Al-Qaeda Principles and Goals - Essay Example

? Case Study: Al-Qaeda Group Introduction The aim of this paper is to carry out a case study on the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. This case study will be carried out by first providing background data about this group’s origins. An outline of their beliefs shall be provided as well. The tactics and strategies used by this group shall also be reviewed and discussed based on the context of how they have changed over the years since their first creation. The group’s modus operandi or mode of operations shall be evaluated and discussed. The motivations of the group and why such motivations are important shall also be considered. A conclusion shall end this paper, and shall consider why this group has emerged and developed as it has, and whether or not it will remain in power as a terrorist group. Body 1. Historical background Soviet presence in Afghanistan From 1979-1989, conflicts were very much rampant in Afghanistan. When the country was invaded by the Soviet Union, Islam extremists in the country rallied to protect their cause. These extremists came from the ranks of young Muslims around the world who were supportive the holy war or jihad against the Soviet Union. One of these young jihadists was 23 year old “Usama” bin Laden from Saudi Arabia (Public Affairs Television, 2010). Bin Laden was the son of a wealthy construction magnate; and took to heart the teachings of Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian who had ties with Sayyid Qutb. Bin Laden hardly participated in the actual fighting in Afghanistan, and he was known more for generously funding the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union (Public Affairs Television, 2010). His goals however were not confined to Afghanistan as he started to establish a more international organization through his monetary support and recruitment of members. His financial network translated to the network known as the “Golden Chain” which was mainly composed of financial supporters from various parts of Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern nations (Public Affairs Television, 2010). 1990s-1996 With the strong support from the US and Saudi Arabia, the Soviets were gradually driven out of Afghanistan in 1989. By then, bin Laden and Azzam decided that their organization was not to be dissolved and to proceed instead in establishing the base of their Al-Qaida organization in Afghanistan (Public Affairs Television, 2010). However, bin Laden and Azzam differed in terms of principles and goals for the group as Azzam wanted to keep the group within the borders of Afghanistan, while bin Laden wanted to expand the goals of the organization. Azzam was killed in 1989 and this left bin Laden to be the full lone leader of the group (Public Affaird Television, 2010). Bin Laden was later driven out of Afghanistan and sought exile in Saudi Arabia; he later moved to Sudan, taking with him the main operations of his group. From Sudan, he started to coordinate his international operations and groups in the Middle East, in Africa, and in some parts of Southeast Asia (Public Affairs Television, 2010). He also declared a fatwa against the US after troops were deployed to Somalia (Hoffman, p. 6). He also started to lay the groundwork for his eventual attack on the US. The group were said to have assisted in the attack on two Black Hawk helicopters in 1993 and the group also took credit for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. In 1995, they also bombed a Saudi-US joint facility which was a training facility for the Saudi National Guard in Saudi Arabia (Public Affairs Television, 2010). Peak 1996-2001 As the group was facing international pressure, Sudan forced bin Laden back into Afghanistan. At this point he was experiencing difficulties in rebuilding his international network. When the Taliban group rose in power in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda started to flourish and to experience a strong international network. In 1998, bin Laden issued another fatwa against the US, including its citizens (Morgan, p. 34). The group also merged with the Egypt-based Islamist Jihad which was headed by Ayma-al-Zawahri who would later become second in command to bin Laden. At this point, Al-Qaida was now considered the headquarters and the leading group in international terrorism (Public Affairs Television, 2010). The activities of the group included training and assisting other terrorist groups; and Afghanistan served to be an ideal place for it to launch its activities from. Attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were launched in 1998 and another attack on the USS Cole in Yemen which killed about 17 American navy soldiers was seen (Public Affairs Television, 2010). Expansion (2001-2005) The group launched its most devastating attack on the US on September 11, 2001 killing about 3000 civilians. The US launched its military attack on Afghanistan and the Al-Qaida group soon after. This crippled the organization and forced the Taliban group and bin Laden into hiding (Public Affairs Television, 2010). As a result, the group was forced to decentralize its powers, to order its regional commanders to make command decisions. This led to a resurgence of power for the group. Fragmentation (2005-onwards) The group’s base was reformed and re-established in Pakistan areas and in the process suffers from persistent attacks by the Americans (Burke and Allen, p. 5). Their leadership is still considered alive; however, there are significant restrictions in their leader’s ability to control the organization and its activities. Their ideology however is persistently strong. On the 2nd of May of this year, their leader was shot and killed by Navy Seals in Pakistan (Klein). Since his death, his leadership in the Al-Qaida has been taken over by his second in command Ayman al-Zawahiri. Hence, the Al-Qaida group remains