The Implications of the Rise of China for Australian Foreign Policy - Essay Example

Foreign policy What Are the Implications of the Rise of China for Australian Foreign Policy? The relationshipbetween China and Australia has been a long-standing one, but approaches to the Asian’s rising power have been radically different over the past four decades. China and Australia have been important trading partners throughout the twentieth century, and this pattern has continued into the 2000s. However, the past decade has reported stronger ties between these two nations owing to China’s explosive economic growth. This state of affairs has implications on Australia’s foreign policy alignments and its association with other long-term allies such as the United States China’s rise China’s economy has grown steadily over the past thirty years; it is the nation with the highest level of foreign reserves currently. The country is acknowledged as the manufacturing capital of the world with a number of exports that rivals most nations of the world. A number of the issues associated with China’s prosperity have emerged; a number of them are predominantly ideological and social. The Chinese government has struggled with internal conflicts between itself and Tibet as well as challenges with Taiwan. Criticisms have also been brought out against the country concerning cyber security as well as its respect for democracy and human rights. For the first time in history, Australia must engage with a centre of power that lacks political and cultural similarities to the nation. In the past, major investors in Australia were largely democratic and western, so it was not difficult for foreign policy experts to forge partnerships between these nations. However, China is a unique case for the country because of the unconventional nature of its social-political climate; some reconciliations and transitions must take place before sustainable relations can be reached (Camilleri, Martin and Michael, 2013). China and Australia’s symbiotic association can largely be attributed to Australia’s mineral resources and China’s huge demand for these resources. On the other hand, several Chinese students come to Australia to acquire a higher education while other older citizens think of Australia as a preferred tourist destination. Australia has been influential in getting China to participate in multilateral institutions, most of which dwell on regional cooperation. Now the largest import source for Australia is China as it brings in about 15.3% of the nations’ inputs. Goods exchanges are not one-sided among these two nations as Australia exports 22.6% of its items to the above country (Capling, 2008). Regardless of the above associations, Australia has been a strategic partner with the United States for a longer period than China. This largely stems from the fact that the US’s economic, cultural and social clout is the most widely recognized in the world. Chinese stakeholders often perceive Australia as a faithful strategic ally to the United States, so in the event of rising tensions between the US and China, it is presumed that Australia would side with the United States. Trade offs are inevitable in the association between Australia and the US or Australia and China; however, it is still possible to maintain beneficial relationships between both countries if Australia comes up with the right foreign policy responses (Jackson and Sorensen, 2013). Strategic Reactions In international relations, it is always imperative to understand what other nations’ intentions are in order to determine the right responses to their needs. The Chinese government has categorically stated that it intends on perpetuating a peaceful development agenda from the international arena as this is in its best interests. What this implies for Australia is that Beijing will continually seek energy and stable trade exchanges from the Southern nation. China also hopes that its can forge different infrastructural, telecommunication and service partnerships with Australia. Perhaps most importantly, China wants to be given a fair chance in using state-owned enterprises to invest in Australia’s economy (Anand, 2006). Given the above needs, it is imperative for Australian foreign policy to refrain from making grand visions and sweeping statements about the Asian partner. Instead, it is more effective for Australia to have well-defined and achievable objectives for interacting with the rising global power. First, Australia should start with explicit national interests then these should be done in a manner that is carried forward into strategic objectives. A sufficient amount of state resources ought to be allocated towards the realisation of these objectives, as well. Australia and China have several common interests, so establishing foreign policy that merges these aspects is quite feasible. Having a stable international atmosphere is desirable for both China and Australia as these two countries will have a high level of economic prosperity. Therefore, facilitating stable partnerships with each other would facilitate the goal and lead to sustainable cooperation and prosperity between the two nations (Anand, 2006). It is imperative for Australia to examine its interactions with the United States as Canberra is a middle power whose associations with the US are the only fact that would raise concerns from China. If the United States participated in a military operation against China, it would be ill-informed for Australia to facilitate these attacks. The country would be making a mistake to allow the US to use its bases, depots and ports in order to stage operations against the Chinese (Mearsheimer, 2010). Perhaps the most effective way of dealing with the perceived threat from a US-Australia alliance is to create a policy of premeditated ambiguity. Australia needs to develop submarine capabilities and other military capabilities that are independent from the United States. For diplomatic