Glass Cockpit Technology - Essay Example

Running Head: Glass Cockpit Technology Glass Cockpit Technology Introduction Looking at an open door in a cockpit of an airplane, one will see an array of lights and displays. That equipment is part of the aircraft’s avionics system – contraction of aviation and electronics (Knight, 2007). An avionics system is a system that consists of computers with special peripherals. Most of the passengers boarding an airplane are not that fully aware of the system’s role in a modern aircraft despite of its obvious presence. What those computers do and they were developed is where the real story lies (Knight, 2007). There is one crucial issue that guarantees the safety of a flight and aviation technology and that is the interface between the pilot of a modern aircraft and the glass cockpit display. The safety of every flight will depend on one hand from technological standpoint and on the other hand from the capability, awareness, knowledge and experience of the pilot. (Schmelzer, n.d). Pilots do study in order to learn the systems of an airplane. In every situation, pilots should always have to be alert of the situation, panels and displays, and the controls. The main issue that must be monitored to maintain safety and create awareness is the human-machine interaction. The combination of human cognitive capabilities and the machine is a great help to confront existing problems (Schmelzer, n.d). According to a series of studies on automation in glass cockpit, the lack of pilot “Situational Awareness” is a concern for those who work in the flight deck safety area. This occurrence has proven to have potential cause, from surprise action of the increasing autonomous automation, to confusion over the state of the automation (Schmelzer, n.d). According to the previous studies, lack of related information and misunderstanding of available data can lead to unwanted decisions and actions on the part of the pilot. Little information of environmental data and automation activity has been considered as factors of the major aviation incidents (ACRC 1996, BEA 1992). There are three steps an achieving situational awareness that Endsley suggest: (1) the way the automation state is assessed; (2) comprehension of the situation; (3) projecting the future condition of the system. They use these steps as their working model in order to identify different problems (Schmelzer, n.d). This paper tackles a new technology known as the glass cockpit and explains the human factors that influence its implementation. It describes the issues of the glass cockpit technology and the human factors related to the invention and implementation of the said technology. The paper describes the development of the technology and compares the glass cockpit with the traditional cockpit. Glass Cockpit Technology Due to opportunity and necessity, the new cockpit design emerge (NASA, 2000). In 1912, in the history of aviation, the first automated pilot was introduced, 6 years after the very first flight of Wright brothers. In the 1950s, the electronic computer era began together with the development of autopilots based on analog computation. The automation of the role of the flight engineer enabled the reduction of the crew of commercial air transports from three to two persons only. Before, mechanical instruments provide information to pilots and flight engineers, mostly in the form of familiar dials. Mechanical instruments are considered expensive, unreliable and required extensive maintenance by skilled technicians. It provides information to pilots, elaborate electromechanical and hydraulic systems affected by the control of the aircraft (Knight, 2007). The term glass cockpit is defined as the flight deck of an aircraft equipped with cathode ray tube (CRT) displays as an alternative to traditional electro-mechanical instruments. It is also described with painted displays onto the glass of a computer screen. Glass cockpits replace some of the switches, gauges, and indicators with automated displays systems. Computers were used in managing the on-board systems. This allows pilots to explain what they want to observe at a specific time that they wanted to observe the indicator. Glass cockpits allowed contemporary aircraft to have only two crew members as a substitute to the three needed by the traditional cockpits (Krell, 2002). A glass cockpit has two screens that replace the standard six-pack of flight instruments. The first screen in front of the pilot is the primary flight display (PFD). It is the one that replaces the flight instruments. The second screen on the right side of the cockpit is the multi-function display (MFD) also called as the multi-frustration display. Although PFD and MFD looks the same they have different personality and functions. Some of these personality and functions are the moving-map displays, engine instruments, traffic, weather and instrument charts. The MFD is a backup and an additional information source to the PFD. The weather options include temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) depicted on the moving map (Doremire, n.d). According to Gregory, originally from NASA, it was Langley, the present NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance, who pioneered the glass cockpit concept in the ground simulators and demonstration flights in the NASA 737 flying laboratory. They were able to gain favorable response from the industry customers and because of that Boeing developed the first glass cockpit for production airlines. This story is considered as an aviation success story (NASA, 2000). Aside from the improved crew/orbiter interaction, the new system also reduced the high cost of maintaining obsolete systems. These systems also provide better backup capability, weigh less and use less power than the original designs (NASA, 2000). Today, most of the glass cockpit CRT imitates electromechanical displays related to the transfer of pilot training from old-to new-generation air-craft. U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), special-purpose human factors research simulators, are