Matter,human attachment and social constructionist theory - Essay Example

? Topic What is the role played by matter in the processes by which attachments are forged between people and between people and objects? To what extent do accounts of these processes challenge social constructionist arguments? Title Matter, Human Attachment and Social Constructionist Theory Name/course/institution/date/course supervisor etc can be either here or on a separate title page- could also include your name in the footnote of each page, on the left if you want to. The Essay Matter, in the form of the human body, or in the form of the external objects that surround humans in their everyday lives, is fundamental to the formation of attachment between people, and between objects and people. In the reversal of processes causing such attachment, matter is equally important in allowing social detachment. If this supposition is to be considered carefully, it is evident that the proposals offered by a social constructionist argument in isolation do not completely serve to explain the connections and interactions between people and between people and objects. It is, though, clear that social practice and the collective meaning that groups of people engage in, do assist in the creation of social worlds. What groups perceive as appropriate in recognisable situations can be, to a degree, accepted as being formed by acknowledged rules, influenced by the social constructs surrounding those situations. But, social constructivists do not propose that the material world – the objects, bodies and nonhuman things – has any bearing on the construction of the social world: “... meanings are not inherent in the rock itself ... rather they are ascribed to it...” (Redman 2008:179). Instead the social world will add meaning to the material world, within specific contexts, and thus form the rules of interactions between people and things. This unidirectional effect – that the social will only affect the material, rather than the reverse, or, indeed, a combination of both aspects – does not serve to explain the nature or processes of attachment or detachment completely. Social constructivist arguments include, then, the overarching understanding that human behaviour in specified contexts draws “on socially available rules, beliefs and conventions” (Gabb 2008: 32). This goes further, too. Human beings are guided in their behaviour by cultural and social conventions which determine even the feelings and emotions that are appropriate in defined situations. In fact, social constructivism will argue, it is particularly those feelings that people regard as fundamental and natural, or normative, is some way, that are guided by culture and society. (see Gabb 2008: 35) Individuality, it can be said, is formed by “social meaning and practices” (ibid: 47). The context, social milieu, and the social practices surrounding the individual are what form that individuality, personality and relationships with others. And the aspects of human lives that we consider most natural, or unquestionable because they really are part of human make up, can frequently be only the product of human behaviour, or the social world. Gabb (2008) argues that even the most basic of human assumptions about themselves – gender – is brought into existence through specific social behaviours and social organisation which is not questioned by individuals. Rather than accept the biological determinants that humans do exhibit characteristics defined by their gender, the social constructionist thinker might ask: might biological sex be “... a social category ... Something learned rather than something that we are?” (Gabb 2008: 28). Therefore even a very accepted view on human behaviour – the definition of personal gender – can be considered to be constructed by society rather than a natural or biologically determined characteristic, if the social constructionist approach is adopted. While the proposals of social constructionist theories do serve to explain human behaviour and social adaptation to some degree, it does appear that the concepts of human attachment or detachment are not sufficiently accounted for by the general overview of social constructionist thinking presented in the last few paragraphs. The area of attachment cannot be fully explained only by the influence of the social world; neither can detachment. Since both these processes are vital in the understanding of social worlds and how they are constructed (Redman 2008: 183), an exploration of both these processes is necessary, if social constructionist thinking is to be supplemented in its explanations of the formation of social worlds. It is suggested by Muniesa (2008) that attachment is a “bond, a tie that associates two or more elements by holding them together” (Muniesa 2008: 113), and that this attachment is based in the material – the things and people in their physical manifestation that are essential to the formation of attachment or, equally, for detachment. Further, attachments and detachments have to be mediated, in that the medium through which an attachment or detachment is formed becomes important in understanding that relationship between people and people, or people and things (see: ibid: 113). Muniesa suggests, in fact, that things themselves are active in attachment and detachment, not only the social worlds in which people and things exist, nor only in the actions of the humans manipulating the things. Similarly, the physical existence of the human body, and its “habits, practices and techniques” (Woodward 2008: 86) gives rise to human behaviours, thinking patterns and reactions in specific situations. Bodies are affected by the social world which surrounds every human, but also act, in a way described by Connell as body-reflexive practices, where the body is able to facilitate or prevent social practices, while it is being affected by the social practices. The body and the social are “constantly modifying each other in their mutual exchanges” (ibid: 103). Hence both the physical body and the physical things that surround humans are continually modifying the social world, and each set adapts to the other. This consideration of the physical, allied to the social constructionist approach may suggest a more comprehensive view of human behaviour. