Russia in Central Asia - Essay Example

Russia in Central Asia Introduction The collapse of the Soviet Union in early 1990s gave rise to the new central Asian republics namely, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan (Rosset and Svarin 245). These states weren’t considered independent republics before being integrated as the part of the Soviet Union and therefore, they had to struggle a lot to establish themselves in the global political system. During the 1993 Tashkent meeting, the presidents of these five independent republic states declared that these states from now on would collectively acknowledge themselves under the tag of “Central Asia” and rejected their traditional Soviet designation “Srednieia Aziia I Kazakhstan” (i.e., “Middle Asia and Kazakhstan”) (Rosset and Svarin 245). The declaration was the first step of these states towards establishing own identity and reduce the Soviet influence. However, economics and politics have been strongly interwoven in the rich historical relationship between Central Asia (Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan) and Russia, which couldn’t separated so easily (Rosset and Svarin 245-247). The current active political involvement of Russia in Central Asia is based on various political and economical interests. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Current Russia’s role in Central Asian region, historical background, political structure, issues, and Russian policies towards Central Asia. 2. Background Russia’s political interests in Central Asia over the last 20 years can be distinguished into three basic periods. During the initial period, i.e. from the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia had neither any interest in Central Asian region nor any foreign policy to deal with the Central Asian states. The negligence towards Central Asia was economical, political, cultural, and even ideological (Oliphant 3). The second period, from the mid-1990s to the late 1990s, witnessed a change in Russia’s approach and was highly influenced by the Primakov’s principle to reestablish Russia’s influence in the former Soviet states (Oliphant 3). This policy was partially successful. The third period can be categorized from the beginning of Putin administration in 2000 till the present, focusing on the Russia’s active engagement in Central Asia (Oliphant 3). Russia’s growing involvement in the region has political, security, and economic dimensions. 2.1 Russia in Central Asia: From 1991 to the mid-1990s Massive numbers of Russian armed forces were presented in the Central Asia during the early 1990s. All newly created Central Asian republics implemented various policies to control the native Soviet units, forming different ministries and agencies to promote the steady development of nationalization (“Russia: Central Asia”). The Soviet Union’s collapse and sudden independency of Central Asian states caused unstable situation. It was the first time when Russia had to deal with the issue of massive diaspora, which was an estimated around 26 million person (Peyrouse 1). Since the early 1990s, Russia has absorbed more than 10 million ethnic Russian citizens from the Central Asian region (Peyrouse 3). The unexpected collapse of Soviet Union raised many issues and questions regarding large migrating population. The migration flow from Central Asian states to Russia was significantly higher than any other former Soviet Union states. Central Asia accounted over 70% of the migrating population to Russia (Peyrouse 3-4). The number was higher in the initial phase of the 1990s. Migration from Kazakhstan to Russia was the largest in 1994, with almost 550,000 migrating population. In Kyrgyzstan, over 200,000 Russians migrated to Russia in the previous year (Peyrouse 4). The Russian outflow was even larger in Uzbekistan. The motivations behind such massive migration were mostly associated with the political, social, and economic concerns. Drastic drop in the standard of living after the collapse of Soviet Union was commonly identified in all Central Asian states. After the independence, Central Asian states adopted radical nationalism policies by implementing the native languages as official state languages to diminish Russian influence in the region. The fear of economic, cultural, and political alienation of Russian minorities in the region caused most of the migration flow in early 1990s (Bandey and Rather 147-152). However, such language policies were not implemented effectively in the region and Russian is still the second widely spoken language in the region. After the independence of Central Asian states, local Russians lost their influence and privilege which they possessed during the Soviet Era and became ethnic minority with low preferences in the region. However, the migration flow towards Russia lowered after 1994 mainly due to the economic crisis in Russia, which caused doubt among Russian migrants about finding better lifestyle in Russia (Peyrouse 6). 