Causes of Intrastate Conflicts in Somalia - Essay Example

Causes of Intra Conflicts in Somalia Somalia is one of the countries, which are referred to as "The Horn of Africa," others being Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The region often experience prolonged interstate and intrastate conflicts. Besides the crippling conflicts inside their borders, these countries have become very active in destroying each other. Conflict, hunger, destruction, and displacement have become words normally used to describe this part of the continent. One might wonder why they are so often tangling with conflicts. In particular, one might be inclined to believe that the prolonged wars have shaped the society's behaviour to be conflict prone (Daniel). It is reiterated by social scientists that conflicts are, generally, manifestations of grievance that emanate from differences in values, interests, beliefs, perceptions or ideologies. When it comes to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa one can identify intricate but open religious and interest based conflict in the Sudan; a mixture of value, interest, belief, and ideology based conflicts in Ethiopia and Eritrea (Daniel). By using the Security Dilemma theory to explain Somalia's clan conflict, international relations experts see conflict as an offensive approach, whereby one actor (in this case, the clan) prepares to defend itself, which is perceived by another actor as threatening (Kaufman, 855). Laitin is careful to suggest that even though there were many threats to survival and security that may have motivated the Somali clans to arm themselves, such as the fear of enemy clans gaining state power after Said lost power in 1991, the security dilemma may not have been a principle motivator for the actions taken. Instead, Laitin argues that it was not security playing primary role, but perhaps a desire to ensure a future Somali state. Until 1991, the Security Dilemma may be a good explanation for clans fighting among themselves, but when Said was taken out of office in 1991, it is no longer valid reasoning for why the fighting could not cease to allow unification. Laitin also points out that the civil war that broke out in Somalia after 1991 was not due to the breakdown of the Central State and a resulting violent anarchy. No one clan was seeking State control to begin with. In David Laitin's paper, "Somalia-Civil War and International Intervention," he notes that country experts usually blame the causes of that intrastate conflict on the segmentary lineage system, the brutality and corruption of Siad's regime, the international agreements that allowed Somalia to become heavily militarized, ecological conditions in the late 1980s. Though ecological conditions in the late 1980s in Somalia were poor as well, this too is another local condition of the conflict while still others argue against local conditions as causes. By suggesting the conflict and civil war in Somalia is due to local conditions only is a testament that the international system will be of no avail in preventing future conflicts of other countries who do not necessarily have Somali like "symptoms" of war. International relations experts will claim otherwise. Somali society is organized as a segmentary lineage system culminating in the qolo translated as clan or tribe. The association of these groupings, each of which claims descent from a single ancestor, constitutes the agnatic basis of Somali society where community is expressed genealogically. Clans are therefore considered wider families, and community is formulated in the idiom of kinship (Klein). Though fluid loyalties and shifting allegiances are the hallmark of the social system, two main lineages - the Sab and Samale, and six main clans are conventionally recognized in ethnographic surveys: Dir, Isaq, Darod, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanwein. Each of these is in turn subdivided, into often a more prominent sub-unit, known as reer. The loose association of clans with particular territory has in recent years been asserted more vigorously as a traditional right to a clan territory, this in response to the dual process of sedentarisation of nomads and the commodification of land. Clans are also associated with each of the political movements, which emerged during the 1980s (Klein). In segmentary lineages, descendents of close kin stand together against more distant kin, and even distant kin will unite against groups on non-kin. Somalia, along with many other Northern and East African countries, uses the segmentary lineage system, which has been compared by some to the Realist "balance of power" systems. Kin groups within Somalia, one of the most ethnically homogeneous societies in the world, once shared political power reasonably well (Crocker, et. Al., 154). The segmentary lineage system in Somalia; however, has been manipulated by the state, so that warlords have power over the mediators. Thus, blaming the lineage system for Somalia's inability to prevent conflict is weak, at best, as societal violence is not factored by the system, but the modern state's changes to that system (Laitin, 2). Statelessness did not merely happen over night for Somalia. In late 1969, a military government assumed power following the assassination of Shermarke. Mohamed Siad Barre, a general of the military forces, became the president. The revolutionary army leaders, headed by Barre, started grand scale public works. They also successfully implemented an urban and rural literacy campaign, in which they helped increase the literacy rate from 5% to 55% by the mid-1980s (Somalia). However, the Somali state was dissolved in 1991 after President Siad Barre was deposed. After almost three decades of dictatorship, Siad Bare left Somalia a totally collapsed state. Somalia has no effective government that administers the country. It has become a territory governed by various warlords who