Does the Use of Aircraft Automation Improve Safety - Report Example

INTRODUCTION Automation represents one of the major industrial trends of the 20th and 21st century. Automated systems are believed to provide superior reliability, improved performance and reduced cost of operations for many functions. This is what has driven the increased levels of control of electromechanical systems with a corresponding distancing of the human from direct system control. Automation has steadily advanced as means have been found for automating physical, perceptual, and more recently cognitive tasks in many kinds of systems. The role of humans has been changed from that of an operator to that of a monitor. This is a task that humans are not suited to. Since automation has been mostly, piecemeal, the presence of human has also been changed to that of an integrator to bridge gaps that the automation has not filled (Wise, et al 1996). People monitor the failures that are expected to occur and check for conditions that are likely to cause failure of the automated system. The more complex a system is the more catastrophic the system failure could be if the failure occurred. This has therefore put a greater burden on the human monitors to watch out for. The challenge is that people are slow to observe or detect faults that need intervention. Once the problem is detected, more time is needed to understand the state of the system in order to act in the appropriate manner. This addition time required before a possible solution to the detected problem is found is very critical. This delay could mean between a swift solution and a catastrophic problem. An example is the 1987 crash where the crew of Airlines MD-80 crashed on take-off at Detroit Airport due to an improper configuration of the flaps and slats. All but one passenger were killed. The main cause was the failure of an automated take-off configuration warning system which the crew had come to be used to (Wise et al. 1994). Observed improvements in aviation The automation of aircrafts has had a tremendous effect on the way aircrafts are flown. The amount of distances covered has been made possible because of the automation of aircrafts. The question of improved safety as a result of the aviation industry is one that has a complex answer. There does not seem to be a significant reduction in the number of aircraft accidents of automated aircrafts as compared to those that are not automated (FAA, 1996). It is evident however that aircrafts are flown more efficiently with the introduction of automated piloting. This has reduced Pilot Fatigue when flying for long distances. This could be said to have had a positive influence on the large number of flights that have grown tremendously but without a noticeable increase in the number of accidents relative to pre-automation days (FAA, 1996). The insignificant decline in the number of accidents recorded has been attributed to the fact that pilots are not trained to understand fully what the autopilot is doing. Therefore there is need to ensure that pilots have adequate knowledge of aircraft equipment operation and malfunctions. The improved reporting of equipment malfunctions and service difficulties could go a long way in improving safety of future operations. This is likely to improve the general safety of aviation operations beyond those that involve only auto piloting of the aircraft only. Source: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics Into Light Aircraft From the figure above, the accident improvement has been there but the change is not very significant. There is not much difference between automated and conventional aircraft. CREW TRAINING AND USE OF AUTOMATION BY CREW Automation and Pilot training Pilots are not always provided with all information needed the unique operational details of the primary flight instruments (Endsley, 1996).. These require more specific training and the general training is no longer sufficient to prepare pilots for safe operation of the highly automated flight instruments in automated planes. Simulators have been found to be the only viable training techniques that can be used for those cockpit avionics failures can are not easily replicated in light aircrafts used for training. The recording capabilities of the glass cockpit displays have enabled significant improvements in the safety of the equipments through data analyses. The low reliability of electromechanical cockpit displays is now a thing of the past. This has increased safety and made then cost of maintenance to drop while at the same time simplifying the storage of spares. In the past for aircrafts to flown safely there was need to have crews of up to five members but now a crew of two is the norm in the flying of modern jets (Wise et al 1994). Surveys show that the more automated an aircraft is, the more the pilots like it. Thus could be attributed with the ease of flying it and the adequate time available to plan ahead which is good for safety of the flight in the modern crowded and busy airports. This has however introduced another challenge. The alternate long periods of inactivity and short periods of intense activity can be overwhelming as has been noted that in conventional aircraft the work done during such period as landing are much less compared to those done in Highly automated aircrafts. This is as a result of the clumsy automation of aircrafts. This is where the even spread of workload through a flight is in conventional aircraft has changed in to long periods of relative idleness interrupted by short periods of intense activity. The long periods of time are times of monitoring the performance of the automatics. This raises the problem of concentration as people are not good at monitoring systems that rarely fail (Gray, et al. 2007). This has the effect of leading to complacency and the inability to believe that a system has failed when it actually has failed. This has lead to another problem in safety assurance as the resulting system failure during intense activities overwhelms the pilots who mostly do not have the in-depth knowledge to troubleshoot the complex automated systems in modern aircrafts as compared to simpler aircrafts. Common phases in failing automated systems express the surprise at seeing automated actions that have never been experienced before and a state of being unable to discern what the current state of action being taken means. Over trust of the automated systems has become a common feature of the risk associated with automation (Gray, et al. 2007). This is because the automation does not give reasons for whatever that it is doing. This leads to complacency on the part of the crew which is potentially unsafe. The effect of the pilot perceiving the autopilot to be performing a task that is actually different from what the autopilot is performing is also another common risk factor in automated aircrafts. This is because when corrective manual measures are needed from the Pilot, the pilot cannot be able to give the correct command as what is happening is not what he or she is actually trying to correct. Automation surprises have therefore contributed to the insignificant observation in the improvement of safety in the aviation industry despite the observed and expected benefits from the automation of aviation industry (Gray, et al. 2007). It has also been found that flight crews have difficulty in understanding the auto flight system