The Current Efforts to Implement biometric Identification - Case Study Example

A Biometric ID System in Europe Privacy Concerns, Public Utility, and Information Technology Table of Contents Table of Contents 1 Introduction 2 Proposals for Biometric Identification in the EU 2 Biometric Technology 4 Privacy Concerns Related to Biometric Technology 6 Public Utility and Biometric Identification 7 Conclusion 8 Sources Cited 10 Introduction Biometric authentication refers to the use of personal identification characteristics in association with information technology for the purposes of verification, security, and tracking. (Zhang, 2002, p. xi) Biometrics can be integrated with passports, identification cards, and driver’s licenses which refer local users to a central database of information for wide-scale identity verification in society. Traditional biometric details include human fingerprints, blood types, retinal scans, and facial recognition that are input by technological devices on a large scale. (Jain, 2004) The privacy issues related to biometrics are primarily concerned with the civil rights of individuals and the way that the security apparatus of government uses biometric information in law enforcement. The issues of individual privacy vs. the legitimate technological use of biometric information will be discussed in this essay in order to analyze the EU policy that would implement biometric information as a basic part of passports and identity cards. Where the social utility of biometric data is furthered by the expansion of technological developments, the civil rights issues of their use must be clearly determined by a review of institutional practice in order for a fair and sustainable policy to be developed. This essay will review the current efforts to implement biometric identification on a universal basis in the EU in the context of human rights and civil liberties to determine if the current application of policy is threatening to the privacy concerns of individuals. Proposals for Biometric Identification in the EU The current proposal for biometric use in the EU includes the complete integration of the technology with existing passport controls and personal identification cards in society. (Heath, 2006) This system will be used in the management of immigration, travel, and related security services in the EU. (Jain, 2004) What the debate over biometrics in this context suggests is that the implementation for security is the main concern, with the risk of terrorism in airports and train stations a major risk to public safety. However, the security use may also “demonize” this technology by painting it in a negative light socially, whereas the technology itself may be given a wider and more beneficial use in easing transactions and identity verification for other purposes. The biometric technology is a product of human invention and its use is contingent on the motivations of the architects of the system. Rather than being inherently invasive or a threat to civil liberties, it is the use and implementation of these technologies that are problematic legally. As Ian Heath wrote in the report “European Union – Biometric Matching System” (2006), “The European Commission is implementing a central Biometric Matching System (BMS) that will serve the Biometric Identity requirements of multiple applications that are essential to European Security. This system is groundbreaking in terms of scale, transactional support and strategic approach offering many valuable lessons in the use and adoption of Biometric Identity capabilities. Top priority has been given to improving the administration of the common visa policy and the implementation of a Visa Information System (VIS) to facilitate the exchange of information between Member States. The Biometric Matching System (BMS) will link biometric identifiers to individual persons, thereby helping to establish and verify their identity... In the BMS-VIS environment, a visa holder arriving at an external border will be checked against their existing fingerprint record confirming a direct link to the application and its status. The EC envisions that the BMS will also act as the central biometric identity assurance tool for all of its pan European applications e.g. SIS II, Eurodac, Registered Traveller and AFIS.” (Heath, 2006) In relation to the EU proposal, the UK has also called for the drafting of “common standards for national identity cards taking into account the achievements in relation to the EU passport and in the ICAO framework” in order to implement a policy in alignment with the continental system. (Lettice, 2005) The EU and UK policies are thus similar with regard to biometrics, and would see the implementation of a new system of regulation, tracking, and identity verification using the latest in biometric processing in alignment with information technology. Where biometrics makes the tracking and identification of individuals more efficient over large populations, the division between the government’s best intentions and the people’s tolerance for intrusions into personal privacy can be severe. For example, there was widespread resistance and rejection of U.S. policies to fingerprint all travelers to the country in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. If biometric identification is not implemented across the entirety of the population, it fails in its basic task of universality. In this regard, the EU drive to include all of its citizens in a universal system of biometrics points to the need for gathering data of hundreds of millions of people and storing it in a secure manner for public access. This is no small task, and by nature, it rouses a large segment of the civil rights community to protest over what they see as intrusive violations by government into the most private details of individual life in the biometric collection process and storage of information in centralized databases. Nevertheless, the social utility of biometrics is related to the technology itself, which was designed for the purposes of social tracking on a centralized basis, making the critique an important issue for the entire policy directive. Biometric