Management, Leadership and Change in Corporations - Essay Example

Management, Leadership and Change in Corporations Prepared by (2993 Words) Executive Summary A business’s endurance in the current competitive milieu is based on how well its top brass management can make strategic and subtle decisions, its ability to adjust to changes and stay above in the competition. The management should explicitly understand the phases of change, and how best to manage change that will otherwise coerce the business to obsolesce. The research concentrated on transformational leadership that enabled Nokia Corporation to remain a market leader for decades. The focal aim of the study was judging if transformational leadership could resolve the change process. According to Aluya (2009), successful transformation would require 70 – 80 percent leadership and only 10 – 30 percent management. Failure to plan is planning to fail. The foremost reasons following the botched change process is the opposition to change (Bean, 2014). A triumphant change principal will engage the members in the change process, and with this participation, the change will be probable. Table of Contents Executive Summary 2 Table of Contents 3 Introduction 4 Aims and Objectives 6 The purpose of the report was comprehensively to scrutinize the transformational leadership that permitted Nokia Corporation to remain a market leader for decades. Another mystifying issue that inspired the research was the fact that Nokia products were facing stiff competition from their close competitors like Samsung yet it was many older than them. It should be settled that Nokia, having been established earlier, should have conquered the market due to customer constancy and high excellence merchandise that are customer-tailored, but this was not the case. There has been the change of leadership from transformational to Democratic leadership style. The research tried to demystify the impact that different leadership styles in organisations in terms of morale of employees, the relationship in the group and the consequent effects of changing from one leadership style to another. The research had a purpose of indicating how beneficial transformation leadership was to the company and showed why the change of direction to Democratic led to market failure of a once giant company. Collectively, the report exemplified that failure to cope with change leads to enormous letdown. 6 Methodology 8 Research Roadmap 9 Research Findings 11 Nokia under Elop – Performance Review 11 Failure of Management 16 Conclusion 18 Differentiation, Neutralization, and Waste 18 Transactional Management over Transformational Leadership 19 Reference List 21 Appendices 22 Appendix…………………………………………………………………………………………22 Introduction Transformational leadership has pragmatically been the preference for extenuating change in a managerial space. An organisation’s survival in the current economic landscape entirely depends on how suitably and adequately it assumes its strategies. The zenith of managers should be well informed of the changes that occur in the industry and rapidly conforms to the changes to prevent being engulfed by the changes (Rowe, 2012). To remain competitive, current managers must create ingenious solutions to challenging problems. The research report was based on information sourced from, books, news articles, and pertinent journals, which was imperative in reconnoitring the concept of leadership and change management. Prior to explicating the objectives and aims of the research, leadership is defined as the act of setting directions, creating and stimulating others with a vision of accomplishing various predestined aspiration or something novel. Transformational leadership targets profound change, and as studies suggest, organisations stand to gain from the constructive effects abstracted from transformational leadership. These benefits consist of enthusiasm, competence, comfort, and job satisfaction. The report systematically discusses the impact of different leadership styles to organisations with respect to management of change. A