Israel and Iran: Cold War Years - Essay Example

? Israel and Iran: Cold War Years 23 October ISRAEL AND IRAN: COLD WAR YEARS Iran and Israel do not have common borders, have not attacked each other in a war and have no problems with territorial claims, and yet they are now in a sensitive state of cold war years (Menashri 2006: 109). Furthermore, in the Pahlavi era, as well as since the 1960s, the two countries established close ties, close enough to be seen as strategic alliance partners, an alliance that quickly soured when the Islamic regime arose in Iran (Menashri 2006: 109). The U.S., as far as it is concerned, supports Israel, where President Barack Obama strives to delay Israel’s planned missile strikes on Iran’s nuclear program through applying sanctions on Iran. At present, newly-elected Iranian president Hassan Rouhani is supposed to be more moderate than hard-liners President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, but Ahmadinejad was recently quoted as saying: “Israel is a wound on the body of the world of Islam that must be destroyed” (Fisher 2013). The quote was later on changed by Iranian media. These circumstances underlie the historical conflict between Israel and Iran and how their leaders’ mindsets and biases can impact peace or war in the future. The paper explores the causes and consequences of the ongoing shadow conflict between Iran and Israel, also called its Cold War Years, and the consequences of the conflict on Israel’s broader Palestinian conflict and Arab conflicts. CAUSES OF CONFLICT Israel-Iran relations started with synergy and ended in years of shadow conflict. Before the rise of the Islamic Regime in Iran, Israel and Iran shared common ties. All that changed when in 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ousted the Shah from power and started Iran's Islamic Revolution. Fatah Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat helped bring about these political changes (Schanzer 2009: 30). As Khomeini remained in exile in France, Arafat’s Lebanon-based guerrilla network, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) supported the former by giving military training and weapons (Schanzer 2009: 30). The first members of Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) received training and equipment from Arafat (Schanzer 2009: 30). Khomeini showed gratitude by closing the Israeli embassy in Tehran and flying a Palestinian flag overhead. The embassy building was turned into a place for an official PLO agency with its own ambassador (Schanzer 2009: 30). The Iran-Iraq War in the 1980-1988 disrupted ties between Arafat and Khomeini. The Palestinians supported Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, while Khomeini thwarted Arafat's efforts to mediate between Iran and Iraq. In 1988, Arafat decided to have peace talks with Israel during the United Nations congress, which punctuated his relationship with Khomeini. In 1989, Khomeini's descendant, supreme leader Ali Khamenei condemned Arafat as “a traitor and an idiot” (Schanzer 2009: 30). One of the main reasons that Arafat changed his disposition toward Israel is the outburst in 1987 of the first intifada, which refers to the aggressive Palestinian resistance effort in the territories that the Jewish state held. During this time, Arafat was in Tunisia, where he was exiled after his ousting from Lebanon in 1982. With the uprising spreading, Arafat gave orders to the Palestinians loyalists in the territories to control other groups, including the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (Schanzer 2009: 30). Arafat had problems managing the conflict from Tunisia, however, which made it easy for members of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood to establish a breakaway organization called Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), also called Hamas. On February 1988, Hamas spread leaflets that opposed the leadership of Arafat. Hamas worked with the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising in a propaganda war that enticed the faithfulness of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians (Schanzer 2009: 30). These organizations were not entirely at ease because they both argued that they inspired and led the first intifada (Schanzer 2009: 30). Arafat wanted to re-establish his authority through continuing his proposal during an emergency meeting of the Palestine National Council in 1988, so in 1947, he passed the General Assembly resolution 181, which mandated the division of Palestine into two states- Jewish and Arab states. He further initiated peace talks with Israel using additional UN resolutions. The West swiftly entered the arena to facilitate the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians in Oslo. Soon, the PLO and Fatah were seen as potential parties to a transition government. Hamas pursued a different path with its openly violent and oppositional resistance, where its main goal is the obliteration of Israel and the formation of a strictly Islamic Palestine in Israel. Hamas’ inflexible approach was then aligned with Iran (Schanzer 2009: 30). The mullahs in Iran knew about Hamas and contacted the latter (Schanzer 2009: 30). They were part of the people who believed that Israel had invalid territorial claims (Menashri 2006: 110). They asserted that Arabs lived in Palestine long before Jews settled there, and so Israel’s historical territorial rights are flawed (Menashri 2006: 110). Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini further questioned if Palestine could “be wiped from the world’s map and replaced with a fabricated and false state by the name of Israel?” (Menashri 2006: 110). These Iranian perceptions of the Jews and Israel are some of the main causes of the conflict between Iran and Israel. In December 1990, Hamas leaders officially visited Iran with rejectionist groups like them and held a conference in support of the continuing intifada (Schanzer 2009: 30). During this time, it became clear that Arafat was the best medium for the U.S.’ peace sponsorship, while Iran boosted support for Hamas, thereby magnifying conflict between Iran and Israel and between Iran and the U.S. (Schanzer 2009: 30). In 1992, Arafat protested that Iran gave some $30 million to Hamas, thereby confirming a report in the Lebanese magazine Al-Shira that Iran had already given around $10 million a year to Hamas from its oil revenues (Schanzer 2009: 30). Subsequent to Arafat’s support for the 1993 Oslo accords, mandated at the White House lawn with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, his connections with Iran degraded even more. In December 1994, Iranian demonstrators asserted in the PLO embassy in Tehran that Arafat was the “biggest collaborator with Israel and the United States” (Schanzer 2009: 30). The mullahs created an increasing distance between them and the growing unpopularity of Arafat. During the same time, Iran offered support to PLO members who were in exile in Tunisia, if they opposed Arafat (Schanzer 2009: 30). A 1995 article in the Independent, a British newspaper, stated that Iran even supported the plan of assassinating Arafat (Schanzer 2009: 30). Other reports indicated that Iran trained Hamas members in Sudan, Lebanon, and other Arab states (Schanzer 2009: 30). President Clinton and his regime saw Iran as a threat because of its open support to Hamas and other terrorist groups, as well as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hezbollah. The U.S. countered Iran’s support by giving financial aid, weapons, and military training to the PA or Palestinian Army to improve its strength and for Iran, it gave additional sanctions (Schanzer 2009: 30; Wellen 2013: 118). The 1995 U.S. trade embargo on Iran and the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) specifically targeted Iran because of its public support for Arafat's opponents (Schanzer 2009: 30). To embarrass and invalidate Arafat and to stop the Oslo peace process, Hamas conducted suicide bombings in Israel in 1994 (Schanzer 2009: 30). Hamas followed the terrorist style of Iranian-supported Hezbollah, where car bombs became weapons of terror in Lebanon during the 1980s. It is possible that Hamas used the technique because of cross-training with Hezbollah (Schanzer 2009: 30). Mohammed Hafez of the United States Institute of Peace asserted that when Israel extradited 415 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad activists to Lebanon in 1992, these Palestinian exiles obtained various forms of support and training from Hezbollah. Michael Horowitz, a scholar at the University of Pennsylvania, summed up the connection between Hezbollah/Hizballah, Hamas, and other extremist Palestinian groups: “Hizballah was the hub from which suicide tactics spread to the Palestinians and other groups” (Schanzer 2009: 30). The PA arrested many Hamas and PIJ members afterwards (Schanzer 2009: 30). While all these are happening, Iran was developing its nuclear program. On September 2002 September, Russian technicians started the construction of Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr, ignoring the opposition of the U.S. A year after, the UN nuclear watchdog, IAEA, asserted that Tehran should provide proof that it is not making atomic weapons. On November 2003, Iran stated that it suspended its uranium enrichment program and allowed tougher UN inspections of its nuclear facilities. IAEA concluded that it found no evidence for a weapons program in Iran. On 2005, Tehran said it