Appraisal of Le Grands Theory - Assignment Example

?Introduction The ‘choice’ agenda was prominent especially in public policy. It is popular as part of the earlier antecedents of the present debate on market-based incentives and motivation. Julian Le Grand is one of the scholars accredited for forming the policy. He argued that assumptions governing human motivation and agency were important to the formulation and implementation of public policy. Most of the policy makers made policies on the assumption that both the implementers and the beneficiaries will behave in certain ways (Deacon 2004). In support of his theory, Le Grand provided the following example: in the ‘classic’ era of the welfare state (1945-79), presumed that the motivation of the public servants was their professional ethic and the interests of those they served were of great concern to them. They appeared as public-spirited altruists (or knights) as they carried out their duties in the public interest. Taxpayers came out in the same light as the public servants because of their willingness to pay taxes. However, as per Le Grand’s theory, after 1979 the public experienced grave assaults on assumptions about motivation and behavior. There was the presumption that the public could understand the behavior of public officials and professionals if they appeared self-interested. Ultimately, it seemed objectionable that the beneficiaries of services received treatment as passive recipients-rather the consumer should be the king (Le Grand 1997). This paper examines the worth of Le Grand’s contribution in ‘knights, knaves, pawns and queens’. This is in regards to the framework of our understanding of relationships between public authorities and organizations, which provider public services paid for. In that line, this paper looks at the merits and shortcomings of Le Grand’s contribution. Le Grand’s theory The observation that policy structures reflect a set of assumptions, implicit or explicit, about the nature of human behavior is vital to understanding Le Grand’s theory. He seeks to comprehend how to formulate and execute policies that enhance altruistic behavior by public servants while maximizing service recipients’ ability to act and make choices. Le Grand argues that to understand the effectiveness of such policies, two central questions that need answers: 1) Are public employees driven by primary self-interested motives or are they public-spirited altruists? 2) Do the recipients of services posse some capability to influence their situations or are their situations merely the product of broader social circumstances? (The ABCs of public service motivation, altruism, behavior, & compensation 2011) Logically he contends that the pay and incentive systems that stimulate the government servants enthusiasm should be formulated in such a manner that it is tough to both types of behavior; and that outsourcing of public sector work to non-profit bodies should not assume that these organizations are purely altruistic (Andrew 2004). This is one of the key contributions of this model that many scholars and researchers received well in this field of study. Flaws in Le Grand’s theory Le Grand’s contribution, since its introduction, has undergone remarkable scrutiny to date. Many scholars and institutions, in this field, have acknowledged, expanded or criticized this framework. The following are some of the issues that arise to challenge and expose the inadequacies that are in the model. Simplicity of the model raises a lot of concern. Many argue that his analysis is too simplistic a means of capturing the complexity of the realities of human motivation and agency. As there is a variety of knights and knaves, and people are not simply pawns or queens (Welshman 2004). For instance, knights exist in two types. The first type, act-relevant knights receive personal gratification from performing an altruistic act. The second type act-irrelevant knights receive personal gratification when those who need help receive it, regardless of who actually performs the helping act (The ABCs of public service motivation, altruism, behavior, & compensation 2011). Frank Coffield and his colleagues, for example, suggested from their fieldwork that the ‘cycle of deprivation’ was too simple an idea to explain the complex lives of four families that they had studied in detail. The casual relationship between motivation and policy context is not fully developed. Is the policy contexts antecedent of altruistic motives or do they simply correlate with one another? Le Grand provides evidence that indicates policy context can align self-interested and altruistic motives. Here, the implication is that individual motives precede policy construction and that the design of policies can be to align pre-existing motives. On the other hand, Le Grand also argues that policy possesses the capability to shape individual motives through crowding-out or crowding-in processes. Ultimately, his conclusion is that sometimes policy creates motives and sometimes it reinforces pre-existing motives. The conception of antecedents of public service motivation, or altruism, has been traditionally as social bodies like the family, profession and religion (Perry & Hordeghem 2008). In this book, Le Grand seems to be inclined to only one mechanism of providing public services. It is evidently clear that he favors the provision of public services through quasi-market mechanisms. In each policy arena, the book illustrates how beneficial quasi-markets have been for both the motivation of public servants and agency of service recipients. Although the empirical evidence provided in the book appears to justify the argument for quasi-markets, one remains to question if the data and methods are appropriate to generalize Le Grand’s findings to other settings in full. Data gathering is from a European context, and there is no systematic statistical investigation across several policy arenas. This data provides a rich description of instances of quasi-market success, but there is no examination of instances of quasi-markets failed to achieve the intended work motivation benefit (Macnicol 1987). The book does not account for the full breadth of motivation research from either psychology or public management. Although minor references to psychological motivation theory exist, the book does not fully use these resources in theory development. Additionally, Le Grand does not address the concept of PSM developed