purposes, it would be quite effective for the nation to forge a neutral stance concerning its territorial protection. This will allow the country to have a continued relationship with Washington without seeming as too inclined to the West by China. In response to China’s rise as a global power, Australia must also re-examine its association with other Asian nations since this has implications on China’s receptiveness. Japan used to be Australia’s largest trading partner, but this position was overtaken by China, so Canberra must revise its associations with Japan. The nation must refrain from taking sides in cases where China and Japan disagree on certain matters as these could be interpreted as attacks on the former nation. Additionally, an association between Australia and India has serious security consequences for China as India has long been a rival of China. In the matter of Taiwan and Chinese relations, it would probably be wise for Australia to remain as neutral as possible unless compelled to take sides. Taiwan is not as strategically important to Australia as China is in terms of trade and economic relations. In fact, the country accounts for about 2.8% of trade with the country; most of it emanates from the iron ore sector. It would thus be more effective for the country to side with China as it would not face a lot of economic hardships if it lost Taiwan. However, taking sides should only take place when Australia has been pushed to the wall; if hostilities between Taiwan and China reach uncontrollable levels, then much of the trade going on between Australia and Taiwan can be easily rerouted to China. This is especially important because China is rising in the region and the world; all decisions ought to be made in accordance to these matters. China is wary of the West’s view of itself as a cultural alien; if Australia perpetuates these stereotypes, it may run the risk of encountering cultural clashes with China. Therefore, concerted efforts are imperative in facilitating these differences and assisting foreign policy stakeholders from misinterpreting Chinese actions or reactions. Prime Minister Rudd was a Mandarin speaker who was presumed to be the ultimate solution to the diverging cultural differences between Australia and China. However, the Minister made comments about human rights abuses and presided over a number of lecturers over the country’s social-political situation. This attitude may not be sustainable in the future because it makes Australia seem like its social and political decisions are superior (Manicom and ONeil, 2010). Australia needs to refrain from its middle-power role as making daring and aggressive postures may not be in its best interests. This approach only serves to stereotype China and isolate the country from Australia; concerted efforts are needed to understand one other. The deep levels of distrust characterising interactions between the two nations may be fought by encouraging cultural educational programs. It is crucial to have more bilingual Australians in English and Mandarin as well as have citizens that understand Asian values in business, politics and other spheres of life (White, 2005). One of the most critical foreign policy reactions that Australia needs to think about concerns resource control between itself and Chinese investors. Investment in Australia’s mining sector has always been a welcome move but Chinese trade has generated a lot controversy in Chinese political circles. The objection to Chinese investment in the mining sector stems from the fact that the country relies on state-owned corporations to carry out these ventures. Australian policy makers assert that these entities may turn into strategic and policy bodies designed to promote Chinese needs instead of Australia’s. Furthermore, it has also been stated that the Chinese government would have substantial control over the nation’s economy. In 2008, a lot of controversy arose when China bought massive shares of international mining company Rio Tinto and thus acquired ownership over the organisation. The Australian investment regulator on foreign investment did not approve this deal and gave warnings concerning its repercussions. The Australian Treasury responded by creating a series of guidelines in which foreign investors would be required to adhere to rules that protect national interests. The release of the guidelines indicated that mining sector stakeholders were being warned even though their names were not specifically mentioned in the report (Wilson, 2011). The FIRB - foreign investment review board - was tightened in 2008 in order to heighten the level of scrutiny exerted on Chinese investments in the mining sector. All organisations were studied in order to determine the way state ownership was handled. Most of the Chinese investors were reinstated but a handful of them were discontinued while others were placed under probation. The Chinese government felt that this was discrimination against its investors, and some stakeholders in Australian foreign policy formulation also felt the same way. These backers felt that China is at the forefront of the international mineral resource market and sidelining them would be tantamount to economic jeopardy. On the flipside, supporters of the policy claimed that even more was needed in order to protect the country against control by China in the mining sector. Calls for additional curtailing of Chinese investment were rife in 2010 and beyond with some political stakeholders claiming that Australia could be overwhelmed by too much Chinese investment in the mining industry. Therefore, nationalistic calls for restrictions of investment are rife in the nation because some feel that Australia could surrender control and ownership of its respective assets. Other groups believe that current restrictions against China are sufficient and should continue to prevail even in these circumstances. Conversely, some parties like a mine developer in Queensland explain