Irans Nuclear Program - Essay Example

Iran’s Nuclear Program The Origin as American Foreign Policy Iran’s nuclear program became America’s foreign policy in theearly 2000s. In 2002, Iran’s nuclear program came to the light when some opposition groups exposed it. Since the program had been hidden for 18 years, America and its allies suspected that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. Although Iran subsequently allowed the IAEA to inspect its facilities, suspicion about its nuclear program is still high because the IAEA has never been allowed to inspect Parchin military complex since 2005. Because Iran has not ratified the 1968 non-proliferation treaty (NPT), there is no guarantee that its nuclear program is not going to be diverted to non-peaceful purposes. In an attempt to curb Iran’s nuclear program, France, Germany, and Britain persuaded Tehran to abandon its nuclear ambitions in exchange for peaceful civilian energy programs. Under the deal, Iran was to disclose its past nuclear activities, stop enrichment, and ratify additional protocol to the NPT. Tehran accepted the deal and signed the additional NPT protocol in December 2003. It also suspended uranium enrichment in November 2004 in exchange for aid and renewed trade talks. Because the deal appeared to work, America responded by dropping objections on Tehran’s efforts of joining the World Trade Organization. However, in 2005, the agreement broke down following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (Katzman 23). In 2005, Tehran breached the IAEA’s seals by resuming uranium conversion at its Esfahan facility. The move raised concerns about Tehran’s commitment to NPT and also security fears in the region. Because Tehran was no longer committed to the previous agreements, the issue became a great concern to the US. American indeed had some good reasons to worry about security threats from a nuclear-armed Iran. First, president Ahmadinejad pursued an aggressive foreign policy, which was a direct threat to the US interests and its allies in the Middle East. Second, Tehran has links with radical groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, which it can use to attack the US. Third, there is a considerable risk that Iran could share its nuclear technology with Islamic extremists such as al-Qaeda. Lastly, Iran’s missiles pose a significant threat to the US forces, ships, and allies in the Gulf (Katzman 31). Current US Policy Iran’s nuclear program is still prioritized in the US foreign policy because there is no permanent future deal in place. However, the lection of Hassan Rouhani raised hopes of a new nuclear deal that could limit Tehran’s capability to develop weapons. As an illustration, Tehran reached a Joint Action Plan (JAP) with the P5 + 1 in November 2013. Under the JAP, Iran agreed to stop enriching uranium above 5% and also convert its 20% stockpiles into oxide in exchange for temporary sanctions relief (Katzman 28). According to the IAEA, Iran has complied with the JAP requirements (IAEA 1-2). However, the US is still suspicious about Iran’s nuclear program because the JAP allows Tehran to retain its nuclear facilities, which could be used to enrich weapons-grade uranium. Although Rouhani has pursued moderate foreign policy, American suspicions on Iran’s nuclear ambitions remain high because of Iran’s connection with state-sponsored terrorism. Tehran supports Shiite extremist groups because it views them as oppressed classes. Though most of the high-profile terror activities against America took place in 1980s and 1990s, Iran’s policy on terrorism is yet to change. For example, it sponsored the 2012 bombings in Bulgaria targeting Israeli tourists. President Rouhani is a moderate leader interested in reestablishing Iran’s broader international engagement, but he may fail to stop state-sponsored terrorism because of the way Iran is governed. For instance, the head of Qods Force, the body in charge of external operations, reports to the Supreme Leader rather than the president (Katzman 33). Also, when Rouhani’s term ends, an aggressive leader like Ahmadinejad could be elected. Therefore, the US foreign policy on Iran is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The Primary Actors The primary actors in Iran’s nuclear program are the P5 + 1, EU, GCC countries, and Israel. Currently, Tehran is negotiating with the P + 1, leaving out Israel and the GCC countries. However, Israel and the GCC countries should be viewed as primary actors because they are the potential victims of Iran’s aggression. Also, Israel can attack Iran if it feels its security is at risk (BBC). The GCC countries fear Iran because it supports Shiite militants in the region. For instance, Saudi Arabia, a predominantly Sunni Muslim country, accuses Iran of financing Shiite dissidents within its territory. On the other hand, the UAE has long disputes with Iran over the Abu Musa Island, which both sides claim. Qatar is wary of Iran’s encroachment on its oil-rich North Field. Bahrain is afraid of Iran because the latter is interested in arming Shiite dissidents opposed to the Al Khalifa regime. Conversely, Oman and Kuwait have taken more neutral positions on Iran unlike other GCC countries (Katzman 35). The EU, like the Gulf countries, is also worried about its security if Iran develops nuclear weapons. Iran has sophisticated missiles capable of hitting much of Europe and Asia. Because of the limited missile defense systems in the region, a nuclear attack from Iran could have devastating consequences. Thus, Germany, France, and UK are actively pursuing diplomatic channels to resolve Iran’s nuclear crisis. Media coverage of Iran’s nuclear program The US media have