Is Modern Society Rational - Essay Example

Is Modern Society Rational? Introduction Since a good part of the worlds population is now undergoing the pattern of change which we call modernization, we should raise the question of the adequacy of various theories to account for that pattern. “Many of the perspectives we have examined so far have dealt directly with modernization, or with certain aspects of it, including Smelsers structural-functionalist analysis of Englands industrialization and the social psychological approaches of Hagen, McClelland, and the students of individual modernity” (Lauer, 1977, pp 304-310). There is, however, no generally accepted theory of modernization. An excellent critique of modernization theory and studies has been offered by Dean Tipps, and his comments are worth examining in some detail. Tipps points out that the concept "modernization" is relatively new, and that those who theorize about it have been largely influenced by evolutionary and structural-functionalist perspectives: Evidence of their influence may be found in many features of modernization theory: the frequent use of dichotomous type constructions and concepts such as "social differentiation" and "social system"; an emphasis upon the ability to adapt to gradual, “continual change as the normal condition of stability; the attribution of causal priority to immanent sources of change; and the analysis of social change as a directional” process (Tipps, 1973, p 199-226). Tipps also notes that modernization has been employed mainly as an inclusive rather than discriminating concept. It is used to summarize a great many phenomena rather than to discriminate what is modern from other conditions. The level of analysis which is of crucial theoretical significance is that of society and culture--the national state is normally the focus of interest. Finally, Tipps classified modernization theories into two types, the "critical variable" and the "dichotomous" theories. The first type in volves a single kind of change, such as rationalization or industrialization, and the term modernization becomes virtually synonymous with the critical variable. The second type is more common, and involves the process of transformation of traditional societies into modern ones. The process, then, is defined in terms of the end goal, and the end goal is “often a nation very similar to those in the contemporary West” (Lauer, 1977, pp 304-310). The empirical critique argues that modernization theory contains empirical errors or lacunae. Thus, Tipps points out that the theories tend to ignore the impact of forces external to the changing society; to stereotype the meaning of "traditional"; to ignore the diverse kinds and diverse experiences of so-called traditional societies; and to overemphasize the dichotomous nature of tradition and modernity. Parkin states: "a recent critical shift has been away from explanation to description, while this is a matter of degree, the movement away from functionalism has lessened our preparedness to explain how the other works in favor of describing it." (1982, pg. xiii). Finally, the metatheoretical critique offered by Tipps involves the choices made by the theorists in building their systems of thought. We have already noted the tendency to make modernization an inclusive rather than a discriminating concept. This choice toward inclusiveness, argues Tipps, has led the theorists to make the concept "unparsimonious and vague." The concept has lost contact with the empirical reality to which it supposedly refers, and at the same time it is used to refer to “an incredible number of changes at virtually all levels of social reality” (Lauer, 1977, pp 304-310). Thus, Tipps call for a redirection of modernization theory. There are, of course, some efforts in that direction. Frank himself, along with a number of other scholars, is viewing the process of modernization in Marxist terms. There have been other efforts to look at modernization at the individual level in terms of cognitive transformation. No theory has yet been developed that is generally accepted. This is not to say, however, that our theories are useless in the study of modernization or that we have learned nothing from the studies of modernization. With respect to the former, “elements of the various theories can be used--in particular, the elements of contradiction, intergroup conflict, and so forth” (Lauer, 1977, pp 304-310). With respect to the latter, many of the studies of modernization have been essentially empirical in nature, guided by theory only in the broad sense that the anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists approach any research with varying sets of conceptual tools. As a result, they provide us with much useful information. Modernity & Rationalization In rational choice theories, individuals are seen as motivated by the wants or goals that express their preferences (Scott, J. 1995 in Rational Choice Theory by John Scott, 2000.) For Max Weber, the development of capitalism was only an aspect—though undoubtedly a major one—of the process of rationalization. By this he meant that certain principles of rationality have come to be incorporated in the dominant institutions and practices of the modern world—including the market and the capitalist organization of production, but also the bureaucracies and legal apparatuses, and the establishments of science and education. Those who live within these institutions and practices cannot but make their lives within the channels socially available to them. Thus, rationalization in an institutional or objective sense generates corresponding modes of rationality in the thought and behavior of those subject to it. There is no simple correlation between capitalist modernity and a specific form of reason. Rather, certain forms of reason which have always existed have become dominant in the modern world, and other forms, which historically at least have had just as good a claim to the status of reason, have been marginalized and treated as irrational. Weber did not provide a unitary account of the relevant notion of reason. In fact, there are at least three distinct forms of reason which may be discerned in Weber’s account of modern Western rationalization. Easily the dominant form of rationality in the modern world is instrumental rationality. It is most clearly present in the market place, the production process and, subsuming both, capitalist accounting procedures. In many discussions, this form of reason is simply identified with rationality per se1. Individuals are rational in this sense if they select from the range of possible actions which are open to them that action which is, on the best evidence available, most likely to achieve a given goal. Where an individual’s goals conflict, reason will select those goals which are most likely to be achieved, taking into account the intensity and duration of the wants involved. “Instrumental reason treats all wants as having a right to gratification; its function is to point towards the ways in which they might be