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the approaches, and at the outset, the reality of the material influence on such behaviour does appear to be evident. Using boxing as an example, Woodward (2008: 96) describes the possibility that embodies attachment takes place in training regimes: “Boxers are their bodies and only become boxers through practice and physical engagement.” This argument is extended to propose that body practices also construct gender – so the boxer becomes an example of masculinity. It is thus necessary to recognise both the material nature of the body and the social construct it gives rise to, in this case a concept of masculine superiority and strength. The materiality of the body is very real in constructing the social world, in that it forms the social rather than just following from it (Woodward 2008: 107). The characteristics of the body will influence and even determine social meaning and practices, at the same time as the same body will be influenced by social meanings and practices (see: Redman 2008: 178). Beyond the physical or material bodies of people, though, the active influence of objects, or things, in determining social interrelationships and social worlds should also be considered. Attachment and detachment can be significantly affected by the material objects that surround humanity. Muniesa (2008: 118) uses the experience that individuals have of music to illustrate that listening is not passive. Instead, the argument unfolds to reveal that “gestures, actions and rituals” (ibid.) interact with objects to enable the enjoyment of music by the individual. Thus a fairly universal human experience – enjoying some music – is mediated by objects and devices, as much as by social worlds. Indeed, these things may form the social world of this context. Perhaps even more illustrative of the influence of objects on social worlds are the examples Muniesa (2008) cites of the giving of gifts in societies. In contemporary societies gifts are always personalised (ibid: 122). Even after a gift has been received, it is still connected on a personal level to the individual who have it; the individual who gives the gift accompanies it with a personal token – a card, a personal handover. Also the so-called altruistic, socially conscious gift – Muniesa uses the examples of blood and organ donation – becomes personal when the “personal commitment” or “social obligation” of the individual is acknowledged and congratulated (ibid: 123). In some societies, as an aside, the exchange of gifts can be used as a process of humiliation of the receiver of the gift, reinforcing the status of the giver of the gift. (ibid: 128). This nonetheless serves to explain a process of attachment allied to the object of the gift, when the receiver is reminded of the power of the giver, and her/his inability to respond to the gift by giving a gift of equal worth. This is similar to the reciprocity, and hence attachment, that is enacted by the giving of gifts. Receivers of gifts will, through some social precedent, but also through the physical nature of the gift, understand that a similar gift will have to be given on return at a later stage. Personalisation of gifts, hence, is a vehicle for attachment (ibid: 126), as opposed to a process of detachment that occurs when people interact in market, or economic contexts. An object or service sold for money ceases to imply an attachment as soon as the money changes hands. The buyer is no longer obliged to the seller in any way. Both the money and the item have served to facilitate detachment. The object has been “properly detached” from its original owner, who no longer has any “remaining right over it” (ibid: 128). Neither of the people involved in the transaction owe each other anything and the object transacted no longer belongs to its former owner – the new owner has complete right to it. Muniesa explores aspects of market transactions in more complex situations – where copyright, entrenched by law, implies dual ownership for the person who has bought the object, and exchanged it for money, thus severing the attachment between previous and new owner; yet, the author of a book, for example, retains some ownership of the object, and a new owner does not have full right to its use (see: Muniesa 2008: 129). Similar dynamic is in play when branded goods are purchased. There is a social commitment from the new owner to “specific rules of usage that will preserve and honour the image of the brand” (Muniesa 2008: 132). And (see: Muniesa 2008: 133) the marketing process which makes an item, or thing, unique and particularly suited to a specific customer. Certainly, it is not only the commodity or the cash involved in the transaction which exclusively contributes to the detachment process. The documentation which accompanies many transactions goes further to ensure the detachment of the people and the objects involved. In much the same way as detachment is then mediated by such documentation, for example, attachment processes are mediated by such items as personalised notes (Muniesa 2008: 137). Although this essay has to some extent suggested that processes of attachment and detachment are not adequately addressed by social constructivist theories, it does not propose that a consideration of the material in explaining these processes is absolutely comprehensive. It is evident that objects, and the material manifestation of the human body, interact with the social worlds and this influence is certainly reciprocal. This is more effective an acknowledgement than the purely social influence on human and social characteristics than social constructivist theory provides, however. Still, it remains that the social and the material worlds are not easily separated – they interact and influence the characteristics of individuals and societies. When the particular context of attachment or detachment is considered, it is also clear that the uniqueness of that context must be taken into account, thus making no prediction of what will inevitably cause attachment of detachment simple. Both the materiality of an object and the contribution it makes to the social world must be considered. And it is imperative that neither be ignored. References Gabb, J. (2008) Chapter 1: Affective attachment in families, in Attachment: Sociology and Social Worlds edited by Peter Redman. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 20-50 Muniesa, F. (2008) Chapter 4: Attachment and detachment in the economy, in Attachment: Sociology and Social Worlds edited by Peter Redman. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 113-139 Redman, P. (2008) Introduction, in Attachment: Sociology and Social Worlds edited by Peter Redman. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 2 -17 Redman, P. (2008) Afterword, in Attachment: Sociology and Social Worlds edited by Peter Redman. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 176-184 Woodward, K. (2008) Chapter 3: Boxing masculinities: attachment, embodiment and heroic narratives, in Attachment: Sociology and Social Worlds edited by Peter Redman. Manchester: Manchester University Press: 84-106 Read More