Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Aftermath - Essay Example

NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY AND ITS AFTERMATH Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Aftermath Introduction The essay focuses on Niger Delta insurgency and analyzes the DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) program. The Niger Delta has immense natural resources and has a strategic significance to Nigeria’s national survival and global energy security (Sampson 2009, p. 30). However, Niger Delta people suffer from immense poverty, inequitable distribution of revenue, deprivation of resources, violation of human rights, and environmental despoliation by MNOCs that has led to militancy in the region (Sampson 2009, p. 31). The adverse effects resulted in the Niger Delta Insurgency/crisis that involves a conflict between the Niger Delta people and Nigeria military (Nwajiaku-Dahou, Obi, 2012, p. 167-168). Indeed, the conflict entails the Boko Haram against Nigeria militancy used to address the Niger Delta situation (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014, p. 151). Notably, the insurgency has led to increased suffering, sexual assaults, harassment, and oppression in the region. The adverse effects of the Niger Delta insurgency call for policy recommendations and adoption of DDR program in the region. Historical Background of Niger Delta Conflicts from 1990 to 2004 The history of Niger Delta conflicts from 1990 to 2004 involves an investigation of the causes and dynamics of the crisis that evolved from ethnic-based protests against in the 90s to the current Niger Delta insurgency that defines a global problem (Nwajiaku-Dahou, Obi, 2012, p. 167-168). Ken Saro-Wiwa initiated the process of condemning and exposing the suffering experienced by Niger Deltans in the 1990s (Sampson 2009, p. 31-32). Notably, Ken used peaceful and non-violent strategies to address the problem through the Movement for the Emancipation of the Ogoni People founded in 1992 (Afinotan & Ojakorotu 2009, p. 192-193). Moreover, through the Ogoni Bills of Rights established in 1990, Niger Deltans demonstrated their quest to regain their human dignity and fundamental human rights (Sampson 2009, p. 32). However, the Nigeria Mobile Police Force was brutal in managing peaceful youth protests that opposed the activities of Shell (Ojakorotu & Gilbert 2010, p. 5). The militancy used by the federal government led to the rise of Islamic radical youth, Boko Haram that sought to create a strict Islamic state in the north that would address the sufferings and ills propagated by the militancy in Niger Delta (Afinotan & Ojakorotu 2009, p. 192-193). Moreover, between 1993 and 1996, the Nigerian government formed the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force to repress, harass, suppress, humiliate, and detain members of MOSOP who opposed the activities of Shell and self-determination in the region (Ojakorotu & Gilbert 2010, p. 5). The unconstitutional execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni compatriots also defined the militancy used by MOPOL and the Nigerian Army to jeopardize protests against WILBROS in 1999 (Ojakorotu & Gilbert 2010, p. 6). The Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in January 1999 and used heavy militancy against Niger Deltans who sought to regain their pride, dignity, equality, and human rights (Ojakorotu & Gilbert 2010, p. 6). Moreover, the federal government of Nigeria asserted its control and ownership over the entire region and its resources using section 44(3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (Sampson 2009, p. 30). However, the 1999 Niger Delta Indigenous Women’s Conference of Bayelsa State advocated political autonomy, accountability, social development, environmental conservation, and resistance to military rule in Nigeria. Notably, military and civil rule ended in 1999 depicting good government response towards the Niger crisis. However, the 2003 oil spillage by Shell Petroleum Development Company resulted to numerous environmental and economic demerits in the region (Afinotan & Ojakorotu 2009, p. 196). As a result, the Nigeria government formed the Joint Task Force in 2003 to suppress the protests that resulted from the 2003 oil spillage (Ojakorotu & Gilbert 2010, p. 6). The operations led to many fatalities (Newsom 2011, p. 3). Apparently, the Historical Background of Niger Delta Conflicts from 1990 to 2004 entailed the Nigeria government, Multinational Oil Companies, and the Niger Deltans. Niger Delta insurgency seeks to address immense poverty, marginalization, inequitable distribution of revenue, deprivation of resources, violation of human rights, and environmental despoliation suffered by Niger Delta people (Newsom 2011, p. 5-6). Policy Recommendations and DDR program in Niger Delta The DDR program implemented in last five years to address the Niger Delta insurgency involved disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Ideally, the DDR program aims at stimulating economic growth by keeping post-conflict societies from reverting to conflict (Okonofua 2011, p. 99). Indeed, under the recommendation of Niger Delta Technical Committee, Nigeria launched the DDR program in 2009 with an aim of facilitating development and addressing the militant activities launched by the Boko Haram who disrupt oil production in Niger Delta. The Nigeria government sought to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the Boko Haram militia in Niger Delta. We can explore how the federal government has implemented the DDR program with respect to sustaining peace in the volatile region. Ideally, the Nigeria government has been responding to peaceful and harmless protest by the Niger Deltans with brutality that has led to multiple injuries and massive deaths in the region (Akpan, Ekanem, & Olofu-Adeoye, 2014, p. 152-153). On the other hand, Boko Haram has been responding to state’s interventions with immense militancy. The federal government sought to mitigate the conflict by disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating the militia for the sake of peace and development in the region. Disarmament entails collecting, verifying the functionality, documenting, monitoring, and disposing of all military weapons held by Boko Haram and other militia in the region (Okonofua 2011, p. 99-100). Demobilization involves controlling the discharge of active combatants from state agencies and the militia safeguarding the interests of the Niger Deltans (Maurice & Kizito 2013, p. 9). Reintegration involves acquiring full civilian status for ex-combatants (Okonofua 2011, p. 99-100). Indeed, several ethnic Environmental Movement Organizations (EMOs), federal governments, domestic, regional, international, bilateral, multilateral partners sought