gratified and, by taking into account their relative strength and the contingencies of the world, to introduce a ranking amongst them “(Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 1978, p 26). Two conditions must be satisfied prior to the application of instrumental reason. It presupposes the existence of ends to which alternative routes are available; it also presupposes the existence of agents who consider themselves free to choose between these alternative routes. These conditions are by no means universal. The instrumental rationalization of the modern world has, however, militated against these two conditions. It has encouraged a conception of the world in which objects, events, agents and activities exist in external and contingent relationships with each other. The overriding concern of instrumental reason is efficiency. Since its only measure of efficiency is quantitative, it is most effective when its materials—ends, potential means—are conceived in quantitative terms. Instrumental reason’s preferred form of existence is as a calculation of quantitative input and quantitative output. However, definite material conditions had to exist before so much of social life could be conceived under the aspects of profit and loss, and expressed in the language of capital accounting which Weber took to be the formal paradigm of instrumental rationality. These included the competitive ‘battle of man with man’ in the market place, the existence of money as a means of measuring value and—perhaps most significant of all—the separation of the working population from the means of production. “Only a legally free, but economically dependent labour force would, Weber argued, have the incentive and the docility necessary to become disciplined participants in the capitalist labour process” (Roth & Wittich, 1978, p 107-9). Much of the time, Weber wrote as if instrumental reason was neutral between different ends. Still, it is implicit in his own account of capitalist rationalization, that there are certain preferred ends towards which it is directed. After all, ‘capitalism is identical with profit and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational capitalistic enterprise’ (Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 1978, p 17). The aim of capitalist enterprise is and must be profit. What this means is that the capitalist and his agents must act in such a way as to maximize their returns, not so that they might consume the proceeds, but in order that these returns might be used to maximize their returns in the next round of activity. And they must continue to act with this end, indefinitely. This is a form of rational activity which is directed towards an end, but where the end is always a means towards a further end of exactly the same kind. Insofar as individuals have ends of this kind, they must have desires which are never satisfied and which are, in a certain sense, unsatisfiable. Weber’s analysis of the Protestant ethic was intended to show how this kind of insatiable desire, rationally pursued, came into existence. Anxiety about whether he was destined for salvation led the Calvinist entrepreneur towards a life of relentless activity combined with austere self-denial—of production without corresponding consumption. It thus provided the psychological impetus necessary for capitalist development to begin. However, once capitalist institutions and practices were well established, and society was objectively rationalized in this sense, the individual capitalist had little alternative but to conform to it. Whether or not the capitalist entrepreneur is concerned with his salvation, he must still be prepared to match his competitors in reinvesting his profit in improved and expanded production, or he will not be able to compete effectively with them and he will soon be replaced by someone who is. For capitalists, as against feudal lords, consumption wants must be subsumed under the rational pursuit of profit, i.e. subordinated to the pursuit of an end which is primarily conceived, not as an end, but as a means towards further ends. It has long been noted, especially by theorists of the Frankfurt School, 2 that instrumental reason seeks power in the sense of control. To conceive of things or persons as means towards the achievement of one’s goals is, other things being equal, to seek to control them. However, the operation of that form of instrumental reason which is especially characteristic of capitalist modernity seeks power in an even more direct sense. To pursue ends which are means to further ends, is to pursue, not ends as such, but the capacity to pursue ends; it is thus identical with the pursuit of power for its own sake. The rationalization of the institutions characteristic of capitalist modernity—the market, the organization of production—means that the individuals who live their lives within these institutions will direct their activities towards power. Those who are rational in this socially dominant sense must subordinate their other goals to the efficient pursuit of power. It is ironic that the apotheosis of instrumental reason is a form of reason which has lost its concern with goals, and focuses its attention on the ‘instrument’ itself. The emergence of Western modernity involved a second principle of rationality which is quite distinct from, and is often opposed to, instrumental reason. This principle is not explicitly distinguished by Weber, and has not received a great deal of attention from his commentators3. However, it is implicit in his discussion of the ‘formal rationality’ associated with the law. This form of rationality—juridical rationality—has an objective social existence in the law and judicial institutions, and in certain parts of the state bureaucracy; like the instrumental rationalization of the capitalist market, it generates corresponding modes of rational behavior on the part of those who are subject to these institutions. This form of reason requires the consistent and impartial application of general legal principles to particular cases. Individuals are formally rational in this juridical sense when they conceive of their actions as an instance of principles which also apply to other actions which are relevantly similar. Thus, the judge or bureaucrat is concerned to establish the appropriate description of some action and then to apply to it the relevant principle. If instrumental reason is concerned with efficiency, this form of reason is concerned with consistency. Juridical rationality will rarely exist in a pure form, even in the legal and quasi-legal apparatuses of the state. It will typically be enmeshed with practices informed by other concepts of rationality, e.g. instrumental reason, even that obsolescent form of reason which is directed towards the achievement of particular ethical ideals. There will be conflicts between these forms of reason; in such cases, Weber suggests, each party to the conflict will think the others irrational. Juridical reason will also exist in the motivations and behavior of the individuals