started again with its uranium conversion at its Isfahan plant and insisted that the program aimed for peaceful functions. IAEA asserted that Iran violated the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On July 2008, Iran test-fired a new version of the Shahab-3, a long-range missile that could hit targets in Israel (Salisbury and Lowrie 2013: 23). At present, Israel plans to bomb the nuclear program of Iran, but Iranian President Rouhani stressed with U.S. broadcaster NBC that Iran will never construct nuclear weapons. By October 2013, plans for comprehensive talks over Iran’s nuclear program were posed, but Israel continued to be suspicious of these efforts from Iran (Halkin 2007: 22). CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT Israel is more worried of anti-Semitic Iran right now than Hamas because Iran has possible atomic weapons, thus the consequences of conflict are war between Israel and Iran, most likely supported by the U.S., although the U.S. still calls for peaceful resolutions between the two nations. Israeli historian Benny Morris recently stated in the German newspaper Die Welt, a “second Holocaust … claim[ing] roughly the same number of lives as the first," in which, "one bright morning, in five or ten years … the orders will go out and [nuclear-tipped] Shihab III and IV missiles will take off for Tel Aviv, Beersheba, Haifa, and Jerusalem,” which could kill “a million or more Israelis” and the deadly irradiation of millions more (Halkin 2007: 19). Halkin (2007) argued that with such a potential scenario, Israel had a right to prevent it from happening, even through the use of a military strike (19). He presented five questions: 1) Is it possible to keep Iran from going nuclear by non-military means such as economic sanctions, diplomatic action, or regime change? 2) If not, can it be done militarily? 3) If so, will the United States do it? 4) If the United States will not, can Israel? 5) If Israel can, should it try to despite the risk, on the one hand, that it might fail and the possibility, on the other hand, that it will be hit in return not just by conventionally tipped, long-range Iranian missiles but by Iran's allies Hizballah and Syria, and perhaps even by a Syrian ground assault on the Golan Heights? (Halkin 2007: 19). These questions underscored the potential spillover of war across the Gulf region once Israel hits Iran, or if the U.S. does it for Israel. Peaceful means of resolving the conflict between Israel and Iran are still available, even when Israel cannot add more sanctions or pressures on Iran to stop its nuclear program. The U.S. has better leverage of imposing heavier sanctions if it could convince Europe, Russia, and China to agree with sanctions, something that is uncertain as of yet (Halkin 2007: 19). In addition, when considering the attack on Iran, it seems that the best feasible route is for the U.S. to do it because it has a larger air force than Iran, longer-range bombers proficient in carrying heavier payloads, and is or can be located closer to Iranian targets, “whether on U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean or at land bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere” (Halkin 2007: 19). This is critical if the strike must be done repeatedly to ensure the destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities (Halkin 2007: 20). Blanche (2009), however, added the possibility of assassinating key figures in Iran, something Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, did with Saddam’s weapons programs through Operation Damocles (28). If the United States decided to not bomb Iran despite the breakdown of non-military measures, Israel would still need to get American approval and support before conducting actions (Halkin 2007: 20). Israel needs America’s diplomacy and military intelligence (to determine the location of Iranian installations and their defenses and the munitions needed to destroy them, for instance), among others (Halkin 2007: 20). Israel's airplanes could not reach targets in Iran and return home without going through and refueling over either Turkey (a friendly country that might not allow any form of participation in air strikes on Iran), Saudi Arabia (a U.S. ally that would be deeply discomfited with such an action), or American air space in Iraq (Halkin 2007: 20). Another route of flying down the Red Sea and across Yemen and Oman was not feasible because it was the longest route among the options provided (Halkin 2007: 20). The U.S. plays a significant role in the brewing war between Israel and Iran because it can ultimately affect whether an attack will be launched on Iran. At the same time, the problem between Syria and Israel looms and will be affected by consequent