An Attempt to Define Democracy - Essay Example

Preliminary: An Attempt to Define Democracy Beginning in the Ancient Greece, when the Greeks where experimenting on a workable political set up given their peculiar condition, democracy to date has grown into such complexity that its meaning depends to a certain extent on the degree to which it is generally understood and accepted. In fact, to have a better grasp of this complicated ideology, semantical models by which to understand its practice by nations in the world are being proposed. This does not mean, however, that one cannot adopt a general description of democracy. For this purpose, one includes the four principles of popular sovereignty, political equality, popular consultation and majority rule (Ranney 1996, see p. 94-105). Democracy’s Initial Beginnings The etymology of democracy is the Greek word demos, which means, first, a village or more technically put the smallest unit of Athenian state like voting or school district, and, second, people. Formally, the demos, referring to the local village or the population in general and the assembly of citizens governing the state, was a potent concept in 5th to 4th BCE Athens. However, we need to state here that in actuality structures and even ideas – for example, that of assembly, democratic judges, among others – that later became significant elements of democracy’s theory and practice were developed already during the pre-democratic era in the history of Greece (Blackwell 2003). Having said thus, we move on by saying that in Ancient Greece democracy meant rule by the people. Simply said, a city was democratic if, firstly, the city affairs were subject to an assembly to which, secondly, all male citizens belonged, and, thirdly, in which decisions were made by simple majority rule. Conventionally known it is that in Ancient Greece, where the “experiment on direct democracy was first recorded,” there was no pure democratic city – that is, historians attest that some officials always did manage to keep some things from the assembly and being deme was not open on reasonable terms to all residents, among others. Eventually, direct democracy was abandoned after the conditions in Athens became no longer conducive for its realization: the population was increasing; property and wealth distribution was not equal; the society became all the more heterogenous; and, finally, those who administered the law managed to function independently of the popular will (Rodee, et. al. p. 44). Nevertheless, democracy has from thereon “caught the fancy” of political thinkers and it eventually has grown to the form we know it now. In closing, tet us likewise recognize the ideas that originated from other cultures and historical times – like the Stoics’ and Cicero’s idea of human equality and natural rights, the Middle Ages’ ethico-religious restraints on political actions like “fair wage” and “just price,” and the Renaissance, Modern and Contemporary philosophies (e.g., John Rawls, John Dewey [London 2000], etc.) – that in one way or the other have enriched democracy’s theory and practice. French Revolution: Its Assertion for Democracy Lasting from 1789 to 1799, the French Revolution brought about great social and political changes in France. For our purpose, let us just mention that the Revolution introduced democratic ideals to France. Nonetheless, we have to qualify our statement. It introduced democratic ideals to France in the sense that the Revolution actually ended the supreme rule by French kings and strengthened the middle class (Woloch, 1999). In the first place, the Revolution – although it was begun by a government financial crisis – started because the monarchs, nobles and privileged groups in France ignored the ideals of liberty and equality that led to various social, political and economic conditions that eventually exploded into upheaval as the lower and middle classes became interested in realizing or implementing “new ideas” about government and politics. One understands better if in this writing we mention about at least a couple of conditions that necessitated the assertion for democracy. First, in French, there was an existing social stratification (which is expected from a monarchical set up) called estates: the first estate was made up by the members of the clergy; the second estate was peopled by the nobles; and the rest of the people – i.e., the peasants, the working people of the cities and even the middle class of the time like the merchants, lawyers and government officials --belonged to the third estate. Expectedly, the third estate resented the advantages that the first two estates were enjoying. Likewise, the legitimizing theory for French’s political set up that was ruled by the monarchs was divine right. That the monarch’s right to rule was thought to come from God had made it extremely difficult to check the kings. However, this slowly became forcefully challenged by new philosophers who were raising new ideas about freedom. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for one, advocated that the right to govern emanated from the people. Not surprisingly, thus, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (adopted in August 1789) abolished some feudal dues that the peasants owed their landlords, the tax advantages of the clergy and nobles, and regional privileges. The same basic rights to all citizens were guaranteed, including resistance to oppression, representative government, property, security and liberty. When Louis XVI continued his resistance to the revolution to the point of “hoping for the victory of the foreign armies of Austria and Prussia” who were commissioned to restore the king and émigrés to their positions, the people of Paris took custody of the king and his family. The imprisonment of Louis XVI brought the curtain down to what historians call the first stage of French Revolution, which had been a liberal middle-class reform movement based on constitutional monarchy, and ushered in the beginning of its second stage that was organized around principles of democracy. The convention that was convoked for this purpose declared France a republic, with its official slogan “Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite” (Rodee 1983, p.95-96). We look beyond French boundaries and see that the American Revolution that freed the colonies from the grasp of England became an inspiration to the French revolutionaries and intellectuals to press for democratic changes. We are reminded that a good number of the European immigrants to what is now America were actually religious and political dissenters from