Safety in Nuclear Industry - Essay Example

Harris Kamran Nuclear Industry Research Paper 19 Spetember Safety in nuclear industry Scope of Safety Case: The development of aSafety Case for the nuclear reactor fuel storage site is of paramount importance as nuclear power plant hazards are very damaging in nature (Feinstein 1989), and effect not only the personnel working on the plant, but also the surrounding population and the environment very seriously (Feinstein 1989), so it is of utmost importance that safety measures be drafted in order to combat those hazards and risks, and provide a safe environment for the workers. The safety guidelines, however, should not me dealt with as rules and regulations, rather as goals towards which the management system has to work to ensure proper and effective applicability (Haddon 2009: 165). Moreover, there is no predefined set of laws that could be implemented in an organisation for safety purposes; each company and each project initiated by that company has specific and different needs that should be met so that proper safety coverage can be provided (Haddon 2009: 165). This is especially true for the nuclear storage site, as it is a highly technical project and has very specific details to it. Therefore, a customised Safety Case would have to be developed for this project. The scope of the Case would be determined by the nature of the project; the financial, human, technical, and managerial resources that are at the disposal of the organisation; and the goals and scope of the project with regard to its period of operation and the different processes that it would operate (Legislation 2003). To quantitatively determine the scope, information regarding the precise processes of the project would be required, as safety measures according to those processes would have to be then developed. The following is a detailed discussion on the development of a Safety Case for the nuclear reactor storage site. Documentation for Safety Case: According to the Man (S) Org Study published in 1994 (Haddon 2009:169), there are certain requirements that need to be documented in the Safety Case by the operator in order to write an effective and authentic report according to the FSA requirements (Haddon 2009:165). This section of the research paper identifies the documentations that need to be produced by the operator in order to write a proper Safety Case for the nuclear reactor fuel storage site. These documentations would cover the safety requirements concerning with each stage of the establishment, from designing to building, commission, operation, decommissioning, and abandonment (Haddon 2009:165). There are four basic areas that need to covered (Haddon 2009:169) in at least four separate documents, with each documents providing details of each aspect of the Safety Case, as will be discussed below. It should be noted that each of the following areas can comprise more than a single document, depending upon the exact information available about the project, and the scope of the Safety Case. In the pertinent case of the nuclear reactor fuel storage site, at least four documents would be produced. Operation details (Haddon 2009:169): this document would deal with a detailed report of the details concerning the organisation, its operational systems, its undertakings, projects, subsidiary companies or installations in other places, the management system and approach, and the overall facts and statistical figures concerning the organization (Legislation 2003). This would constitute the general information regarding the company and its operations. A complete subsection, or a separate document, as is deemed fit by the operator, should be dedicated to provide information about the particular project or operation for which the Safety Case is being written (Legislation 2003). This is important as it will highlight the parameters that need to be kept in focus when the safety guidelines and safeguards are being constituted for application. As described previously in the paper, there is no single set of safety rules that could be followed in order to provide safety measures for all types of operations (Haddon 2009:165); each project requires its wown customised safety procedures (Haddon 2009:165). Detailing the workings of the operation would make it easy for the operator to draft those measures, and for the regulating body to analyse if the those measures are sufficient and adequate for the said operation (Haddon 2009:169). Identification of hazards and risks (Haddon 2009:169): this is perhaps the most important document of the Safety Case, especially in the pertinent case of the nuclear reactor fuel storage site, because it submits to the regulating body the possible hazards and risks associated with the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the storage site (Legislation 2003). Nuclear operations are associated with risks that have a very high scale of hazard if they are not met with appropriately (Feinstein 1989), encompassing not only the workers in the plant, but also the population in the surrounding areas, and the environment, with a huge radius (Feinstein 1989). If things were to go awry, a serious situation would develop that would require a lot of technical, financial, and personnel resources (Feinstein 1989). Therefore, drafting the document on hazards and risks with great detail and acute awareness about the project is paramount for the safety of the workers and the environment, and therefore, for the success of the Safety Case. Identification of safety guard measures (Haddon 2009:169): after the drafting of the document on hazards and risks associated with the operation, the next document to follow would be the designing of customised safety procedures and guards in order to combat those hazards and to provide adequate safety