Democratic leader, on the other hand, shares the decision-making and problem-solving tasks with their team while maintaining the final say in the ultimate resolution. Democratic leadership creates a platform that encourages employee contribution, commitment, and partaking in the decision-making process (Iqbal, 2011). More often, environments with Democratic leaders yield a well-motivated team that is inventive and supportive in solving problems. This form of leadership motivates employees to lay down workable goals and recognizes their achievements. The most intriguing issue answered in the research was how Nokia lost the Smartphone fight despite dominating the global market share in 2007. Some experts argued that it was losing to software stagnation, others that it was a self-satisfaction and the incumbent leadership. Contrary, the report argued that shared emotions within the company were the greater part of the account. Evidently, the argument circled around the suggestion that the emotions felt by a significant number of people within an establishment can influence the accomplishment of strategy execution even when these opinions go confined (Bean, 2014). When Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, former C.E.O of Nokia was asked to illustrate his familiarity in the aggressive market of the mobile phone industry during his term, he admitted to the hasty changes in the competitive business atmosphere. He further explained that the unprecedented momentary transformations altered the market dynamics that no one could recognize the factual character of the industry anymore. All the mobile telephony components alongside internet industry and application industry have presently evolved into one. Strategy is the foundation stone for successful business execution in the current competitive environment. With the benefit of retrospection, Nokia would have done so many things differently, like Morrill, (2010) reiterates. The falling market-share of the multinational company, most recent being 54 percent reduction in revenue affirms the impedance to strategic management of resources. It would be sound to argue that vigilant control of expressive processes would have enabled the pinnacle management to congregate precise information of Nokia’s software potential and advance momentum. One of the ways the apex management would have used to strengthen peripheral fear might have been consenting the middle managers obtain and explore rival products expansively, akin to what Samsung did, to certify that the middle managers increase a suitably profound understanding of their potency over Nokia’s products along detailed magnitude, like usability. Nokia’s lesson is relevant to several thriving and less successful organisation. The C.E.O’s primary role involves inspiring and mobilizing all the factions to explicitly and legitimately collaborate with one another to produce valuable and inventive products for their consumers. Successful multinational companies continuously invest in new persuasive ideas, innovative consulting advantage, and market intelligence. Strategic goals are always clear but implementing them is always much more intricate. Analysts argue that the strategy is 5 percent thinking and 95 percent implementation. The higher percentage represents more collective participation of members at all levels, and managing collective emotions in strategy execution. Aims and Objectives The purpose of the report was comprehensively to scrutinize the transformational leadership that permitted Nokia Corporation to remain a market leader for decades. Another mystifying issue that inspired the research was the fact that Nokia products were facing stiff competition from their close competitors like Samsung yet it was many older than them. It should be settled that Nokia, having been established earlier, should have conquered the market due to customer constancy and high excellence merchandise that are customer-tailored, but this was not the case. There has been the change of leadership from transformational to Democratic leadership style. The research tried