to address the Niger Delta insurgency. In making policy recommendations about economic development, we must consider protecting Niger Deltas from Boko Haram attacks and ensuring a professional, legal, and detailed security services from the federal government. In the domestic scene, the Nigeria’s Federal Government should stop the use of military force in managing the protests by the Niger Deltans. Ideally, militancy may promote extremism among the frustrated youths from the region (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 42). The federal government should also prosecute police officers who engage in extra-judicial killings with the aim of meeting Boko Haram’s demand (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 42). Moreover, Nigeria should prosecute Boko Haram members for convicted crimes. Ideally, good governance, transparency, and accountability would foster economic development in the region. Nigeria government must allocate natural resources to solve poverty, inequality, and social frustration in the region. Indeed, ensuring a transparent process of distributing revenue, eliminating corruption, and initiating development programs will address the Niger Delta insurgency. The implementation of Far North Development Commission that bears the mandate of addressing significant issues presented by the Niger Deltans can also address the Niger Delta insurgency (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 46). In the regional front, state governments from the northern region should collaborate with Nigeria to disarm, re-integrate, and demobilize the Boko Haram and other militias in the Niger Delta region (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 42). Moreover, regional partners like Mali should help Nigeria to secure its borders and curb the militia. Indeed, Nigeria will lose the capacity to curb militia activities if its borders are vulnerable to insecurity from neighboring countries. Regional partners should help Nigeria Reforming the Quranic educational system and addressing teachers’ welfare would reduce the poverty levels and hardships in the region (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 44). Notably, the involved parties can stipulate high standards of transparency and accountability to ensure that the Niger Deltans receive their fair and total share of the oil wealth. The building of bi- and multinational security ties and networks by regional partners should help in combating Boko Haram (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 43). The regional partners should increase mixed patrols at Nigeria’s borders to hinder the movement of the militia and ensure the continued exchange of intelligence (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 46). All the state agencies in the region should seek to establish a political perspective to the Boko Haram. Ideally, these policies would help the Nigeria government to guarantee security and economic development in the Niger Delta. In the international front, Nigeria has partners who support different programs that seek to curb the Niger Delta insurgency. Indeed, the international partners should aim at promoting social and economic development in the region. Nigeria and its international partners should develop an effective national policy of zero tolerance for corruption (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 44). International partners should support all programs initiated by the federal government with an aim of addressing unemployment, poverty, and discrimination that heightens the crisis. International partners should also encourage Nigeria to eliminate all forms of corruption, inequality, and discrimination in the region (International Crisis Group 2014, p. 47). Moreover, oil companies based in the Niger Delta should carry out corporate social responsibility and environmental assessment in the region to minimize the conflict between the oil companies and Niger Deltans who raise serious issues about environmental degradation in the region. Nevertheless, Boko Haram remains the dominant threat to Nigeria’s stability and a fundamental security challenge in Niger Delta (Maurice & Kizito 2013, p. 9). Conclusion The Niger Delta has immense natural resources and has a strategic significance for Nigeria’s national survival and global energy security. Niger Delta people suffer from immense poverty, inequitable distribution of revenue, deprivation of resources, violation of human rights, and environmental despoliation. The insurgency has increased suffering, sexual assaults, harassment, and oppression in Niger Delta. The history of Niger Delta conflicts explores the evolution of the crisis from ethnic-based protests against in the 90s to the current Niger Delta insurgency that defines a global problem. The DDR program aims at stimulating economic growth by keeping post-conflict societies from reverting to conflict. Ethnic Environmental Movement Organizations (EMOs), federal governments, domestic, regional, international, bilateral, multilateral partners sought to address the Niger Delta insurgency. Works Cited Afinotan, L & Ojakorotu, V 2009, “The Niger Delta crisis: Issues, challenges and prospects,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations Vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 191-198. Akpan, F., Ekanem, O. & Olofu-Adeoye, A. 2014, "Boko Haram Insurgency and the Counter-Terrorism Policy in Nigeria,” Canadian Social Science, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 151-155. International Crisis Group 2014, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency, retrieved 4 December 2014, < http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haram-insurgency.pdf> Maurice, O & Kizito, E 2013, “Niger Delta Militancy and Boko Haram Insurgency: National Security in Nigeria,” Global Security Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 1-14. Newsom, C 2011, Conflict in the Niger Delta, US Institute of Peace, retrieved 2 December 2014, < http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/Conflict_Niger_Delta.pdf> Nwajiaku-Dahou, K., Obi, Rustad, ,C. & S.A. 2012, "Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: managing the complex politics of petro violence", The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 167-168. Ojakorotu, V & Gilbert, L 2010, Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, retrieved 4 December 2014, < http://www.iags.org/Niger_Delta_book.pdf> Okonofua, B 2011, Paths to Peace building: Amnesty and the Niger Delta Violence, retrieved 4 December 2014, < http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1061&context=sociology_diss> Sampson, I 2009, “Niger Delta militancy and the challenge of criminalizing terrorism in Nigeria,” African Security Review, vol. 18, no. 2. pp. 29-41. Read More