measures for the workers on the plant (Haddon 2009:169). The nature of the project, the scope of the hazards and their implications, and the financial, technical, human, and other resources that are available to the organisation should be kept in focus when designing the safety guidelines. Moreover, these guidelines should be practical in nature with a high degree of applicability so that they can prove to be beneficial to the organisation. Merely stating rules is not enough (Haddon 2009:165); as discussed previously, the measures should be goal-oriented so that they can be applied towards achieving the safety of the workers rather than simply fulfilling documentation and official procedures (Haddon 2009:165). The safety guards should also be flexible in nature, so that they can be modified according to the precise needs of the time and the stage of the operation (Haddon 2009:169). Description of safety management system (Haddon 2009:169): a development of a sound management system is imperative for the functioning and application of safety guidelines and measures (Haddon 2009:167). This management system would help in streamlining the safety procedures and in ascertaining the actual application of the developed measures at the ground level, and at all other levels of the organization (Haddon 2009: 167). Through this system, a process of accountability would be established, so that the precise tiers in the management which are lacking appropriate application or motivation towards application could be identified and dealt with (Legislation 2003). This system would put the operator in charge of the safety management (Haddon 2009:169), and the risks would be shifted from the clients or the workers to the operator (Haddon 2009:169), who would in turn report to the regulatory body (Haddon 2009:169). A proper safety management system would also make revisions and modifications in the guidelines possible (Haddon 2009:169), based on the observations and analysis of the operator over time. Hence, the drafting of this document is essential to the overall maintenance and functioning of the safety measures and procedures. Safety Management System (Legislation 2003) Document: As described in the previous section, the drafting of each safety document has its own importance in the overall development of the Safety Case, especially as it pertains to the pertinent case of the establishment of nuclear reactor fuel storage site. However, for the smooth functioning of the safety system, it is imperative to develop a foolproof safety management system (Haddon 2009: 167). The importance of management is high as it will streamline the safety guidelines and their applications according to the precise needs and stages of the operation at hand (Haddon 2009: 167). This section of the research paper will, therefore, discuss in detail the document concerning the safety management system, by describing the different subsections that will constitute the document, and a brief explanation of each subsection. It should be noted that the precise arrangement and description of each subsection can be modified according to the project for which the Safety Case is being produced. The description provided here is in relation to the reactor fuel storage site. Section 1: Layout and organisation of management system (Legislation 2003): the basic organisation of the management system should be drafted, detailing the levels of organisation that would be involved in the management of safety procedures, from the managers to the workers (Legislation 2003). It is important to include participation of all tiers of organisation, since nuclear hazard effects all personnel on site, even of they are not directly involved with that particular section of the project that has experienced the hazardous situation (Feinstein 1989). Therefore, a concise description of all personnel involved with the management system and their roles in the management should be drafted (Legislation 2003). This section should also highlight any training that the personnel would require (Legislation 2003), and should submit whether resources exist at the plant for the provision of that training (Legislation 2003). It is the responsibility of the operator to provide the necessary training to the personnel in order to ascertain effective safety management. Training for nuclear hazard control is a specialized field, so technical and specialist expertise in the form of professionals would have to be involved (Feinstein 1989). Section 2: Identification of hazards and risks (Legislation 2003): although a complete document would already have been drafted with respect to the identification of hazards and risks as regards the operation of the storage site, as discussed in the previous section of the paper, a concise summary of those hazards should be included in this document to provide landmarks that have to be achieved and issues that have to be addressed by the safety management system in order to achieve a successful Safety Case (Legislation 2003). The risks should be evaluated based on the likelihood of their occurrence and severity (Legislation 2003), and an outline for the safety systems developed to address them would have to be provided, and analysed (Legislation 2003). Section 3: Operational management (Legislation 2003): the running of the storage site and the different processes associated with it would be discussed in this section briefly (Legislation 2003), as a detailed description would already have been provided in a separate document, as previously discussed. In this subsection, emphasis should be placed on the safety requirements at each stage of the operation (Legislation 2003), and the availability of resources required to meet those safety procedures. The close association of the safety management personnel with the technical