to demystify the impact that different leadership styles in organisations in terms of morale of employees, the relationship in the group and the consequent effects of changing from one leadership style to another. The research had a purpose of indicating how beneficial transformation leadership was to the company and showed why the change of direction to Democratic led to market failure of a once giant company. Collectively, the report exemplified that failure to cope with change leads to enormous letdown. Methodology The most imperative aspects considered during the selection of the research method were data collection process, data accuracy, time, and cost. The study utilized primary and secondary, qualitative and quantitative research methods in collecting information. The primary methods included; survey, interviews, and observations. The primary method made it possible for the data collectors to gather current and reliable data while providing total control of the research and streamlining the leadership styles of Nokia and trends of the company. Judgementally, it was regrettable that accessibility of the information was hampered by the massive expenditure concerned and the need for opposite human wherewithal that lowered its achievability. Secondary sources used in data collection involved the internet, journal articles, and books. Books and the internet granted far-reaching information that augmented the capability to illuminate the research question that tried to understand how the change of leadership fashion by Nokia led to the company’s dwindling performance. The methodology further focused on the research question that enabled the researchers to delineate the benefits and hitch of various leadership techniques through an examination of leadership theories and qualities. The research methodology also generated a new inside into the comprehension of the change introduced in Nokia and consumer perspectives on the subject. According to James (2014), study of written resources portrays the risk of acquiring artificial, deficient, obsolete and erratic information. A miscellany of the various methodologies certified that only the best data was captured and actually used in answering the research questions and formulating concrete conclusions. Research Roadmap The roadmap tool was vital in providing direction for the team members. The roadmap was necessary for accomplishing a series of goals outlined in the objectives of the research. Some of the specific objectives included organizing the research team, data collection and analysis mechanisms and final reporting of the results. The roadmap tool also provided a formation whereby agenda could be argued in a more prolific approach. Research Roadmap Purpose To understand the different leadership techniques used in Nokia Corporation and to understand the various impact of each style. Goals To collect as much data as possible to scrutinize the outcomes of the leadership models. Guidelines Observing data collection and reporting time limits. Adhere to scope of the research. Keeping time. Roles The leader controls the overall progress of the team All members are responsible for the research process All members shall actively participate in achieving the goals of the study. Other roles may arise as required. Plan Initial meeting held to discuss research concepts and evaluate data collection techniques. Drafting a working budget. Procuring all the materials required for the research. Data collection - journals, books, interviews, observations, internet sites Data analysis – using charts, graphs Data recording Drafting report Report presentation Feedback The group attained most of its research objectives The lessons learnt were recorded for future reference and several lessons were also learnt in the process Research Findings Information obtained from different sources depended on the mode of data collection and the relevance to the subject. From a researcher’s standpoint, the most accurate information can be obtained when raw data is analysed. In some cases, access to raw data was cumbersome, and the data