Aviation Accident Analysis - Case Study Example

Number Subject Name Lecturer’s Name Business Due date Date Submitted Aviation Accident Report Factual Information The History of the Flight On June 15th, 2015 at about 0825 hours, a King Air 200, N135TF, registered to and operated by American Air Ambulance Service crashed in an open field near Lake Wales in Florida, the flight had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 flight from Witham Airport (KSUA), Stuart, Florida to Tallahassee International Airport (KTLH), Tallahassee, Florida. The plane was cleared for take-off from Witham Airport, Stuart, Florida at about 0730 hours. Subsequently after take off the air traffic controls were shifted to the Air Route Traffic Control Centre in Miami. At about 0745 hours, the plane was cleared to flight level 150 by the Miami Centre and to flight level 150 at about 0755 hours. The Miami Centre notified the pilot of a large area of precipitation near Lakeland to the northwest, advising caution to be taken. The pilot requested to be cleared to fly 315 degrees and to deviate right if the need arose. That would be the last communication between the plan and the Air Traffic Control Centre in Miami. Radar data show that the plane climbed up to 17,000 feet at about 0805 hours and remained there for about 45 seconds. The plane then turned to the right at 0810 hours and lowered to 16,000 feet. A second shift to the left was noted at 0816 hours and further dropped to 13,500 feet. The pale dropped further to 8,500 feet at 0818 hours. At 0823 hours, the plane turned to the left and headed to the north-eastern direction and at 0825 hours, it made a secondary return at an altitude of 1,300 feet. A plane that was flying nearby reported that it made out Mayday calls and a sound of an emergency locator transmitter signal. Crew Information The pilots operating a plane are required to be qualified and competent for the job and with full certification. They are also expected to have received on the job progress training on various aspects. The crew and especially the pilot are required to have a medical certificate to pass them for their tasks. The pilot of the plane George Hur aged 63 was fully certified with clearances for airplane single engine land, instrumental airplane and multi-engine land. The pilot had a total airtime of about 2,493 hours of which 1,550 hours were spent in an aircraft powered by a turbine. The pilot had exceptional experience with the make of the plane he was flying at the time of the accident having clocked 900 hours on the plane make, of these; 900 hours had been as a pilot in command. The pilot had received considerable training from 2013 in November. The training sessions involved Attitude and Heading Reference System (AHRS), Electronic Instrument System (EFIS) and flight instrument review (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). The activities of the pilot before the accident are brought to light by a personal friend and colleague, John Brown. The friend explains that the pilot had experienced a rather tiring week preceding the accident on Monday morning. There is cause to believe that the pilot had spent the previous day, Sunday, on a golf course relaxing with some bottles of beer. In addition, there is cause to believe from his friend and colleague that the pilot had a non-existence, miserable or unhappy family life. Airplane Information The accident plane, a King Air 200, N135TF serial number BB-2084, registered to and operated by American Air Ambulance Service was made in April 2010 and was a product of Hawker Beechcraft Corporation. The accident plane was powered by two Pratt & Whitney PT6A-42 turboprop engines. Every engine had a conventional Hartzell 93-inch diameter four blades mounted. The plane had undergone a pilot static, and altimeter testing on 2014, September 19th and the altimeter was tested to an altitude of 35,000 feet. The accident plane had been last inspected on July 29th of 2014 after an accumulation of 1, 074.7 hours. The maximum flying altitude of the accident plane was 35,000 feet and had a top speed of 259 knots. The Wreckage and Impact Information Some parts of the plane including sections of the two wings, the horizontal stabilizer and the elevator were found approximately 1.75 miles south-east of the main wreckage. The main wreckage included the two engines, fuselage and sections of both wings. Fuel could be easily identified in the debris field, and there is evidence of a post-crash airplane fire. The post-crash fire destroyed parts of the cockpit, the midsection and the engines. The tail section of the plane was found separate from the fuselage. After the examination of parts of the aircraft, there was no evidence of failure or malfunction prior to the accident. Medical and Toxicology Information The toxicological findings for the captain provided evidence of toxicity. The report found positive results for the presence of drugs in the samples taken from the captain. The captain suffered extensive injuries and trauma to the head, which resulted in excessive bleeding leading to death. The tests found that there was less than ten percent of carbon monoxide in the blood of the pilot. The body of Savannah Brench who was serving as a flight nurse in the ill-fated plane was found by the Polk Country Sherriff Department ten days later on 25th June 2015. The body was found 2.25 miles southwest of the crash site and presented concrete evidence that