personnel at each stage of operations should be identified and emphasised, as it is of the utmost importance (Haddon 2009: 166). The safety personnel are directly responsible to ensure the well being of the plant and the workers, so they should be intimately involved in the working of the plant (Haddon 2009: 166). Section 4: Operational change management (Legislation 2003): this subsection would highlight any changes that will be involved in the structuring or operational techniques of the storage site (Legislation 2003), so that new and customised safety procedures could be developed according to the changes. It will essentially highlight the inclusion of operational change management in the management system so that it can be applied whenever such a change takes place (Legislation 2003). Section 5: Emergency management (Legislation 2003): this is a vital part of the safety management system, as it deals with the development of techniques and procedures that would deal with emergency situations in the storage plant and provide escape and relief methods (Legislation 2003). This subsection would also include the provision of modifications and revisions of the emergency procedures (Legislation 2003), so that they can be reviewed and improved with the passage of time and according to the precise requirements of the stage of operations. Section 6: Evaluation and monitoring (Legislation 2003): this is a crucial constituent of the safety management system. Regular assessment and monitoring is vital for the application and effectiveness of the safety guidelines (Legislation 2003). Without the evaluation, any loopholes in the system and any deficiencies which might exist or develop over time would not be identified (Legislation 2003), and they might result in serious damage to the plant and the personnel if any hazardous situation were to develop due to those deficiencies. Moreover, any non-compliance on the part of the personnel should be reported to the operator (Legislation 2003) so that he can take appropriate measures and improve the situation. Such proceedings should also be reported to the regulatory body (Legislation 2003) so that they are appraised of the situation well in time. This would prevent any damages or cases later in time. Section 7: Audit (Legislation 2003): the subsection, like the previous subsection, deals with review and analysis of the safety management system (Legislation 2003). However, whereas the previous subsection deals with the analysis of the individual rules and personnel with regard to the established safety management system, this subsection provides for a review of the management system itself and as a whole in order to ascertain if the system itself is appropriate to the developing needs of the plant, or if some changes or complete redrafting of the system is required (Legislation 2003). To this end, it is proposed that an audit should be conducted every five years (Legislation 2006) to review the effectiveness of the existing system, and the report should be submitted to the highest levels of management and the regulatory body (Legislation 2003). The regulatory body should, in this case, also be involved in the analysis and redrafting, if need be, of the safety management system (Legislation 2003). Bibliography 1994. The Licensing of nuclear installations. [Online]. Health and Safety Executive. Available: http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/notesforapplicants.pdf. [19 September 2011]. 2006. Safety Assessment Principles for Nuclear Facilities. [Online]. Office for Nuclear Regulation. Available: http://www.hse.gov.uk/nuclear/saps/saps2006.pdf. [19 September 2011]. Bishop, P. & Bloomfield, R. 1998. A Methodology for Safety Case Development. [Online]. Critical Systems Symposium. Available: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.40.9838&rep=rep1&type=pdf. [19 September 2011]. European Commission. 2003. Radioactive Waste Management Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) in the Context of the Entire Safety Case. U.K.: OECD Publishing. Feinstein, J. S. 1989. The safety regulation of U.S. nuclear power plants: violations, inspections, and abnormal occurrences. Journal of Political Economy, 97(1): 115-154. Glasstone S. & Jordan W. H. 1980. Nuclear power and its environmental effects. U.S.: American Nuclear Society. Haddon, C. 2009. The Nimrod Review. U.K.: The Stationery Office. Jacobs, R. & Habor, S. 1994. Organizational processes and nuclear power plant safety. Reliability engineering & systems safety, 45(1-2): 75-83. Kivimaki, M, Kalimo, R., & Salminen, S. 1995. Perceived Nuclear Risk. Organizational Commitment, and Appraisals of Management: A Study of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel. Risk Analysis, 15(3): 391-396. Legislation. 2006. The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005. [Online]. The National Archives. Available: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/3117/regulation/13/made. [19 September 2011]. Legislation. 2003. The Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999. [Online]. The National Archives. Available: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1999/743/schedule/2/made. [19 September 2011]. Maguire, R. 2006. Safety cases and safety reports: meaning, motivation and management. U.S.: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. OECD. 2005. Management of uncertainty in safety cases and the role of risk. Sweden: OECD Publishing. OECD. 2007. Radioactive Waste Management Linkage of Geoscientific Arguments and Evidence in Supporting the Safety Case. Canada: OECD Publishing. Waker, C. 2002. Guidance on the Purpose, Scope and Content of Nuclear Safety Cases. [Online]. Nuclear Safety Directorate. Available: http://www.hse.gov.uk/foi/internalops/nsd/tech_asst_guides/tast051.pdf. [19 September 2011]. Read More