available were obsolete. Nokia under Elop – Performance Review The data gathered was used to compare Elop’s performance against his predecessor. Elop was Nokia CEO for two years and eleven months, which is from September 21, 2010 (Bean, 2014). Figure 1: Nokia Performance. Retrieved from The graph displays that the three-year period of Elop’s involvement was a disaster. The company struggled to stay afloat during Elop’s tenure. During his leadership, Nokia corporate revenue declined by 40 percent. Nokia handset sales revenues dropped by 40 percent, and Nokia handset market share fell by 54 percent. The Smartphone sales revenue was down by 69 percent during the same period, and the Smartphone market share collapsed by 90 percent. Nokia profits were reduced to 92 percent. The shareholder value had dropped by 13 Billion dollars in this period (Bean, 2014). Even before Elop’s tenure, Nokia, as a corporation was in trouble. Elop was expected to make a dramatic turnaround that would rescue Nokia from the dropping revenue and sales volume. By 2011, Nokia under Kallasvuo had lost about 56 percent of their worth. Nokia was still vigorous when Kallasvuo left, but not stronger as it had been under Jorma Ollila. Elop was introduced by Chairman Jorma Ollila with an assignment to fix execution problems that were slowing down sales. Elop’s Performance The analysis measured total revenues, total profits, and total handset sales including Smartphones and feature phones. The graphical analysis shows how Nokia performed during the last year of Kallasvuo and the proceeding years in Elop’s tenure. Figure 2: Nokia five-year performance. Retrieved from The graph confirms Nokia’s poor performance under Elop’s leadership. During Kallasvuo’s last twelve months, Nokia’s proceeds were flat, but profits grew progressively, and handset unit sales grew to some extent. Since Elop assumed office, all the three aspects witnessed a massive fall. The revenues initially maintain flat performance followed by a drastic drop (Bean, 2014). Huge losses ensued, recovering a tenth of the profits Elop inherited. The handset unit growth faced a steep dive, declining instantly. Several lessons could be learnt from the scenario. The company’s flat revenues were converted into decline during Elop’s occupancy. His leadership wiped out profits that were vigorously growing, and steered a deep plunge of losses in record three years. Elop’s intervention was foreseen as a rescue to the ailing Nokia. Apparently, he aided in killing the sick patient. The Extent of Damage Records indicate that in 2010, Nokia’s business was in three identical units, the Smartphone unit, the feature phones unit, and the networking unit (Bean, 2014). The performance of the three divisions was very impressive in Q3 2010. Revenue produced was by double digits, least being thirty percent revenue generated by the network department. A graphical representation was used to compare the regime under which the most damage was done. Figure 3: Nokia business unit performance. Retrieved from Nokia’s networking unit considerably improved under Elop’s regime, returning it to ultra slim profits without sacrificing sales revenue (Bean, 2014). This was technically a good performance. The networks department was able to achieve profitability since Elop did not concentrate on damaging their business, but instead opted to leave them alone to their own devices and they fixed the problem without his intervention However, some analysts purported that Elop paid more attention to the phones department and hence the bigger damage witnessed there. Interviewees’ Opinion As was anticipated, different respondents had a different view regarding the style of leadership employed during the two tenures. However, most of them shared the same sentiment on the subject of the downfall of what was once the market leader in the phone business industry (Bean, 2014). One interviewee, Mr. Casais, argued that Samsung was able to beat Nokia in 2010 when it was able to convert the collection of its feature phones to benefit from on the rise of the Smartphone market. He