Feasibility of a Denuclearised North Korea - Essay Example

Feasibility of a Denuclearised North Korea Introduction North Korea’s nuclear programme has been a main source of concern for theglobal community, especially as the country moves closer to technology that would allow it to miniaturise a nuclear weapon and mount a nuclear warhead on a missile (Cumings, 2003: p10). The state has already conducted three successful nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013, of which the first two utilised plutonium and gave credence to fears that the country may have sufficient weapons-grade plutonium to mount at least six weapons. Five members of the Six Party Talks, the US, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea, have all expressed their wish for a denuclearised Korean Peninsula, while the UN Security Council (UNSC) continues to impose sanctions aimed at deterring North Korea from advancing its nuclear programme. However, the North Korean leadership continues to view nuclear weapons as an essential instrument to ensure its survival, as well as to give it a bargaining platform with its neighbours (Cumings, 2003: p10). Therefore, while the idea of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and inclusion of North Korea in such a strategy remains an interesting and desirable proposition, it is ultimately unrealistic as long as the current regime remains in power. Incentives for North Korea to Abandon Its Nuclear Programme Most advocates of a denuclearised North Korea, according to Yi (2009: p766), argue for this outcome on the basis that North Korea may be convinced to abandon its programme if Japan, South Korea, and the United States committed never to pursue a nuclear attack on North Korea through a treaty. This nuclear weapon-free zone concept in Northeast Asia generally refers to North Korea, South Korea, and Japan at its core, while Russia, China, and the US would pledge not to use nuclear weapons in this zone. A treaty would bind signatory parties to refrain from possessing, producing, and testing such weapons. Moreover, another possibility underlying this zone is that the other countries may sign the treaty with North Korea joining at a later date, similar to the Latin America nuclear weapons-free zone, which Argentina and Brazil joined ten years after ratification by other countries (Yi, 2009: p766). In such a scenario, therefore, it may be assumed that North Korea would be willing to abandon its nuclear weapons program should the leadership get assurances that nuclear weapons will never be used within the zone, including against them. Cha and Kang (2003: p61) argue that there are several conditions under which North Korea may denuclearise, noting that its leadership may cave to international and domestic pressure by realising its limits economically and politically as China and Russia, its erstwhile allies, continue to append their signatures on UNSC-sponsored sanctions. In addition, North Korea may also assent to denuclearisation if the United States in collaboration with Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China engages North Korea directly to persuade it that the US can be trusted and that accepting to abandon its nuclear programme is in its own interest, rather than that of its neighbours and the US. Also, in the event that South Korea – North Korea relations improve, however unlikely this may be, South Korea may become an important ally in easing security concerns about threats posed by US troops in South Korea, while enhancing economic and political stability in the North. It is also plausible that a US delegation to North Korea, led by the President and high level officials, may provide North Korea with the assurances they need of a non-aggressive policy, similar to President Nixon’s visit to China in the 70s that repaired decades of military tensions akin to the present one with North Korea (Cha & Kang, 2003: p61). Pollack (2003: p27), on the other hand, argues that in order for North Korea to be persuaded to abandon its nuclear programme and to denuclearise, it is important for the US to review prior negotiating tactics and strategies by pursuing open-minded diplomacy with the current regime. In this case, North Korea may abandon its program if the negotiated agreement results in mutual benefits for them, the US, and its Asian allies Japan and South Korea. For instance, the acceptance of responsibly delivered serious overtures from the North Korean government may lay the groundwork for a nuclear deal. In 2002, Kim Jong IL, the late President of North Korea, sent emissaries to the US government, stating that North Korea would cease uranium enrichment if the US recognised North Korea’s sovereignty, while also assuring them of non-aggressive policies. However, this overture that summarily rejected by the US government on the basis that North Korea had not met the US’ pre-conditions, after which North Korea increased their enrichment activities and tested its first weapon four years later (Pollack, 2003: p28). Indeed, it seems that the only way to reduce, contain, and eliminate nuclear weapons in North Korea is through diplomacy and dialogue, rather than counter-productive measures by the US that continue to increase tensions. It may also be possible for North Korea to abandon its nuclear program if Japan and North Korea were to give up their extended deterrence measures. Hughes (1996: p85) notes that North Korea has always demanded that Japan and South Korea must renounce American protection under the latter’s extended nuclear deterrence, which may partially satisfy North Korea’s concerns about nuclear threats from ICBMs and naval vessels. North Korea may, indeed, denuclearise if South Korea accepts to reduce its conventional forces along the demilitarised zone, which would ensure their border security. Since North Korea is obviously concerned about the survival of its regime in the face of US military superiority, an agreement that ensures US military forces are not positioned on North Korea’s borders would provide an incentive for it to consider abandoning its nuclear program. In fact, a guarantee for North Korea’s regime may be the most important aspect of any future deal for denuclearisation of North Korea, and this could be achieved by allowing inspectors to verify that South Korea and Japan have no nuclear weapons programs of their own (Hughes, 1996: p85). However, the major question remains: Whether verified denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula would prove enough for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. Barriers for North Korea to Abandon its Nuclear Programme Roy (2010: p120) asserts that the main reason why North Korea will never abandon its nuclear weapons programme is because the country really does need to be nuclear armed, especially for the elite in North Korea who are the major decision-makers in the country. The nuclear weapons program, since its inception in the late 60s, has always sought to ensure the security of the government and the government itself. The leadership of North Korea continues to believe that the US and its allies will never attack a country armed with nuclear weapons, even if they have primitive or a few weapons