operate for their own personal gain. Despite attempts to end the Somali tragedy, the provisional government in Mogadishu is not recognised by the majority of the warlords. In the East, the Somaliland, which is more stable and with effective government, has also declared its independence but has not yet, secured recognition from the international community. Due to the lack of effective government in Somalia, it has become a testing ground for various destructive grounds. Despite the arms embargo imposed on the country, neighbouring countries, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Egypt smuggle arms for various reasons (Daniel). Ethiopia assists a number of the warlords for its own political stability, after rebel groups called Al-Itihad, which reportedly to have a relationship with Al-Qaeda, had attacked Ethiopia on several occasions. Similarly, Somalia has a long-standing border dispute with Ethiopia. Eritrea has strong historical ties with Somalia because Siad Barre was one of the African leaders who stood on the side of the Liberation Front, during the armed struggle for liberation. At the same time, Egypt has a stake in Ethiopia, because of the Nile, and by supporting armed groups in Somalia like Al-Itihad, it attempted to destruct the Ethiopian development plan. Moreover, the lack of established government became a good opportunity for terrorists to thrive and take refuge in Somalia. Therefore, Somalia has become a battleground not only for the warlords but also for those who wanted to destabilise the region as a whole (Daniel). Without the necessary mechanisms for social and political integration beyond the clan but vast scope for fragmentation at lower levels, the project of nation building was to prove a great challenge in spite of cultural homogeneity. The difficulties of imposing the order and discipline of formal statehood are complicated further by the cultural specificity of the Somali tradition (Klein). Formulated during the high period of nomadism, when sub-clan, group or even a single family or would traverse the clan territory with their herds, the republican ethos is summarized in a proverb: "In Somalia each man is his own Sultan." This individualism notwithstanding, Somali identity remains a powerful cultural symbol and retains its political appeal. Somalia's political history is therefore determined by the conflicting dynamics of charismatic leadership and nonconformist individualism. Political leaders can build alliances and attract followings on the strength of shared culture, language, and ancestry, but they have to adopt the awkward means of modern statehood to institutionalize their authority. This often backfires, driving people away from the modernizing project to seek refuge and support in their regional or sub-clan identities (Klein). Colonialism introduced the Somalis to modern warfare, including Africa's first experience of aerial bombardment. Armed resistance to British rule in northeastern Somaliland under the leadership of Mohammed Abdulle Hassan lasted until the 1920s. In the Italian colony of Somalia, meanwhile, soldiers were recruited to participate in the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and fought on both sides in the Second World War. Somalia also secured support from the Soviet Union, mainly in the form of military aid, which in turn satisfied the army, extended the power of Barre's clan, and allowed him to entertain dreams of regional expansion (Klein). Somalia first began receiving help by the Soviet Union, who could help provide a modernized army in exchange for an access to the strategically located base, Berbera, along the Red Sea. In the midst of the Cold War era, 1977, when it was clear to the US that Somalia and the Soviet Union were no longer on good terms, the US announced that they too would begin to supply Somalia with arms. In fact, Somalia has a history of seeking weapons from many countries, to include China and Libya. The presence and accessibility of weapons; however, is a poor excuse for the death and violence taking place in Somali. Despite the widespread conflicts in the region, the civilian population in all countries remains detached from and equally victimised by the political upheaval of the regimes involved. For instance, when the Ethiopian government deported the Eritreans who were living in Ethiopia for decades, their Ethiopian friends, and neighbours took care of their properties and belongings that were left behind, and the same is true on the side of Eritrea (Daniel). This supports my position that the animosity has had little or no social ramification or roots, which is a good prospect for peace building efforts in the future. Similarly, strong NGOs, civic organisations and other nongovernmental institutions are flourishing to fight the social ills brought by those bossy regimes in the Horn. Those organisations have recognised the need to establish a cross-border networking to overcome the failures of the state institutions. Therefore, as the grassroots is moving to the right direction, the effort to build a peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa is not that far from realisation (Daniel). There is no single cause for the intrastate conflict in Somalia, but a rather a combination of many factors such as the segmentary lineage system, the brutality and corruption of Siad's regime, the international agreements that allowed Somalia to become heavily militarized, and the ecological conditions in the late 1980s. In an attempt to bring peace into Somalia, a future Somali government will be facing with the fundamental questions of how to entice regional power-holders to submit themselves to the national interest. If Somalia is to return to statehood, it needs to produce positive advantages to all groups (Klein). Works Cited Daniel. "The Horn of Africa: Prospects for Peace." Peace and Conflict Monitor. 20 May 2004. University for Peace. 31 Oct. 2005. Read More