Technology Biometric technology relates to the specific characteristics of humanity that make individuals unique, such as the fingerprints, retina print, blood type, and facial structure. While identity verification has traditionally followed various methods including birth date, social security numbers, weight, height, eye color, etc., biometrics uses information technology advances to make this process more efficient. In defining biometrics, the Zhang report titled “Biometric solutions for authentication in an e-world” (2002) states, “Biometric authentication, or simply, biometrics refers to automatic identification of an individual based on his distinguishing physiological and/or behavioral characteristics (biometric identifiers). Because many biometric identifiers (e.g. fingerprint) are distinctive to each person, they are more reliable than knowledge-based (e.g., Personal Identification Number or password) and token-based (e.g., ID card or key) techniques in differentiating between an authorized person and an impostor.” (Zhang, 2002, p. xi) Biometric technology is implemented in a benign manner in identity verification in corporate security and financial services, such as the use of credit cards, network access, account logins, and other verified services. As the society moves more and more toward automation of regulations on a base of information technology, biometrics is a natural extension of existing tools for identity recognition and verification in large groups. Biometrics is used widely in information technology today in providing secure access to institutions, accessing computer systems, laptop security, cellular phones, and ATMs. (Jain, 2004) These systems require individual identification verification for access, and biometric technology greatly improves this process. “Biometric recognition, or, simply, biometrics, refers to the automatic recognition of individuals based on their physiological and/or behavioral characteristics. By using biometrics, it is possible to confirm or establish an individuals identity based on ‘who she is’, rather than by ‘what she possesses’ (e.g., an ID card) or ‘what she remembers’ (e.g., a password).” (Jain, 2004) By eliminating the need for password identification and preventing fraud in access to services, biometric technology can be an important part of modern network security. Nevertheless, the privacy issues must be reviewed to validate the use of this technology by governments. Privacy Concerns Related to Biometric Technology Civil libertarians and human rights activists protest against biometric technology in use by governments such as the integrated EU policy because it is mandatory and universal as part of the passport or personal identification requirements. There is an aspect of biometrics that may be offensive to some individuals as it involves the scanning of parts of the body. Fears on unwarranted search and seizure are made on these invasive technologies when used by the police forces as part of the security apparatus. Civil libertarians see the EU policy as totalitarian because it is all-inclusive and allows for no ability of individuals to opt out or not participate. Though some may see the activist viewpoint as related to anti-technological viewpoints, in most instances the concern is the marriage of government institutions with the technology for use in ways that are contrary to individual rights to privacy. The warehousing or storage of information in vast, centralized databases also gives rise to security fears as to how this data will be protected from unauthorized use and transmission. “Unlike the body rendered knowable in the biomedical sciences, biometrics generates a readable body: it transforms the bodys surfaces and characteristics into digital codes and ciphers to be ‘read’ by a machine. ‘Your iris is read, in the same way that your voice can be printed, and your fingerprint can be read’, by computers that, in turn, have become ‘touch-sensitive’, and endowed with seeing and hearing capacities.” (van der Ploeg, 1999) Descriptions of biometrics from civil libertarians and activists typically portray the use of biometrics by government as an aspect of an Orwellian ‘1984’ type of system where mass-populations are controlled through centralized databases of personal information. Davies (1994) and others discussed how early attempts at biometric implementation were met with public resistance, and were even characterized in the terms of science fiction and “chip implantation”. (Davies, 1994) While civil libertarians and conscientious objectors to biometrics are free to opt out of consumer use of the technology, there is no such ability to not participate with an integrated EU immigration policy. Because of this, the European fears of totalitarianism and the liberal tradition of the continent both suggest that the implementation of biometrics by the EU must be monitored by public ‘watchdog’ groups that are independent from government control and review and can answer public questions based on informed advocacy. Public Utility and Biometric Identification Davies (1994) was one of the first academics to write on the growing issues surrounding the use of biometric technologies by corporations and government. He described the early use of this technology in “social security entitlement, payments, immigration control and election management.” (Davies, 1994) Thus, from the earliest origins of biometrics in Information Technology, there are widely acknowledged benefits relating to social utility that drive the concern of the implementation. The integration of biometrics with computer security, financial accounts, and identity verification in private industry is widely acknowledged to be useful, beneficial, efficient, and progressive. However, it is the fusion of this technology with non-restrained government power that is most offensive to civil libertarians, and not the biometric technologies themselves that are objectionable. From this it is possible to conclude that the implementation and context are important in determining the legitimacy of the policy, and not the technology itself, which can be used for both good and evil purposes. In