further informs that the transition emanated from an explicit strategic intention on the helm of management in Nokia. Lastly, he affirms that market demand could drive Nokia in a number of directions, but what it lacked in its recipe was the compass for making big bets. The next interviewee, Mr. Foo, had a similar opinion but using Blackberry as the quid pro quo. He articulates that Nokia’s doom was inevitable, just like Blackberry’s downfall was. He then outlined a series of incompetent decisions made by Elop that further plunged the company into the deep end. Among them were there burning platform memo, predicting the death of Symbian before he could prove his worth, quickly adopting the unpopular Windows phone, giving the strategic direction of the company future to Microsoft and ultimately killing substitutes like Nokia N9. Mr. Foo believed that Nokia C.E.O knew that Android market dominated the Smartphone market but still opted for Windows, a decision that was ill-fated. When random interview was done in a crowd, fifteen out of twenty people interviewed confirmed that they would buy a Nokia Lumia today if only it had an Android operating system. This validates customer allegiance to the brand despite the current predicament that it faces. Failure of Management One of the tech’s websites (http://metro.co.uk/2014/10/22/goodbye-nokia-telephone-microsoft-dumps-our-old-friend-for-new-lumia-brand-4917446/) had a similar take on the demise of Nokia. The site suggests that Nokia had access to the new touch screen technology at that time and when one of its leading engineers presented the idea of adopting the technology to the board, it was swiftly shut down by the conservative, contented and the egghead attitude of the board (Stacey, 2012). That was an innovative solution to Nokia’s problem at that time, but Nokia’s dominant market position, and preceding success barred the board from supporting the technology which may have guarantee their continued existence at present. In the last quarter of 2009, Nokia had a lucid market leadership of 38.6 percent but at the end of 2014, that global market headship spot concurrently with the brand had vanished. In the time, a new world market head, Samsung, had gone from 3.3 percent market share to 23.8 percent market position within five years. The subject is how did they handle the extraordinary expedition? The graph below explains the journey. Figure 4: Quarterly performance by brand. Retrieved from Table 1: Current market share by brand. Retrieved from The table illustrates the current position of the once-dominant brand, currently falling under “Others”. Conclusion The most innovative companies in the world have a strange mix of intensity and laid-back cool. Their products are revolutionary and have transformed the entire industry. Nokia’s products, say phones, have an ideal blend of structure and function and are both striking and handy, as one executive contended. Differentiation, Neutralization, and Waste The Geoffrey Moore school of thought shares three ways to unchain the power of innovation. Failed attempts and waste form an indispensable part of change and make-up over half of innovation activities. Their three outcomes of change are exclusively mentioned to help in understanding the different leadership styles. A company can take the corridor of differentiation, neutralization or optimize the spot of their present market offering. In the case of Samsung, the path of neutralization established their dominant market position. They glimpsed at Apple’s products and became resolute to offer the market similar product but faster, superior and inexpensive. The one-dimensional analysis was used by Apple to counterbalance against Samsung’s differentiation improvement with the larger screens on the iPhone 6 and enhanced photography but plainly Samsung’s path to market control came through a neutralization strategy. Figure 5: Return on Innovation. Retrieved from Transactional Management over Transformational Leadership The lack of innovation management and understanding was the key ingredient to the demise of