to be a group persistent in its terrorist goals and activities. Based on these persistent ideals of radical Fundamentalism, this group shall persist, maybe not in its current setting, but under the same fundamental beliefs (Horgan and Braddock, p. 55) 2. Outline of beliefs Radical Islamist The Al-Qaida group believes in radical Islamist or radical Fundamentalism. These believers are considered the ‘global jihadi movement’ and are said to be a part of the large community of Islamists otherwise known as the Salafis (Wictorowicz, p. 75). Salafis are defined as groups of individuals who are followers of the companions (salaf) of the Prophet Mohammed. As such, this group believe that as these salafs were direct followers of Mohammed, they were able to learn the true and pure teachings of Islam. They believed that only such an understanding of Islam can be accepted (Wictorowicz, p. 75). The other practices and interpretations of the Islamic faith after Mohammed’s time were considered departures from the actual teachings of true Islam. These radicalists therefore felt that Muslim must purify and cleanse the religion by following strictly the teachings of the Qur’an (Wictorowicz, p. 75). They believed that all of their practices must be based on the Qur’an. There are however disagreements within in group about the use of violence. The Al-Qaida group obviously believes that violence must be used in order to build and support Islamic states and to fight the US and its allies (Wictorowicz, p. 75. Sharia law The Sharia law is the law of the Islam religion which is said to contain the teachings of Allah as taught to the Prophet Mohammed (Morgan, p. 30). The Al-Qaida group as radicals believe that there is no middle ground in the Sharia and the teachings of Islam; in effect, either it should be accepted or rejected. Since these are teachings from Allah, they should not be modified based on man’s needs. Trying to modify these teachings are tantamount to trying a lack of faith in the teachings of God (Robbins). Jihad Based on the above beliefs of the acceptable nature of the world, they consider the non-believers to be ‘infidel.’ These Al-Qaida are therefore of the belief that those who are considered infidels must be engaged in a holy war called the Jihad (BBC Religions). Among the radical fundamentalists, they believe that they have to fight this holy war to battle the non-believers and to defend the religion against those who threaten its integrity and teachings (BBC Religions). They also believe that they have now gone past the lesser jihad and are now ready to fight the greater jihad. As such, many of the attacks on what they believe as the non-believers or those who threaten their lives are considered subjects to their jihad or their holy war. 3. Tactics and strategies Suicide bombing (usually multiple) This is the most common form of attack used by the group. It is efficient, it does the most damage, and is also the most difficult to prevent and manage. There are five strategic efficiencies which are associated with suicide terrorism. These strategies have been recognized by the Al-Qaida group and so they have perpetuated its practice in their terrorist activities (Pape, p. 2). Firstly, suicide bombing is very strategic because most of these attacks have been carried out not in isolated areas and not as random acts by individuals; instead, these have been carried out in clusters “as part of a larger campaign by an organized group to achieve a specific political goal” (Pape, p. 2). Secondly, this strategy has been seen as a means of forcing modern democratic nations to make agree to goals of national determination. For the most part, these attacks have been meant to drive away military forces from what these terrorists see as their homeland. Lastly, in the past 20 years, this strategy has increased in usage because many of these terrorists believe that it is a very successful strategy. It has been successful in driving away US and French forces in Lebanon in the 1980s, and it has been used as a successful method in driving Israelis out of Lebanon (Pape, p. 2). Car bombing/roadside bombings These bombings have also been used in order to cause the most destruction among civilians. Some of these bombings have been carried out in the US and others have been exploded in their homelands, targeting foreign embassies and other strategic areas which would suffer the most damage and gain the most attention from target authorities. In a report by Lappin, writing for an Israel news outlet revealed that the Al-Qaida has now taken advantage of the internet in order to inform their terrorists on how best to set-off car bombs and similar devices in order to gain the most success and cause the most damage. In reviewing websites which spread such data, advice which include: not parking illegally and leaving the scene quietly (Lappin). Such advice was not followed in two unsuccessful car bombs in London as one of the bombers crashed his car and fled the scene immediately, thereby causing much suspicion from the authorities; another parked the car illegally causing the car to be moved away from its intended target (Lappin). These terrorist websites also advise their bombers to park their vehicles in different targets like cinemas and stadiums. Other kinds of explosives are also aimed at group demonstrations and festivals. They also teach their terrorists to monitor their targets ahead of time, identifying how these targets go home, what path they often take, and similar details (Lappin). Hijacking This strategy is considered one of the more damaging strategies for the group, and other terrorists to have used in the course of their history. In terms of human deaths and damage from any single terrorist attack, this strategy has been known to cause the most deaths and destruction. This is evidenced in the September 11 attacks on the US where about 3000 civilians were killed after four planes were