in their arsenal. While this assumption may seem paranoid to most, North Korea is aware that Afghanistan and Iraq were left helpless as the United States invaded and overthrew their governments, despite previous agreements and widespread condemnation of their actions. The case of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya provides a more instructive example for the North Korean government. In this case, Muammar Gaddafi had agreed to exchange the country’s nuclear weapons program in order to receive economic benefits and advantages in turn, a similar agreement to what has been offered to North Korea at the Six Party Talks (Hill, 2013: p12). However, when a rebellion broke out in Libya, NATO armed the Libyan rebels and provided air support that was critical to his overthrow and eventual demise. This experience confirms the North Korean government’s assumption that nuclear weapons are essential for their survival. The nuclear weapons programme has continued to provide the government with essential leverage diplomatically. Smith (2000: p116) notes that the economy and population of North Korea are analogous to those of Mozambique and Ghana, arguing that North Korea’s skilful nuclear diplomacy has been a major reason why the country continues to squeeze aid from the international community. Their nuclear programme has for decades proved to be a useful instrument to attract world attention towards their demands. In addition, while also proving an important bargaining chip that allows the regime to trade willingness to denuclearize and freeze nuclear weapons development for political concessions and monetary rewards. North Korea’s nuclear programme also enhances the likelihood that the country will get foreign aid, while also ensuring that there is little control or monitoring of how this aid is used or distributed. Such an arrangement is only made possible by their nuclear weapons program, which enables political survival for the regime by allowing them to distribute this aid as a form of reward for important political and regional actors (Mazarr, 2007: p82). This helps to maintain stability of the regime where the support or docility of these actors is vital for internal national stability. Apart from the importance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as a geopolitical function, the government is unlikely to abandon its program because it plays significant domestic purposes. Alagappa (2008: p43) argues that contrary to popular international beliefs and assumptions, there is good evidence to believe that North Korea’s nuclear programme is popular with most common citizens in the country, specifically because it shows the state’s power and technological sophistication. The program also provides the government with a good excuse for the economic problems faced by the country and its people. The government continues to insist to its people that famine is as a result of natural disasters, as well as being a consequence of North Korea’s need to deter Japan, South Korea, and the US from invading their country as they did during and after WWII. This has resonated with the nationalist society as a way to maintain the dignity of North Korea, the nation’s physical survival, and its independence (Beal, 2005: p38). Therefore, it is important to consider whether North Korea stands to gain more than it stands to lose by abandoning its nuclear programme. Whereas they may receive large amounts of financial and humanitarian aid, their medium- and long-term future would be vulnerable to reunification attempts by South Korea supported by the US. While the economic hardships of further sanctions by the international community may prove unpleasant, it is important to note that the burden will be borne by the common North Koreans, rather than by the regime and elites. Sagan (1996: p59) observes that although it may be speculated that economic hardships could result in a revolution, this is not a certainty and, additionally, abandoning their nuclear weapons program would leave the country more vulnerable if confronted by internal and external threats. Taking this into account, any prospects that North Korea could abandon its nuclear programme and denuclearise appears fart-fetched, and this should concern South Korea and the US even as they continue to advocate for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Korean Peninsula. Whereas constant repetition of denuclearization as a major slogan for Japan, South Korea, and the US will almost certainly remain a major part of their dealings with North Korea, this does not change the basic fact that the government needs nuclear weapons and will not give them up (Rozman, 2011: p33). Finally, the continued chairmanship of China at the Six Party Talks significantly reduces any chance that North Korea will abandon its nuclear programme because it has used its position to maintain its influence on North Korea and to maintain its stability. Haggard and Noland (2012: p245) contend that China’s seriousness about a denuclearised North Korea must be questioned in light of their failure to act as an honest broker following the sinking of a naval ship owned by South Korea by a torpedo fired by North Korea. It seems that China, as the country with the most leverage over North Korea as its benefactor, is more concerned about the effects of regime collapse in North Korea, as well as the resulting inflow of refugees into China in such an event (Habib, 2011: p49). Thus, China is more interested in a stable North Korea with nuclear weapons than a denuclearized but unstable country. Conclusion In conclusion, a denuclearised North Korea is not feasible because the treaty required to achieve this goal is impossible as long as there are no diplomatic relationships between North Korea and the US, South Korea, and Japan. Moreover, the nuclear program is too important for the North Korean regime domestically, regionally, and internationally. As a result, the only way that North Korea will abandon its nuclear weapons programme and denuclearise is if there is a drastic change in the country’s regime, which would make economic growth a priority rather than political survival. At the moment, strengthening partnerships between North Korea and Japan, South Korea, and the US provides an opportunity for North Korea to undertake a go-slow on its program, but not to denuclearise. References Alagappa, M. (2008). The long shadow: Nuclear weapons and security in 21st century Asia. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. Beal, T. (2005). North Korea: The struggle against American power. London: Pluto Press. Cha, V. D., & Kang, D. C. (2003). Nuclear North Korea: A debate on engagement strategies. New York: Columbia University Press. Cumings, B. (2003). Wrong Again. London Review of Books, 25, 3, 9-12. Habib, B. (2011). North Koreas nuclear weapons programme and the maintenance of the Songun system. The Pacific Review, 24, 1, 43-64. Haggard, S., & Noland, M. (2012). Engaging North Korea: The Efficacy of Sanctions and Inducements. Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, 12, 2, 232-260. Hill, C. R. (2013). The Elusive Vision of a Non-nuclear North Korea. 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