implementations techniques such as the varying of the airplane speed by varying of the plane’s pitch attitude and the speed controlled by varying engine thrust levels. This is interesting considering that the same concepts are applied in manual flight. When these concepts are not well understood, they are confused by the flight crew during auto flight system annunciations and behaviour. The difference in the design and inconsistency in the automation philosophy in different airplane types as well as planes from the same manufacturer has also contributed to flight crew deficiencies in the understanding of automation (Endsley, 1996). This has had a significant impact on the expected improvement of safety in the automated airplanes. One the most accepted area of concern is the use of the flight management system’s (FMS) vertical flight path modes. These have been found to be very difficult to understand but some operators provide very little training, if any on the use of these modes of operation (Endsley, 1996). Currently the training of crew is held in two main views with one suggesting that the crew should be trained only to perform rigid functions without understanding the underlying principle on which the automation is based. The other view is that the crew should be trained on the underlying principle of operation of the automated system to enable them understand different modes of operation and be in a position to tell what is happening in cases where corrective manual measures are needed. It is also important to note that without knowledge of the underlying principle of operation, crew members are likely to substitute their own model of how the automation is working based on their observations and assumptions of automation behaviour. This is potentially unsafe as the crew’s model could be not only incomplete but incorrect leading to fatal errors during emergency corrective measures experienced during bad weather or normal hitches experienced due to mechanical faults during takeoff or during preparations for landing. Crew reaction in relation to expected crew reaction Studies have shown that crew members react in different ways unforeseen during the design, training, certification and procedure development of these highly automated airplanes. Previously in the event of a fault during flight, all the crew did was to switch off the autopilot and fly manually. Now with automation more capable and reliable, it became easier and potentially safe to handle these situations with the assistance of automation. This could be running one engine inoperative approach or go-round and one engine inoperative drift down from cruise altitude (CAA, 2010). Other situations like the malfunction of the auto lift could be handled by either turning off the automation or reverting to a lower level of automation. In more recent cases the flight crew have either inappropriately continued to use automation when they found themselves in an abnormal situation or if the automation was initially off, it is turned on to try to accomplish a recovery (CAST, 2008). Examples of these include a fixation where the flight director is followed and airplane attitude is ignored. This resulted in one case in a low sped excursion after which the flight crew engaged the autopilot to accomplish the recovery. This was the case when the crew of a Tarom A380 at Bucharest attempted to engage the autopilot in the moments preceding the March, 1995 crash as they attempted to recover from an extreme bank angle resulting from the large thrust asymmetry (CAA, 2010). The assumptions used in the design of the automation system are those of basic airmanship which plays an important role in how the flight crew interacts with automation. The unsafe potentialities that have resulted in the due use of automation are attributed to the increased capability, reliability and the authority of automated systems leading to the crew over relying on the automation (CAST, 2008). The belief among the flight crew is that the autopilot may be more reliable than their airmanship skills. When this perception is inaccurate, it can have potentially hazardous consequences. As an example, contrary to the common belief of many flight crews, some auto flight systems could take the airplane outside of the normal flight envelope or attempt manoeuvres that would not be expected from a human pilot (NASA, 2011). Source: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics In Light Aircraft From the above graph, fatal accidents are declining even though they are not very significant. Conclusion These characteristics have potential hazards especially when the flight crew are unaware of them. From these observations, it is clear that the automation designers need to modify their assumptions of pilot behaviour for the effective benefits expected from automation to be realised. Mixed-mode flying has been suggested as a possible way to enhance the expected benefits of automation. This is where the airplane is neither completely in automatic or manual control. Some operators discourage this mode on some airplane types while others generally encourage its use as a way of retaining proficiency of the manual skills and while at the same time minimising of the workload and taking advantage of partial automation of tasks like the use of auto throttle to maintain speed control (JPDO, 2011). The demerit of mixed-mode is that it could lead to unintended mode changes or configurations and result in cross-coupling and inappropriate pitching. This could also lead to masking of what is controlling the plane by masking trends in the plane’s energy state or path. Mixed mode however has its merits when conducted in a manner consistent with the manufacturer’s design intent and assumptions in its limitations, advantages and proper use. Some operators have already established a clearly enunciated philosophy regarding flight crew training, automation use and made it available to their flight crews (JPDO, 2011). This is an important step in realising safety resulting from the automation of the aviation airplanes that has not been realised yet. REFERENCES National Aeronautics and Space Administration, (2011). Aviation Safety Program Washington, DC.,available at www.aeronautics.nasa.gov/programs_avsafe.htm. Joint Planning And Development Office, (2011). National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan: Next Generation Transport System. Civil Aviation Authority, (2010). Safety Plan. National Transportation Safety Board, (2010). Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics, into Light Aircraft: Washington, DC, available at Commercial Aviation Safety Team, (2008). Safety Enhancement:“Mode Awareness and Energy State Management Aspects of Flight Deck Automation” Capt. G.A.C. Gray, Capt. Gil Gray, Capt. Peter Bugge, Capt. Tony Banfield, Capt. Alex Fisher, Mr. Peter Tait, Capt. Keith, Wilson-Clark, (2007). Pilot Handling Of Highly Automated Aircraft Gapan Working Group Report. Endsley, M. R.(1996). Automation and situation awareness. In R. Parasuraman & M. Mouloua (Eds.), Automation and human performance: Theory and applications (pp. 163-181). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Federal Aviation Administration ,(1996).The Interfaces Between FlightcrewsandModern Flight Deck Systems . John A. Wise, Donald S. Tilden, David Abbott, Jennifer Dyck, & Patrick Guide, (1994). Managing Automation in the Cockpit. Lisbon, Portugal. Read More

