The Digital Age in Posthumanism - Essay Example

The Digital Age in Posthumanism Essay Introduction The concept of ‘posthuman’ seems to have penetrated current critical analyses in the social sciences and humanities in the 1990s, although its origins can be traced to the 1960s and declarations of it popularised by Foucault in the conclusion of The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (Sobchack, 2000, p. 174). Posthumanism could also be attributed to the Macy symposiums on cybernetics between 1946 and1963 and the introduction of systems theory including John von Neumann, Warren McCulloch, Gregory Bateson, and numerous other personalities from an array of disciplines who come together on a new theory for communicational, mechanical, and biological mechanisms that took out humans from any honoured or advantaged status with regard to issues of cognition, information, and meaning (Wolfe, 2010, p. xii).This essay discusses the ways in which digital culture can be said to be ‘posthuman’. It specifically analyses whether it is fair to describe the contemporary period as ‘posthuman’. Definition of Posthuman Post-humanism has been described as a synergy between human and technology. A large number of people believe that the human-technology fusion is a favourable advancement, but numerous people are also anxious of its potentially harmful effects. One adverse potential is the permanently destructive impact it could inflict on human behaviour, especially by means of intrusive technologies. Katherine Hayles explains the positive aspect of the human-technology synergy (Herbrechter, 2013, pp. 42-43): First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life. Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process than began before we were born. Fourth, and most important, by these and other means, the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals. Hayles, in her seminal book How We Became Posthuman, declines to accept what she calls a ‘prescriptive’ view of ‘posthumanism’, yet she still claims that in certain aspects, posthumanism asserts that ‘informational pattern’ is more essential than ‘material instantiation’, and hence that ‘embodiment is… an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life’ (Herbrechter, 2013, p. 43). Moreover, Hayley states that posthumanism’s forms have a specific similarity, that is, the split between body and mind (Chan, 2014). Hayles also claims that the intellectual, technological, and cultural ‘transformations’ resulting in the displacement of ‘human’ by ‘posthuman’ were by no means absolute changes and that as a result ‘human’ and ‘posthuman’ overlap in changing structures that differ with historically given settings (Hayles, 2008, p. 7). For example, she asserts that “cybernetics was a means to extend liberal humanism, not subvert it. The point was less to show that man was a machine than to demonstrate that a machine could function like a man” (Hayles, 2008, p. 7). Hence she emphasises that “many attributes of the liberal humanist subject, especially… agency, continue to be valued in the face of the posthuman” (Hayles, 2008, p. 279). She believes that posthumanism is different from the long-established humanism primarily in rejecting the idea that human beings are “an autonomous self with unambiguous boundaries” (Miccoli, 2010, p. 6). It is easy to assume that the ‘posthuman’ is a void, adverse, and purposely useless classification created to mask or escape the fundamental inconsistencies of humanism. Rise of Digital Culture and Network Society The ideas of Baudrillard about virtual reality have been categorised as deterministic and fatalistic. Baudrillard, in a deterministic sense, does not draw a line between ‘virtual’ and ‘real’. For him, the virtual naturally disregards or resists the existence of such boundary (Land & Bayne, 2011, p. 116-7). On the other hand, in fatalistic terms, Baudrillard strictly emphasises what he sees as the unyielding fixation of society with new technologies and the media. His ideas of virtual reality are based on two principles. First is that the virtual is indisputable. He says, “virtual reality, the reality that might be said to be perfectly homogenised, digitised, and ‘operationalised’, substitutes for the other because it is perfect, verifiable and non-contradictory” (Chan, 2014, p. 51). Second is that because the virtual goes beyond borders and displaces reality, the virtual eventually leads to a total assimilation or immersion of the subject and subjectivity, as well (Chan, 2014, p. 51). Baudrillard further explains that “we are no longer dealing with value: we are merely dealing with a turning-into-data, a turning into calculations, a generalized computation in which reality-effects disappear” (Land & Bayne, 2011, 117). Rather, “it is the virtual which thinks us: no need now for a subject of thought, a subject of action; everything happens by technological mediation” (Land & Bayne, 2011, 117). The core of the virtual theory of Baudrillard is such concept of ‘simulation’ which he proclaims as the central symbol indicating the disconnection of the postmodern period form the earlier modern period. He