hijacked. Two of these planes crashed into the Twin Towers in New York, another plane crashed into the Pentagon, and the other was a foiled attack on Washington. This strategy has also been used in other Al-Qaida attacks throughout the years, but the most significant and most damaging of these attacks remains to be the September 11 attacks. In this strategy, terrorists board flights bound for any part of the world, in the domestic or the international region. While on board, they then attempt to take control of the planes from the pilots and use such planes to crash into their target buildings or structures. The Al-Qaida hijackers entered into the US legally, and while in the US, they tried to blend into the American culture. Many of them actually had false identities in order to provide cover for their real purpose in the US. After they assumed American identities, they then looked into aviation schools (Mowbray). These terrorists actually chose to learn flying in America because the prices were within their reach and the weather was ideal. This gave them more flying hours. As they completed flight school, they also increased their flight hours and further took lessons and simulations on flying the big jumbo jets, such as those used in the 9/11 attacks. Security arrangements and procedures in airports were also reviewed (Mowbray). Ways to unravel these issues in the airports were also sought. In 2001, the Al-Qaida hijackers started to arrive in the US in staggered numbers, with the remaining 14 hijackers arriving in June 2001. These hijackers communicated with each other using means which were ‘under the radar’ and they also used simple terms in order to avoid detection from the US authorities (Mowbry). These terrorists then booked seats for their flight over the internet, strategically choosing their seats based on what they would do during the hijacking. The terrorists chose specific seats, mostly in the first class and the business class, with the terrorist with piloting skills sitting at the first class section so that he can access the cockpit (Mowbry). He would be assisted by two other ‘brothers’ who would help him gain entry into the cockpit. Another group was tasked with supporting the first group and providing protection for them from the back and preventing any people from foiling their plans. After the flight is taken over, the direction of the aircraft is then steered towards the target (Mowbry). This process usually has to be completed within six minutes. This method has proved to be successful, unfortunately, for about 3000 individuals on September 11, 2001. Use of media The media was also one of the tools used by Al-Qaida in order to further its goals (Levi, p. 653). Osama actually had a filmmaker commissioned to film him while he was fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan. When he stayed in Sudan, he also appeared before the Sudanese media (Schuster). The group had a media committee since its founding in the 1980s and one of its spokespersons was ironically enough, Abu Reuter. He was first interviewed by the Western media while he was in Sudan and also carrying out his first CNN interview in Afghanistan in 1997 (Schuster). Reporters claim that bin Laden had a media strategy from the very start and he asked reporters to submit questions to him ahead of time, whittling down the questions to those he only wanted to answer. When he and his group declared war on the US, they also orchestrated a press conference which ended in gunfire (Schuster). After the 9/11 attacks, his media appearances called for much media attention, mostly these appearances were aimed at provoking the US and warning them of future attacks (Blanchard, p. 7). In the wake of the Afghanistan bombings, there was silence from bin Laden’s camp, raising speculations that he was already dead. However, after about 13 months of silence, an audiotape surfaced dispelling any issues on his life (Schuster). Time and again, taped messages were released by the group in order to make their persistent threats on the US and other Western countries. These messages have achieved their purpose of striking terror on the general citizenry and to make their presence among the Westerners felt. 4. Mode of operation Hierarchical The Al-Qaida group adopted a hierarchical mode of operations, especially during their fight against the Soviet Union. Its war with the Soviets became its model for its fight with the infidels (Mishal and Rosenthal, p. 277). The different units were supported by a pyramid-like structure which was under bin Laden’s leadership. This structure helped to support the troops and to send some aid to Afghanistan and it later became the basis for the initiation of terrorist attacks in other parts of the world. This approach sets forth social identities and boundaries, and the player’s choices are often consistent (Mishal and Rosenthal, p. 277). Network approach Aside from the hierarchical mode of operations, the organization also existed under the network approach (Taylor, p. 181). After the war with the Soviets ender, the behaviour of the organization shifted to this approach. Bin Laden also emphasized that the organization would now be transnational and that the organization was now fighting for various causes (Mishal and Rosenthal, p. 278). The group believed that social structures are supported by exchange systems based on the presence of interactions between the actors and other players. This network could expand their relations beyond the organizational setting and beyond the boundaries while also supporting the need for interactions and interdependence among the members of the group. Based on this approach, the Al-Qaida is composed of a specific web of overlapping groups and none of these groups are able to achieve their goals without involving the other group (Mishal and Rosenthal, p. 278). Their interests are heterogeneous and either competes or overlaps with each other. The