Radical Islamism - Research Paper Example

August 5, Review of Literature This paper reviews the literature on radical Islamism, U.S. relations with the Muslim world, and the rise of the global Jihadi movement. Several authors examine the roots of religious violence, and some offer practical and policy resolutions to respond to these different causes of Jihadi violence. They differ on the causes of religious violence, as well as on the right solutions for this continuing problem. This paper notes that radical Islamism and Jihadism are largely misunderstood in the West and that the West and Muslim states and communities must work together in finding long-term and short-term resolutions to various issues that contribute to religious violence. Radical Islamism has evolved into a global Jihadi movement that spreads violence in the name of Islam, although this form of Islamism itself is heterogeneous enough to elude any generalization of its means and goals. Husain, in Chapter ten of Global Islamic Politics, describes the history of Afghanistan as a nation, which is struggling to become a “unified” and strong state. Its history with both foreign and local invaders and rulers, respectively, from the Soviet Union to the Taliban, demonstrates the chaotic political development of Afghanistan. It also shows that the Taliban is one of the most ruthless rulers that espouse radical Islamism, and that mainstream Islam and Islamism do not promote and condone Taliban's use of extensive violence in achieving its religious objectives. Mandaville defines and examines Jihad and Islamism in relation to the teachings of violence in Islam and the rise of the global Jihadi movement in “Radical Islamism and Jihad beyond the Nation-State.” He says that radical Islamism is different from mainstream Islamism, because the former rejects modern sovereign state systems and emphasizes jihad or the violent struggle, as its main or even exclusive means for attaining political changes (239). He underscores that within radical Islamism, there are several different movements and not all have the same viewpoints on their means and goals. For instance, Osama Bin Laden's jihad concentrates on ensuring that Muslim territories are free from foreign forces, while Hizb ut-Tahrir movement's jihad stresses the need for establishing a caliphate using non-violent means as much as possible (Mandaville 240). Mandaville and Husain agree that the Soviet war and occupation in Afghanistan had a great impact on the formation of modern global Jihadi movements. When other radical Islamists joined the struggle of Afghan Arabs against the Soviet forces, they formed the “generation of Arab Afghans,” who later developed a transnational Jihadi system (Mandaville 242). This Jihadi system, however, can still be broken into several organizations, whose ideologies, priorities, and means differ widely from one another. The concept of jihad is gravely misunderstood in the West as meaning only “holy war,” when Muslim scholars define it in many ways, and so it is wrong to say that Islam defends and promotes violence against non-Muslims per se. Mandaville describes how religious scholars define the sub-categories of jihad, which includes “jihad, al-qalb (struggle of the heart), jihad b'il-lisan (struggle by the tongue), jihad bil-qalam (struggle by the pen), and jihad bil-sayf (struggle by the sword) (250). He stresses that Islam only uses jihad when it is under attack and it also does not condone all forms of violence, the way some Jihadi organizations have like al-Qaeda. Jihad also embraces fiqh-al jihad (jurisprudence of warfare), which is similar to the concept of Just War in Western theory (250). The diversity of Jihadism proves that Islamism and Islam do not unilaterally promote violence per se against non-believers without just causes and without the use of just means. Bajoria studies the origins and recent updates on al-Qaeda. Like Mandaville, Bajoria shows that al-Qaeda continues to survive, because its network of networks remain strong. Furthermore, Esposito, in a lecture at FIU in 2010, “Inside Islam: What a Billion Muslims Think,” shows that when Americans continue to know so less about Islam and Muslims, the less they know about how majority of the Muslims feel about some Muslim terrorists' brand of jihad. When Islamist believers see armed struggle as part of the cosmic struggle, they are more prone to use religion in defending and promoting their various convictions, including the justification of violent and destructive means. In “The Logic of Religious Violence,” Jurgensmeyer argues that the root of religious violence is based on the nature of religion as dealing with tensions between order and disorder, and disorder happens to be filled with violence. He underscores, however, that it is still the people who use religion to justify their violent means, as the Sikh have done. He says that religion provides the “meta-morality” (145), with its violent symbols and languages, which authorizes violence against non-believers or even “false” believers. In “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” Pape disagrees with Jurgensmeyer because the former believes that religion is no longer the dominating force for suicide terrorism. For Pape, the logic of suicide terrorism starts with seeing it as a means of achieving political objectives, particularly the removal of foreign occupation on Muslim lands. He stresses the same views in his interview at Oregon Univ.