the Old World. In American they were able to forge for themselves and their eventual generations a “fertile ground for liberal ideas.” They were carriers of long tradition of struggle for freedom and equality, and they were learned to have known for example John Locke’s Second Treatise on the Government which, among others, eloquently argued that a government that fails to uphold the rights of the people need to be changed. And, according to John Locke, taking his social contract theory on political set up as his point of departure, it was the people’s moral obligation to do so. America was in revolution, and Europe was watching. When America emerged victorious, French in particular saw that their belief on equality, accountability, and human rights were altogether strengthened and validated. It is in this sense that American Revolution served as precursor to French Revolution. Democracy in Contemporary Australia Kilcullen (2000), by saying that Australian political system is both democratic and undemocratic, contributes sharp insights into our subject matter. Accordingly, what for him is democratic is the relationship between the Prime Minister, the Parliament and the electorate; and the undemocratic features are the bicameralism, federalism, monarchy – to name just a few. By making a distinction between what is democratic and what is not, Kilcullen does not intend “to separate the sheep from the goat,” as it were. He simply operates from the framework of the traditional elements of democracy. But, we shall not limit our interest with the determination of democracy in Australia by simply considering the institutions. It would be more enterprising should we look at the citizens’ attitude and actions towards democracy. And, for this part, recent significant transpirations will be scrutinized to see threads of development of theory and practice of democracy in contemporary Australia. Let us begin by considering the Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party’s winning eleven (11) seats in the 1998 Queensland State election (see Davidson 2000). While this could mean different things to different political pundits, it is being highlighted to mean or validate an observable growing dissatisfaction among the Australians towards their liberal representative democracy. In effect, this displeasure on democratic practice takes the form of declining belief in parliament as a central component in Australian responsible government and the Australians’ desire to “punish” their elected representatives for a perceived lack of responsibility. This transpiration is epitomized by an account on which an angry constituent confronted the then Federal Primary Industries Minister, John Anderson, in his electorate of Gwydir sometime in 1998. The protester told the Minister: “I’m going to kick you and kick you and kick you until you do something.” Asked the Minister, “But why?” The reply was, “Because you have power and I have none!” (Rothwell 1998). Is this simply an instance of an irate protester? Nay, it is not. It is said to be a clear widespread view that the state of Australian democracy is not healthy as it could be. Towards politics and politicians, people are cynical, disillusioned and/or disenchanted. And this is expectedly resulting to growing abyss between the government and the “governors” on one hand, and the governed on the other. And, precisely, this kind of sentiments of Australians has prompted them to explore possibilities of increasing the roles and responsibilities to be conceded by their government to the Australian people. And this is made concrete by the Citizen’s Initiated Referendums (CIR). Notwithstanding the unpopularity of citizen referenda, CIR’s are projected to be a viable instrument for an exercise of direct democracy. If one recalls, during the 1998 Constitutional Convention that was held to determine major dimensions of a possible Australian Republic, the “Aussies” were very active in joining the debate – which in the process is tantamount to exercising their political role as citizens in a democratic society – in favor of the proposition that the Head of the State (of Australia) be ascertained by popular, direct election. This proposition was, of course, practically defeated by every Federal MP’s opposition; but, still, it is worth noting here that Australian communities would want to be the direct electors of their state head. Thus, the popular support for CIR’s, the call for direct election for the President of the Australian Republic, and the “anti-politician sentiment” are all but indications of Australians political maturation to not just limit their civic participation to voting in elections. And these breed more participatory attitude among the citizens of the Down Under towards democracy. This development is significant especially when one considers that until recently the emergence of democratic citizen was not evident in Australia. In fact, in Australia, the state can trample on rights recognized elsewhere in the world; for one, not until 1999 was there a Bill of Rights in Australian legal system to protect citizen inviolability. In fact, it is a difficult question for Australian political thinkers why international standards have not forced or led the nation away from its undemocratic political residues (Davidson 2000). References: Blackwell, C.W. 2003, ‘The Development of Athenian Democracy,’ Available at www.stoa.org Davidson, A. 2000 ‘The State, Democracy and Citizenship in Australia,’ Available at www.law.unimelb.edu.au/events/citizen/davidson.pdf Kilcullen, J. 2000. ‘Democracy in Australia,’ Available at http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockham/y67xa.html London, S. 2000. ‘Organic Democracy: The Political Philosophy of John Dewey,’ Available at http://www.scottlondon.com/reports/dewey.html Macklin, M. 1995. ‘The Case For A Citizen’s Initiative,’ Constitutional Centenary, 4(4):6-8 Political Institutions: History of Australian Democracy, _______ Available at http://www4.gu.edu.au/ext/civics/cv02/mod01/cv02m01t04.htm Puplick, C. 1995. ‘The Case Against A Citizen’s Initiative,’ Constitutional Centenary, 4(4):8-10 Ranney, A. 1996. Governing: An Introduction to Political Science, 7th edn, Prentice-Hall International, Inc., New Jersey. Rodee, C.C., et. al. 1983. Introduction to Political Science, 4th edn. McGraw-Hill International Inc., Singapore Rothwell, N. 1998. ‘Bushwacked,’ Weekend Australian, July: 21, 18-19 Woloch, I. 1999. ‘The French Revolution (1789 to 1799) Introduced Democratic Ideals to France,’ Available at http://www.laughtergenealogy.com/bin/histprof/misc/french_rev.html Read More