Nokia’s Organization (Stacey, 2012). For more than a century, Nokia had demonstrated transformational leadership growing from a producer of rubber products to technology hardware and eventually to the global market leader in mobile telephony. These evolutions took transformational leadership in the form of futuristic thinking, risk taking, durable forecast and the vigilant administration of business transformation and managerial tradition. However, the preceding leadership exhibited the traits of transactional leadership focused on the ephemeral strategies, and step up of performance. The notion together with stuck-up personality of a market leader who believes they recognize their market best due to historical performance is eventually the rationale behind Nokia’s impulsive downfall.  Nokia’s fall should be a lesson to all the companied presently at the helm of the market. In the hastily shifting technology market, the zenith team should wield a transformational leadership fashion as opposed to transactional leadership style. In product and business model development, the team should be clear about whether they are neutralizing, differentiating or optimizing. If the wrong leadership choices are made, the repercussions are evident and vice versa. Reference List Aluya, J., D B a Dr Joseph Aluya (2009) Complexity of Leadership, Organizations and the Real Estate Industry: Disrupting Existing Systems. United States: Authorhouse. Bean, J. (2014) ‘Bye Bye Nokia – A failure of management over leadership’. Jonobean. Available at: http://jonobean.com/2014/11/12/bye-bye-nokia-a-failure-of-management-over-leadership/ (Accessed: 19 March 2015). Iqbal, T. (2011) The impact of leadership styles on organizational effectiveness: Analytical study of selected organizations in IT sector in Karachi. Germany: Grin Verlag. Morrill, R. L. (2010) Strategic Leadership: Integrating Strategy and Leadership in Colleges and Universities. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Rowe, G. W. and Guerrero, L. (2012) Cases in leadership. Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications Inc. Stacey, R. D. (2012) Tools and Techniques of Leadership and Management: Meeting the Challenge of Complexity. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis. Appendices Appendix A 2015 CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENTS, Reported, EUR million     (unaudited)                     Reported Reported Reported Reported   10-12/2014 10-12/2013 1-12/2014 1-12/2013 Net sales 3,802 3,476 12,732 12,708 Cost of sales -2,147 -1,998 -7,094 -7,363           Gross profit 1,654 1,478 5,638 5,345 Research and development expenses -698 -620 -2,493 -2,619 Selling, general and administrative expenses -465 -430 -1,634 -1,671 Impairment of goodwill 0 0 -1,209 0 Other income 27 42 136 272 Other expenses -65 -197 -268 -809           Operating profit 454 274 170 518 Share of results of associated companies -3 6 -12 4 Financial income and expenses -39 -50 -396 -280           Profit/loss before tax 412 230 -237 243 Tax -84 -47 1,408 -202           Profit - continuing operations 327 183 1,171 41           Profit from continuing operations attributable to equity holders of the parent 326 181 1,163 186 Profit/loss from continuing operations attributable to non-controlling interests 1 3 8 -145           Profit/loss from discontinued operations 117 -201 2,305 -780           Profit/loss from discontinued operations attributable to equity holders of the parent 117 -206 2,299 -801 Profit from discontinued operations attributable to non-controlling interests 0 5 6 21           Profit/loss 445 -18 3,476 -739           Profit/loss attributable to equity holders of the parent 443 -26 3,462 -615 Profit/loss attributable to non-controlling interests 1 7 14 -124 Profit/loss 445 -18 3,476 -739           Earnings per share, EUR         (for profit/loss attributable to the equity holders of the parent)         Basic earnings per share         From continuing operations 0.09 0.05 0.31 0.05 From discontinued operations 0.03 -0.06 0.62 -0.22 From the profit 0.12 -0.01 0.94 -0.17 Diluted