-Humanities Institute, where many suicide terrorists are more secular than religious. He cites history, where some suicide bombers are even anti-religion. Atran, in “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” agrees with Pape that radical jihadists have political goals, but confirms Jurgensmeyer's assertion hat suicide terrorists genuinely believe in the cosmic importance of their sacrifices, meaning, religion still plays a key role in suicide terrorism. Sageman studies the profile of jihadi members who were connected to the actors of 9/11 in “Understanding Jihadi Networks.” He explains his scientific method and findings in the discussion he gave at the New America Foundation in 2008. This discussion contradicts several misconceptions about jihadists, such as that they are poor or fundamentalists, and easy to brainwash. He notes that many of them come from middle-class and secular families. These jihadists are also not young (average age is 26 years old), and so they are not that easy to brainwash. His findings confirm Jurgensmeyer's assessment that religion, particularly Salafism, influenced jihadists to embrace jihad bil-sayf (struggle by the sword). Sageman highlights that the global Salafi jihadi movement remains as an idealogical struggle that feeds the causes of the minority of jihadists. In order to control the rise of suicide terrorism and spread of violence that do so through Salafism, it is important to address all factors that contribute to the logic of religious violence. Pape recommends the enhancement of homeland security. Atran disagrees with Pape's limited recommendation and argues that policymakers should not overlook the moral values and group relations of Jihadi movements. He believes that Jihadism cannot be entirely quelled; instead, they should be assisted in finding other non-violent channels of their religious expression. Furthermore, in “To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East,” Atran gives examples of several nations where they influenced radical Jihadi members to surrender by using the ties that bind these radical Jihadi members, particularly their families, schools, and friendships. Sageman agrees with Atran in the importance of understanding the morality and group and network dynamics of the global Salafi jihadi movement, in order to determine lasting solutions. Unlike Atran, Sageman recommends “discrediting the legitimacy of the leaders and the ideology behind the global Salafi jihad and replacing it with an inspiring vision of a just and fair partnership with Islam” (11). This indicates that Sageman does not believe that Jihadism can exist in a peaceful and secular modern world. The conference “US Relations with the Muslim World: One Year After Cairo” underlines the value of engagement that interconnects national and international governments and organizations in resolving the diverse conflicts between the West and the Muslim world. Engagement should also involve local Jihadi organizations, as well as Muslim sectors and movements. Scholars have different ideas on how the U.S. should respond to global Jihadi terrorism, because they have conflicting notions of foreign policymaking in America. Prodromou, in “U.S. Foreign Policy and Global Religious Pluralism,” calls for a “religious turn” (298) in American foreign policymaking, without seeing religion as a “source of risk and confrontation” (298). She stresses that though U.S. foreign policies have consistently possessed religious intonations, they failed to respond to the religious aspects of modern jihadi terrorism. Buzan, in “Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?” stresses that the U.S. is using the global war on terrorism (GWoT) to resolve its “threat deficit” that it incurred after the ending of the Cold War. He believes that the U.S. is exploiting its GWoT as an essential component of its “new macro-securitization” (1103), so that it could strengthen its global hegemony. President Barack Obama, in his speech in Cairo, “A New Beginning,” argues for combining social, economic, and military resolutions to foreign policymaking to effectively deal with global terrorism. He stresses the importance of giving financial aid to war-affected states, which can help build or rebuild schools, businesses, roads, and other basic infrastructures, such as what the U.S. did for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The PBS documentary on “Obama's War”in 2009, nevertheless, demonstrates the complexity of a holistic approach to ending America's multiple wars for good. It shows that the U.S. does not have enough resources to help build stable social, economic and political infrastructures in its post-war efforts. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton delivers her remarks in “The U.S.-Islamic World Forum” (2011) and supports Obama's economic-social-political approach as a long-term response to radical Jihadism. She underscores the value of technology and openness of information in forming more tolerant and peaceful Islamist movements. Obama's war seems to have a different ideology compared to Bush's war, which is tainted with economic and political interests, as shown in PBS's Frontline's “Bush's War.” This video confirms Obama's action toward more holistic solutions to Jihadism. Assassinating terrorist organization leaders will not solve the tension between the U.S. and Jihadi extremists in the long-run. Carter, in “The Burden of Victory,” says that Osama Bin Laden's assassination only provides a sense of “closure” and “victory.” Still, he notes that Bin Laden's death does not, in itself, resolve the war against terror and related U.S.-Islam tensions. “Targeted Killing: The Ethics and Realpolitik of Assassination” is an article that agrees with Carter that by killing Bin Laden, Obama confirms that he condones the assassination of terrorist leaders. This implies the discrepancy between foreign policy rhetoric and actual American action. “Targeted Killing” says that this kind of assassination, which Israelis are also known for, will only feed another cause for future terrorism. Nasr argues that the U.S. should focus on using trade and commerce to align Iran with its general interests of peace, in the article “The Power of Commerce.” He notes that the strong and large middle class population and other demographics of Iran can pave the way for the development of the kind of Iran that would not fuel or support Jihadi terrorism. Esposito, in “America and the Muslim World: Building a New Way Forward,” believes that Muslim moderates have a large role in shaping a better relationship between Islamic states and the West. At the same time, he emphasizes the need for multi-faith and multi-ethnic initiatives that will serve as grassroots efforts in transforming how Muslims and non-Muslims see and tolerate one another. These articles depict the absence of monolithic Islamism and Jihadism, and yet many Americans insist on the contrary. Islamism and Jihadism are not “evil” in concept, because they are made of different strands of ideologies. America still has a long way to go in improving its understanding of how Muslims, with all its different strands, see America and its foreign policies. Furthermore, scholars have different ideas on the causes of religious violence and Jihadism, which affect their recommendations for stemming religious violence. Nevertheless, it is clear that a holistic approach, which considers security and engagement, as well as a wide range of economic, social, political, cultural, and religious dimensions, will be critical in addressing the immediate and long-term issues that gave rise to radical and violent Jihadism. Works Cited Atran, Scott. “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism.” ---. “To Beat Al Qaeda, Look to the East.” Bajoria, Jayshree. “al-Qaeda.” Buzan, Barry. “Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?” Clinton, Hillary. “Lecture: The U.S.-Islamic World Forum (2011).” Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . Conference: “US Relations with the Muslim World: One Year After Cairo.” Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . Esposito, John L. “America and the Muslim World: Building a New Way Forward.” ---. “Inside Islam: What a Billion Muslims Think (lecture at FIU 2010).” Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . Husain, Mir Zohair. Global Islamic Politics, Chapter 10. Jurgensmeyer, Mark. “The Logic of Religious Violence.” Mandaville, Peter. “Radical Islamism and Jihad beyond the Nation-State.” Nasr, Vali. “The Power of Commerce.” Obama, Barack. Speech in Cairo: “A New Beginning.” Pape, Robert. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.” ---. Oregon Univ.-Humanities Institute. Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . PBS. “Bush's War.” Frontline, PBS, Mar. 2008. Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . ---. “Obama's War.” Frontline, PBS, Oct. 2009. Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . Prodromou, Elizabeth H. “U.S. Foreign Policy and Global Religious Pluralism.” Sageman, Marc. New America Foundation. Feb. 2008. Web. 3 Aug. 2011 . ---. “Understanding Jihadi Networks.” “Targeted Killing: The Ethics and Realpolitik of Assassination.” Read More