argues that whilst modern societies were structured around or centred on production, postmodern ones are structured around ‘simulation’ (Chan, 2014). Hence in modern societies labour was the source of energy whereas in postmodern ones labour is displaced by symbols, codes, and signs. In the postmodern period, social reproduction, sustained and propagated by the digital culture like knowledge organisations, cyberspace, and computers, ‘simulate’ or mimic realities (Gere, 2002). The outcome of Baudrillard’s concept of simulation and the postmodern era can be seen in his ideas of ‘hyperreality’. In ‘hyperreality’ the media of cultural symbols and images create experiences more forceful, exciting, and real than what are ‘truly’ real, through which the images, codes, and symbols challenge people in an overpowering and endless bombardment of confusion (Creeber & Martin, 2008). The core representation of simulation alongside its product of hyperreality makes up the centre of Baudrillard’s theory of virtual reality. He believes that in postmodern societies individuals become desensitised by simulation to the point of totally confusing the ‘real’ from the ‘unreal’ (Chan, 2014). The emergence and growth of digital technologies is generally viewed to be part of a cultural evolution (Barney, 2013, p. 1983): To say that we inhabit a digital world is an understatement. In recent years the Internet and other information technologies have transformed many fundamental parts of life: how we work and play, how we communicate and consume, how we create knowledge and learn, even how we understand politics and participate in public life… The ubiquity of digital data storage, computation and telecommunication have made us profoundly dependent on computer networks (whether we realize it or not) enveloping society in what might be termed a ‘digital culture’. The term ‘network’ can be defined in a number of ways. In a culture that depends on information, Castells claims that the ‘network’ becomes the main connection in the digital world (Barney, 2013, p. 1983). The ‘network’ begins to displace the ‘hierarchy’ as informational culture’s social arrangement. Networks have persistently existed in society such as trading networks and peer networks (Weaver, 2009). In view of this, networks are anything but new. Nevertheless, the connection between space and networks is new. The basis for the ‘network society’ of Castells is that such network structure is basically formed and performed by means of electronic media (Chan, 2014). These networks are remarkable for they exchange information in ‘real time’. In a sense, if a person is ‘within’ the network, spatial and temporal elements become irrelevant, since communication does not consume time and space. The network society highlights a transition towards relationships and communications and a move away from space and time, such as borderless networks formed through the application of global information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Miccoli, 2010). With regard to this, the networking model significantly changes the processes and consequences in possibly all major societal operations—culture, power, consumption, and production. As new information and communication technologies keep on spreading across the globe and into everyday existence, they affect and shape the social world in intricate and complicated ways. Computer-mediated communication (CMC) programmes, like social media or social networking sites, are evermore relied upon to facilitate personal relations, and exploring a context of intermediated individual identities has become a crucial social ability (Hand, 2008). Gaining these abilities enable individuals to come up with helpful communicative choices about their intermediated identities that facilitate particular results. By itself, a person’s intentional, involved behaviour online becomes a vital component in building and sustaining social relationships (Miller, 2011). A particular feature of this developing mediated social environment is that the borders of interaction are not limited anymore by physical aspects like geography, enabling individuals from various cultures to communicate or interrelate with more convenience. Because numerous CMC programmes enable users to make their own identities, and images created in CMC media can generally be more forceful than those created in offline settings, it is helpful and important to know how individuals who belong to various cultures use ICTs to build their images and interrelate with other people (Miller, 2011). In the contemporary period, the Internet is an extremely popular and frequently used technology. As technology advances and new ones are continuously introduced to the people, movement towards stronger ties between public and private technology becomes more evident (Wolfe, 2010). Global technology is encouraging continuous use of and involvement in the Internet, and consequently, encouraging the formation of digital identities. In cyberspace, identities are to a certain extent can be manipulated by users. Nevertheless, as emphasised by Suler, characteristics or personal information which are not knowingly