actions on the part of Israel. Peace negotiations between Syria and Israel root from Rabin’s administration years. On some instances, they almost agreed on peaceful resolutions, such as the “Barak-Assad summit at Shepherdstown, Virginia in 2000” (Halkin 2007: 20). The peace talks were severed, like past ones because of three territories, also called as “June 4, 1967 lines,” or the lines at the bottom of Golan Heights that divided the Israeli and Syrian armies when the Six-Day War happened, in contradiction to the internationally accepted Syrian-Palestinian frontier that the French and English drew in 1923 (Halkin 2007: 20). Syria claims these territories too, which included the lowlands of the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers and the Sea of Galilee (Halkin 2007: 20). Three past Israeli Prime Ministers, Rabin, Barak, and Shimon Peres, even possibly Netanyahu, noted that they were willing to let go of all of Golan. For the past five years, such offers were not made to Syria anymore; though Golan is reportedly put back on the peace talks table (Halkin 2007: 20). The biggest payoff for peace with Syria for Israel is Iran. The American-Israeli historian and political commentator Michael Oren stated in the New York Times: More crucial still, by detaching Syria from Iran's orbit, Israel will be able to address the Iranian nuclear threat--perhaps by military means--without fear of retribution from Syrian ground forces and missiles. Forfeiting the Golan Heights, for … Israelis [who support such a move], seems to be a sufferable price to pay to avoid conventional and ballistic attacks across most of Israel's borders. (Halkin 2007: 21). There are consequences again, which Oren said: The potentially disparate positions of Israel and the United States on the question of peace with Syria could trigger a significant crisis between the two countries--the first of Mr. Bush's expressly pro-Israel presidency. … But if trust is established on both sides and the conditions are conducive to peace, a settlement between Syria and Israel may yet be attained and a clash between Israel and Washington ignited (Halkin 2007: 21). With President Obama, however, the scenarios become a bit more uncertain. Tira (2011) added the nuclear era scenario without the containment of Iran. Hence, the consequences of the conflict between Iran and Israel are wars and greater conflicts in the region, affecting millions of people, combatants and non-combatants. CONCLUSION Cohen (2010) talked about the importance of removing all sources of nuclear weapons for Israel because of its history with Holocaust and Diaspora. Slager (2012) questioned the need for pre-emptive self-defense, however, because of the spiraling side effects. Israel wants to reduce all potential threats using all means possible. It is not willing to bend to waiting and trusting Iran. The conflict heightens as new leaders thread existing division lines that traverse psychological, social, economic, and political issues. Thus, Israel does not show inclination for yielding unless Iran destroys its nuclear weapons and starts following anti-nuclear weapons treaties, and the possibility of war becomes more evident as time passes because of the absence of strong peaceful resolutions. REFERENCES Beinart, Peter. 2012. “Frenemies.” Newsweek, March 19, 159 (12): 46-52. Blanche, Ed. 2009. “Iran-Israel Covert War.” Middle East (402): 28-31. Cohen, Avner. 2010. “Israel's Nuclear Future: Iran, Opacity and the Vision of Global Zero.” Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics & Culture 16 (3/4): 6-19. Fisher, Max. 2013. “Iranian President’s Comments on Israel Are Latest Flashpoint in War of Perceptions.” Washington Post, August 3. Retrieved from October 20, 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/02/iranian-presidents-comments-on-israel-are-latest-flashpoint-in-war-of-perceptions/ Halkin, Hillel. 2007. “Israel: The Waiting Game.” Commentary 123 (3): 17-23. 7 Menashri, David. 2006. “Iran, Israel and the Middle East Conflict.” Israel Affairs 12 (1): 107-122. Salisbury, Daniel, and Lowrie, David. 2013. “Targeted: A Case Study In Iranian Illicit Missile Procurement.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 69 (3): 23-30. Schanzer, Jonathan. 2009. “The Iranian Gambit in Gaza.” Commentary, February, 127 (2): 29-32. Slager, Katherine. 2012. “Legality, Legitimacy and Anticipatory Self-Defense: Considering an Israeli Preemptive Strike on Iran's Nuclear Program.” North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial Regulation 38 (1): 267-325. Tira, Ron. 2011. “Can Iran be Deterred?” Policy Review (169): 39-48. Wellen, Russ. 2013. “Can't Stand the Suspense: An Attack by Israel on Iran.” Journal of Psychohistory 41 (2): 118-130. Read More