earnings per share         From continuing operations 0.08 0.05 0.30 0.05 From discontinued operations 0.03 -0.06 0.56 -0.22 From the profit 0.11 -0.01 0.85 -0.17           Average number of shares (1 000 shares)         Basic         From continuing operations 3,667,023 3,712,421 3,698,723 3,712,079 From discontinued operations 3,667,023 3,712,421 3,698,723 3,712,079 From the profit 3,667,023 3,712,421 3,698,723 3,712,079 Diluted         From continuing operations 3,986,613 4,396,223 4,131,602 3,733,364 From discontinued operations 3,986,613 3,712,421 4,131,602 3,712,079 From the profit 3,986,613 3,712,421 4,131,602 3,712,079           Interest expense, net of tax, on convertible bonds, where dilutive -12 -23 -60 -           From continuing operations:         Depreciation and amortization -80 -77 -297 -560           Share-based compensation expense 17 12 62 42           Appendix B Nokia Stock Share Index – 2007 to 2015 Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close 02/02/2015 8.01 8.14 7.62 7.78 30,703,600 7.78 02/02/2015 7.58 8.09 7.49 8.01 9,836,900 8.01 01/02/2015 7.97 8.13 7.4 7.6 14,269,900 7.6 12/01/2014 8.34 8.37 7.61 7.86 12,712,000 7.86 11/03/2014 8.38 8.44 7.63 8.24 15,025,700 8.24 10/01/2014 8.33 8.58 7.58 8.27 23,839,500 8.27 09/02/2014 8.3 8.73 8.24 8.46 16,824,200 8.46 08/01/2014 7.92 8.4 7.6 8.37 21,032,700 8.37 07/01/2014 7.64 8.35 7.3 7.93 16,666,400 7.93 06/02/2014 7.99 8.35 7.56 7.56 15,787,400 7.56 05/01/2014 7.45 8.15 7.16 8.13 16,194,900 7.63 04/01/2014 7.49 7.84 7 7.5 28,433,700 7.04 03/03/2014 7.5 8.06 7.08 7.34 20,379,400 6.89 02/03/2014 6.85 7.81 6.64 7.58 21,529,300 7.12 01/02/2014 8.03 8.2 6.81 6.92 24,457,300 6.5 12/02/2013 8 8.18 7.31 8.11 21,889,900 7.61 11/01/2013 7.62 8.18 7.42 8.06 25,283,300 7.57 10/01/2013 6.66 7.77 6.22 7.63 37,682,700 7.16 09/03/2013 5.45 6.78 4.97 6.51 88,103,100 6.11 08/01/2013 3.98 4.22 3.87 3.9 17,484,600 3.66 07/01/2013 3.95 4.29 3.81 3.94 25,922,800 3.7 06/03/2013 3.44 4.12 3.42 3.74 32,003,900 3.51 05/01/2013 3.38 3.92 3.25 3.44 32,998,700 3.23 04/01/2013 3.3 3.63 3.02 3.38 38,272,800 3.17 03/01/2013 3.57 3.76 3.19 3.28 47,446,700 3.08 02/01/2013 4.02 4.17 3.54 3.65 46,442,100 3.43 01/02/2013 4.18 4.9 3.67 3.92 83,765,100 3.68 12/03/2012 3.29 4.35 3.24 3.95 62,302,700 3.71 11/01/2012 2.76 3.59 2.6 3.26 50,389,100 3.06 10/01/2012 2.59 2.95 2.52 2.67 41,682,000 2.51 09/04/2012 2.9 3.14 2.27 2.58 73,310,600 2.42 08/01/2012 3.98 4.21 2.29 2.82 32,690,600 2.65 07/02/2012 2.11 4.07 1.63 3.94 36,562,000 3.7 06/01/2012 2.65 3.03 2.04 2.07 42,835,900 1.94 05/01/2012 3.69 3.75 2.63 2.67 38,218,000 2.51 04/02/2012 5.4 5.52 3.54 3.65 52,331,900 3.17 03/01/2012 5.31 5.57 4.9 5.49 31,303,200 4.77 02/01/2012 5.1 5.87 4.95 5.29 31,360,200 4.6 01/03/2012 5.17 5.78 4.93 5.04 39,425,500 4.38 12/01/2011 5.8 5.82 4.46 4.82 27,418,400 4.19 11/01/2011 6.25 6.91 5.27 5.79 29,432,100 5.03 10/03/2011 5.72 7.38 5.1 6.73 34,491,400 5.85 09/01/2011 6.69 6.84 5.13 5.66 26,572,800 4.92 08/01/2011 5.79 6.59 4.82 6.44 42,548,500 5.6 07/01/2011 6.39 6.49 5.31 5.8 33,514,900 5.04 06/01/2011 6.51 7.03 5.79 6.42 49,484,000 5.58 05/02/2011 9.32 9.38 6.79 7.02 36,256,200 6.1 04/01/2011 8.44 9.42 8.26 9.23 26,056,600 7.55 03/01/2011 8.73 8.81 7.73 8.51 21,970,700 6.96 02/01/2011 10.58 11.75 8.44 8.63 47,972,100 7.06 01/03/2011 10.58 11.02 10.2 10.7 22,965,000 8.75 12/01/2010 9.5 10.39 9.49 10.32 14,870,200 8.44 11/01/2010 10.52 10.88 9.08 9.23 24,190,100 7.55 10/01/2010 10.31 11.62 9.98 10.7 28,438,500 8.75 09/01/2010 8.81 10.29 8.76 10.03 29,890,800 8.21 08/02/2010 9.61 9.73 8.47 8.56 20,226,700 7 07/01/2010 8.43 9.59 8.21 9.51 27,636,100 7.78 06/01/2010 10.05 10.27 8 8.15 37,269,400 6.67 05/03/2010 12.22 12.28 9.64 10.12 38,624,000 8.28 04/01/2010 15.81 15.89 11.93 12.16 38,614,300 9.45 03/01/2010 13.3 15.65 13.23 15.54 19,219,800 12.08 02/01/2010 13.98 14.43 12.73 13.47 22,293,100 10.47 01/04/2010 13.26 14.47 12.52 13.69 32,440,900 10.64 12/01/2009 13.56 13.6 12.14 12.85 15,107,100 9.99 11/02/2009 12.77 14.04 12.56 13.26 18,343,600 10.31 10/01/2009 14.41 15.6 12.59 12.61 29,901,900 9.8 09/01/2009 13.61 16 13.15 