being used to search the efficiency of multicolored CRT display formats unobstructed by the limitation or previous training or instrument hardware. Modern glass cockpits, just like the Boeing 777, the F-117 stealth fighter and Shuttle Atlantis, represent changes in the way cockpits and aircrafts are designed. These changes started year 1970 when the flight-worthy cathode ray tube (CRT) screen replaced electromechanical displays, gauges and instruments. The new glass instruments gave the cockpit different look and suggested the name glass cockpit. Newer aircraft in the airline services make use of glass cockpit type instrumentation. Interaction between decision and communication are affected by the increased level of automation related to cockpit; the greater the extent of this automation, the greater the effect. The concept of communication in a traditional manner has been applied mainly to the crew and not aircraft or machine. This communication entails a dialogue that suggests better understanding among the participants (Lee, 1989). The glass cockpit of the near future is considered as having very high levels of automation and has increasing prevalence of expert system. Dialogue between man and machine becomes more important than between humans. Man and machine will have to work as one in making decisions, and the crew’s input will be only one of the many inputs to the aircraft’s computerized control systems. (Lee, 1989) Human Factors Consideration The cockpit technology has improved a lot in the last twenty years as microprocessors and color graphics have also developed. There are doubts and questions expressed regarding the human factors in the astonishing automation this robotic technology brings to the table. Questions like: whether an average pilot could handle the automation and its various modes; whether the new hardware and software can really reduce the workload giving way to a possibility of eliminating the flight position of an engineer and flying a large jet aircraft over oceans using two pilot crew; whether an automated flight would result to large errors like other limitations of automatic applications; whether pilots would not be able to keep up with the airplane and fall out the loop; or whether skills in manually flying an aircraft become degraded (Wiener et al.. 1999). This complimented the three-year study made by NASA in the pilots of Boeing 757 which reveals that there are disagreements on the issue of whether automated cockpits really lessen the workloads and whether there may be some safety problems that might occur (Hughes, 1989). According to Wiener (1993), there is a little write-ups about training pilots to manipulate high-technology aircrafts and the transition of pilots to automation. Also worthy of note is that in designing cockpit systems, training should be given consideration and the design should be seen in practice. Documenting automated systems should be given proper care to enable pilots to understand visibly how to use them, the manner of operating them and how they can maximize them (Wiener et al, 1999). Computerized cockpit is aimed to lessen the workload in ideal conditions. According to a pilot, the system is working well in flying an aircraft. However, there are a lot of times that there are changes in the designated flight routes which is very usual in a busy terminal area. Pilots showed concerns on reprogramming the computer during departures and arrivals as slightest change in their flight plan will result to excessive workload. Leaving the flight management computer alone below 10,000 ft. is really a difficult job for co-pilots. But these problems could be rectified by gaining experience (Hughes, 1997). The designated runway for a particular aircraft usually changes when it descends below 10,000 feet, forcing the pilot to reprogram flight management computer or set the automatic flight guidance to off mode (Hughes, 1989). The tragic accidents and incidents during the late 1990’s raised the concerns about providing adequate trainings for pilots in flying aircrafts with high-technology cockpits (Hughes and Dornheim, 1995), especially that the pointed reason for such mishaps are the lack of comprehension of autoflight modes and the lack of advanced training in using an advanced cockpit (Earl et a. 1999). It may be a great pride for pilots to fly the advanced but there are concerns about some safety issues related to the glass-cockpits which highly depend on cathode ray tubes driven by computers. For some pilots, automation increases their workloads instead and this opinion did not change when they were asked a year later notwithstanding having more experiences in using such new technology (Hughes, 1989). Heads-down operation is causing problems in different situations especially for older pilots who depend more on their basic flying skills. Using the combination of their minds, hands and feet seem to be faster than their monitoring-programming capabilities. Younger officers, on the other hand, are more comfortable in using the computer (Hughes, 1989). Programming a computer during flights deviates the attention of a pilot causing problems for many pilots. The intellectual attention that the programming requires makes it difficult for a pilot to do anything else. The division of roles among the cockpit crew members usually breaks down in automated aircraft according to some researchers. Pilots may be disturbed in their tendency to look at their co-pilots when the latter enter data into the computer (Hughes, 1989) According to an interview made by David Hughes (1989) with Jack Gray, the latter disagreed with the notion that flight management computer is more difficult to use when below 10,000 ft. In a manual process, he said that rerouting below 10,000 ft. also requires a pilot to dig out the graphs and start over again. In which case, it is also appears to be a head down operation. He further averred that it does not require much time for a pilot to reprogram the flight management computer and it can be checked by the other pilot before activating it. A pilot does not need to try