largely ignored some fundamental issues such as Iran’s nuclear capabilities, intentions, Israeli strategies, US and EU influence, and impacts of a non-proliferation regime. While covering Iranian issues, the media lacks precision and consistency over time. Most of the information does not provide adequate sourcing and claim contexts. The media also relies mostly on US government officials for information. Such reliance reduces the sets of policy options and ignores other possible approaches to the dispute. The media largely embraces the US, EU, and Israeli approaches to the dispute, ignoring the roles of other countries that are also affected by the dispute (Siegel & Barforoush v). The Future of the Program Currently, the future of Iran’s nuclear program is uncertain. Experts in Middle East affairs believe that the future of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions depends on the outcome of the current talks with P5+1. If Tehran accepts to give up its nuclear ambitions, it will be subjected to thorough IAEA scrutiny for many years. It will also have to ratify the NPT in order to pursue peaceful civilian energy programs. In addition to this, the U.S. will also be carrying out secret unilateral monitoring of the program (Katzman 53). If Tehran fails to reach a deal with the P5+1 by the November 24th deadline, it is likely that it will face more economic sanctions. The P5+1 will likely look for ways of pressurizing the current regime into accepting a permanent deal that favors all parties. Apart from sanctions, the US will likely seek to isolate Tehran in the region (Katzman 53). Military action is also likely to be used against Tehran. Israel has warned on a number of occasions that it will use military action to cripple Iran’s nuclear facilities. When the P5+1 reached the JAP in November 2013, Israel vehemently opposed the move. Analysts believe that the Israeli Air Force is capable of carrying out aerial attacks, but uncertainty remains on the damage of such attacks on Iran’s facilities (Katzman 54). If Tehran arms itself with nuclear weapons, there are a number of actions that the US could use to respond. One of them is military action in the form of aerial bombardments. The US airpower is capable of destroying Iran’s nuclear facilities. However, there are a number of retaliatory moves that Tehran could use in the event of a US military attack. For example, Tehran can attack the GCC countries opposed to its nuclear program. Alternatively, Iran could use terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to attack Israel, a key ally of the US (Katzman 54). Apart from military action, the US and Israel could use covert strategies to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program. For instance, in recent years, Iran’s nuclear scientists have been assassinated. Though no country has claimed responsibility, Israel is suspected to be involved. There was also an incident of a computer virus that crippled Tehran’s uranium enrichment. The US is suspected to have carried out the attack. Analysts believe that if Tehran arms itself with nuclear weapons, the US could intensify such covert strategies (Katzman 54). The Best Policy for the Country Diplomacy is one of the best policies for the US in its response to Iran’s nuclear program. If diplomacy is combined with economic sanctions, it could force Tehran to give up its nuclear program. Since 2009, the US government has been using pressure and diplomacy to persuade Iran to limit its nuclear program. Subsequent EU and US sanctions have severely damaged Iran’s economy, forcing the government to the negotiating table. If there will be no agreement by the November 24th deadline, the US should reconsider further sanctions against Tehran. Economic sanctions can trigger civil unrest, forcing aggressive regimes out of power. In addition to pressure and sanctions, the US can increase its military presence in the Persian Gulf. Currently, there are nearly 35,000 troops in the region, but the number can be increased to deter Tehran’s aggression. The US should also train and equip the militaries of the GCC countries that are potential targets of the future Iran’s aggression. If the US manages to do so, it will shift a significant portion of the defense burden to the GCC countries. If Tehran refuses to limit its nuclear program, the US should support popular uprisings that could cause regime change. In 2009, antigovernment demonstrators protested the reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. If the US could have supported such moderate groups, the government of Ahmadinejad could have fallen. In the future, the US should reconsider such strategies because they prevent American direct involvement in wars. Lastly, the US can pursue a similar policy to that of North Korea. Currently, the US has resisted temptations to act against North Korea’s provocative nuclear tests. A similar policy should be applied to the case of Iran. The policy is appropriate because it prevents unnecessary wars. Works Cited BBC. “Q&A: Iran Nuclear Crisis.” BBC. 17 September 2014. Web. 30 October 2014. . IAEA. “Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program in Relation to Joint Plan of Action.” N.p., 20 July 2014. Web. 30 October 2014. . Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.” Congressional Research Service. 1 October 2014. Web. 30 October 2014. < http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf>. Siegel, Jonas and Barforoush, Saranaz. “Media Coverage of Iran’s Nuclear Program: An Analysis of U.S. and U.K. Coverage, 2009-2012.” Centre for International and Security Studies at Maryland. April 2013. 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