2.2 Russia in Central Asia: From the Mid-1990s to the Late 1990s During the mid-1990s, the Primakov’s doctrine about regaining the lost control over former Soviet Union states received massive support in Russia (Oliphant 3-4). Consequently, after the mid-1990s, Russia changed its approach towards Central Asia and focused on establishing military and economic ties with the Central Asian states. Tajikistan’s main military force, i.e. the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, was inherited by the Russian Federation (“Russia: Central Asia”). During the civil war in the region, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division along with the Russian armed forces played a crucial role in establishing stability and peace in the region. Russia’s military presence in the region was mainly to protect Russia’s political interests. These interests were described as stopping the drug-trafficking and extreme Islamic nationalism in Central Asia as both possessed significant threat to Russia itself (“Russia: Central Asia”). During 1996, Tajikistan established its own independent army whose 75% of the leading officers were Russian. As Tajikistan had no air force, it was entirely depended on Russia for air defense. Moreover, almost 17,000 troops to guard borders of Tajikistan were Russian (“Russia: Central Asia”). Besides Tajikistan, Russia maintained significant control over other Central Asian states’ defense forces. Though Turkmenistan regularly refused the combined CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) military control, Russian Federation has equal command of three major rifle divisions of Turkmenistan’s army (“Russia: Central Asia”). Under the military support treaty of 1993, there were more than 12,000 Russian troops in Turkmenistan in the late 1990s (“Russia: Central Asia”). Though Uzbekistan had full command of its army, the air force was mainly controlled by ethnic Russians and Russian Federation provided extensive support in border patrolling, air defense, and military training. Kazakhstan with the largest military force (around 26,000 in 1996) among Central Asian states had substituted majority of the Russian officers with Kazaks by 1996. However, more than 6000 Russian troops were present in the country in late 1990s (“Russia: Central Asia”). Russian troops guarded the Kyrgyzstan’s border with China as Kyrgyzstan had insufficient military capabilities. Though Kyrgyz President Asker Akayev insisted on greater Russian military presence for the country’s security, Russia didn’t response to it till the late 1990s mainly due to low priorities of Russia in the region (“Russia: Central Asia”). 2.2 Russia in Central Asia: Putin Era The involvement of Russia in Central Asia rapidly increased with the beginning of Putin administration in early 2000s (Oliphant 3). In 2006, Putin administration adopted policies to encourage the Russian minorities in Central Asia to return to Russia. In response, over 400,000 Russians from Central Asia migrated to Russia by 2009 (Peyrouse 6). Also, considering the growing threat of China and necessity of maintaining influence in resource-rich Central Asia, Russia adopted policies to promote economic and military ties with Central Asian states to maintain political control over the region. Between 2002 and 2007, the commercial trade between Russian and Central Asia almost tripled from mere US$ 8 billion to US$24 billion (Oliphant 3). In 2011, the mutual trade was estimated around US$28 billion which was significantly lower than US$40 billion of trade between China and Central Asia. In 2012, the trade between China and Central Asia even rose over US $47 billion, causing significant threat to Russia’s dominance in the region (Oliphant 3). Considering the growing threat to Russia’s influence in Central Asia, the Putin administration is seeking for the fourth phase of Russia’s approach towards Central Asian states by considering its crucial geopolitical location, vast energy resources, economic opportunities, presence of ethnic Russian minorities, overall Russian ideological and cultural impact, and growing presence of China in the region. 3. Political Structure and Issues 3.1. Central Asian Political Structure The Central Asian states achieved independence by similar manner. Their emergence as independent states was the consequence of the Soviet Union’s collapse. There was no struggle for the independence in these states. In fact, the states were reluctant to separate from the Soviet Union. Current democratic structure of Central Asian states possesses numerous deficiencies (Sharma). Their political structure lacks in legitimacy and long-term strategic and political objectives. The impaired political structure in Central Asia is mainly due to its deceptive democracies. The deceptive democratic structure in these states has been imposed on the basis of minimal requirement of democracy, i.e, formal elections (Sharma). Therefore, it has constrained the effectiveness and efficiency of the political structure in Central Asia. The lack of socio-political communication and overall public involvement limits the social and economical developments in the region. The deceptive democracy is threatening to the formation of peaceful civil society; consequently, it raises insecurity and instability in the region. According to the famous political expert, Robert Dhal, participation of entire population and competition among political parties in the democratic political structure is essential for its success (Sharma). On the basis of Dhal’s democratic doctrine, Central Asian states have failed to establish effective political structure in their region. However, somehow all the Central Asian states are stable. There are no records of extreme social or political turmoil in Central Asia since 1991 (Sharma). Though Tajikistan is an exception, the top political leaders in other Central Asian states remained same. In central Asia, only ethnic minority is hostile to its political system due to constant fear of dislocation and violence against them (Cooley). With the growing international terrorism concern, Uzbekistan was the first state in Central Asia to assure political and security reforms in the country. However, till now, it has remained only empty promises (Sharma). Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizstan have comparably stable democratization system. Tajikistan as an exception has significantly damaged political system as various Islamic radical groups emerged and largely active in the country (Cooley). 3.2 Issues Central Asia emerged from the Soviet Union as a region with literate population and comparably developed personnel and state institutions, legitimate borders, and advanced economic and civil infrastructure. During the Soviet era, the region was comparatively more developed than the Middle East as its economy was relatively stable and progressive. However, with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the states became suddenly independent which were used to rely on direction and assistance from Moscow (Sharma). The Central Asian states were completely helpless to tackle their ethnic, political, and economic issues. The political leaders assumed that it was necessary to establish ties with outer world rather than Russia for their economic development. It took some years for these states to realize that the strong economic and political ties with Russia and CIS were crucial for tackling with the growing economic crises. The process of national development in Central Asia has been significantly declined due to rise of autocratic administrations, high rates of corruption, and weak governance. The political elites are mainly focused on controlling the governing system of their country. Human rights violation is significant in the region. The current peace in the region is highly illusive as the growing instability and religious radical groups possess massive threat to it. Besides instability, poverty is another major issue in the region. According to the reports of the World Bank, average wages in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan cover merely 30% of the minimum needs to survive (Sharma). Due to extreme poverty and failed political systems, locals are losing their faith and turning towards Islamic radicalism. Especially, after the attacks of 9/11, the Islamic threat in the region became more vibrant, bringing the issues in Central Asia on the global platform (Cooley). 4. Importance of Central Asia 4.1 Russian Interests Traditionally, Russia has played a major role in political, social, and economical system of Central Asia. With the growing intervene of China, the US, and Western countries in Central Asia, the importance of the region for Russia has increased even more as it is struggling to maintain its political influence in the region. The vast petroleum reserves in Central Asia are focus of economic interests of Russia in the region. According to the 2009 reports of IEA (International Energy Agency), Central Asia possessed over 120 billion of barrels of oil reserves (Petersen and Barysch 23). By allowing own pipelines for petroleum transport to other countries, Russia controlled the petroleum sector of Central Asia. Since last two decades, Russia was the sole buyer of the petroleum products from Central Asia. It was buying oil and natural gas from the region and selling in western market and China for higher prices, securing enough revenues (Petersen and Barysch 22). Considering the growing exploration of oil fields and natural gas resources in the region, it is estimated that Kazakhstan could rise as one of the leading oil exporter, while Turkmenistan could become one of the leading natural gas exporter in the world (Petersen and Barysch 38-40). Considering this fact, establishing strong influence in the region has become essential for Russia. Besides petroleum sector, Central Asia is important for Russia for its commercial trade growth too. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are leading trade partners of Russia, constituting almost 80% of trade share between Central Asia and Russia (Paramonov and Strokov 3-4). Therefore, maintaining good relationship with these states is important for Russia to protect its economic interests. 4.2 The American Interests After the attacks of 9/11, the US implemented strong policies against international terrorism. Considering the growing Islamic radical groups and organizations in Central Asian states, the US began to actively monitor the region (Cooley). However, Russia is not pleased with the growing interest of the US in the former Soviet region. Russia is not openly showing its displeasure mainly due to two reasons. One, it will switch the focus from Chechnya issue; and second, it will assist Russia to deal with the major drug trafficking issue in the region (Cooley). 4.3 Chinese Interests China’s major interest in the region is stability in order to secure peace and integrity in Xinjiang region. Xinjiang region is important for China for its vast resources, but radical separation movements in the region possess constant threat to economic interests of China (International Crisis Group 6). The Chinese government is concern over the risk of progress of Central Asian Islamic groups into the Xinjiang region. Therefore, China has increased military presence near the borders with Central Asian states to avoid any potential threat (International Crisis Group 6-7). Besides security, China’s growing energy needs are another reason of Chinese interest in the region. In 2010, China’s oil consumption raised over 10 million barrels per day, making it second largest oil consuming country in the world (Paramonov and Strokov 11). According to the reports of IEA, within next two decades, China will have to import more than 75% of its oil consumption from other countries (Paramonov and Strokov 11). China’s demand for natural gas has also increased rapidly in last 10 years. Therefore, Central Asia is crucial for China to fulfill its energy demands (Paramonov and Strokov 11-12). 