is consistent with a fall from a significant height. Weather Information The weather around the state of Florida at the time of the accident was not pleasing. The forecast had predicted thunderstorms and moderate rain after 6 am in Central Florida. The storms could be severe and accompanied by clouds reaching to flight level 450. The forecast was supported by a similar prediction by the National Weather Service’s (NWS) Storm Prediction Centre. Satellite images further showed the clustering of clouds around Central Florida and the likelihood of thunderstorms, high winds and tornadoes. About thirty minutes to the accident, the National Lighting Detection Network had found 45 lighting strikes that projected from the clouds to the ground about 15 statute miles from the site of the accident. The time of the accident was associated with thunderstorms by a convective SIGNET. It warned of storms moving towards the south at about 35 miles per hour. Lastly, a Severe Weather Forecast Alert issued at about 0805 hours advised caution in preparation of serious and intense storms in the area of the accident site. Analysis Operational Factors The weather was examined in the investigation and analysis stage of the report writing. According to the inquiry, the weather was not conducive or friendly for flying such a plane as the accident plane. There were numerous forecasts and prediction drawing attention to the deteriorating weather around the crash site according to the weather reports. Therefore, the weather played a critical role in the happening of the crash. Maintenance and Material Factor The plane had undergone comprehensive and concrete maintenance and repair services. The plane was relatively new and has had no accident history. It was in perfect condition before the ill-fated flight according to the airplane information. In addition, there was no evidence of failure or malfunction in any of the plane’s components prior to the crash according to the wreckage information. As a result, the condition of the plane had nothing to do with the aircraft crash Human Factors The toxicological report found the pilot’s body positive for drugs that were tested in the post mortem. That finding is collaborated with witness statements that indicate that the pilot may have spent the day prior to the flight drinking beer on a golf course. Evidence shows that he was intoxicated during the flight that led to the crash. Fatigue is another factor that was considered during the investigation. The witness statement shows that the pilot had a very tedious week. The day of the crash was the last day at the end of a week of flying. The witness agrees that the one week could be very stressful and tiring. It is paramount to note that the pilot has been reported as a night owl meaning that he could have had very limited sleep and rest in the night preceding the ill-fated flight. Therefore, fatigue and stress are a contributing factor to the accident involving the plane (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). Conclusion The first conclusion of the investigation into the accident is that the pilot was probably intoxicated at the time of the accident that could have negatively affected his judgment making and his ability to concentrate and focus under stressful conditions. The second conclusion is that the pilot was most likely suffering from the lack of sleep in the morning of the flight, and this is likely to affect his ability to guide the aircraft during emergencies negatively (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). The third conclusion is that the pilot was fatigued, stressed and tired on the day of the ill-fated crash. The pilot may have been having problems with his family, and he may have been emotionally unstable. This is likely to decrease his levels of work performance and may cause him to overlook basic safety measures. Lastly, the fourth conclusion is that there were thunderstorms, clouds and lighting at the time of the accident and in the region of the crash. It is unfortunate that such information was not relayed to the pilot by the Air Traffic Control Centre in time. It is most probable that this affected visibility and navigability of the plane through these turbulent conditions. Recommendation The report makes several recommendations with the aim of preventing any further accidents in the same or similar nature in the aviation industry. The recommendations propose changes or modification that may be useful in preventing any further accidents. The first recommendation is that airline and airports should have stringent and strict policies on intoxication for its crew members. In addition, there should be a compressive testing of the crew for intoxication before all flights. The second recommendation is that the sleeping patterns of the crew should be monitored to ensure that they are healthy and provide the members with the required healthy sleep and rest. The third recommendation is that the emotional well-being of crew members should be examined periodically and comprehensively. Counseling and psychological sessions are advised for all crew members to assist them in dealing with emotional issues. Lastly, airlines and airports have the responsibility to take note of weather forecasts and predictions and advise the pilots accordingly (Wood & Sweginnis, 2006). References Wood, R. H. & Sweginnis, R. W. (2006). Aircraft Accident Investigation, 2nd Edition. Casper, WY: Endeavor. Read More