to do them all at once. When information has been entered into the computer, he can look outside for traffic before he finishes the task in programming. Rerouting can be done initially by entering waypoint identification, referring to the data base and use the direct-to-commands. Pilots who left non-automated aircraft and face transition tend to expect they are returning to the non-automated ones. Pilots are also concerned of the training they undergo as they focus more on learning how to operate the compute instead of operating the aircraft. The shift to automation creates the tendency to depend much on automation rather than on their own airmanship. Working around the features of the computer program does not always generate the desired performance (Hughes (1989). Another major issue is the complexity of automation. who were asked about their opinion about the automatic features responded in an overwhelming manner (Hughes, 1989). Despite the above-mentioned negative feedback, majority of the pilots articulated positive impressions on the glass-cockpit technology. 90 percent of the surveyed pilots said that glass cockpit instruments and displays show a big leap (Hughes, 1989). Conclusion Maximizing the technology and taking improvements in the design of the cockpit are necessary to limit the gap between the pilot’s cognitive capabilities and the complexity of the technology. Though providing good trainings to the pilots could help, there is no substitute for having the appropriate design for cockpits (Schmelzer). Ideally, automation should reduce the workload of pilots. It is important to consider in designing a cockpit glass the ability of the human brain and its limitation to process information given by the system to prevent or at least limit the mismatch between the pilot and the cockpit information system which can give undesirable results (Lovesey, 1995). Thus, giving the pilot too much information to process should be prevented which add to the usual distractions like noise and bad weather conditions. To successfully finish a flight mission, it is necessary that the information to be presented must be well-chosen and it should appear at the right time either by the pilot himself or automatically by the system (Lovesey, 1995). Lovesey (1995) gave some recommendations that could be considered in designing aircraft systems to ensure appropriate information process and prevent mismatches, such as: reduction of overload of information for the pilots, precluding information that are unnecessary and giving to the aircraft computer all the calculations. The last suggestion may apply specifically to smaller commuter aircrafts since the information displays and flight computers are not so advanced like the more modern aircrafts whose calculations are all done by the computers. It is also worthy to note the avoidance in having repetitive and uninteresting tasks. Moreover, pilots should be given tasks that they enjoy to enable them to render more attention and maintain situational awareness. This can be done by giving the pilots sufficient work to keep busy but at the same time allowing ample mental capacity to deal with emergency cases (Schmelzer n.d). There are a lot of points that can be considered in ensuring enough information process with regards the human cognitive work and avoiding miss-matches. Lovesey recommended the reduction of information overload towards the operator and avoiding unnecessary information. And aside from that, he also suggested to submit all calculations to the aircraft computer. With regards to smaller commuter aircraft, information displays and flight computers are not that progressive just like what a modern airplane does. Most of the modern airplanes have a flight computer that does almost all the calculations. That is the reason why Lovesey suggested avoiding uninteresting and repetitive tasks. Aside from that, pilots should enjoy what he does so that he can pay more attention in maintaining situational awareness, allowing himself enough work to occupy and at the same time having enough mental alertness in dealing with emergency cases (Ringo Schmelzer). In the past years many of the problems experienced regarding the glass cockpit have been resolved. It is said that the rate of the failure today in first-time glass transition is almost the same with the traditional aircraft, only less than one percent. But even if it passes or fails it doesn’t give us the whole scenario. We must be sure that 99 percent of the graduates who attended the training about the transition will serve them well in their flying (Wiener et al., 1999). Today, it is important that the training that our pilots are having for any aircraft be consistent not only with the best operation of the equipment but also with the training objectives of the entire fleet. A unified training philosophy is needed for a variety of aircraft that are flown as common fleet. (Wiener et al., 1999) Another noteworthy recommendation is that of Wickens (1997) wherein it was stated that the design should be pilot-centered (focus on the pilot requirements). Thus, a clear defined information requirement is a major importance. Bibliography Doremire, B.. (n.d). In Plane and Pilot. (chap. Pilot SkillsSwitching to Glass) Retrieved Jun. 22, 2009, from http://www.planeandpilotmag.com/proficiency/pilot-skills/switching-to-glass.html?tmpl=component&print=1&page= Hughes, D. (1989, Aug 7 ). Pilot React to The Automated Cockpit Glass Cockpit Study REveals Human Factors Problems. Aviation Week and Space Technology, 131, Knight, J.. (2007, Sep.). (chap. How Things WorkThe Glass Cockpit) Retrieved Jun. 22, 2009, from http://dsonline.computer.org/portal/site/computer/menuitem.5d61c1d591162e4b0ef1bd108bcd45f3/index.jsp?&pName=computer_level1_article&TheCat=1055&path=computer/homepage/Oct07&file=howthings.xml&xsl=article.xsl& Krell, T. A. (1997, Feb. Day ). Retrieved Jun. 22, 2009, from http://www.npl.com/~tkrell/writings/aviation/glass-cockpit.html Lee, R. B. (1989). Communications and Decision MakingIn the Glass Cockpit. 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