interactions of the group is bargaining and negotiating with each other. In the years before the September 11 attacks, the group used this network mode of operation. In 1998, bin Laden established the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders; this organization was established as a network of Islam leaders and organizations operating within the state levels (Mishal and Rosenthal, p. 278). This networking style has also helped provide refuge to bin Laden while he was in hiding and fleeing the Allied hunt and attack. This networking style has also ensured that the group could easily dispatch its well-trained members in order to attack targets anywhere in the world. In effect, even as the Americans were carrying out an active military campaign to apprehend and kill bin Laden, the latter could still give orders, evading the Americans, and maintaining the strength of the organization. Its network was also diverse and was composed of groups which were highly adept in their regions (Mishal and Rosenthal, p. 279). In the process, they were able to receive logistical support and intelligence through their units in Europe and even Southeast Asia and to use these support in order to gain entry into any part of the globe, including the US. 5. Motivation The Al-Qaida group has mostly been motivated by its radical Fundamentalist ideals, and its overall goal of ridding the world of what they consider of infidels in the hope of establishing a world order under a single Islamic caliphate. As such, they have built on such goals by recruiting as many individuals to their cause (Best, p. 535). As such the group supports and authorizes their members to “inspire and incite Islamist movements and the Muslim masses worldwide to attack those perceived to be enemies of Islam (Gunaratna). Although most Muslims do not agree with the teachings of this group, the group has been able to actively recruit Muslims who have been experiencing an increasing discontent, anger, and resentment towards the US and its allies (Gunaratna). Even as many of the Al-Qaida leaders have been captured or killed, the ideology of the group remains and is still considered a threat to the US and its allies. Bin Laden’s imagining of the group is still one of the strongest beliefs upon which this group bases its ideology and motives. It still believes that the group must serve as the “Muslim vanguard that would overturn un-Islamic regimes in the Middle East and establish Islamic rule” (Gunaratna). Azzam’s contribution to the Al-Qaeda Charter was based on his ideal for the organization, to direct the energy of the Afghan mujahidin towards fighting for the benefit of all oppressed Muslims around the globe. The group was also set in their willingness to launch violent attacks against those whom they believed to be enemies of Islam. These perceptions were based on Sunni Islam thinker Wahhab and Qutb. Wahhab believed that following the death of Mohammed, Islam became diseased and corrupted (Gunaratna). Wahhad also rejected un-Islamic cultures. Qutb on the other hand based his ideals on his travels in the US where afterwards he declared the country as an enemy of Islam; therefore he recommended that a jihad must be declared to defend their Islamic beliefs and to purify the world of these un-Islamic beliefs (Gunaratna). They believed that Israel and the US were a major part of the global conspiracy against Islam. The group was also increasingly disappointed with the US presence in the Middle East, as well as its support of Israel and its assistance of Western power in their region (Gunaratna). As a result, their motivations against the Westerners were very much rooted on their desire to be rid of Western presence in their homeland, as well as the need to purify Islam. Conclusion The above discussion establishes that the Al-Qaeda group first saw life during the Afghan-Soviet war where many young Muslim men were recruited to drive out the Soviets out of Afghanistan. One of these men was Osama bin Laden. In the aftermath of the Soviet war, the group decided to continue its activities, mostly in the name of its radical Islamic beliefs and in an effort to drive the Western troops, especially American troops in the Middle East. The tactics of this group have mostly included the use of suicide bombings, car and roadside bombings, media propaganda, hijacking, and other tactics meant to cause the most damage to persons and property. Their mode of operations has ranged from the hierarchical to the networking approaches. These modes have allowed the group to operate well despite the military operations being carried out to clear them out. Their motivations have mostly been religious and based on their radical fundamentalist interpretations of Islam; they have also been motivated by their strong anti-Western and anti-American sentiments. Based on these considerations, the Al-Qaeda group potentially still has a strong future as a terrorist organization. Its basic precepts and beliefs about the teachings of Islam are very much intact among their followers. As such, even when their leaders or other members would be hunted down, killed, or captured by allied troops, there would still be many members who share their beliefs and who can be ready and willing to continue fighting for their cause. This group has also established a strong network in different parts of the world. Even with the death of bin Laden, it is easy enough for another leader to step in and engage the network yet again. For as long as their beliefs persist, this group too shall persist. Works Cited BBC Religions. ‘Jihad.’ 2009. 25 November 2011 from Best, A. ‘International history of the twentieth century and beyond’. 2008. London: Taylor & Francis. Blanchard, C. ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology’. CRS Report for Congress. 2007. 25 November 2011 from Gunaratna, R. ‘Al Qaeda's Ideology’. 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