14.62 24,669,500 11.36 08/03/2009 13.51 14.27 12.1 14.01 18,776,500 10.89 07/01/2009 14.92 15.77 12.54 13.34 29,759,300 10.37 06/01/2009 15.95 16.58 14.01 14.58 19,299,400 11.33 05/01/2009 13.73 15.65 13.42 15.3 16,806,400 11.89 04/01/2009 11.48 15.13 11.46 14.14 21,311,700 10.99 03/02/2009 9.11 12.36 8.47 11.67 23,077,000 8.75 02/02/2009 12.13 13.54 9.22 9.36 28,607,800 7.02 01/02/2009 15.57 16.38 11.73 12.27 22,248,800 9.2 12/01/2008 13.52 16.73 12.87 15.6 15,814,500 11.7 11/03/2008 15.7 17.05 12.08 14.17 22,736,500 10.63 10/01/2008 18.42 18.87 14.12 15.18 28,452,600 11.39 09/02/2008 24.65 25.02 17.22 18.65 24,511,200 13.99 08/01/2008 27.27 27.99 24.67 25.17 12,348,800 18.88 07/01/2008 23.7 28.34 23.58 27.32 19,440,800 20.49 06/02/2008 28.16 28.22 23.61 24.5 20,206,000 18.38 05/01/2008 30.16 30.48 27.73 28.4 17,898,300 21.3 04/01/2008 33.57 34.9 28.28 30.07 20,257,100 21.96 03/03/2008 35.65 35.77 28.47 31.83 21,999,200 23.25 02/01/2008 37.11 38.64 33.85 36.01 13,847,800 26.3 01/02/2008 38.34 38.38 29.5 36.68 23,725,600 26.79 Dec-07 40.01 40.59 35.4 38.39 11,133,300 28.04 Nov-07 39.75 42.22 36.64 39.33 13,163,800 28.72 Oct-07 36.74 39.93 35.08 39.72 15,995,000 29.01 Sep-07 32.86 38.06 32.82 37.93 12,323,000 27.7 Aug-07 28.26 33.14 27.35 32.88 14,042,900 24.01 Jul-07 28.2 30.31 27.06 28.64 9,679,400 20.92 Jun-07 27.54 29.19 27.35 28.11 9,662,800 20.53 May-07 25.27 27.57 24.42 27.38 11,231,100 20 Apr-07 22.76 25.75 22.54 25.25 11,798,500 18.03 Mar-07 21.23 23.22 20.77 22.92 10,689,200 16.37 Feb-07 22.13 23.21 21.5 21.83 12,563,500 15.59 Jan-07 20.63 22.15 18.87 22.1 21,321,600 15.78 Appendix C               NOKIA NETWORKS, EUR million             (unaudited)                             Non-IFRS Special items & PPA Reported Non-IFRS Special items & PPA Reported   10-12/2014 10-12/2014 10-12/2014 10-12/2013 10-12/2013 10-12/2013               Net sales 3,365   3,365 3,105   3,105 Cost of sales -2,078   -2,078 -1,936   -1,936               Gross profit 1,287   1,287 1,169   1,169 % of net sales 38.2   38.2 37.6   37.6               Research and development expenses1 -487 -7 -494 -452 -6 -458 % of net sales 14.5   14.7 14.6   14.8               Selling, general and administrative expenses2 -336 -9 -345 -318 -6 -324 % of net sales 10.0   10.3 10.2   10.4               Other income and expenses3 6 -6 0 -50 -94 -144               Operating profit 470 -22 448 349 -106 243 % of net sales 14.0   13.3 11.2   7.8               Depreciation and amortization -44 -16 -60 -47 -11 -58               EBITDA 512 -6 506 398 -94 304                             1 Amortization of acquired intangible assets of EUR 7 million in Q4/14 and EUR 6 million in Q4/13. 2 Amortization of acquired intangible assets of EUR 9 million in Q4/14 and EUR 6 million in Q4/13. 3 Restructuring charges and associated charges of EUR 6 million in Q4/14 and 94 million in Q4/13.   Appendix D NOKIA TECHNOLOGIES, EUR million             (unaudited)                             Non-IFRS Special items & PPA Reported Non-IFRS Special items & PPA Reported   10-12/2014 10-12/2014 10-12/2014 10-12/2013 10-12/2013 10-12/2013               Net sales 149   149 121   121 Cost of sales -2   -2 -2   -2               Gross profit 147   147 119   119 % of net sales 98.7   98.7 98.3   98.3               Research and development expenses1 -45 -9 -54 -27 -15 -42 % of net sales 30.2   36.2 22.3   34.7               Selling, general and administrative expenses2 -24   -24 -10 -2 -12 % of net sales 16.1   16.1 8.3   9.9               Other income and expenses -1   -1 0   0               Operating profit 77 -9 68 81 -16 65 % of net sales 51.7   45.6 66.9   53.7               Depreciation and amortization -1   -1                     EBITDA 78 -8 70 81 -16 65                             1 Transaction and other related costs of EUR 9 million in Q4/14 related to the sale of substantially all of Devices & Services business to Microsoft and EUR 15 million in Q4/13. 2 Transaction and other related costs of EUR 2 million in Q4/13 related to the sale of substantially all of Devices & Services business to Microsoft. Appendix E Read More