exposed are disclosed because of the medium’s familiarity (Goertzel & Bugaj, 2006). Suler also observes that cyberspace is viewed by adolescents as a secure environment to discover aspects of their identity and self-image; nevertheless, it is argued both that there are several aspects of the Internet which are dangerous and troubling, and that there is likelihood for aberrant behaviour or practices to be performed in cyberspace (Matrix, 2006). The Posthumanism of Digital Culture In theory, technology is a tool to expand human abilities, and has consistently been related to illusions of freedom from the restrictions of human nature. However, in the 1990s the swiftness of transformation in digital culture and technology heightened the belief that humans were facing a drastic change (Bentkowska-Kafel, Cashen, & Gardiner, 2009). New kinds of information and communication technologies and practices were equalled by developments in surgery, biotechnology, and genetics, which in combination posed essential issues about the self’s nature, the connection between human bodies and humans, and the disappearing borders between machines and human beings (Herbrechter, 2013). For a number of people, ‘posthuman’ suggests a belief that there will come a time where machines or technologies would become self-reproductive, self-conscious, and independent, or where machines would be deeply integrated into the previously human domain that a new class of organism would be required (Miller, 2011). As stated by Extropianism, a techno-utopian organisation, “We will co-evolve with the products of our minds, integrating with them, finally integrating our intelligent technology into ourselves in a posthuman synthesis, amplifying our abilities and extending our freedom” (Harrison, 2010, p. 191). The central issue in debates about the posthuman is the extent of control and power individuals are believed to hold over their environments. Do technologies liberate humans from the restrictions of human nature? Stelarc, arguing that ‘the body is obsolete’, tried to enhance its capability by inserting electronic limbs or through networking its bodily functioning; for instance, in Fractal Flesh (1995), he made himself online that enabled members in various places to become the organisers of his campaigns (Harrison, 2010, pp. 191-2). These presentations called to mind the picture of a body that can be upgraded and adjusted infinite numbers of times, and thus not limited to only one universal system anymore. As he declared in an article released in 1991, “Once technology provides each person with the potential to progress individually in its development, the cohesiveness of the species is no longer important” (Harrison, 2010, p. 192). The human aspects in individuals would not dwell anymore in absolute, God-given body; rather, it grew to be completely autonomous of its physical aspect, an absolute work of self-control and motivation (Herbrechter & Callus, 2009). The posthuman environment is generally viewed in adverse or catastrophic ways— a rejection of the Cartesian theory of consciousness, the replacement of humans by technologies (Braidotti, 2013). According to Hayles, it is possible that human beings are now posthuman due to their profound relationship to technology, yet this does not automatically imply that all people take part in a posthuman discourse. She argues that “[t]he changes announced by the title mean something more complex than ‘that was then, this is now’” (Herbrechter & Callus, 2009, p. 149). Seen entirely as a critical understanding of the current digital culture, posthuman is simply a likeness of the Zeitgeist, a circumstance humans are thrown into by their standing and position as contemporary humans; seen as a frame of thinking that manifests itself as another approach to humanism, posthumanism develops into behaviour and thoughts, and not essentially bounded by temporal aspects (Herbrechter & Callus, 2009, p. 149). The scientific and technological revolutions that are taking place all over the world should be recognised, but only accepting technological advancement does not comprise posthuman thinking. Hayles emphasises this in her essay about cybernetic issues (Miccoli, 2010, p. 41): “I see the deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject as an opportunity to put back into the picture the flesh that continues to be erased in contemporary discussions” (Miccoli, 2010, p. 41). Digital culture or cybernetic should not be classified as essentially posthuman, and in truth numerous of the discourses and perspectives that presently dominate are directed towards bringing back a sense of integrated subjectivity to the discourse on the effects of science and technology. In contrast, posthuman thinking should identify in these changes the chance to examine the diversities or differences of humanity, to break down instead of restore the liberal entity (Braidotti, 2013). As stressed by Borges, the notion of private or personal identity is firmly associated with notions of memory. Archival automated works, which could take the forms of a digital storage or film, are insufficient simulations of timeless memory (Herbrechter & Callus, 2009). Posthuman memory may be interpreted in a number of ways—a definitely forged collection of true historical records ascribed to real and fabricated people; a reckoning of the human brain’s archival capacities in the form of ‘bytes’; an effort to store all kinds of information on the Web; the envisioned future biogenetic enrichment of individual mnemonic capabilities of humans; and the potentially perpetual record of cultural memory offered by the Internet (Herbrechter, 2013). A major issue intrinsic to the development of logical explanations of posthuman matters is the evident freshness of the issue. Driven by science and technology that is being advanced at a remarkable pace, the posthuman environment is beset by the non-existence of source (Miccoli, 2010). Nowadays an audience of digital presentation enters into the space or domain of the presentation as a deeply exposed inhabitant of the cyberworld, knowledgeable of the host of technologies s/he holds and/or uses, several of which are still tied to his/her body, immersed in the tradition of technoculture, ready to expand him/herself domestically and internationally, trained in distributing his/her focus all at once between represented and non-represented renditions of reality (Wolfe, 2010). Therefore, the audience is now a cyborg. This is factual in the sense that s/he depends considerably on any handy technology to accomplish social activities of communication and movement. Rosi Braidotti claims, “In our cyber-universe, the link between the flesh and the machine is symbiotic, creating a bond of mutual dependence” (Bay-Cheng, Kattenbelt, & Lavender, 2010, p. 137). Not simply has his/her existence as social cyborg familiarised his/her to changing his/her non-cognitive concentration from representation to simulation, it is probable that technology has even transformed how s/he represents his/her experience with the presentation in numerous understated ways (Hand, 2008). Hence all dramaturgical production existing nowadays already competes with the posthuman subjectivity of its spectator, a displaced and dispersed subjectivity which Braidotti referred to as ‘nomadic’ (Bay-Cheng et al., 2010, p. 137). The continuous transformation of the audience into a ‘cyborg’ will possibly remove hypnotic or addictive technology from the domain of an independent and individual experience and create a new public posthuman view of performance spectatorship (Bay-Cheng et al., 2010, p. 138). As Ira Livingston and Judith Halberstam argue, “Posthuman bodies are not slaves to master discourses but emerge at nodes where bodies, bodies of discourse, and discourses of bodies intersect to foreclose any easy distinction between actor and stage, between sender/receiver, channel, code, message, context” (Bay-Cheng et al., 2010, p. 138). Due to the conversational and loose adoptions to which it is exposed—constructionist, post-structuralist, psychoanalytic), it is appealing to attempt and retrieve a form of pure body from mediated performance (Chan, 2014). Lavender discusses digital culture’s paradigm-modifying features, such as modified views of time and space, and changes in how events and objects are made and consumed. He explains that the concept of the binary stands as an incomplete symbol for the different interactions that exist within digital culture; afterwards, he claims that the theory of the network provides a more flexible way of explaining the multiple and changing interconnections of the digital era (Bay-Cheng et al., 2010). Remshardt broadens this issue with regard to ‘posthuman’. He explains the idea that bodies can also be viewed as units of a system. He examines the idea that people are currently involved in a ‘post-biological’ period where concepts of the real and representations are disturbed—or helpfully broadened—by virtual domains and disseminated performance (Bay-Cheng et al., 2010, p. 123). Insofar as the person is involved, Remshardt argues, “a digitally hybridised or nomadic subjectivity” is prevailing in the ‘new performance ecology’ (Bay-Cheng et al., 2010, p. 123) of digital culture. Conclusions This essay in general shows that the digital is the core, because it has transformed people’s experience and perspective of physical, spatial, and temporal concepts; yet a component as well of the variety through which cultural production and performance becomes more and more interbred. There is a kind of unstoppable reorientation of the media, bodies, and spaces in force. It is true that the digital era is posthuman, but not entirely in the physical science, but even more so in spatial and temporal terms. As a cultural critique, posthumanism attempts to break up the numerous dualities promoted by Western dichotomy: self-other, body-mind, and so on. References Barney, D (2013) The Network Society. UK: John Wiley & Sons. Bay-Cheng, S, Kattenbelt, C, & Lavender, A (2010) Mapping Intermediality in Performance. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Bentkowska-Kafel, A, Cashen, T, & Gardiner, H (2009) Digital Visual Culture: Theory and Practice. New York: Intellect Books. 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