that anxieties about national control of mining were keeping China away, yet the Asian investor could be critical in bringing huge profits to the country. Chinese investors have categorically stated that their investments in Australian mining were simply commercially motivated and no political motifs were in play (Anand, 2006). They vehemently spoke against additional scrutiny carried about FIRB among Chinese investors with this matter being a top priority for negotiators who came to the country in 2009 (Wilson, 2011). The above responses have attracted a lot of political undertones and criticism from politicians; it is likely that these debates will continue through the years. Analysts believe that FIRB responses were still liberal in nature, and that claims of nationalist protection may simply be done by political bodies in order to gain support for their political agendas. Most of the policy responses by the FIRB are still commercially oriented even though they may include job protection as one of the proponents. However because Chinese is a rising global power, it is imperative for Australia to adopt proposals that will protect the nations’ strategic interests in a transparent and non discriminatory manner (Wilson, 2011). Australia must think of China’s rising power in the global climate when redefining the role it assigns to the FIRB. It may be imperative for the government to separate treasury from the foreign investment regulator in order to make it is easier for the body to act strategically (White, 2005). Additionally, it may be necessary to clearly define what the notion of national interest really means in the above body’s charter. This would eliminate ambiguity and the confusion that results when various representatives make their own interpretations of these interests. Furthermore, clarifying those interests would ensure that the Chinese understand what standards are used to judge their actions. This would reduce their feelings of being isolated; in other words, their mistrust of the Australian government would be dramatically reduced. The move could strengthen ties between the two nations and subsequently ensure that Australia’s economy is secured as it does business with this rising global power. On the other hand, a neorealist interpretation of the Chinese-Australian mining relationship may be perceived as a potentially volatile one. Supporters of this school of thought state that too much reliance on China as a mining partner could spell doom for Australia once its resources become insufficient to supply the country (Fearon, 1998). Furthermore, neorealists claim that without diversification of investments, state-owned corporations from China still have certain political interests. Additionally, because of state ownership, even trivial issues like deficient management or economic downfalls could be misinterpreted as strategic moves by the Chinese bodies. Too much resource dependence on China will always put Australia at a vulnerable position because these security concerns may escalate if the costs of trade to China no longer become a challenge. Diversification of partners may be necessary in the future when it appears that market needs and profits have been exploited and costs of war now exceed trade costs. Conclusion Australia is in a delicate position because it relies on two countries that are the most influential in trade and politics; China and the United States. Since China might overtake the United States as a new global power, it is critical to treat interactions with the above country with measured confidence. Australia should refrain from aligning its defence capabilities to the United States as forgoing military independence could maintain relationships with US while still prevent China from seeing Australia as a potential ally in heightened ways. Cultural education may be imperative in this case because it eliminates the feeling of cultural alienation from the west concerning China. Additionally, foreign policy initiatives need to be explicit as broad and sweeping statements may not be sufficient to account for this rising power. In Asia, Australia ought to remain neutral on most stands but must side with China in cases where continued tensions persist with certain entities like Taiwan. Finally, the role of the FIRB ought to be revised and clarified in order to facilitate an understanding of what is required from Chinese investors and develop trust between these parties. Diversification of foreign investment partners may also be imperative in order to minimise too much dependent on state-owned corporations from the Asian country. References Anand, V., 2006. Chinese concepts and capabilities of information warfare. Strategic Analysis, 30, pp. 44-48. Camilleri, J.A., Martin, A. and Michael, M.S., 2013. Courting the dragon: Australias emerging dialogue with China. Asian Politics & Policy, 5(1), pp. 1-25. Capling, A., 2008. Twenty years of Australias engagement with Asia. The Pacific Review, 21(5), pp. 601 - 622. Fearon, D., 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and Theories of International Relations. Annual Review of Political Science, 1(1), pp. 289-313. Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G., 2013. Introduction to international relations: Theories and approaches. Oxford: OUP. Manicom, J. and ONeil, A., 2010. Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual? Australias response to a rising China. The Pacific Review, 23, pp. 23 - 44. Mearsheimer, J., 2010. The gathering storm: China’s challenge to US power in Asia. Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3(4), pp. 381-396. White, H., 2005. The Limits to Optimism: Australia and the Rise of China. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59, pp. 469–480. Wilson, J., 2011. Resource nationalism or resource liberalism? Explaining Australias approach to Chinese investment in its minerals sector. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 65(3), pp. 283 - 304. Read More