focusing on the social utility of biometrics, the policies of the EU must be reviewed in the context of civil liberty and human rights laws particularly because of the government policy it is tied to and not inherently because of the technology itself. This suggests that biometrics may then be an issue not related specifically to the use of the technology, but that the public policy must be consistent with the liberal democratic tradition of society to proceed successfully in implementation. Whether or not the EU can manage this effectively depends on local issues as well as pan-national ones, calling to attention the need for independent verification and watchdog groups to protect the public interest against arbitrary government intrusion. This, too, is more difficult in practice than in theory due to the wide scope of implementation in the identification and immigration system as proposed by the EU. Terrorism is the defining aspect of civil society in the early 21st century, as both America and Europe are engaged in extensive public policy directives to combat terrorist infiltration of public institutions, specifically the airports and train stations that are the most-common targets of terrorist attacks. The call for public security regulation is an important and emotional aspect of current government policies, and is reflected in the mandate of the EU and other governments to protect the people that they claim to serve. The potential for abuse in the biometric system is still open to debate, for the information collected and stored is personal. Privacy concerns relating to government search and seizure or collecting and storing lifestyle information on citizens reeks of the worst traditional abuses of power by totalitarian regimes in European history. Therefore the EU’s biometric policy will need to be regulated both by official public review boards and also private citizen activist and watchdog groups if there is to be a balance of the use of biometric technology with the concerns of the civil libertarians and human rights traditions. Conclusion Biometric technology has been demonized by activists who oppose the EU and UK policies for identity verification and tracking since the very first days of its invention. (Davies, 1994) The evidence suggests, however, that biometric technology is not the main threat to civil liberties, but rather the means through which it is deployed and implemented in society that is determinant. For example, a tool may be used for constructive or destructive purposes due to the intent of the user and not solely contingent on the technological device itself, or even the reasoning of the inventor. Therefore, when analyzing the EU and UK proposals for a universal identification and passport system based on biometric technology, it is important to review the policy implementation of technology and not overly emotionalize the foreign nature of new technology. Biometrics as a platform can be innovative and progressive for society if it is used in positive and beneficial ways for public safety that are still consistent with liberal-democratic traditions. However, these policies must be continually monitored and verified by independent watchdog groups just as other policies must be reviewed legally by civil libertarians in order for new technology to be implemented in public policy in a way that is consistent with the human rights guarantees of society. The argument of public utility is the strongest in favor of the use of biometric technology in large scale social monitoring of individuals, for this new technology has a precision and detail that is lacking in traditional identity verification methods. Yet, human individuals inherently resist totalitarian policies on the basis of the civil rights standards. When this conflict between public utility and civil rights become highly contested, as in the implementation of biometric policies in the immigration service in the EU and UK, it is important to separate the technologies themselves from the patterns of usage in order not to confuse the issues. When faced with threats to the public security through terrorism, the government is expected to provide protection of innocents through advances in the security apparatus. The threat is always that government can go too far in seeking to preserve the life of its citizens that it abandons the basic, fundamental protections of the human rights tradition or seeks to advance new policies under guise of technology that subverts the liberal-democratic tradition in favor of increased security. In these instances, public watchdog and activist groups lead in the verification of government enterprise and the resistance to policy through legal challenges. The public utility of biometric technology must therefore be firmly balanced with traditional controls on government power that prohibit unwarranted searches and seizures, or the totalitarian use of information in security institutions, in order that the implementation of policy proceeds in accordance with social standards of liberal democracy and does not go against them in practice. Sources Cited Davies, Simon G. 1994, "Touching Big Brother: How Biometric Technology Will Fuse Flesh and Machine", Information Technology & People, Vol. 7 Iss: 4, pp.38 - 47, viewed 3 August 2011, . Heath, Ian 2006, European Union – Biometric Matching System, Directorate General – Justice Freedom and Security (EUJLS), Brussels, Belgium, viewed 3 August 2011, . Jain, A.K.; Ross, A.; Prabhakar, S.; 2004, An introduction to biometric recognition, Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, IEEE Transactions, Jan. 2004, Volume: 14 Issue:1, page(s): 4 - 20 , viewed 3 August 2011, . Lettice, John 2005, UK EU presidency aims for Europe-wide biometric ID card, The Register, 13th July 2005 , viewed 3 August 2011, . van der Ploeg, Irma 1999, The illegal body: `Eurodac and the politics of biometric identification, ETHICS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, Volume 1, Number 4, pp. 295-302, viewed 3 August 2011, . Zhang, David 2002, Biometric solutions for authentication in an e-world, Kluwer Academic Publications, Springer, viewed 3 August 2011, . Read More