from http://www.emsa.europa.eu/Docs/accidents/9-230.pdf Fishnewseu.com (2010), Investigation into fatal incident on Ever Elite published viewed on 2nd August 2010 from http://www.fishnewseu.com/latest-news/uk/3904-investigation-into-fatal-incident-on-ever-elite-published.html Ingersoll J. R., Rocco F. (1809), A manual of maritime law: Consisting of a treatise on ships and freight and a treatise on insurance, Hopkins and Earle, Virginia. p.V. International Maritime Organization (2008), Casualty investigation code: code of the international standards and recommended practices for a safety investigation into a marine casualty or marine incident, IMO Publishing, Geneva p.23. Maib.gov (2009), Report on the investigation of heavy weather encountered by the cruise ship Pacific Sun viewed on 2nd August 2010, http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Pacific_Sun_Report.pdf Maib.gov.uk (2009), Report on the investigation of the uncontrolled descent of an accommodation ladder from the container ship Ever Elite San Francisco Bay viewed on 2nd August 2010 from http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Ever_Elite_Report.pdf Maib.gov.uk(2010), Investigation Reports: Reports by incident type, viewed on 2nd August 2010 from http://www.maib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_by_incident.cfm Maritimeaccident.org (2009), Accident Report: Cruise Industry Needs Weather Best Practice–Pacific Sun viewed on 2nd August 2010 from http://maritimeaccident.org/2009/06/24/accident-report-cruise-industry-needs-weather-best-practice-pacific-sun National Research Council (U.S.). Marine Board. Committee on Fishing Vessel Safety(1991), Fishing vessel safety: blueprint for a national program, National Academies, Washington DC. pg 264. Ozanne-Smith J., Oyebite K., Peden M. M., World Health Organization (2008), World report on child injury prevention, World Health Organization, Washington. pg 68. Stenaline.co.uk (2010), Stena HSS Voyage viewed on 3rd august 2010 from http://www.stenaline.co.uk/ferry/our-ships/stena-voyager/ Taic.org.nz (2009), Marine Occurrence Reports viewed on 2nd August 2010 from http://www.taic.org.nz/ReportsandSafetyRecs/MarineReports/tabid/87/language/en-US/Default.aspx UN.org, United Nations Convention on the Law Of The Sea, viewed on 2nd August 2010, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm . Unlawoftheseatreaty.org (2010), The Law of the Sea Treaty, viewed on 2nd August 2010, http://www.unlawoftheseatreaty.org par 4. Uscgboating.org (2008), Recreational Boating Statistics, viewed on 2nd August 2010, www.uscgboating.org/.../1/Publications/Boating_Statistics_2008.pdf, p. 56, 57. Uscgboating.org (2010), Accident Statistics, viewed on 2nd August 2010, http://www.uscgboating.org/statistics/accident_statistics.aspx Read More