There does not seem to be a significant reduction in the number of aircraft accidents of automated aircrafts as compared to those that are not automated (FAA, 1996). It is evident however that aircrafts are flown more efficiently with the introduction of automated piloting. This has reduced Pilot Fatigue when flying for long distances. This could be said to have had a positive influence on the large number of flights that have grown tremendously but without a noticeable increase in the number of accidents relative to pre-automation days (FAA, 1996).

The insignificant decline in the number of accidents recorded has been attributed to the fact that pilots are not trained to understand fully what the autopilot is doing. Therefore there is need to ensure that pilots have adequate knowledge of aircraft equipment operation and malfunctions. The improved reporting of equipment malfunctions and service difficulties could go a long way in improving safety of future operations. This is likely to improve the general safety of aviation operations beyond those that involve only auto piloting of the aircraft only.

Source: Introduction of Glass Cockpit Avionics Into Light Aircraft From the figure above, the accident improvement has been there but the change is not very significant. There is not much difference between automated and conventional aircraft. CREW TRAINING AND USE OF AUTOMATION BY CREW Automation and Pilot training Pilots are not always provided with all information needed the unique operational details of the primary flight instruments (Endsley, 1996).. These require more specific training and the general training is no longer sufficient to prepare pilots for safe operation of the highly automated flight instruments in automated planes.

Simulators have been found to be the only viable training techniques that can be used for those cockpit avionics failures can are not easily replicated in light aircrafts used for training. The recording capabilities of the glass cockpit displays have enabled significant improvements in the safety of the equipments through data analyses. The low reliability of electromechanical cockpit displays is now a thing of the past. This has increased safety and made then cost of maintenance to drop while at the same time simplifying the storage of spares.

In the past for aircrafts to flown safely there was need to have crews of up to five members but now a crew of two is the norm in the flying of modern jets (Wise et al 1994). Surveys show that the more automated an aircraft is, the more the pilots like it. Thus could be attributed with the ease of flying it and the adequate time available to plan ahead which is good for safety of the flight in the modern crowded and busy airports. This has however introduced another challenge. The alternate long periods of inactivity and short periods of intense activity can be overwhelming as has been noted that in conventional aircraft the work done during such period as landing are much less compared to those done in Highly automated aircrafts.

This is as a result of the clumsy automation of aircrafts. This is where the even spread of workload through a flight is in conventional aircraft has changed in to long periods of relative idleness interrupted by short periods of intense activity. The long periods of time are times of monitoring the performance of the automatics. This raises the problem of concentration as people are not good at monitoring systems that rarely fail (Gray, et al. 2007). This has the effect of leading to complacency and the inability to believe that a system has failed when it actually has failed.

This has lead to another problem in safety assurance as the resulting system failure during intense activities overwhelms the pilots who mostly do not have the in-depth knowledge to troubleshoot the complex automated systems in modern aircrafts as compared to simpler aircrafts. Common phases in failing automated systems express the surprise at seeing automated actions that have never been experienced before and a state of being unable to discern what the current state of action being taken means.

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