subject to these institutional structures. This will generate conflicts—internal to the individual—between the dictates of instrumental reason and the demands of juridical rationality. Juridical reason is, of course, Kant’s moral law in another guise. But where the moral law was supposed to exist first and foremost in the motivation of the individual moral agent, juridical reason’s primary form of existence is institutional. As such, it provides the legal structure necessary to define and protect the rights of owners of property and makers of contracts. As a derivative of this it encourages individuals to think of themselves and others as bearers of rights and duties. Capitalism works through the market: it requires a market in which the means of production may be purchased, a labour market in which it may recruit its work force, a money market through which it can raise funds and a commodity market so that it may sell its products. If a framework of rights and duties is necessary to sustain the market, it is also necessary to sustain capitalism. However, the forces which capitalism generates are much more potentially destructive than those at work in the market. What is at work is not merely a rational concern to further one’s self-interest, but an insatiable drive towards power. Instrumental rationality is embodied primarily in the institutions of production and exchange, but it informs a large range of other areas of human activity as well. To be rational, in the dominant capitalist sense of this term, is to pursue power as an end in itself. Power is a value in capitalist modernity in the strongest sense: it is an intrinsic good, which is pursued for its own sake. While it may—usually does—serve other ends, these do not provide its justification. Power does not stand in need of a legitimizing principle outside itself. Power is not the only value engendered by capitalism, though it is undoubtedly the dominant one. Consumption is another, and this too is pursued for its own sake. In the form which is most characteristic of capitalism, the desire to consume has the same repetitive and insatiable character as the desire for power. Both may be rationally pursued, but neither defines an object which can ever be achieved. While capitalism has massively increased our ability to achieve our goals and to satisfy our needs and wants, it has done this at the cost of severing any intelligible connection between the exercise of these capacities and the gaining of satisfaction and happiness. Instrumental reason promises, if nothing else, the efficient realization of an individual’s goals. However, in its characteristically capitalist form, it takes as its goals ends which are essentially unrealizable. Where it is directed towards consumption, its aim is not the satisfaction of one’s pre-existing needs and wants, but the act of consumption itself. The gratification achieved with the attainment of a particular object must immediately give way to the quest for further objects. What is achieved in consumption is not satisfaction, but repetition. The goal of power is equally unattainable. In part, this is because the power sought is essentially comparative: it involves power over others, so that having must mean having more than others. Since one’s achievements are always liable to be undermined by the achievements of others and one can never be sure what those achievements will be, one must constantly strive to increase what one has (See Leviathan, op. cit., part I, chs 10-11). But it is also because the power which is sought is not the capacity to carry out a particular task or range of tasks; it is rather the means to acquire further means to further means, and so on indefinitely. Whatever ends are achieved are valued only insofar as they are means towards further ends which are themselves means. Whether or not this program of endless deferral of ends is coherent4, it is certainly unsatisfying. What is achieved is not the efficient realization of goals, but endless and compulsive repetition. There are of course modalities in the experience of power. The industrial workers described by Marx exist in a subordinate position to capital because of their lesser power within the labour market. Within the production process, the power of their collective work is brought into existence by, controlled by and experienced as belonging to capital. 34 But however large the holdings of any individual capitalist, he too is subject to forces which he may influence but cannot control. He is, together with his fellow capitalists, not to mention his employees, subject to market forces which are generated by their various activities but which are only dimly comprehended and not controllable as such. If power is a value engendered by capitalism, it is a value which is denied to just those individuals who value it. It is massively present in capitalist society, but paradoxically it is always absent. This is because the powers that modernity call into existence—the forces of production and destruction, of capital, of bureaucracy, of the market and even of history—are collective powers. In one way or another they result from the joint action of many individuals. But where there is no mechanism for the collective control of these powers, and where the dominant mode of experience is individual possession, it can only be experienced as anonymous and alien: as belonging elsewhere. Where actual power is always other, it may be enjoyed only in simulacrum, as fantasy or representation. Notes As Aristotle argued; see Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J.A.K. Thompson and revised by Hugh Tredennick, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1976, ch. 1, section 1 It is not, for example, mentioned in the works by Levine and Brubacker, op. cit., note 20. See, however, the discussion in Gorän Therbom, What the Ruling Class Does when It Rules, London, New Left Books, 1978, pp. 51-6. Therborn has a particularly useful discussion of the tensions between the two forms of reason in the modern state. See Leviathan, op. cit., part I, chs 10-11 See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, ‘Industrialisation and Capitalism in the Work of Max Weber’, in Negations, translated by J.J. Shapiro, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1968. See, for example, the editorial introduction to Jon Elster (ed.), Rational Choice, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986. Reference Dean C. Tipps, 1973. "Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical Perspective," Comparative Studies in Society and History 15: 199-226. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 1978. Max Weber, Economy and Society, edited by Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, vol. I, p. 26 Parkin, David (1982)Weber; Academic Press, London Robert H. Lauer, 1977. Perspectives on Social Change. Allyn and Bacon. Ross Poole, 1991. Morality and Modernity. London and New York. Scott, J. 1995. Sociological Theory: Contemporary Debates. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Read More