5. Current Russian Policies and Active Involvement in Central Asia The increasing presence of China and western world in Central Asian region is causing serious threat to the dominance of Russia in the region. Therefore, in recent years, the Putin administration has implemented policies to regain control over the region and reduce influence of other countries in Central Asia. In order to maintain the oil monopoly in the region, many Russian companies, especially Lukoil, are actively investing in petroleum development projects in Kazakhstan to lower the growth of western oil companies in the region (Oliphant 6-7). In 2007, Russia upgraded its contract with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan over application and development of the major Soviet-era pipelines for the transportation of gas into Russia. Russia signed the deal during the period when there was no demand for Central Asian gas in global market. It highlighted the Russia’s willingness to give up short-term revenues for long-term political and economical profits (Petersen and Barysch 29-30). Also, Russia is taking massive military actions against radical Islamic groups in Central Asia, because the Islamic unrest is slowing entering Russia. For instance, 270 Islamic terrorists were recently captured in St. Petersburg on the charges of violent provocation (Blank). Currently, Russia is willing to establish pro-Russian governments in Central Asian states with the permanent military camps and the right of intervention in emergencies through the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization); secure crucial energy and commercial deals, especially with Kazakhstan, to gain control over Central Asian resources (Blank). Current Russian policies towards Central Asia are based on the seven major objectives (Roy). First is to maintain economic and political stability in Central Asian states. Second is to protect economic interests of Russia in the region. Third is to maintain Russian dominance and control over the Central Asian states. Forth is to protect ecological system of Central Asia. Fifth is to prevent the growth of Islamic radicalism in the region. Sixth objective is to curb illegal arms smuggling and drug trafficking and the last one is to protect the Russian minorities in Central Asia (Roy). In a way, the Russian Federation Foreign Policies Concept (RFFP) of 2013 identifies both the importance and opportunities in Central Asia for Russia (Oliphant 3). Also, the Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2020 has emphasized on the potential challenges and risks such as, xenophobia, extreme nationalism, separatism, and religious radicalism in Central Asia (Oliphant 3-4). 6. Conclusion Even though Central Asian states are independent, their political, social, and economical systems are highly dependent on Russian federation. Even though, in late 1990s, Russia’s influence was overshadowed due to the emergence of Chinese and western presence in the region, Russia regained its control over the region in the era of Putin administration. Russia’s aggressive political, military, and economic policies allowed it to establish its dominance in the region. As both, Russia and Central Asia holds mutual economic interests, it is necessary to establish healthy relationship with one another for the mutual economic growth. Central Asia is important due to various social, economical, and political factors to Russia, while it is necessary for the Central Asian states to maintain good bond with Russia to secure their economical growth and stability in the region. Works Cited Bandey, Aijaz A., and Farooq Ahmad Rather. “Socio-economic and political motivations of Russian out-migration from Central Asia.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4.2 (2013): 146-153. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Blank, Stephen. “The Influence of China and Russia in Central Asia: Ongoing Rivalry and Shifting Strategies.” Interview by Zara Rabinovitch. The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). 9 Apr. 2013. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Cooley, Alexander. “Central Asia: A Political History from the 19th Century to Present.” Asia Society. 2014. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. International Crisis Group. “China’s Central Asia Problem.” Asia Report 244 (27 Feb. 2013): 1-36. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Oliphant, Craig. “Russia’s role and interests in Central Asia.” Saferworld (2013): 1-13. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Paramonov, Vladimir, and Aleksey Strokov. “Russia and Central Asia: Current and Future Economic Relation.” Conflict Studies Research Center (2006): 1-13. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Petersen, Alexandros, and Katinka Barysch. “Russia, China and the geopolitics of energy in Central Asia.” The Centre for European Reform (CER) (2011): 1-62. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Peyrouse, Sebastien. “The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2008): 1-29. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Rosset, Damian, and David Svarin. “The Constraints of the Past and the Failure of Central Asian Regionalism, 1991–2004.” Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia 3.2 (2014): 245-266. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Roy, Meena Singh. “Russia and Central Asia: Problems and Prospects.” idsa-india.org. n.d. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. “Russia: Central Asia.” ita. 10 Nov. 2004. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Sharma, R. R. “Political System and Democratic Discourse in Central Asia: A View from Outside.” Dialogue 6.2 (n.d.). n. pag. Web. 17 Oct. 2014. Read More