in public management (Perry & Wise 1990). The body of public management research on PSM could contribute substantially to Le Grand’s theoretical account because it examines the social origins of altruistic tendencies, as well as the behavioral characteristics associated with public service motivation. Brown and Madge found out that many of the research projects seemed to favor a structural rather than a personal or behavioral approach. They reported, “Most of the research concerned with exceedingly broad definitions of deprivation has ineluctably concluded that there is disadvantage deeply entrenched in society’s structure”. The above statement comes in handy to question the validity of ‘cycle deprivation’, which Le Grand introduced. Using a different metaphor, Frank Coffield and colleagues concluded, “The web of deprivation, rather than the cycle of deprivation, depicts more accurately the dense network of psychological, social, historical and economic factors which have either created or perpetuated problems for these families”. Their conclusions cast doubt on Le Grand’s explanations that sought to lay the blame for deprivation either on the inadequate personalities of the poor or the economic structure of society alone. The above illustrations confirm that Le Grand’s concept of ‘cycle deprivation’ in the explanation of poverty had its shortcomings. Another challenged aspect of Le Grand’s theory is periodisation and his focus on 1945 and 1979 as turning points. Le Grand ignores the longer-term preoccupations with rival structural and behavioral analyses of poverty that had been a recurring feature of at least the past 100 years (Macnicol 1987). Le Grand, therefore, mistakes in regarding 1945 as a watershed. It is striking that Joseph’s assault on the assumptions and achievements of the postwar welfare state came not after 1979 but before then (Joseph 1966). The implication of this evidence is that Le Grand’s periodisation of 1945-79 needs revising. The study of the United Kingdom’s (UK) Private Finance Initiative (PFI) shows that there is a flaw in the motivational rationale. Both the Labour and Conservative governments have argued that PFI enhances the public interest through the provision of additional resources for public investment, and delivering infrastructure and services more efficiently than the available alternatives such as public procurement. The study shows that investment through PFI cannot in itself, lead to fiscal savings; and the economic case for the method bases on false assumptions and misleading evidence (Kendall 2001). The study further shows that, far from enhancing the public interest the effects of PFI have been to reduce National Health Service capacity, thereby threatening its ability to meet needs. Another research on the motivation and behavior of hospital trusts occurred. The outcome was that the 1991 quasi-market reforms and subsequent 1997 (Labour Government White Paper) reforms in the UK have done nothing to alter the fundamental motivation of the dominant actors, namely consultants (Crilly & Le Grand 2004). This study exposes the flaw in the author-favored supply provision mechanism. It is a conclusion that Le Grand contribution had a great impact in this field; however, it has its own shortcoming. There have been questions concerning the usefulness and adequacy of Le Grand descriptions and their interpretation of attitude towards motivation and behavior. Hence, it has to be revised, and the necessary modifications be made to it. However, it is good to note that the examination of the motivations of parties in the welfare state and incidental services has increasingly captured the imagination of leading analysts in the field. There are some challenges that these analysts may face in their quest to better the model crafted earlier by Le Grand and other great minds in this field. From a conceptual point of view, the examination poses fundamental questions in regards to the assumptions that underpin public interventions; and to what extent the formulation of social policy can be to accommodate, and provide appropriate responses to, or even change, prevailing mixture of motives. The changes experienced in the modern world in terms of technological development and knowledge has to undergo great consideration during modifications. Nevertheless, we have to remain optimistic and hopeful that the expected alterations will be successful. Bibliography Brown, M. & Madge, N 2002, Despite the welfare state: a report on the SSRC/DHSS Programme of Research into Transmitted Deprivation, London: Heinemann, pp. 4-5 Crilly, Tessa & Le Grand J, 2004, The Motivation & Behavior of Hospital Trusts, London School of Economics: Department of Social Policy Coffield, F., Robinson, P., & Sarsby, J 1980, A Cycle of deprivation? A case study of four families, London: Heinemann, pp. 163-4 Deacon, A. 2002, Perspectives on Welfare: ideas, ideologies and policy debates. Buckingham: Open University Press, pp. 23-6 Deacon, A. 2004, Review article: Different interpretations of agency within welfare debates. Social Policy Soc, vol. 3, pp. 447–55. Donahue, J 2008, The warping of government work, Cambridge ma: Harvard University Press, pp. 2245 Joseph, K 1966, Social security: The new priorities, London: Conservative Political Center, pp. 163-4 Kendall, Jeremy. 2001, Of knights, knaves & merchants: The case of Residential care for older people in England in the late 1990s, Social Policy and Administration, vol. 35, no.4, pp. 360-375 Le Grand, J. 1997, Knights, knaves or prawns? Human Behavior and social policy, Journal of Social Policy149-169 Le Grand, J 2003, Motivation, agency, & public policy: of knights & knaves, prawns & queens, oxford, Oxford University press, pp. 2-11 Macnicol J, 1987, In pursuit of the underclass, Journal of Social Policy, vol. 16, no. 2. Mark, H & Pollock, AM 2004, Do PPPS in Social Infrastructure Enhance the Public Interest? Evidence from England’s National Health Service, Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 69 The ABCs of public service motivation, altruism, behavior, & compensation, 2011. Available from: . [27 March 2013] Perry, J & Hordeghem, A (eds) 2008, ‘Motivation in public management’: The call of public service, oxford: oxford university press, pp. 346 Welshman, J 2007, ‘Knights, knaves, prawns and queens: attitudes to behavior in post-war Britain’, Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health vol. 61, no. 2, pp. 95-7 Read More